

A HISTORICAL
COMMENTARY ON
ARRIAN'S
HISTORY OF
ALEXANDER

BY
A. B. BOSWORTH

VOLUME I
COMMENTARY ON BOOKS I-III

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PREFACE

ALEXANDER THE GREAT has never lacked historians in any age, but his own historians have been less fortunate. Little of the massive modern literature on Alexander has been devoted to the extant primary histories, and over the last century the main thrust of historiographical research has been to attempt to reconstruct the lost works produced in the first generation after Alexander's death. As a result the extant histories of his reign have been regarded more as compilations of lost source material than as literary works in their own right. Arrian is perhaps the most notable victim of this tendency. Although he is universally regarded as the most authoritative historian of Alexander, his authority mainly rests on his choice of Ptolemy as his principal source. 'Ptolemy/Arrian' is his conventional label, evoking the image of a copyist rather than a creative, critical writer. Nothing illustrates better the neglect of Arrian the writer than the fact that, when this Commentary was begun, the last commentary of any kind on his history of Alexander was K. Abicht's school edition of 1871, which understandably concentrated on matters of language, and there was no historical commentary at any level. I have therefore made it a priority to place Arrian the writer at the centre of my own work. The Introduction is devoted entirely to the life and historical work of Arrian, and I have not thought it necessary to give any introduction to the actual history of Alexander's reign. There is already an excellent general introduction in Professor Brunt's recent Loeb edition, and I have made a conscious effort to avoid a biographical approach to Alexander. My main aim is to elucidate Arrian's view of Alexander and the view of Arrian's sources, in so far as it can be disentangled, and to avoid imposing my own moral judgment. That is, I realise, a counsel of perfection, but so much scholarship on Alexander has been written with a political or ethical *parti pris* that there is now an urgent need to establish the facts themselves and to determine how the historical tradition was shaped in antiquity. Both these tasks can be attempted in the relatively neutral context of a historical commentary.

The first aim of the Commentary is to elucidate Arrian's qualities as a writer and historian and the second to criticise the material he presents. The principal tool of criticism is source comparison, and in the body of the Commentary Arrian's material is juxtaposed consistently with the so-called 'vulgate' tradition, the material common to Curtius Rufus and Diodorus Siculus. As a result I have rejected Arrian's account far more often than is conventional, partly because of the bias of his sources but also because of the low estimate of Arrian's technical abilities which must result from close study of his work. The postulates

of ancient and modern historiography are different, and, though one cannot blame Arrian for his encomiastic approach to his subject matter and his carelessness and superficiality in handling his material, they are aspects which must be constantly kept in mind. I have learned to be as suspicious of Arrian as of any other Alexander source and I may at times be hypercritical, but I hope the approach serves as a corrective to the unqualified acceptance of Arrian which has been and remains the worst evil of Alexander scholarship.

In the Commentary I have tried to keep my exposition firmly tied to the context in Arrian and have avoided long excursions. The result is that there is no single comprehensive discussion of major issues such as Alexander's relationship with the Greeks of Asia Minor or the organisation of the Macedonian army. Instead there are a number of passages of commentary linked together by cross-references and listed together in the general index, which cumulatively give a comprehensive discussion. I have also combined the general bibliography of short titles with more specific sectional bibliographies so that the reader has a general survey of Alexander literature and in addition a summary of literature for each specific problem. The text was substantially finished in 1977. I have when possible referred to articles which appeared subsequently but certain major works could not be used. I would mention specifically N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* ii (Oxford 1979), and D. W. Engels, *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* (Berkeley 1978).

I have many debts. Professor P. A. Brunt initiated me into Alexander studies at Oxford and has given me every support and encouragement in the years since. I am also glad to acknowledge, like so many scholars of my generation, the stimulus provided by the work of Professor E. Badian and the personal interest which he has shown in my writing; the Commentary owes much directly and indirectly to his painstaking and penetrating criticism. My own University has been most generous in granting me two periods of study leave which enabled me to make use of the unrivalled libraries and expertise in ancient history of the University of Oxford and the equally unrivalled peace and academic challenge of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Without the hospitality of those institutions this book could not have been written, and I could not have begun without the facilities of the Reid Library of the University of Western Australia whose librarians have indefatigably acquired for me the most esoteric literature from all corners of the globe. I am grateful to my colleagues who have cheerfully endured my inroads on their books and their ears, to my typists Jenny Stamopoulos and Kit Hayles, who coped with two successive drafts of my manuscript with exemplary proficiency and courtesy, and to Anne Raynor, to whose cartographic skill I owe the bases for the maps. Finally I must express my appreciation to the Oxford University Press

for its impeccable professional standards, and not least for its continued tolerance of a project that showed an alarming tendency towards exponential growth.

A.B.B.

April 1980

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ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SHORT TITLES

<i>AAA</i>	Ἀρχαιολογικὰ Ἀνάλεκτα ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν: <i>Athens Annals of Archaeology</i>
<i>Abh. Berl. Akad.</i>	<i>Abhandlungen der preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Abteilung</i>
<i>ABS</i>	<i>The Annual of the British School of Archaeology at Athens</i>
<i>AE</i>	<i>L'Année épigraphique</i>
<i>AHR</i>	<i>American Historical Review</i>
<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité</i>	<i>Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique</i> xxii (Fondation Hardt, Geneva 1976)
<i>Andreotti. Il problema politico</i>	R. Andreotti, <i>Il problema politico di Alessandro Magno</i> (Parma 1933)
<i>Ἀρχ. Ἐφ.</i>	Ἀρχαιολογικὴ Ἐφημερίς
<i>Ath. Mitt.</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts: athenische Abteilung</i>
<i>AS</i>	<i>Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechenland</i> , ed. J. Kromayer and G. Veith (4 vols.: Berlin 1903-31)
<i>ATL</i>	<i>The Athenian Tribute Lists</i> , by B. D. Merritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor (4 vols.: Cambridge and Princeton 1939-53)
<i>Badian, Anc. Soc. & Inst.</i>	E. Badian, 'Alexander & the Greeks of Asia' in <i>Ancient Societies and Institutions: Studies presented to V. Ehrenberg</i> (Blackwell, Oxford 1966)
<i>Badian, Studies</i>	E. Badian, <i>Studies in Greek and Roman History</i> (Oxford 1964)
<i>BCH</i>	<i>Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique</i>
<i>BE</i>	J. and L. Robert, <i>Bulletin Épigraphique</i> (published initially in <i>REG</i> and reprinted as a series with indexes, Paris 1972-)
<i>Bellinger</i>	A. R. Bellinger, <i>Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great</i> (Numismatic Studies xi: New York 1963)
<i>Beloch</i>	K. J. Beloch, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> (2nd edn.: 4 vols.: Strassburg-Berlin and Leipzig 1912-27)
<i>Bengtson, Strategie</i>	H. Bengtson, <i>Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit</i> (Münchener Beiträge, vols. xxvi [1937]; xxxii [1944]; xxxvi [1952])
<i>Berve</i>	H. Berve, <i>Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage</i> (2 vols.: Munich 1926)
<i>BMC Arabia</i>	G. F. Hill, <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Arabia, Mesopotamia and Persia</i> . British Museum Catalogue (London 1922)
<i>BMC Caria</i>	B. V. Head, <i>Catalogue of the Greek Coins of Caria, Cos, Rhodes, etc.</i> , British Museum Catalogue (London 1896)

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

<i>BMC Phoenicia</i>	G. F. Hill, <i>Greek Coins of Phoenicia</i> , British Museum Catalogue (London 1910)
Briant, <i>Antigone le Borgne</i>	P. Briant, <i>Antigone le Borgne: les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'assemblée macédonienne</i> (Paris 1973)
Brunt, <i>Arrian</i>	P. A. Brunt, <i>Arrian</i> i (Loeb Classical Library: Cambridge and London 1976)
Busolt-Swoboda GS	G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, <i>Griechische Staatskunde</i> (3rd edn.: Munich 1920-6)
Casson, <i>Ships and Seamanship</i>	L. Casson, <i>Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World</i> (Princeton 1971)
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
<i>CIS</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum</i>
Cook, <i>Troad</i>	J. M. Cook, <i>The Troad: an archaeological and topographical study</i> (Oxford 1973)
<i>Corinth</i>	<i>Corinth; results of excavations conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens</i> (Cambridge and Princeton 1929-)
<i>C.Phil.</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CRAI</i>	<i>Comptes rendus de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres</i>
<i>CW</i>	<i>The Classical World</i>
Delbrück	H. Delbrück, <i>Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte</i> (3rd edn.: Berlin 1920)
<i>Denkschr. Akad. Wien</i>	<i>Denkschriften der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien</i>
Droysen	J. G. Droysen, <i>Geschichte des Hellenismus</i> (2nd edn.: Gotha 1877-8)
Ehrenberg, <i>Al. & the Greeks</i>	V. Ehrenberg, <i>Alexander and the Greeks</i> (Blackwell, Oxford 1938)
Ellis, <i>Philip II</i>	J. R. Ellis, <i>Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism</i> (London 1976)
<i>FGH</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> (Berlin and Leiden 1923-)
Fuller	J. F. C. Fuller, <i>The Generalship of Alexander the Great</i> (London 1958)
Gomme, <i>HCT</i>	A. W. Gomme, <i>A Historical Commentary on Thucydides</i> (vols. i- : Oxford 1945-)
<i>Grazer Beitr.</i>	<i>Grazer Beiträge: Zeitschrift für die klassische Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>Greece & the E. Mediterranean</i>	<i>Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in History and Prehistory</i> , Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr, ed. K. H. Kinzl (Berlin 1977)
Grundmann	H. R. Grundmann, <i>Quid in elocutione Arriani Herodoto debeatur</i> (Berliner Studien II [1886])
Habicht, <i>Gottmenschentum²</i>	Chr. Habicht, <i>Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte</i> (Zetemata XIV: 2nd edn.: Munich 1970)
Hamilton, <i>Al.</i>	J. R. Hamilton, <i>Alexander the Great</i> (London 1973)
Hamilton, <i>Plut. Al.</i>	J. R. Hamilton, <i>Plutarch, Alexander: a Commentary</i> (Oxford 1969)
Hammond, <i>Epirus</i>	N. G. L. Hammond, <i>Epirus: The Geography, the Ancient Remains, the History and the Topography of Epirus and Adjacent Areas</i> (Oxford 1970)

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hammond, <i>Macedonia</i>	N. G. L. Hammond, <i>A History of Macedonia i</i> (Oxford 1972)
Head, <i>HN</i> ²	B. V. Head, <i>Historia Numorum</i> (2nd edn., Oxford 1911)
<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>HZ</i>	<i>Historische Zeitschrift</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones graecae</i> (1st edn. Berlin 1873—2nd edn. Berlin 1913—)
<i>IG Bulgaria</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria Repertae</i> , ed. G. Mihailov (4 vols.: Sofia 1958–70)
<i>IGR</i>	<i>Inscriptiones graecae ad res romanas pertinentes</i>
<i>ILS</i>	<i>Inscriptiones latinae selectae</i> , ed. H. Dessau (Berlin 1892–1916)
<i>Inscr. Magn.</i>	O. Kern, <i>Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maender</i> (Berlin 1900)
<i>Inscr. Priene</i>	F. Hiller von Gaertringen, <i>Die Inschriften von Priene</i> (Berlin 1906)
Instinsky	H. U. Instinsky, <i>Alexander der Große am Hellespont</i> (Godesberg 1949)
<i>Ist. Mitt.</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts: Abteilung Istanbul</i>
Janke	A. Janke, <i>Auf Alexanders des Großen Pfaden</i> (Berlin 1906)
<i>JDAI</i>	<i>Jahrbuch des deutschen archäologischen Instituts</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>The Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
<i>JKF</i>	<i>Jahrbuch für kleinasiatische Forschung</i>
<i>JÖAI</i>	<i>Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Instituts</i>
Jones, <i>CERP</i> ²	A. H. M. Jones, <i>The Cities of the Eastern Provinces</i> (2nd edn.: Oxford 1971)
<i>JRAS</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>The Journal of Roman Studies</i>
Julien	P. Julien, <i>Zur Verwaltung der Satrapien unter Alexander dem Großen</i> (Diss. Leipzig 1914)
Kaerst	J. Kaerst, <i>Geschichte des Hellenismus</i> (2 vols.: Leipzig 1927 [vol. i, edn. 3] and 1926 [vol. ii edn. 2])
Kirchner, <i>PA</i>	J. Kirchner, <i>Prosopographia Attica</i> , 2 vols. (Berlin 1901–3)
Kornemann	E. Kornemann, <i>Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I von Aegypten</i> (Leipzig 1935)
Kromayer–Veith	J. Kromayer and G. Veith, <i>Heerwesen und Kriegführung der Griechen und Römer</i> (Munich 1928)
Lanckoroński	K. Graf Lanckoroński, <i>Städte Pamphyliens und Pisidiens</i> , unter Mitwirkung von G. Niemann und E. Petersen (2 vols.: Vienna 1890–9)
Lane Fox	R. Lane Fox, <i>Alexander the Great</i> (London 1973)
Larsen, <i>GFS</i>	J. A. O. Larsen, <i>Greek Federal States</i> (Oxford 1968)
Launcy, <i>Recherches</i>	M. Launcy, <i>Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques</i> (2 vols.: Paris 1949–50)
Leuze, <i>Satrapieneinteilung</i>	O. Leuze, <i>Die Satrapieneinteilung in Syrien und in Zweistromland von 520–320</i> (Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft: Geisteswiss. Klasse xi [1935])
<i>LSJ</i> ²	H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, <i>A Greek–English Lexicon</i> (rev. ed. Oxford 1968)
Magic, <i>RRAM</i>	D. Magic, <i>Roman Rule in Asia Minor to the end of the Third Century after Christ</i> (Princeton 1950)

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Marsden	E. W. Marsden, <i>The Campaign of Gaugamela</i> (Liverpool 1964)
Mederer	E. Mederer, <i>Die Alexanderlegenden bei den ältesten Historikern</i> (Stuttgart 1936)
Meiggs/Lewis	R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> (Oxford 1969)
Meyer, <i>Forschungen M. Helv.</i>	E. Meyer, <i>Forschungen zur alten Geschichte</i> (2 vols.: Halle 1892-9) <i>Museum Helveticum</i>
Milet	<i>Milet: Ergebnisse der Ausgrabungen und Untersuchungen seit dem Jahre 1899</i> (Berlin 1906-)
<i>Miscellanea Rostagni</i>	<i>Miscellanea di studi alessandrini in memoria di Augusto Rostagni</i> (Turin 1963)
Moretti	L. Moretti, <i>Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche</i> (Florence 1967-)
Müller, <i>GGM</i>	C. Müller, <i>Geographi graeci minores</i> (2 vols.: Paris 1855-61)
<i>NC</i>	<i>Numismatic Chronicle</i>
<i>OGIS</i>	<i>Orientalis graeci inscriptiones selectae</i> , ed. W. Dittenberger (2 vols., Leipzig 1903-5)
<i>PACA</i>	<i>Proceedings of the African Philological Association</i>
<i>PCPS</i>	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
<i>PdP</i>	<i>La parola del passato</i>
Pearson, <i>LHA</i>	L. Pearson, <i>The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great</i> (Philological Monographs XX: Am. Phil. Ass. 1960)
<i>PIR</i> ²	<i>Prosopographia imperii romani, saec. I, II, III</i> , 2nd edn., ed. E. Groag, A. Stein, L. Petersen (Berlin and Leipzig 1933-)
<i>P. Oxy.</i>	<i>Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i> , ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (London 1898-)
<i>PSI</i>	<i>Papiri greci e latini</i> (Pubblicazioni della Società Italiana per la ricerca dei papiri greci e latini in Egitto)
<i>P. Tebt.</i>	<i>Tebtunis Papyri</i> , ed. B. P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt, J. G. Smyly, E. J. Goodspeed (3 vols.: London-New York-California 1902-38)
<i>RE</i>	<i>Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , ed. Pauly, Wissowa, Kroll (Stuttgart 1893-)
<i>REA</i>	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
<i>RFIC</i>	<i>Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica</i>
<i>Rh. Mus.</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
Robert, <i>Études anatoliennes</i>	L. Robert, <i>Études anatoliennes: recherches sur les inscriptions grecques de l'Asie Mineure</i> (Paris 1937)
Robert, <i>Hellenica</i>	L. Robert, <i>Hellenica, recueil d'épigraphie, de numismatique et d'antiquités grecques</i> (vols. i- : Paris 1940-)
Rostovtzeff, <i>SEHHW</i>	M. Rostovtzeff, <i>The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World</i> (3 vols.: Oxford 1941)
<i>RSI</i>	<i>Rivista storica italiana</i>
<i>SB Berlin</i>	<i>Sitzungsberichte der preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse</i>
<i>SB Heidelberg</i>	<i>Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse</i>
<i>SB Munich</i>	<i>Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Abteilung</i>

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Schachermeyr ²	F. Schachermeyr, <i>Alexander der Große: das Problem seiner Persönlichkeit und seines Wirkens</i> (Sitzungsberichte der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, cclxxxv [1973])
Schachermeyr, <i>Alexander in Babylon</i>	F. Schachermeyr, <i>Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode</i> (Sitzungsberichte der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, cclxviii. [1970])
Schaefer	A. Schaefer, <i>Demosthenes und seine Zeit</i> (2nd edn.: Leipzig 1886)
Schwyzcr	W. Schwyzcr, <i>Dialectorum graecarum exempla epigraphica potiora</i> (Leipzig 1923)
SEG	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
Seibert, Alexander der Große	J. Seibert, <i>Alexander der Große</i> (Erträge der Forschung X: Darmstadt 1972)
SGDI	<i>Sammlung griechischer Dialekt-Inschriften</i> , ed. H. Collitz and F. Bechtel (4 vols.: Göttingen 1884–1905)
SIG ³	<i>Sylogae inscriptionum graecarum</i> , ed. W. Dittenberger (3rd edn.: Leipzig 1915–24)
Staatsverträge	<i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums</i> , ii: <i>Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr.</i> , ed. H. Bengtson (Munich 1962), iii: <i>Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.</i> ed. H. H. Schmitt (Munich 1969)
Strasburger	H. Strasburger, <i>Ptolemaios und Alexander</i> (Leipzig 1934)
TAM	<i>Tituli Asiae Minoris</i>
TAPA	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
Tarn	W. W. Tarn, <i>Alexander the Great</i> (2 vols.: Cambridge 1948)
Tod	M. N. Tod, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , vol. ii (Oxford 1948)
von Schwartz	F. von Schwartz, <i>Alexanders des Großen Feldzüge in Turkestan</i> (Munich 1893; 2nd ed. 1906)
Walbank, Philip V	F. W. Walbank, <i>Philip V of Macedon</i> (Cambridge 1940)
Walbank, Polybius	F. W. Walbank, <i>A Historical Commentary on Polybius</i> (vols. i–iii: Oxford 1957–79)
Welles, Diodorus	<i>Diodorus of Sicily</i> , vol. viii, ed. C. B. Welles (Loeb Classical Library: Cambridge and London 1963)
Welles, RC	C. B. Welles, <i>Royal Correspondence of the Hellenistic Age</i> (Yale 1934)
Wilcken	U. Wilcken, <i>Alexander the Great</i> , with Introduction and Notes by E. N. Borza (New York 1967)
Wilcken, Berliner Akademieschriften	U. Wilcken, <i>Berliner Akademieschriften zur alten Geschichte und Papyruskunde (1883–1942)</i> (2 vols.: Leipzig 1970)
Wilcken, Grundzüge	L. Mitteis and U. Wilcken, <i>Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde</i> (4 vols.: Leipzig–Berlin 1912)
Wilcken, UPZ	U. Wilcken, <i>Urkunden der Ptolemäerzeit</i> (2 vols.: Berlin 1922–37)
Wüst, Philipp II	F. R. Wüst, <i>Philipp II von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren 346 bis 338</i> (Munich 1938)
YCS	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

N.B. References to the ancient sources follow the standard conventions. Where Diodorus Siculus is cited by chapter and section alone the reference is to Book xvii.

INTRODUCTION

1. THE LIFE AND WORK OF ARRIAN¹

LUCIUS FLAVIUS ARRIANUS² was born and educated in Nicomedia, the provincial capital of Bithynia. The date of his birth is not attested, but, since he held the consulship around A.D. 130, it may be assumed that he was born somewhere between 85 and 90. His background is wholly Greek; he addresses a Greek public and talks of Romans as alien, always qualifying them as *Ῥωμαῖοι* (cf. iii 5. 7, v 7. 3, vii 15. 5). It is Bithynia that he regards as his *patris* (*Bithyniaca* F 1) and the first historical work that he set his heart upon was the history of Bithynia. He certainly moved in the same circles as the Trajanic orator Dio of Prusa, and Cassius Dio of Nicaea, his future biographer. His family, so his name implies, had achieved Roman citizenship during the Flavian period and it must have belonged to the social élite of Nicomedia. He himself held the priesthood of Demeter and Kore, the most important in the city hierarchy, and he most probably held the financially onerous magistracies of *archon* and *agonothetes* (cf. i 12. 5 n.). As a young man he attended the lectures of the great Stoic, Epictetus, and he remained with him at Nicopolis for some time, long enough to take the extensive notes which were later published as the *Diatribae*. This was in the first decade of the second century, in the years around 108.³ During this period Arrian must have moved freely about the province of Achaea. He will have visited Athens, perhaps briefly, and received initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries, as was proper for a priest of Demeter (cf. iii 16. 8 n.). He seems to have been in the entourage of C. Avidius Nigrinus, legate in Achaea immediately before or after his consulship in 110; at least a Flavius Arrianus is attested in Nigrinus' *consilium* for the boundary regulation at Delphi and it is very tempting to identify him as Arrian the historian.⁴

¹ In this section I follow in outline my monograph 'Arrian and Rome', in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* ii (under the heading 'Sprache and Literatur'). See also Schwartz, *RE* ii 1230 ff.; E. Bowie, *Past & Present* xlvii (1970) 24-8; Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 163 ff.; Brunt, *Arrian* ix-xiv.

² The full name is given by the new Athens inscription; cf. D. Peppas-Delmouzou, *AAA* iii (1970) 377-80; J. H. Oliver, *GRBS* xi (1970) 338; E. N. Borza, *AAA* v (1972) 99-102. Arrian's *praenomen*, Lucius (not Aulus), now seems assured (E. Kapetanopoulos, *AAA* vi (1973) 301-4).

³ The dating depends mainly on the identification (hardly certain) of the *corrector* Maximus, who appears in *Diatr.* iii 7, with the recipient of Pliny *Ep.* viii 24. Cf. F. Millar, *JRS* lv (1965) 142.

⁴ A. Plassart, *Fouilles de Delphes* iii 4 (1970) 38 ff. (nos. 290, 294); Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 184 n. 2. For the dating of Nigrinus' legateship see W. Eck, *Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian* (Vestigia xiii: 1970) 218, 258.

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Arrian claims in the *Cynegeticus* (1. 4) that his pursuits since youth had been those of Xenophon—hunting, campaigning (στρατηγία), and liberal studies. The reference is vague, but it suggests some form of military service in his younger years—perhaps as military tribune in one of the Balkan or eastern legions. But he need not have proceeded directly to the Roman senate; he might have returned to Nicomedia and resumed his role as provincial magnate, like his coeval Cn. Cornelius Pulcher, who began his career as tribune of IV Scythica in Syria and returned to be *duovir* at Corinth.⁵ What seems clear is that Arrian owed his promotion to Hadrian; in the *Periplus* he makes it clear that he enjoyed that emperor's particular favour (*Peripl.* 2. 4). The later biographical tradition, deriving from the fourth-century sophist, Heliconius of Byzantium, claims that Arrian owed his promotion to his παιδεία.⁶ That is far from unquestionable fact, but the context of the statement seems relatively accurate. Hadrian was sympathetic to the merits of culture and erudition, and, if Arrian already had an established literary reputation, it might well have influenced the emperor in his favour. The two may have met at the feet of Epictetus (cf. *HA Hadr.* 16. 10), and Arrian must surely have helped to entertain the emperor when he passed through Bithynia on his way to Rome after the accession.⁷ Imperial entertainment was an onerous burden which provincial magnates, if abroad, were expected to return and share. It is perfectly possible, though not provable, that Hadrian adlected him to senatorial rank in the aftermath of his accession.

Arrian certainly became a senator. His first datable post is the consulship, which he held as suffect consul with a certain Severus in 129 or 130.⁸ It had been conjectured that he previously governed a province of praetorian status and that conjecture has been all but confirmed by the discovery of a verse inscription at Córdoba in southern Spain, erected by a proconsul Arrianus.⁹ The rarity of Greek inscriptions in Spain leads one to posit Greek extraction for the dedicant; and the content of the epigram, though obscure, seems to refer to the author as the fountain-head of the Muses. It seems that the poem was written by Arrian the historian, in which case he was proconsul of Baetica, probably in the vicinity of 125. But by far his most important and best-

⁵ *IGR* iv 795; cf. *Corinth* viii 1. no. 80; *SEG* xxii 289; *Plut. Mor.* 86B. Like Arrian, Pulcher was honoured by the Gellii of Corinth (*Corinth* viii 1, no. 83).

⁶ Photius *cod.* 58: 17^b11 ff.; 'Suda' s.v. 'Ἀρριανός' (T 2 Roos); cf. Wirth, *Historia* xiii (1964) 507; Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 164 ff.

⁷ *SIG*³ 831; cf. Magic, *RRAM* i 611 f. Hadrian also passed through Nicomedia and Nicaea on his first journey of 119–21 (Magic 613 f.).

⁸ *CIL* xv 244, 552. The consular *fasti* of 127 and 128 are complete, and, since Arrian was in Cappadocia by 131, the only years in question are 129 and 130.

⁹ For bibliography, reading, and interpretation see Bosworth, *GRBS* xvii (1976) 55–64. See also M. Marcovich, *ZPE* xx (1976) 41–3; L. Koenen, *ZPE* xxiv (1977) 35–40. For the historical implications see (briefly) Eck, *RE Suppl.* xiv 120 (Flavius 44).

attested post is the consular governorship of Cappadocia which he began, as was customary, immediately after the consulship and retained for seven years.¹⁰ We have evidence of his activities from his own minor works. The *Periplus Maris Euxini* depicts a voyage of inspection from Trapezus to Dioscurias shortly after his arrival and before the death in 131/2 of Cotys II of the Bosphorus. His most spectacular achievement was his repulse of an incursion by the Alani, who had previously devastated Albania and Media Atropatene. Arrian blocked their advance by a show of force near Satala, and he followed them into the Caucasus, where he reorganized the kingdoms of Iberia and Albania.¹¹ That took place in 135, and Arrian commemorated his exploits in the *Order of Battle against the Alani*, a curious pamphlet consisting of a literary reworking of his commands for the advance and battle dispositions. His last literary work while legate was the *Essay on Tactics*, written in 136/7, which *inter alia* supplies a vivid and valuable description of the training methods of the Roman auxiliary cavalry.¹² The latest epigraphic record of his legateship is dated to 137 and he was relieved before the death of Hadrian in 138.¹³

Nothing more is known about his public career. It is possible that he went into retirement at the death of Hadrian, his friend and patron. Certainly his residence became Athens, and like the great Vibius Crispus in Domitian's reign he became an honorary citizen.¹⁴ In 145/6 he held the eponymous archonship,¹⁵ and his family became domiciled in Athens. A Flavius Arrianus of Paecania (Arrian's deme) served as prytany in 166/7 and 169/70,¹⁶ and a metrical inscription from Eleusis praises an initiate, Clementiane, whose father and grandfather, both named Arrianus, had been consulars distinguished for their σοφία.¹⁷ Given the provenance and content of the inscription it is very tempting to identify the family with that of Arrian. It is quite obscure how long

¹⁰ For Arrian's legateship the essay by H. F. Pelham, *Essays in Roman History* (Oxford 1909), 212–33, is still valuable, particularly for its analysis of the *Periplus*.

¹¹ For full discussion of this episode and the implications of Arrian's *Order of Battle against the Alani* see Bosworth, *HSCP* lxxxi (1977) 217–55.

¹² The work was written in Hadrian's 20th regnal year (*Tact.* 44. 3.). It has been fully discussed, and the passage on training methods (32. 3–44) printed in full with translation and commentary, by F. Kiechle, *Bericht der röm.-germ. Kommission* xlv (1964) 87–129.

¹³ *ILS* 8801 (T 17) is dated to Hadrian's 21st tribunician year. Arrian's successor, L. Burbulcius Optatus Ligarianus, spanned the reigns of Hadrian and Antoninus (*ILS* 1066).

¹⁴ *Cyneg.* 1. 4. Vibius Crispus has recently been attested as eponymous archon, apparently after his third consulship: cf. S. N. Koumanoudes, *AAA* lii (1970) 403–6.

¹⁵ *IG* ii² 2055 (T 21) with W. Kolbe, *Ath. Mill.* xlvi (1921) 148; Oliver, *GRBS* ix (1970) 337 f., S. Follot, *Athènes aux ii^e et iii^e siècles* (Paris 1976) 34–6.

¹⁶ *IG* ii² 1773, 1776 (T 23); cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 181 f. This man may be the Fl. Arrianus who was ephebe in the middle of the second century (*IG* ii² 2045. 9; for the very nebulous dating see E. Kapetanopoulos, *Historia* xix (1970) 561 f.).

¹⁷ *IG* ii/iii² 4251–3 (T 25); cf. Bosworth 182.

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he lived in Athens as an honorary citizen. The ancient biography excerpted by Photius and the 'Suda' suggests that he survived (in Rome!) until the reign of Marcus Aurelius. But there are textual problems,¹⁸ and the detail may not be reliable. Nothing is attested about his life and work later than the reign of Antonius Pius.

As Lucian (*Alex.* 2) confirms for us, Arrian was one of the leading senators of his day. It is, however, peculiar that he apparently retired to Athens in his mid fifties after a notably successful tenure of Cappadocia. There has been a persistent theory that he fell out of favour with Antoninus and retired under a cloud.¹⁹ That is unlikely and unattested in the ancient sources. It might have been held that Arrian had enjoyed a good innings with his seven years in Cappadocia, twice the normal length of office, and could well forgo a second consular province.²⁰ But it is an unproved assumption that Arrian resided continuously in Athens; he may have taken time to visit Rome and hold further office. Iulius Quadratus of Pergamum was legate of Syria in 101-4 and later continued residence at Pergamum, where he gave generous subsidies to the games honouring Trajan.²¹ In 109/10 or thereabouts he was proconsul of Asia. Now Arrian mentions absences from his estates for political purposes (*Cyneget.* 5. 4), and he may mean more than his involvement in the civic affairs of Athens. He could easily have been allotted a proconsulship of Asia or Africa some time during the 140s A.D. His public career certainly need not have ended when he took up residence in Athens.

The main outline of Arrian's life is clear, but it is far from clear how his literary achievements are to be fitted into its chronological framework. It was the theory of Eduard Schwartz that Arrian's literary work was the product of his retirement to Athens, and that his earlier life was dominated by his military career.²² Accordingly his career as a writer began with the monographs written while he was legate of Cappadocia, and after his essay on hunting he moved to progressively more ambitious works. This theory is largely an *a priori* construction,

¹⁸ The 'Suda' inverts the reigns of Antoninus Pius and Marcus (*ἐπὶ . . . Μάρκου καὶ Ἀντωνίνου*). The passage has been variously emended (cf. Wirth, *Historia* xiii (1964) 506f.), perhaps unnecessarily; the same inversion of the reigns of Marcus and Antoninus Pius recurs in Themistius, *Orat.* 34. 7 and 17 (p. 307 Downey).

¹⁹ Schwartz, *RE* ii 1231; cf. E. Gabba, *RSI* lxxi (1959) 373; Wirth, *Historia* xiii (1964) 508f.

²⁰ Compare the famous case of Cn. Julius Agricola, seven years in Britain and then kept from a further consular command: Tac. *Agr.* 40; cf. Syme, *Tacitus* i 23: 'Domitian and his advisers may have argued that any claim for a second consular province was offset by the abnormally long tenure of Britain.'

²¹ *IGR* iv 336. Quadratus was also perpetual gymnasiarch (*ILS* 8819). For his proconsulship of Asia see Syme, *Tacitus* ii 665; *PIR*² I 507.

²² Schwartz, *RE* ii 1230-6. The theory has been widely accepted (e.g. Jacoby, *FGH* ii D. 553; Christ-Schmidt, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*⁶ (Munich 1924) ii 2. 746-51; A. Stein, *PIR*² F 219). For criticism see F. Reuss, *Rh. Mus.* liv (1899) 446-65; Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 163-85.

based on the assumption that Arrian was primarily a career soldier and the secondary assumption that the life of a *vir militaris* could not be blended with extensive literary activity. The latter assumption is patently false; most Roman senators had periods of leisure intermingled with their spells in the provinces, and we know for a fact that Arrian's younger contemporary, A. Claudius Charax of Pergamum, was famous as a historian by the time that he reached his consulship.²³ Nor can it be said that the Cappadocian monographs are apprentice works; they are complex and sophisticated exercises, the work, it seems, of a mature writer with an assured public.²⁴ The *Cynegeticus* in particular is a work steeped in Xenophon, whom Arrian cites effortlessly both directly and indirectly, and the descriptions of hounds and hunting contain cameos which display the highest descriptive skill.²⁵

The ancient evidence suggests that Arrian engaged in literary and philosophic production throughout his life. In the Alexander history he states somewhat obscurely that literary studies have been his ruling passion since youth (i 12. 5 n.), while in the *Cynegeticus* (1. 4) he claims that *σοφία*, like hunting and campaigning, has been his preoccupation, again since youth. That is what one would expect. Literary studies, and specifically historical studies, could begin very early. Fronto was directing the young Marcus towards historiography when he was no more than eighteen years old,²⁶ and two centuries later Praxagoras of Athens produced two books on the kings of Athens in his nineteenth year.²⁷ Arrian speaks in general terms of his early studies and he does not explicitly mention published work. It would, however, be peculiar for Lucian to describe him as a lifelong devotee of *paideia* if he had produced no publications before his fifties. The ancient biographical tradition describes Arrian as a philosopher, and Themistius indeed regards him as primarily a philosopher, drawn reluctantly to public life like a Platonic guardian.²⁸ The tradition dates to his lifetime, for two contemporary inscriptions name him philosopher (both date to the period after his consulship).²⁹ One of these inscriptions was set up by the Gellii of Corinth, and it is no accident that Arrian's prefatory letter

²³ *SEG* xviii 557; cf. C. Habicht, *Ist. Mitt.* ix/x (1959/60) 109–25; Bosworth 170.

²⁴ See my full discussion in 'Arrian and Rome' (p. 1 n. 1 above); for the *Order of Battle* see *HSCP* lxxxi (1977) 247 ff.

²⁵ Note the description of his favourite, Horme (*Cyneget.* 5. 1–6); see now P. A. Stadter, *GRBS* xvii (1976) 157–67.

²⁶ Fronto, *ad M. Caes.* iv 3. 8 (p. 60 V.d.H.); for the date see E. Champlin, *JRS* lxiv (1974) 143 f.

²⁷ Photius cod. 62 = *FGH* 219. Praxagoras also wrote a six-book history of Alexander when he was thirty years old.

²⁸ Themist. *Orat.* 34. 8, 20 (T 13); compare the biography in Photius and the 'Suda' (T 2). Cassius Dio wrote a biography of 'Arrian the philosopher' (T 1); whether the epithet 'philosopher' comes from Dio himself or the 'Suda' must remain an open question.

²⁹ *Corinth* viii 3. no. 124, attributed to Arrian by G. W. Bowersock, *GRBS* viii (1967) 279 f. For the Athens inscription see above, p. 1 n. 2.

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to his notes of Epictetus' *Diatribae* is addressed to a Lucius Gellius.³⁰ It has therefore been suggested that his philosophical reputation rested primarily upon his publication of his notes of Epictetus. But the prefatory letter is quite definite that his notes are not an original composition, but a bare *hypomnema* recording what was actually said.³¹ It is not feasible that this editorial work alone qualified him for his title as philosopher, or even his digest of Epictetus' doctrine in the *Encheiridion*. Photius observes that several works of Arrian were known to have been lost by his day, and that *corpus* may well have included philosophical works. Some fragments have come down to us in the meteorological excerpts preserved by Stobaeus. These fragments are written in a style identical to that of Arrian's extant works, and there can be no doubt that he was their author.³² He was certainly no unthinking disciple of Epictetus. His views as expressed in his extant works are the conventional moral views of an Antonine senator, and the meteorological fragments seem totally divorced from any Epictetan influence. There seems little doubt that Arrian produced specific works of philosophy, and from those works came the stylistic mastery which he boasts of in the Alexander history. What is more, some philosophical works at least must derive from Arrian's early years, for they must have preceded his specifically historical production, and the Alexander history, which demonstrably comes early in the sequence of his historical works, was composed when Arrian was in his thirties.³³ It seems best to accept what the *Cynegeticus* and the ancient biographies imply, that Arrian's career as a writer was concomitant with his public career.

Arrian was celebrated as the New Xenophon. He is so termed in the ancient biographical tradition and he may even have been portrayed as such in contemporary sculpture.³⁴ The relationship is stressed in his writings. Arrian refers in the *Periplus* to the 'older' Xenophon, implying that he himself was the young Xenophon, and in the *Order of Battle* he goes further and terms himself simply Xenophon.³⁵ In the *Cynegeticus* he observes that he is the homonym of Xenophon, a citizen of the same city, and he sets himself the task of revising the master's work on hunting

³⁰ Either L. Gellius Menander (Bowersock, loc. cit.) or L. Gellius Iustus the elder (J. H. Oliver, *GRBS* xi (1970) 335-8).

³¹ Most scholars take Arrian literally; Th. Wirth, *M. Helv.* xxiv (1967) 149-89, 197-216, has argued that the prefatory letter is an elaborate *recusatio* and that the arrangement and presentation of material is largely Arrian's own work.

³² The fragments are printed by Roos, *Arriani Scripta Minora* 186-95. For the attribution to Arrian see the classic discussion by A. Brinkmann and H. Herter, *Rh. Mus.* lxxiii (1924) 373 ff.; lxxiv (1925) 25 ff.

³³ See section 2 below.

³⁴ See Photius and the 'Suda' (T 2). For the attribution of an Athenian double herm to Arrian and Xenophon see J. H. Oliver, *AJA* lxxvi (1972) 327 f. with E. Minakaran-Hiesgen, *JDAI* lxxxv (1970) 141-6.

³⁵ *Peripl.* 12. 5, 25. 1; *Écl.* 10, 22.

in the light of the vastly improved performance of the contemporary Celtic greyhound. Arrian adopted the name as a pseudonym,³⁶ and he was far from unique. Sentimental links with the classical past were strong in the Greek world of the second sophistic movement, and men re-enacted the roles of their heroic forebears, commemorating the fact with assumed nomenclature. In Athens C. Julius Nicanor was celebrated as the New Homer,³⁷ and on a less exalted level the deluded Christians of Asia named Peregrinus the New Socrates (Lucian, *Per.* 12). Arrian's imitation was sincere and deep, and he seems to have based his entire life on Xenophon's aristocratic retirement at Scillus. But the affectation seems to have increased with the years. It is the work published in his fifties and later which has the obsessive references to Xenophon. His model is much less obtrusive in the Alexander history (see section 2) and the historical works generally, so far as they can be reconstructed. Arrian's conviction of himself as the New Xenophon probably took shape gradually. The publication of the *Diatribae* will have suggested the parallel with Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and the similarity was accentuated by the ensuing stream of historical works; and the successes in Cappadocia were probably the final touch in the creation of the *persona*. He may have modelled himself on Xenophon from his earliest years, but it seems to me more likely that Arrian took on the guise of the new Xenophon only after he became aware that his life and work were taking the shape of the classical master's.

2. THE HISTORY OF ALEXANDER

Arrian's major work, the history of Alexander, is universally known by the title *Anabasis Alexandri*. The title occurs in the *codex Vindobonensis*, the known archetype of Arrian, as well as in excerpts from Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v. *Ἀσσακηνοί*) and the 'Suda' (s.v. *περὶ Πινδάρου*). But the ancient testimonia are not consistent. The majority of later writers, in particular Photius, refer to the work in more general terms, as *τὰ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου*.¹ Arrian himself gives little hint of the true title, merely referring to it as his 'history concerning Alexander' (vii 3. 1). Now this divergence does not occur in the companion work, the *Indica*, whose title is twice given by Arrian and is repeated in the manuscript tradition and later testimonia without significant variation.² The divergence in

³⁶ P. A. Stadter, *GRBS* viii (1967) 155–61, argues that Xenophon was an actual *cognomen* of Arrian; but the name never appears in the epigraphical testimonia, and it seems very improbable that it was part of his official nomenclature.

³⁷ A. E. Raubitschek, *Hesperia* xxiii (1954) 317–19; cf. *The Athenian Agora* xiv 115 n. 9. Note also Heracleitus, son of Heracleitus, who was honoured as 'the Homer of medical poems' (*TAM* ii 910; cf. Oliver, *Historia* xxiv (1975) 125f.).

¹ Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 58: 17^b24; cod. 91: 67^b23; cod. 93: 73^b12. See also Eustath. *ad Dion. Per.* 907, 976; *Anecd. Bekkeri* i p. 129. 27; Schol. *ad Procl. Comm. in Timaeum* (i 469 Diehl) *τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου ἱστοριῶν*.

² Arr. v 6. 8; vi 16. 5. Cf. Phot. *cod.* 91: 68^b1; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Μάσσακα*.

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the case of the Alexander history is troublesome. Krüger took it as axiomatic that *Anabasis* was the original title and assumed that the variants arose from a desire to provide a companion work (and title) for Arrian's *History of the Successors* (τὰ μετὰ Ἀλέξανδρον). That seems hardly compelling, and there is at least an equal possibility that the title *Anabasis* is a fiction of late antiquity. Commentators meeting a work in seven books by a man purporting to be the New Xenophon might well have given it a spurious Xenophontean title. Certainly Arrian's work on Alexander is not notably influenced by Xenophon. His stylistic debts are rather to Herodotus and Thucydides, and his direct references to Xenophon's work are sparse and perfunctory,³ a sharp contrast to the *Cynegeticus*, a work which is explicitly modelled upon Xenophon and which constantly, both implicitly and explicitly, echoes the subject-matter and phraseology of the master.⁴ The ancient critics were only too aware of the relationship, and on the title-page of the *Cynegeticus* Arrian's name has been deleted and replaced by 'Xenophon of Athens, the second'.⁵ They might easily have been dissatisfied with a title as unassuming as τὰ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου and fabricated a second *Anabasis* for their second Xenophon.

The date of the work is as controversial as its title. There is both an early date, some time in the reign of Hadrian, and a later date, towards the end of the reign of Antoninus Pius or even in Marcus' reign.⁶ The theories to some extent depend on the view of Schwartz (above p. 4) that Arrian only devoted himself to serious historical inquiry after his retirement from public life, but the arguments which are crucial rest upon the internal evidence of the text and the extant testimonia about the relative order of Arrian's historical works. What is certain is that Arrian has complete confidence in his abilities as a writer. He invites comparison with all extant histories of Alexander, claiming that he is fully competent to do justice to the greatness of his subject, and the success of his work will cement his pre-eminence in Greek letters.⁷ The language presupposes a good deal of earlier publication—and successful publication, if not necessarily in the sphere of historical studies. Such indications as we have suggest that the Alexander history came relatively early in the sequence of historical works. In his digest of the *Bithyniaca* Photius summarizes Arrian's apology for the late appearance

³ i 12. 3, ii 7. 8, ii 8. 11 (see my notes ad locc.), vii 13. 4. Herodotus is far more to the forefront of his work.

⁴ See the excellent discussion by P. A. Stadter, *GRBS* xvii (1976) 157–67. In the Alexander history the echoes of phraseology are confined to Herodotus (cf. iii 30. 8 with *Hdt.* iv 57).

⁵ Cf. Roos, *Arriani Scripta Minora* xii; Stadter, *GRBS* viii (1967) 157.

⁶ The *locus classicus* for the late dating is E. Schwartz, *RE* ii 1230–6. See also G. Wirth, *Historia* xiii (1964) 209–45; *Studii Clasice* xvi (1974) 188–209, esp. 199f.; E. Bowie, *Past and Present* xlvii (1970) 24–7. For the early date see F. Reuss, *Rh. Mus.* liv (1899) 446–65; A. B. Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 163–85, and 'Arrian and Rome', section iv.

⁷ i. 12. 2–5 (see the notes ad loc.); cf. *praef.* 3, vi 11. 2; vii 30. 3.

of this history of his native province;⁸ he mentioned other works, monographs on Timoleon and Dion, which preceded the *Bithyniaca*, and Photius claims that the *Bithyniaca* was Arrian's fourth historical effort, succeeding the history of Alexander and the two monographs.⁹ The subject-matter seems generally derived from Arrian; and, even if the statement about the relative order of the works comes from Photius himself, he must have had some grounds for the statement. Later works are also quoted and excerpted, the seventeen books of the *Parthica* and the ten books of the *History of the Successors*. They were not mentioned in the preface to the *Bithyniaca* and presumably followed it in the sequence of Arrian's works. There is some corroboration in the literary echoes of the Alexander history which we find in the *Parthica*. The fragments dealing with Trajan's voyage down the Tigris are strikingly reminiscent of the description of Alexander's voyage down the Hydaspes¹⁰ and the character-study of Arsaces echoes the wording of Arrian's celebrated encomium upon Alexander.¹¹ As far as the evidence goes, it suggests a definite pattern in Arrian's historical development. He began with biographical monographs, culminating in the Alexander history, and then turned to more complex composite works, covering more extended and variegated periods of time.

An absolute date is a more difficult task. Citations in later datable authors give merely a *terminus ante quem*, and it is rare that we can be sure that Arrian is in fact cited directly. The supposed satire in Lucian's treatise on historiography (c. 165) is not only anonymous; its association with actual passages of Arrian's history of Alexander is very tenuous and depends upon free use of the imagination.¹² It is hardly a basic dating criterion. Similarly Appian's use of the Alexander history in his *Syriaca* and Book II of the Civil Wars,¹³ even if it is proved, gives no more than the most general indication of date (before 161-3). The relative chronology of Arrian's own work is more helpful. There seem to be echoes of his work on Alexander in the *Parthica*, and, since that work concluded with Trajan's Parthian Wars of 114-17,¹⁴ there is every reason to assume that it was published before the victories of

⁸ Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 93: 73^a32 ff. = *Bithyniaca* F 1. For the interpretation see Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 178-80 (*contra* Wirth, *Studii Clasice* xvi (1974) 199 n. 128).

⁹ μετά τε γὰρ τὰ περὶ Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ Τιμολέοντα καὶ Δίωνα . . . ἤδε αὐτῷ ἡ συγγραφὴ ἐξέπονθή.

¹⁰ *Parthica* F 60-3 (Roos) = vi 3. 3. The alternative suggestion (Wirth, *Philologus* cvii (1963) 298), that Arrian excerpted both passages from Nearchus, gives too little credit for stylistic originality.

¹¹ *Parthica* F 19 = vii 28. 1-3.

¹² For the supposed echoes see C. E. Gleye, *Philologus* liii (1894) 442-8; Wirth, *Historia* xiii (1964) 232-45.

¹³ App. *Syr.* 56. 285-91 = vii 22. 5; App. *BC* ii 152. 639 f. = vii 18. 1-4; *BC* ii 153. 642-44 = vii 16. 5-17. 2; 21. 1-22. 1. Cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 176-8.

¹⁴ *Parthica* F 1. 2-3 (Roos). The seventeenth (and last) book apparently dealt with the siege of Hatra in 117 (F 17).

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Lucius Verus in 165/6. The Alexander history appeared some considerable time before, with the *Bithyniaca* published in the interval, and we must surely go back at least to the middle years of Pius' reign. More significant, however, is the *Order of Battle against the Alani*, the literary report of Arrian's engagement with the Alani while he was governor of Cappadocia. I have tried to prove that in this opusculum Arrian cast himself in the role of Alexander, and borrowed from his description of Alexander's defeat of the Saca nomads in 329.¹⁵ In any case he uses Macedonian terminology for the Roman army of the 130s A.D. describing legions as phalanxes, his infantry headquarter corps as *σωματοφύλακες*.¹⁶ Arrian was certainly familiar with Macedonian military institutions and, in all probability, when he wrote the *Order of Battle* he had the Alexander history already behind him. Now it is probable that the *Order of Battle* was composed in the aftermath of the engagement with the Alani, as a literary adjunct to his official report, some time around A.D. 135. If the Alexander history preceded it, it cannot be dated after Hadrian's reign and almost certainly pre-dated the legateship of Cappadocia.

The dating criteria which can be extracted from the body of the Alexander history are largely arguments from silence. It is a feature of Arrian's work that he draws upon his own experience to illustrate or expand material from his sources. The information is provided even where it is not directly relevant, as in the case of the contemporary location of the statue-group of the tyrannicides.¹⁷ Yet there are instances where Arrian ignores experiences which are attested elsewhere in his literary *corpus*. Ignorance of Cappadocia is particularly striking. His discussion of the location of Prometheus' cave is a case in point. Arrian is aware that the subject is controversial and he explicitly criticizes his sources (*Anab.* v 3. 1-4). Yet he had been shown Prometheus' purported place of punishment in the Caucasus during his inspection tour of 131/2 (*Periplus* 11. 5). His experience was materially relevant, but he fails to adduce it. There is also ignorance of the most elementary facts of Armenian geography, which is astounding in a man who had worked and fought in Cappadocia and Lesser Armenia.¹⁸ There is a *prima facie* case for dating the work before the legateship. But Arrian seems ignorant of Rome also. His interest in the tyrannicide-group at Athens contrasts with his lack of interest in Lysippus' statue-

¹⁵ Bosworth, *HSCP* lxxxi (1977) 247-55. The most convenient and accurate text of the *Order of Battle* is in Roos, *Arriani Scripta Minora*, pp. 177-85. For the parallels with Alexander's engagement see Bosworth, *op. cit.* 252.

¹⁶ *Eclaxis* 5-6; 15 (phalanxes); 22 (*σωματοφύλακες*). Cf. Bosworth 248-51.

¹⁷ Cf. iii 16. 8 with note.

¹⁸ At vii 16. 3 he refers to majority opinion for the simple fact that the river Araxes flows into the Caspian (contrast Strabo xi 16. 3 (527)), and there is no hint of autopsy in his reference to the domicile of the Amazons along the Thermodon (vii 13. 4-6; cf. *Periplus* 15. 3).

group, which had been removed from Dium in 148 B.C. and transferred to Rome, where it became a noted monument, stationed outside the *porticus Octaviae* in the southern part of the Campus Martius (i 16. 4 n.). Arrian speaks as though the group were still at Dium—a startling oversight, if he had already held office in Rome. Even the location of the tyrannicide-group at Athens may be imprecise; Arrian seems to have placed it at the wrong point along the Sacred Way (cf. iii 16. 8 n.). If so, it is an error hard to credit in a permanent resident of Athens; it presumably derives from Arrian's faulty recollection of the procession of the initiates, which he will have participated in as a visitor to Athens. Finally the digression on Heracles in the West also contains inaccuracies and a surprising lack of knowledge about the antiquities of Gades, which must have been familiar to him after his proconsulate in Baetica (cf. ii 16. 4 n.). The argument from error and omission is cumulative, and it suggests a date of composition before 125, when Arrian was in his thirties.

There is one strongly autobiographical passage, where Arrian proudly conceals his name and career, claiming that his works are paramount. In the context he claims that he has no need to write his name, nor his homeland, nor the offices he has held ἐν τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ. The reference to offices can only denote offices held in Arrian's homeland, Bithynia (cf. i 12. 5 n.); certainly not Rome, for there is no instance of Greek authors of the second century AD describing Rome as the πατρίς of a citizen of eastern extraction. Italy was merely a land of temporary domicile.¹⁹ Now the omission of his senatorial *cursus* is important in the context. The point Arrian is making is most emphatic; his offices are of secondary importance to his literary themes. It would be most strange if he chose to omit the prestigious senatorial offices and concentrated on the much less distinguished local magistracies. The evidence as a whole suggests a relatively early date of composition. Arrian was a mature writer with a successful record of publication, but not primarily in the area of historical studies. What his earlier works were can only be guessed at, but there is a tradition of specifically philosophical works, portions of which have survived in the meteorological fragments preserved in Stobaeus. Arrian was specifically commemorated as a philosopher in his own lifetime (above p. 5) and it is perfectly possible that his notes on the *Diatribae* of Epictetus were followed by a series of philosophical dialogues and treatises. Arrian's interest in history, as he claims in his Alexander work and the later *Cynegeticus*, dates back to his extreme youth,²⁰ but he did not embark on historiography until he was a relatively experienced writer.

¹⁹ Dio F 1. 3; cf. F. Millar, *Cassius Dio* 10.

²⁰ ἀπὸ νέου: i 12. 5; *Cyneget.* 1. 4. The *Cynegeticus* speaks only of interest in σοφία, but the term was general enough to include history, and some regarded history as its most important component (cf. Dio xxxviii 28. 1).

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Arrian's work on Alexander was the third of a series of biographical monographs. Nothing is known of the earlier works on Dion and Timoleon, but both belonged to a background of philosophical history and *exempla* which might have rendered them congenial subjects. But there is more. All three individuals had been the subjects of biographies by Plutarch, and the biographies are so interconnected by cross-references that Mewaldt argued that the three pairs were issued simultaneously.²¹ The theory is plausible in itself and has found some acceptance.²² If so, it is hardly coincidental that Arrian produced three successive monographs on figures whose biographies appeared conjointly in Plutarch's publications; and, since Plutarch's biographies (at least the three in question) appeared before 116,²³ there is every possibility that they provided Arrian with his direct inspiration. It was an inspiration to emulate. Arrian harps constantly on the deficiencies of previous histories of Alexander, and, if he knew Plutarch's work, he included it in the general censure. The same will have applied to the lives of Dion and Timoleon. The appearance of Plutarch's work could have given Arrian the stimulus to improve upon it.²⁴ There is no direct influence in the work on Alexander. Arrian worked from different sources, used a different arrangement of material, and is never, it seems, influenced by Plutarch's style or phraseology. Plutarch seems merely to have supplied the theme and the element of literary rivalry. Arrian himself gave a similar stimulus to later writers. A certain Amyntianus dedicated a work on Alexander to Marcus Aurelius and he promised to give an account worthy of Alexander's deeds, language that irresistibly recalls Arrian's own boasts (cf. i 12. 4, vii 30. 3). The classic of one generation became something for the next to surpass.

Arrian's interest in the figure of Alexander certainly went deeper than mere literary emulation of his predecessors. The programmatic statement at i 12. 5 suggests that his involvement with his literary themes goes back at least to his youth. What is more, his generation had witnessed an increasing emphasis on the positive aspects of Alexander's figure. As is well known, the complex and contradictory personality of

²¹ J. Mewaldt, *Hermes* xlii (1907) 564-78. *Dion* 58. 10 refers to the *Timoleon*, whereas *Timoleon* 13. 10 and 33. 4 refer to the *Dion*. *Brutus* 9. 9 refers to the *Caesar*, whereas *Caesar* 62. 8 and 68. 7 refers to the *Brutus*.

²² Mewaldt's thesis was attacked extensively by C. Stolz, *Zur relativen Chronologie der Parallelenbiographien Plutarchs* (Lund 1929), but he failed to shake the arguments for the interrelation of the *Dion* and *Timoleon* and the *Caesar* and *Brutus*. Cf. P. A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods* 32 n. 1; C. P. Jones, *JRS* lvi (1966) 66f.; J. R. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* xxxvff.

²³ Cf. C. P. Jones, *JRS* lvi (1966) 69; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* xxxvii.

²⁴ It need not have been an immediate stimulus. Literary rivalry with Plutarch persisted throughout the second century. Appian, *BC* ii 149-54. 619ff, supplies a comparison between Caesar and Alexander, which Plutarch had omitted; and Amyntianus also wrote parallel lives of figures omitted by Plutarch (Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 131 = *FGrH* 150).

the Macedonian king made him an obvious source of examples for every type of moral theory; he was a bottle into which could be poured any and every vintage.²⁵ The character of the king was debated in the philosophical schools of the Hellenistic period, but the tradition is too sparse and ambiguous for any clear picture to emerge. There are modern theories of canonical and hostile Stoic or Peripatetic views of Alexander, but those views are largely constructs from scattered passages in later writers, predominantly Cicero, passages which are rarely, if ever, securely derived from a Hellenistic original.²⁶ It is safer to say that the actions of Alexander could be separated into widely different compartments, each compartment serving as an illustration for theories upon monarchy. Certainly there was a tradition of hostile criticism with its keynote Alexander's lack of moderation. Cicero could castigate Alexander for pride, cruelty, and lack of moderation and rate his *humanitas* far lower than that of his father, a view which Seneca continued more emphatically and consistently, regarding Alexander at best as the victim of his passions and at worst as the type of the cruel tyrant.²⁷ Certain episodes lent themselves to this stock portrait: the murder of Cleitus and execution of Callisthenes, the excess of grief at the death of Hephaestion, the adoption of Persian dress and court protocol, and the claims to be son of Ammon.²⁸ The result was a caricature, but a caricature designed to serve as an *exemplum*. There were of course other portraits. Alexander the world-conqueror was the symbol which inspired his military imitators—Pompey, Augustus, or Trajan; and in the hands of a Dio Chrysostom Alexander could be portrayed as a defender and emulator of the ideal Homeric kingship.²⁹ It was largely the literary form which determined the treatment for good or ill, and the same incident might be used in very different ways. The adoption of Persian dress could be used either as a sign of pride or immoderation or as an example of conscious stimulation of unity of feeling within the empire.³⁰ Dio Chrysostom varied his treatment of

²⁵ The metaphor of A. Heuss, *Antike und Abendland* iv (1954) 102, developed by E. Badian in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 280 ff. (with respect to modern interpretations).

²⁶ The theory of Peripatetic hostility to Alexander is based on interpretation of Theophrastus' lost work, *Callisthenes* (cf. Schwartz *RE* iv 1899; Tarn ii 319), and its supposed derivatives in later literature. But nothing is known of the content or economy of the *Callisthenes*, and the other passages cited cannot be referred to specific Peripatetic sources. Cf. Badian, *CQ* viii (1958) 153 ff.; E. Mensching, *Historia* xii (1963) 274 ff.; Bosworth, *Historia* xix (1970) 407 f. The Stoic portrait was a construct of J. Stroux, *Philologus* lxxxviii (1933) 222–40, and its foundations have been recently undermined by J. R. Fears, *Philologus* cxviii (1974) 113–30. See further P. A. Brunt, *Athenaeum* lv (1977) 30–48.

²⁷ Cic. *de Off.* i 26. 90; *ad Att.* xiii 28. 3; Sen. *de Ben.* i 13. 2–3, ii 16. 1–2, v 6. 1, vii 2. 5–6 (cf. Lucan x 20 ff.); on Seneca see Heuss (above n. 25) 88 f.

²⁸ For a typical exposition see Livy ix 18. 3–5.

²⁹ Dio Chrys. *Orat.* 2; for discussion see Heuss 92 f.

³⁰ Cf. Livy ix 18. 3–4; Curt. vi 6. 4; Justin xii 3. 8 f. (negative); Plut. *Al.* 45. 1; *de Al.* f. i 8, 330 A (positive). Arrian seems to espouse both views: iv 7. 4 f., vii 29. 4.

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Alexander in his orations on kingship. In the fourth Alexander appears as a youthful interlocutor of Diogenes, basically sound but in need of Cynic deflation. In the second he is the defender and advocate of Homeric virtues, while in the first oration, a general treatise on the ideal king, he appears briefly as a type of the immoderate ruler (*Orat.* 1. 1). Even in Seneca, whose treatment of Alexander is almost uniformly hostile, there is an inconsistent anecdote: his trust in Philip the Acarnanian is praised as a classic example of moderation (*De Ira* ii 23. 2 f.).

The literary treatment of Alexander must have continued to be multifaceted and contradictory, but the literature which has survived from the late first and early second centuries is largely encomiastic. The young Plutarch produced two rhetorical speeches *On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander* which are undiluted rhapsodies upon the perfection of the king; their object is rhetoric and there is no streak of dark in the entire picture.³¹ Similarly Dio Chrysostom had written an eight-volume treatise on the virtues of Alexander, which was on a much more extended scale than Plutarch's work, but no less encomiastic.³² It was a work which should have influenced his fellow countryman Arrian, and it may have stimulated him as much as did Plutarch's *Life*. The literary climate was encomiastic and so was the political climate. Trajan's personal interest in Alexander is well attested. He sacrificed to the Macedonian king in the ruins of Babylon and boasted to the senate that in 116 he had advanced further than Alexander.³³ Given such a background Arrian could hope for both official and public approval.

Arrian's emphasis is clear from the outset. It is Alexander's *ἔργα*, the *res gestae* of the reign, which primarily concern him; they have never been adequately commemorated in prose or verse (i 12. 2-4). Arrian is emphatically declaring that his function is to give a record of action and achievement; and there may be an implicit contrast with Plutarch's declaration at the beginning of his *Life of Alexander*, the statement that the magnitude of Alexander's deeds precludes an exhaustive enumeration of them (*Al.* 1. 1-2). Arrian, on the contrary, claims to give a full history of his hero and he makes it plain from the outset that its aim will be encomiastic. The stress is upon recording fact, and there is relatively little attempt to use the events of Alexander's life as material for moral discussion. Arrian is of course aware of the role of the historian as moral critic (vii 30. 3), and in Isocratean fashion he inveighs against Alexander at the standard points where his behaviour was used for

³¹ See the analysis by Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* xxiii-xxxiii.

³² 'Suda' s.v. *Δίων ὁ Πασικράτους* = *FGrH* 153 F 6.

³³ Dio lxviii 29. 1, 30. 1. Cf. W. Weber, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Kaisers Hadrianus* (Leipzig 1907), 8 ff.; F. A. Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian War* (Oxford 1948), 193 ff.; G. Wirth, in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 197 ff.

philosophical *exempla*. The clearest example is at iv 7. 4, where Arrian is clearly shocked by the barbaric mutilation of Bessus and digresses to give a sermon on the necessity for moderation. Elsewhere he adverts naïvely on the incongruity of Alexander's revenge motive (iii 18. 12, vi 30. 1). But the criticism of Alexander himself is generally muted. When he discusses the Cleitus affair he strongly condemns Cleitus for his contumacy but pities Alexander for falling victim to anger and drunkenness, and he praises the depth of Alexander's repentance (iv 9. 1-2; cf. vii 29. 1). Similarly he condemns Callisthenes for his intransigence and agrees that Alexander had every reason for his hostility (iv 12. 6 f.). The criticism may be muted in other ways. Arrian condemns various aspects of Alexander's grief for Hephaestion (vii 14. 2-7), but he presents the offensive behaviour as reports from untrustworthy authorities, which he himself discounts. Again, Arrian cites with approval the gymnosophists' criticism of Alexander's lust for conquest (vii 1. 5-6), but he adds that Alexander himself approved the criticism, even though he could not resist his ambitions (vii 2. 1-2); and the passage begins with a rapturous description of Alexander's will to conquer, which tends to nullify the criticism. The positive side of Alexander's achievement is presented without qualification. Whereas he uses the unreliability of the sources to discount criticism, he can be quite sophisticated where praise is involved. The story of the reception of Sisymbria might be apocryphal, but Alexander deserves praise for having inspired it (ii 12. 8). The cutting reply to Parmenion is similarly presented as a subsidiary report (λέγουσιν ὅτι), but Arrian gives no opinion about its authenticity and praises Alexander for his reasoning and his self-confidence (iii 10. 1-4). The final character study epitomizes the entire tendency of the work (vii 28-30). It begins with an impassioned eulogy, framed in superlatives, and then turns to the various statements of reprobation, which Arrian mitigates firstly by stressing the saving grace of repentance (vii 29. 1-2) and then by suggesting that both his claim to divine filiation and the adoption of Persian dress were σοφίσματα, stratagems to influence the subject peoples (vii 29. 3-4). Finally he says categorically that Alexander's faults are insignificant in comparison with his achievements, and even implies that the critic of Alexander is himself reprehensible (vii 30. 1).

The bias towards encomium explains much of Arrian's work. It is basically a narrative of achievement, with a favourable verdict built into the texture of the narrative (cf i 17. 12, ii 4. 11). Indeed one of the principal reasons why Arrian preferred Ptolemy and Aristobulus as narrative sources may well have been their very favourable attitude to the king (see below p. 30). It also explains the comparative dearth of moral comment. Arrian's verdict was presupposed, and the main function of his comments was to mitigate the criticisms traditionally levelled at the figure of Alexander. He could therefore devote himself

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to the composition of a laudatory account of Alexander's *res gestae* and concentrate on the stylistic presentation.

3. ARRIAN'S HISTORICAL METHODS

In the *Praefatio* Arrian supplies information about his use of sources which is almost unique in ancient works of non-contemporary history. That information concerns both his principles of selecting material from his sources and the reasons for his choice of two basic sources for his historical narrative. The principles of selection come first, and it is best to begin the discussion with them. Arrian states that where Ptolemy and Aristobulus give a consistent account he will follow their consensus as wholly true; where they disagree he will adopt the version he considers the more worthy of credence and the more memorable (*praef.* 1). One is therefore tempted to assume that Ptolemy and Aristobulus are considered of equal weight and used alternately. But it is clear that Ptolemy is the more important authority. At vi 2. 4 Arrian explicitly singles him out as his principal source (*ὃ μάλιστα ἐγὼ ἐπομαι*), and it seems that he placed him above Aristobulus in the same way that he places Ptolemy and Aristobulus together above the subsidiary sources (cf. v 7. 1, vii 15. 6). Passages like the account of the Danubian campaign seem extracted *in toto* from Ptolemy with no additional material added from other sources (cf. i 1. 4, i 4. 6 nn.). The narrative core of Arrian's history is generally agreed to be Ptolemy, but it remains controversial to what degree Aristobulus is used as a control source. There exist speculative analyses by Hermann Strasburger and Ernst Kornemann, but they depend on supposed general characteristics of the lost works, extrapolated from the scanty extant fragments.¹ There is rarely any concrete ground for a positive source attribution, and Arrian's text is usually a safer basis for reconstruction than one's impressions of a vanished original source.

Direct citations give some assistance. Like most historians of antiquity Arrian refers to his sources primarily in order to dissociate himself from some particular statement. He may signal a source-conflict by naming his authorities but he also marks out specific statements in the sources which strike him as suspicious by noting the author's name. In the early books it is almost always Ptolemy who is singled out in this way. His

¹ H. Strasburger, *Ptolemaios und Alexander* (Leipzig 1934); E. Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I. von Ägypten* (Leipzig 1935). Of the two Strasburger's scheme is the more flexible, and he begins with an analysis of Arrian as a historian (8 ff.), but the explicit 'Ausgangspunkt' is appreciation of the extant fragments of Ptolemy (16 ff.), and much depends on subjective presuppositions of the contents of the lost original (e.g. 'Spuren seines Stils finden sich nicht': 40). Kornemann's work is far more schematic and operates on the assumption that Arrian had no style of his own and largely copies Ptolemy. For appreciations see Strasburger's review, *Gnomon* xiii (1937) 483-92; Pearson, *LHA* 195 f.; Wirth, *RE* xxiii 2467 f.

figures for the Macedonian casualties at the Lyginus (i 2. 7) and his statement that Perdiccas began the attack on Thebes (i 8. 1) are the only direct citations in Book i and in both cases the detail singled out is an integral part of the context. The surrounding narrative may be attributed to Ptolemy with reasonable confidence. There is no named reference to Aristobulus before Book ii, and, when he is adduced, it is usually to note some aspect of his account which is discrepant from the general tradition.² Few passages before the end of Book vi can be attributed to Aristobulus by the method of citation,³ whereas whole chapters can be singled out for Ptolemy with relative ease. There is a good example in Book v, where Arrian mentions in passing that the Acesines was the only river whose breadth was noted by Ptolemy (v 20. 8); the narrative continues in an unbroken flow with the crossing of the Hydraotes and the siege of Sangala, culminating with an engagement led by Ptolemy himself (v 23. 7-24. 3). The combination of direct citation and autobiographical material led Jacoby to attribute the entire extended passage to Ptolemy (*FGrH* 138 F 35), and he was certainly right to do so.⁴ There is some temptation to infer that Arrian followed the procedure Klotz attributed to Livy,⁵ namely excerpting Ptolemy's narrative without comment and using Aristobulus as a control source. But Arrian's procedure is certainly more sophisticated. There are passages like the account of the journey to Siwah (iii 3. 3-6) which juxtapose material from Ptolemy and Aristobulus in a way that suggests that material from the two authors was blended in a composite narrative. It clearly made a difference whether an incident was recounted with similar but complementary details or retailed in two different contradictory versions. In the one case Arrian might use the two sources together, selecting material alternately as it appealed to his taste, but in the other he would be tempted to select one version and either suppress the other or note the variants.

Internal inconsistencies also help to isolate the contributions of the two sources. There are variations, and significant variations, in Arrian's use of geographical terms. The people of modern Sistan are termed Drangae or Zarangae, and the alternation of names twice helps to isolate the separate traditions in Arrian.⁶ Similarly the Tapurians of the Elburz are referred to either as *Τόπειροι* or *Τάπουροι* (cf. iii 8. 4 n.), and the form *Τόπειροι* occurs in the Persian army list taken from Aristobulus (iii 11. 4). The different forms suggest different authors.

² e.g. ii 3. 7, 4. 7, iii 30. 5, iv 6. 1-2, 8. 9.

³ From the end of Book vi Aristobulus becomes dominant: cf. vi 22. 4-8, 28. 3-4, 29. 4-11, vii 17. 5-22. 5.

⁴ Cf. Pearson, *LHA* 202-4; Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* (Munich 1969), 23-5.

⁵ A. Klotz, *Livius und seine Vorgänger* (Leipzig/Berlin 1940-1); cf. P. G. Walsh, *Livy* (Cambridge 1963), 138 ff.

⁶ iii 25. 8, 28. 1, vi 15. 5, 17. 3. See further *CQ* xxvi (1976) 128 f.

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There are also variations in the military terminology, which may also be indicators of the different sources. The battle of the Granicus is a particularly useful test case. The cavalry under the command of Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus is termed both *πρόδρομοι* and *σαρισσοφόροι* in passages which are widely spaced,⁷ and the account of the Macedonian battle line at i 14. 1–3 has the striking incongruity that the phalanx battalions are termed *φάλαγγες*, not *τάξεις*, the term used in all the other major battle narratives. There is a strong presupposition to identify the source as Aristobulus, for there is no doubt that Arrian's principal source for the battle narratives was Ptolemy. But variations of this nature are infrequent and, when they occur, there is often no means of deciding which variant should be attributed to which author.

Citations in other authors are also a help. Strabo's excerpt of Ptolemy's account of the Danubian campaign confirms that the parallel passage of Arrian is also derived from Ptolemy (cf. i 4. 6 n.), and his excerpts from Aristobulus' version of events at Pasargadae and in Babylonia supplies excellent material for comparison with Arrian's text.⁸ But once again the available material is not extensive and there are dangers. It is only too easy to gloss over significant differences and make an attribution on general similarity of narrative. The digression on the Sardanapallus monument has been attributed to Aristobulus on the basis of the parallel descriptions in Athenaeus and Strabo even though the central feature of the description is markedly different (cf. ii 5. 3 n.). The truth is that Arrian's use of his major sources is intricate and varied, and there is no single reliable method to isolate their relative contributions. In the Commentary I have attempted as far as possible to refer specific passages to specific sources, but it must be admitted that the attributions are largely conjectural.

Arrian's use of his major sources is complex but his technique is far from infallible, as one would expect in the first extended work of his historical corpus. There are a number of errors resulting from inefficient conflation or insufficiently close reading of his sources.⁹ On occasion he accepts one tradition but inadvertently combines it with the variant he has rejected. The result can be perplexing. At iii 11. 9 Philippus intrudes as the patronymic of Amyntas son of Andromenes, an error which seems only explicable if Arrian had in mind the name of Philippus, son of Balacrus, who the variant tradition names as the commander of Amyntas' battalion at Gaugamela. Similarly the double placing of Craterus' battalion at the Granicus (i 14. 2–3) is best explained on the assumption that his two sources located it at different points in the battle line and Arrian unwittingly combined the two versions. Occasionally his sources are so divergent that he gives both

⁷ i 12. 7, 14. 1, 14. 6; see the notes ad locc.

⁸ Strabo xv 3. 7 (730) = vi 29. 4–11; xvi 1. 11 (741) = vii 20.

⁹ For a fuller exposition see *CQ* xxvi (1976) 117–39.

versions independently without noticing that they refer to the same event. This may occur on a minor scale, as in the case of the double reference to the passage of Drangiana (iii 27. 4–28. 1), but there are also quite serious doublets where the same event is narrated twice at different points in the narrative. The arrival of Phrataphernes and Stasanor is narrated in the winters of both 329/8 and 328/7 (iv 7. 1, 18. 1), and the march of Craterus' column through central Iran is described at two different stages of the journey down the Indus (vi 15. 5, 17. 3).

The occurrence of doublets and conflation inevitably raises a wider question: how careful was Arrian in his use of primary sources? Since neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus is an extant author, we have little scope for direct comparison. But there is another work, the *Cynegeticus*, where Arrian was operating with an extant source, the *Cynegeticus* of Xenophon, and the accuracy of his reproduction can there be checked.¹⁰ It is quite clear that Arrian is capable of reproducing his original almost *verbatim* with only the most insignificant variations of wording (*Cynegel.* 30. 2; cf. Xen. 7. 3), and in the Alexander history he includes an extremely faithful quotation of Herodotus (iii 30. 8 = Hdt. iv 57). But at other times Arrian merely gives a free paraphrase.¹¹ He may distort the sense slightly by variation of expression—and the slightest change in word-order and construction can produce a genuine difference in sense.¹² What is more, he can superimpose ideas of his own upon his original; from his citation of the exordium of the *περὶ ἱππικῆς* (*Cynegel.* 1. 5) one would assume that Xenophon disclaimed all considerations of rivalry with Simon but wrote for reasons of general utility. Neither motive in fact occurs in the original. There are obvious repercussions for our assessment of Arrian's use of source material in the Alexander history. We can never be sure how true Arrian is to the wording of his original—and in the case of Ptolemy and Aristobulus he may well have allowed himself freer range than when he adapted the classical masters of prose style. More significantly, he may always alter the original meaning of his source by stylistic reinterpretation or superimpose his own views. The Alexander history is of course far longer than the *Cynegeticus* and the use of sources is more complex. Arrian is not commenting upon and adding to a single text, but working up a historical narrative from two major sources and a number of subsidiary works. The scope for variation is accordingly greater as is the mass of source material, and there are a number of instances where Arrian can plausibly be argued to have misunderstood his original. These slips range from relatively venial errors such as the placing of the Macedonian Olympia at Aegae instead of Dium (cf. i 1. 1 n.) to serious distortions of historical fact, such as (I believe) the

¹⁰ See the excellent discussion of P. A. Stadter, *GRBS* xvii (1976) 159–67.

¹¹ For examples see Stadter 161.

¹² Cf. Arr. 2. 2 with Xen. 5. 29; Arr. 31. 2 with Xen. 7. 5.

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statement that Alexander visited Ecbatana in 330 (cf. iii 19. 5 n.). The conclusions must impose caution. We cannot usually separate the contributions of Ptolemy and Aristobulus with any degree of certainty. The traditions may be intertwined and intertwined in a misleading fashion. Nor can we be sure that Arrian even in direct citations reproduces the exact wording of his sources or that his reproduction of the original factual material is unerringly accurate. All this may well seem depressingly negative; but the tendency of modern historians is to regard Arrian as a direct reflecting mirror of Ptolemy and his own characteristics as historian and stylist have been relegated to the background—or, more often, ignored altogether. A corrective is both salutary and urgently needed.

Arrian also refers to his subsidiary sources in the *Praefatio*. There is material from historians other than Ptolemy and Aristobulus which strikes Arrian as memorable and not unconvincing and he has included it under the heading of tales told about Alexander (*ὡς λεγόμενα μόνον*). The motif recurs repeatedly in the body of the narrative,¹³ and it is tempting to infer that whenever an incident is introduced by a formula like *λέγεται* it is a detail extracted from Arrian's subsidiary sources. But, once again, Arrian's usage is more sophisticated than it first appears. The formula has a wider purpose, to mark out a detail which Arrian does not find wholly convincing and does not wish to relate on his own authority. Such detail may well come from his principal sources.¹⁴ At vii 20. 1 he introduces the information about the gods of the Arabians with the sceptical formula *λόγος δὲ κατέχει*, but it is clear from Strabo (xvi 1. 11 (741)) that the material comes directly from Aristobulus. Again, it seems certain that the narrative of the Danubian campaign is taken directly from Ptolemy, yet it proceeds in *oratio obliqua* for some eight lines before reverting to direct narrative (i 1. 4–5). In this case the introductory *λέγεται δὴ* does not express scepticism; it seems to be a conventional introductory formula (cf. i 1. 1 n.). At other times the *λέγουσι*-formula is used in a general sense to indicate passages of general agreement and to prepare the way for variants. At ii 12. 3 he begins the story of the Persian captives with a general reference to the statements of some Alexander historians; at 12. 5 he identifies those sources as Ptolemy and Aristobulus and adds a *logos* from his subsidiary sources dealing with the confusion between Alexander and Hephaestion. Similarly at vi 24. 1–2 Arrian first refers to the general tradition (*λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοί*) and then singles out Nearchus' unique story of rivalry with Cyrus and Semiramis. True *logoi* are relatively rare and they illustrate Arrian's methods of selection. The stories of Hephaestion's actions at the tomb of Patroclus pave the way to the *logos* of Alexander

¹³ Cf. ii 12. 8, iii 2. 1, vii 15. 6.

¹⁴ The classic discussion is by Schwartz, *RE* ii 1240–3; see also Kornemann 21–30 (much oversimplified).

envying Achilles his Homer, which in turn leads naturally to Arrian's famous piece of self-advertisement (i 12. 1 with notes); the *logoi* are chosen to lead naturally to the justification for the history.¹⁵ Again, the *logos* at ii 12. 6–8 is explicitly introduced to illustrate the virtues of Alexander and the story of Parmenion's advice to launch a night attack leads to an appreciation of Alexander's generalship (iii 10. 2–4). Other stories are included for pure sensationalism, like the Bacchic procession through Carmania, which Arrian is at pains to deny—in true Herodotean manner.¹⁶

Arrian's procedure is, as always, flexible. In the *Praefatio* he says merely that he will present material from his subsidiary sources as *legomena*. That does not exclude his using *oratio obliqua* to present material from his principal sources. Indeed there is every reason to believe that Arrian followed Herodotus in referring to his source material, as he followed him generally in matters of style. Now Herodotus has a rich variety of constructions in *oratio obliqua*, designed to indicate reservations towards his subject matter.¹⁷ His method centres on constructions with the infinitive; and infinitives may intrude in subordinate clauses, follow sequentially in a clause introduced by *ὅτι/ὡς*, or even do duty for indicatives in narrative passages. Arrian uses the narrative intrusive infinitive, notably in the account of the happenings at Nysa, and the usage appears Herodotean.¹⁸ His deployment of intrusive infinitives is nowhere near as sophisticated as Herodotus', and often accusative and infinitive constructions alternate with *ὅτι*-clauses, with no motive apparent other than desire for variation.¹⁹ But the alternation is occasionally more complex. At iii 26. 1 he begins his account of the Philotas affair with the joint account of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, presented as a *ὅτι*-construction. But when he presents Ptolemy's story alone the construction switches to accusative and infinitive—with a single vivid clause in the indicative underlining the ground of Philotas' conviction (iii 26. 3). At iii 27. 1 the joint account resumes, beginning with accusative and infinitive, but changing to *oratio recta* after the first clause. The most elaborate instance is the extended passage beginning with the Cleitus affair (iv 8 ff.). Arrian first states that he will narrate the episode out of chronological sequence and plunges immediately into an extended construction in *oratio obliqua*, with a single outburst into direct speech introduced for

¹⁵ Compare the discussion of the Amazons at vii 13. 2–6, where the *logos* is a peg for an antiquarian excursus.

¹⁶ See also the discussion of Alexander's reaction to the death of Hephaestion (vii 14. 2–8).

¹⁷ See the detailed analysis by Guy L. Cooper, *TAPA* civ (1974) 23–80.

¹⁸ v 1. 4 (*παρελθεῖν τε*); 2.2 (*Ἀκουφιν δὲ εἶναι*); 2.5 (*ἐλθεῖν τε*). In all these cases the intrusive infinitive follows directly after a genuine accusative and infinitive construction, and the closest parallel seems to be Hdt. i 59. 3 (cf. Cooper 72).

¹⁹ Cf. iii 2. 3–6, iii 10. 1, etc.

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dramatic effect (iv 8. 8). Now it is clear that the story is not taken in its entirety from Arrian's subsidiary sources, for he cites an apologetic variant from Aristobulus (iv 8. 9). The *oratio obliqua* occurs because Arrian wishes to distance himself from his material; it was a stock negative *exemplum* hardly congenial to his encomiastic purposes (above p. 14), and Arrian is reluctant to retail it as fact on his own authority. Accordingly he switches to an infinitival construction and distances himself from the narrative. We cannot therefore infer from the construction that the episode was not recounted by Ptolemy; it is perfectly possible that he gave the story much as Arrian tells it.²⁰

Arrian's citations of his source material are complex and varied, but there is no reason to doubt what the *Praefatio* implies, that the majority of his narrative was built upon the works of Ptolemy and Aristobulus. It remains to see how justifiable that choice was. Such an investigation properly requires detailed examination of all the extant fragments together with detailed study of the general characteristics of Arrian's narrative. That clearly lies outside the scope of an Introduction, and in what follows I can only distil the arguments expounded at greater length in the body of the Commentary.

Ptolemy's history is almost entirely known from citations in Arrian.²¹ Arrian provides all but four of the fragments which Jacoby accepts as genuine; and of those four one is a piece of comic romance preserved by Synesius,²² another is at best a second-hand citation by Stephanus of Byzantium, the third a passing reference to his figure for Alexander's invasion army, cited by Plutarch in a list of variants, and finally Strabo's brief reference to the story of the Celtic embassy.²³ It is a reasonable assumption that Ptolemy's work was ignored and largely unknown in antiquity. It was Arrian's service to exhume his work, and modern scholars have been unstinting in their gratitude. But, even so, the outlines of Ptolemy's work remain vague. We have no idea of the number of books or how the material was distributed. More seriously we have no information when Ptolemy wrote, except for Arrian's statement that the history appeared after Alexander's death. It is commonly believed that the work fell after 305/4, when Ptolemy assumed the title of king, but we cannot assume that Arrian's reference to him as a king is taken from Ptolemy's preface or is even strictly

²⁰ Similarly we cannot assume that he omitted the stories of the Gordian Knot and Philip the Acarnanian (ii 3. 8, 4. 7 notes).

²¹ The fragments are printed by Jacoby, *FGrH* 138. For a survey of literature see Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 19–21; note particularly the discussions of Pearson, *LHA* 188–211 (with Badian, *Studies* 256–8) and G. Wirth, *RE* xxiii 2467–84.

²² F 11. Cf. E. Rohde, *Rh. M.* xxxviii (1883) 301–5; Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 504; Pearson, *LHA* 189.

²³ F 5, 4. 2. Curt. ix 5. 21 refers to Ptolemy's statement that he was not at the Malli town (more fully in Arrian vi 11. 7–8 = F 26a) and Plutarch, *Al.* 46. 2 includes Ptolemy in a list of sources not mentioning the Amazon queen (more fully in Arrian vii 13. 2–3 = F 28^b).

accurate for the time of writing. Arrian may have regarded him in timeless terms, the kingship a permanent characteristic. Nor can it seriously be alleged that Ptolemy had no time for serious writing until he abdicated in favour of his son in 285;²⁴ such an argument would make it *a priori* impossible for, say, Caesar to have written his *Commentarii* or Augustus his *Autobiography*. It would help if it could be proved that Ptolemy knew Aristobulus' work, for that author wrote after 301 in his old age (see below), but the hypothesis is at best unprovable. The key passage (v 14. 5) is not evidence for direct criticism of Aristobulus. Arrian merely places Aristobulus and Ptolemy side by side and (for once) explains his preference for Ptolemy; the formula ἀλλὰ... γὰρ marks the return to Ptolemy's statement about the forces with Porus' son, after an anticipatory argument justifying the figures (and rejecting those of Aristobulus) on grounds of general probability.²⁵ Nothing seriously suggests a late date of composition, but there are certain positive and negative aspects of the work which suggest a period close to Alexander's death. The strongly autobiographical character of many of the attested fragments indicates a period when it was in Ptolemy's interest to emphasize his closeness to Alexander, and the well-known polemical bias against Perdikkas and his associates suggests a period not too far removed from Perdikkas' death during the invasion of Egypt in 321.²⁶

The characteristics of Ptolemy's narrative are equally hard to grasp. His traditional reputation rests largely on the assumption that he preserved in his narrative archival material derived from the *Ephemerides* or *Court Journal* of Alexander himself. This is a time-hallowed theory²⁷ but impossible to sustain. The *Ephemerides* as such are cited in the sources six times in all—once for Alexander's hunting habits, three times for his excessive drinking, and most extensively in the reports of Alexander's last illness, which Arrian and Plutarch take from the *Ephemerides* with varied and sometimes inconsistent details.²⁸ It seems most probable that Arrian's extract is in fact taken indirectly from Ptolemy and/or Aristobulus. He concludes his digest of the *Ephemerides* with the observation that Ptolemy and Aristobulus took their narratives no further (οὐ πόρρω δὲ τούτων: vii 26. 3). The alternative interpretation, that their account was not substantially

²⁴ Cf. Kornemann 7 f.; Tarn ii 43; Pearson, *LHA* 193.

²⁵ So Hamilton, *PACA* iv (1961) 19 n. 24; Badian, *Studies* 257, against Pearson, *LHA* 172 f., following the traditional view (cf. Schwartz, *RE* ii 916; Kornemann 13–15).

²⁶ So R. M. Errington, *CQ* xix (1969) 241.

²⁷ Adumbrated by Droysen i² 2. 383–6 and established as a canon by Wilcken, *Philologus* liii (1894) 84–126. I have examined the theory briefly in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 3–6. See also Brunt, *Arrian* xxiv–xxvi.

²⁸ The extant fragments are printed by Jacoby, *FGrH* 117. For analysis of the reports of the illness, with the variants, see Pearson, *Historia* iii (1955) 432–4; cf. also Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 120 f.

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different from that of the *Ephemerides*, is most unlikely.²⁹ Arrian is delaying mention of his principal sources (as at ii 12. 3–6); he begins with a reference to the account of the *Ephemerides* (vii 25. 1), repeats it at vii 26. 1, and then ends his report of the official version with a remark that Ptolemy and Aristobulus take the story no further. He can then add the vulgate story of the bequest 'to the strongest' (vii 26. 3). The account provided by the *Ephemerides* was recounted by Ptolemy (or Aristobulus) as the prime source for Alexander's death; but the document is not cited outside the context of the last illness and it is a reasonable assumption that the information it provided did not extend beyond the last months of Alexander's life.³⁰ But even if the *Ephemerides* were, as some have supposed, a complete day-to-day record of the official business of the reign, the fact that Plutarch refers to them proves that they were not unique to Ptolemy and the variants in his account suggest that they existed in several recensions—and were not necessarily an unimpeachable source of fact.

Nor is the so-called archival material unique to Ptolemy's narrative, as reproduced by Arrian. The 'vulgate' tradition of Diodorus and Curtius Rufus provides details of appointments, promotions, arrival of reinforcements, and reception of embassies which often corroborate the material in Arrian and not infrequently supplement it.³¹ There seems to be a central core of information about the public business of Alexander's court which was available to all sources. It may stem originally from some document like a court journal, but there is no positive evidence for the supposition and equally nothing to controvert the suggestion that the 'archival' material was transmitted first by contemporary historians like Callisthenes, recording events from their own experience, and then used by subsequent writers as basic fact. Ptolemy's only advantage over the other sources is that he was closer to Alexander and presumably had more direct experience of events at court, but it remains conjectural whether his memories and files were any more accurate or detailed than Callisthenes' contemporary account of events as they happened. Perhaps the most seductive (and certainly

²⁹ For a review of opinions see Pearson, art. cit. 438 n. 37 (add Jacoby, *FGH* ii D. 507; Strasburger 48 f.). Like Herodotus Arrian uses *πóρρω* in a spatial sense, even when he is metaphorical; so iv 11.5 *πóρρω τοῦ ἱκανοῦ* = 'further than is sufficient' (cf. v 20. 10: *οὐ πόρρω τοῦ ἀληθοῦς* = 'not far from the truth'; Strabo xv 1. 35 *πóρρω πίστεως μᾶλλον ἢ ἐγγύς*). 'Far from this' in the sense of 'different from' is unlikely and one would expect some explanatory qualification. Elsewhere Arrian tends to be explicit; cf. iv 14. 1 *Πτολεμαῖος ὡσαύτως λέγει*.

³⁰ For hypothetical explanations of these peculiarities see A. E. Samuel, *Historia* xiv (1965) 1–12; Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 117–23. Pearson 432–9 argues that the so-called document is in fact a Hellenistic forgery.

³¹ Note the records of arrangements in Babylon and Susa (iii 16. 4 and 9–10 with notes). For a baffling case of disagreement over what must have been officially recorded and widely known see the variant reports of Greek embassies at the Persian court in 333 and 330 (ii 15. 2 n.).

the most fallacious) argument is based on the 'diary-like' style of Arrian, which is thought to reflect—at two removes—the dry, factual record of the original court journal. But, if anything is certain about Arrian as a writer, it is that his style is his own, and, if his narrative has lucid clarity and an apparent diary-style, that is a carefully contrived result and contrived by Arrian himself. There are passages in Thucydides which are as dry and detailed as any in Arrian, but nobody would claim (I hope) that the style is based on some official chronicle of the war which he copied out.³²

There is another hypothesis that Ptolemy wrote 'to set the record straight', that is, to correct the extravagant fantasies of earlier writers by presenting a sober record of fact. Once more there are some serious difficulties. In the first place there is no evidence that Ptolemy indulged in polemics against other writers. The two passages of Arrian which might be adduced under this heading are the criticism of Aristobulus' figure for the forces with Porus' son (v 14. 3–6) and the criticism of the vulgate tradition that Ptolemy saved Alexander's life at the Malli town (vi 11. 7–8), but in both cases the criticism is Arrian's own; he places Ptolemy's statement against the other tradition and uses it in an argument from probability. If, then, Ptolemy's critique of Alexander historians was not explicit, it was implicit, leaving his readers to draw their own conclusions from his unvarnished record of fact.³³ Such a hypothesis is difficult either to support or subvert. If Ptolemy's narrative differs from the rest of the tradition it is indeed possible to argue that he was attempting to correct it—but it is also possible that the majority tradition is correct and that Ptolemy had motives for altering the record. The question can only be answered by continuous detailed analysis of the tradition such as attempted in the Commentary, and even then the results are ambiguous. There are cases like the treatment of Parmenion (cf. i 13. 2, iii 15. 1 nn.) where Ptolemy does seem to be implicitly rebutting some aspect of the received tradition, but there is not sufficient evidence to single out such implicit criticism as a primary reason for his writing. More often when his version is discrepant there appear to be personal or propagandist motives at work. Nor can it be seriously argued that Ptolemy reacted against the romantic, novel-like aspects of earlier writers. It seems difficult to maintain that he avoided all excursions on natural history, for the Elder Pliny names him alongside such authors as Onesicritus and Ehippus as an authority on

³² There are obvious similarities with Wilamowitz's famous theory that the entire framework of Athenian local history was provided by an official chronicle of the *exegetai*. Cf. Jacoby, *Althis* (Oxford 1949) *passim*, esp. 5: 'an ingenious thesis . . . which moreover begins with the monstrosity in method that the first Attidographer must be eliminated from Attidography'.

³³ 'So ist sein Werk Korrektur und Polemik durch Darstellung und Stillschweigen' (Strasburger 55); 'silence was Ptolemy's method of dealing with untrue stories; he never explicitly rejects or argues' (Tarn ii 268).

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exotic types of trees.³⁴ His account of Issus included the romantic picture of a ravine choked with enemy dead (cf. ii 11. 8 n.), and it is difficult to accept his story of guidance to Siwah by snakes as anything more than romantic fiction (iii 3. 5 n.).

What, then, can be deduced about the characteristics of Ptolemy's history? In the first place it was strongly autobiographical. Ptolemy laid great emphasis on his services under Alexander and wrote them up in vivid and elaborate detail, particularly in the section dealing with the Indian expedition.³⁵ What is more, he certainly exaggerated his role, particularly in his earlier appearances; his command at the Persian Gates is apparently distorted in respect of its importance and function (iii 18. 9 n.) and his role in the capture of Bessus is built up into a full-scale repetition of Alexander's pursuit of Darius (iii 30. 5 n.). Such an emphasis is only natural in a survivor of the campaigns (one need only think of Nearchus);³⁶ and it had an immediate purpose in the period of the Successors, when prestige was enhanced and positions were cemented by reference to services rendered under Alexander.³⁷ But natural though the emphasis is, it should put us on our guard against the idea that Ptolemy is an unsullied repository of historical fact. There are also occasions where a hostile bias can be demonstrated. Ptolemy's treatment of Perdiccas is particularly vulnerable in this respect. Perdiccas' achievements are omitted (iii 15. 2 n.), particularly his promotion in 324 to the vacant chiliarchy of Hephaestion, and there is a degree of calumny, notably in the allegation that the Macedonian reverse at Thebes was caused by an unauthorized attack on his part (i 8. 1 n.). The same bias can be detected in Ptolemy's treatment of the lieutenants of Perdiccas, particularly Aristonous who is almost totally ignored in Arrian³⁸ and the younger sons of Andromenes, who are portrayed in a most invidious light (cf. iii 11. 9, 14. 5, 27. 2 nn.). Antigonus' achievements in Phrygia are also omitted, but in this case there is no detectable malice (cf. i 29. 3 n.). Once again the bias has an immediate explanation in the period after Alexander's death; Ptolemy was suppressing services rendered by his political enemies and suggesting that their role was harmful. But the bias is again an obvious warning against accepting every detail from Ptolemy as the literal truth. The assessment of the rest of the narrative is a more intricate problem, since what we have is an amalgam of Ptolemy and

³⁴ Pliny *NH* i 12-13 (T 2); cf. Badian, *Studies* 256; *CW* lxxv (1971) 38.

³⁵ See, in general, the survey by C. B. Welles in *Miscellanea Rostagni* (Turin 1963), 101-16; his arguments are challenged and modified by Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* 4-26, but the conclusions reached are similar.

³⁶ For the bias of Nearchus see Pearson, *LHA* 131-9, and most recently Badian, *JCS* xxiv (1975) 147-70.

³⁷ See the independent observations by Bosworth and Errington in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 14-16, 159-62. Cf. also Seibert, *Untersuchungen* . . . 152-6.

³⁸ See the cogent analysis by Errington, *CQ* xix (1969) 235 f.

Aristobulus; but that amalgam has certain general characteristics which can be analysed and appreciated. The appreciation must, however, follow consideration of Arrian's use of Aristobulus.³⁹

Aristobulus' work appeared relatively late, after the battle of Ipsus in 301 (vii 18. 5); and according to the pseudo-Lucianic *Macrobioi* he stated in his preface that he began writing in his 84th year.⁴⁰ He is also described as a citizen of Cassandreia,⁴¹ founded in 316 B.C. on the site of Potidaea, and it seems very probable that he wrote in Macedonia after the death of Cassander (298). Details of his life are very sparse, and we know only that he served with Alexander. In what function is uncertain. The supposition that he was an architect and/or engineer⁴² rests on his commission to restore the pillaged tomb of Cyrus (vi 29. 4-11; cf. Strabo xv 3. 7 (730)), but that was largely a cosmetic operation; the only feature requiring anything like engineering skills was the sealing of the door (cf. vi 29. 10). His other commission in India is totally obscure (Strabo xv 1. 19 (693)). All that can be said is that Aristobulus served as an under-officer, close enough to Alexander to receive direct commissions but outside the immediate court entourage.

In antiquity Aristobulus was much better known than Ptolemy. Outside Arrian there are citations in Plutarch, Athenaeus, and Strabo. Strabo in particular seems to have used him as a primary source for his description of India. Even so the content of his work is most imperfectly known. No book-number survives and there is no indication how the narrative was distributed. Various characteristics appear in the surviving fragments, but it is conjectural how prominent they were in the non-extant parts of the work; Aristobulus is cited by name for divergent or sensational details, and it is unsafe to extrapolate from them characteristics of the whole work. There seems an interest in botanical curiosities. Aristobulus described the oaks of Hyrcania (F 19), the asafoetida of the Hindu Kush (iii 28. 5-7 = F 23) and the plants of the Gedrosian desert (vi 22. 4-8 = F 49). Rivers are also prominent in the extant fragments. Aristobulus noted the course of the Oxus (F 20), the phenomenon of the disappearing rivers of Central Asia (F 28), the monsoon floods in the Punjab (F 35), the fauna of the Nile (F 39), and the drainage system of Mesopotamia (vii 21; cf. F 56). Such preoccupations were not unique to Aristobulus; Onesicritus gave a detailed (and inaccurate) description of the banyan trees of India⁴³ and

³⁹ Fragments of Aristobulus may be found in Jacoby, *FGrH* 139, and a survey of modern opinion in Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 21-3. See most recently, P. A. Brunt, *CQ* xxiv (1974) 65-9.

⁴⁰ [Luc.] *Macrob.* 22 = T 3. Brunt, art. cit. 65, suggests that the author may have been deceived by a manuscript corruption; that seems improbable.

⁴¹ T 2, F 6, F 47 (Plutarch and Athenaeus).

⁴² The assumption is well-nigh universal; cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 508; Berve no. 121; Pearson, *LHA* 151; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* liv.

⁴³ *FGrH* 134 F 22; cf. T. S. Brown, *Onesicritus* (Berkeley 1949), 81 ff.; Pearson, *LHA* 100 f.

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the monsoons are a common feature of Alexander historians. But the citations of Aristobulus' data about natural history come from a variety of sources, both from Strabo and Arrian; and botanical and geographical excursuses are likely to have been a recurrent feature of his work. We can go further. Some of Aristobulus' information is given by other sources in different contexts. Aristobulus mentioned *asafoetida* as a natural curiosity of the Hindu Kush, but another source, excerpted by Strabo (xv 2. 10 (725)), includes a description of the plant in an account of the hardships suffered during the transit of the passes (cf. iii 28. 6 n.). Similarly the description of the monsoon rains is presented as a catalogue of natural phenomena with no attempt to trace their effect (which was devastating) upon the Macedonian troops.⁴⁴ Again Aristobulus' description of the flora of the Gedrosian desert is a bland survey of curiosities—even the giant thorns being portrayed as more comic than dangerous (vi 22. 7–8), whereas in Strabo's parallel account (probably from Nearchus) the desert plants are described as poisonous, contributing to the fearful hardships suffered during the desert journey.⁴⁵ There seems a tendency to shy away from descriptions of hardships and to concentrate on the curiosities of the march. That tendency was not unique to Aristobulus. One of Hermann Strasburger's great services has been to call attention to a series of reports of hardships ('Strapazenberichte') which are totally ignored by Arrian,⁴⁶ and the most obvious and plausible explanation is that they were omitted by both his primary sources. Stories of suffering and casualties on the march did not apparently suit the taste either of Ptolemy or of Aristobulus.

An associated tendency of Aristobulus' work is his inclination towards apologetic, to exculpate or mitigate aspects of Alexander's behaviour which were susceptible to criticism. This tendency has often been noted, perhaps too emphatically;⁴⁷ we know too little of what happened at Gordium or at the Cydnus to be sure that his variant stories are apologetic in nature (cf. ii 3. 7, 4. 7 nn.). But some things are indisputable. Aristobulus unequivocally made Cleitus alone responsible for his murder (iv 8. 9) and denied that Callisthenes was ever executed

⁴⁴ Cf. Diod. 94. 1–3; Strabo xv 1. 27 (697). Nearchus also described the Acesines in flood, and Strabo significantly connects his account with the effects on the Macedonians: they were forced to move camp (xv 1. 18 = *FGH* 133 F 18).

⁴⁵ Strabo xv 2. 7 (723) with Theophr. *HP* iv 4. 13. The fundamental treatment of the passage is by H. Strasburger, *Hermes* lxxx (1952) 461–5. His attribution of the variant account to Nearchus has not gone unchallenged (cf. Pearson, *LHA* 178 n. 151; Badian *CW* lxxv (1971) 50), but it should be clear that the passage on the poison plants does not come from Aristobulus.

⁴⁶ Strasburger, art. cit. 470–3. The most striking of these instances is the death march to the Oxus (cf. iii 29. 2 n.).

⁴⁷ Cf. Schwartz, *RE* ii 917 f.; Strasburger 13 f.; Pearson, *LHA* 150, 157 ff. Tarn (ii 37–43, 131 f.) protested in favour of Aristobulus, but his own taste for apologetic was remarkably similar.

(iv 14. 3). He also reacted against the contemporary allegations that Alexander drank himself to death and maintained that the king did not drink excessively but kept late hours for conversation's sake.⁴⁸ This apologetic tendency was noted in antiquity. Some of the references are of late and weak authority and may be discarded,⁴⁹ but it is hard to see how Lucian's story of Alexander's rebuke to Aristobulus (*de hist. conscr.* 12 = T 4) could have taken shape unless his history was commonly thought to be a highly flattering one.⁵⁰ Clearly Arrian was aware of the reputation of his source but he thought the bias justified. Because Aristobulus wrote after Alexander's death he wrote what he did without fear or favour; if, then, his work has a bias towards eulogy, it is a bias justified by the facts. The argument may be naïve and simplistic, but it does not disprove the view that Aristobulus' work was adulatory and apologetic. Again Ptolemy shared the tendency, to some degree at least. The tendency to exculpate is sharply illustrated by their common account of the trial of Philotas, which both treat as a clear-cut case of treason and even, it seems, adduce admissions extracted by torture as historical fact (iii 26. 1 n.); and they state unequivocally that Callisthenes was involved in the Pages' conspiracy (iv 14. 1).

There was clearly much material common to both Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Their joint account is sometimes referred to, as are joint omissions (cf. ii 12. 6, iii 26. 1, iv 14. 1, v 7. 1, vi 11. 5, vi 28. 2, vii 13. 3). Occasionally variants are cited which are so trivial that they suggest that the two accounts were otherwise unanimous (cf. iv 3. 5, v 20. 2). It has even been argued that Aristobulus drew upon Ptolemy,⁵¹ but it is hard to see why he should have followed the same general lines and chosen the most trivial points for disagreement. It seems more probable that both authors followed a common tradition which diverged in detail. Arrian may even have chosen to report only those variants which he was unable to decide between and in other cases made his own selection without noting the variants. The disagreements may well have been wider and more radical than the text of Arrian implies. But even so, the narrative of Arrian has certain general characteristics which were certainly common to both sources. Arrian's narrative can be placed alongside the so-called vulgate tradition, the tradition common to Diodorus xvii, Curtius Rufus, and Justin, which in all

⁴⁸ For the contemporary propaganda see Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 114-16 and for a possible additional example of Aristobulus' apologetic see below i g. 1-8 n.

⁴⁹ Cf. Brunt, *CQ* xxiv (1974) 65 ff., disposing successfully of the evidence from the Byzantine epitome on rhetoric (T 5), which most likely does not refer to the historian Aristobulus.

⁵⁰ Brunt 68 f. attacks the content of Lucian's story as romantic fabrication. That is no doubt true, but it is significant that the romance was attached explicitly to Aristobulus. It is a counsel of desperation to suggest that it was wrongly fastened to him in later tradition.

⁵¹ Cf. Strasburger 15 f., cautiously approved by Badian, *Studies* 257.

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probability derives from the first-generation historian Cleitarchus;⁵² and from critical comparison of the two traditions various traits emerge.

Firstly, it is undeniable that there is a strong encomiastic trait in Arrian, a trait that depicts both the king and his army as invincible and virtually superhuman. The campaign narrative reads as an unbroken catalogue of success, and contrasts sharply with the more chequered record of the vulgate. There is little or no record of setback and losses—and what defeats occur tend to be attributed to others. The reverse outside Thebes is laid at the door of Perdiccas (i 8. 1) and the disaster in Sogdiana attributed to the incompetence of other officers (iv 5. 7–6. 2). Alexander is uniformly successful, except in the first assault at Tyre (ii 22. 6–7 with notes) and the first advance on the Persian Gates (iii 18. 3 n.), and these comparative failures are given the briefest coverage, with no suggestion that casualties were widely sustained. In the large-scale siege descriptions, particularly those of Halicarnassus, Tyre, and Gaza, the selection of episodes is overwhelmingly biased towards reports of Macedonian successes, particularly those led and inspired by Alexander himself,⁵³ and there are significant instances where reverses sustained are transformed into victories for the attackers.⁵⁴ They are not merely victories but effortless victories. There is an additional tendency. Alexander is made to accept every challenge offered him. At the Granicus he accepts at once the challenge of the Persian defence along the river bank (i 13. 2 n.) and at Issus the whole tenor of the narrative is that Alexander moved at high speed to attack the Persians on their chosen position at Sochi; there is no hint of the rival tradition that Alexander deliberately forced the Persians into *his* chosen ground in the coastal defiles (ii 6. 1 n.). Natural obstacles also presented challenges to be overcome, and the motif is epitomized in the comment about the 'impregnable' position of Gaza (*αἰπετόν . . . ὅσω ἀπορώτερον*: ii 26. 3; cf. iv 21. 3, 28. 3–4). There are also exaggerations of the natural difficulties, notably the absurd figures for the height of the walls of Tyre (ii 21. 4 n.) and the description of the citadel at Celaenae (i 29.

⁵² The existence of a common source has long been known and it is an incontrovertible fact, acknowledged as such since at least the first edition of de Sainte-Croix, published in 1770 (cf. Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 26–8; and for a revealing list of parallels see Schwartz, *RE* iv 1873 f.). The identification of that source as Cleitarchus is still contested (cf. E. N. Borza, *PACA* ii (1968) 25–45; P. Goukowsky, *REA* lxxi (1969) 320), but there seems no other viable contender and the identification has been strongly pressed in recent years (cf. Schachermeyr² 658–62; J. R. Hamilton in *Greece & the E. Mediterranean* 126–46). The dating of Cleitarchus' work is controversial and depends in part on intricate arguments of borrowings which at times border on the metaphysical. I would accept with great caution the arguments lately adduced which would place his work in the vicinity of 310 B.C.; cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 211–24; Badian, *PACA* viii (1965) 1–8; Hamilton, *Historia* x (1961) 448–58.

⁵³ Cf. i 21. 5, ii 4. 4, ii 10. 3, ii 22. 4, 23. 5, iii 14. 3, etc.

⁵⁴ Cf. i 21. 3, 22. 2, ii 22. 6 with notes ad locc.

i n.). Alexander conquers against all obstacles and conquers effortlessly with the favour of the gods. That tendency is perhaps best illustrated by the brief narrative of the passage of Mt. Climax (i 26. 2 n.), but the presentation of Arrian as the favourite of heaven is recurrent and consistent (cf. i 17. 6, ii 3. 8, 6. 6, 7. 3, 14. 7, iii 3. 4). The king fought with the gods on his side and was naturally invincible, as the casualty figures strikingly demonstrate. Nowhere else in the extant sources is so much carnage wrought upon the enemy at such trivial cost as in Arrian's narrative (cf. i 16. 4, ii 11. 8, 24. 4, iii 15. 6 with notes).

The encomiastic aspect of Arrian's narrative is patent, as are the distortions it produced, and it seems that much of the tradition was already provided by Alexander's first historian, Callisthenes of Olynthus.⁵⁵ Callisthenes' work was notoriously eulogistic and flattering to the king, and some of the known features of his work recur in Arrian. His description of the phenomena encountered in the journey to Siwah was repeated more or less completely by Ptolemy and Aristobulus (iii 3. 4 n.). More significantly Arrian's account of Issus not only follows the main lines of Callisthenes' narrative (in so far as it can be restored from Polybius' critique) but reproduces and even improves upon the encomiastic distortions which it contained (ii 10. 1, 11. 8 nn.). The motif of divine favour is also likely to derive from Callisthenes, who depicted the Pamphylian sea offering *proskynesis* to Alexander (F 31; cf. i 26. 2 n.), portrayed him as son of Zeus (F 14 a), and reported his prayer at Gaugamela—which was duly answered (F 36 = Plut. *Al.* 33. 1–2). The eulogistic bias is entirely explicable, since Callisthenes was broadcasting the king's achievements from court, and the emphasis upon invincibility had an obvious propaganda value at a time when there was serious unrest in the Greek world. Nor is it surprising that Ptolemy used and improved upon the distortions in Callisthenes. He was the custodian of the mummified body of Alexander, and his regime depended upon Alexander's right of conquest. Not only that. Survivors of Alexander's campaigns were well represented in his armies, and he had some interest in stressing that they had been invincible.⁵⁶ Aristobulus' bias is less easy to explain. It is usually argued that he was influenced by genuine friendship and admiration for Alexander, and that may be true. If so, his experiences under Cassander may have had some effect. Cassander was bitterly hostile to the memory of Alexander, annihilated his family, and ceremoniously restored Thebes.⁵⁷ The negative aspects of Alexander's reign will have been stressed in the propaganda of his reign, and Aristobulus may well have been left with

⁵⁵ For the fragments of Callisthenes see Jacoby, *FGH* 124. The foundation article is still that by Jacoby in *RE* x 1674–1707. See also T. S. Brown, *AJP* lxx (1949) 225–48; Pearson, *LHA* 22–49; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* liii f.; Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 11 f.

⁵⁶ This argument is expanded in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 25–9.

⁵⁷ Diod. xix 52. 4–5, 53. 2 ff.; cf. Errington, in *Alexander le Grand: image et réalité* 151 f.

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an obsession to correct the emphasis at all costs. If he were looking back at Cassander, his tendency to apologetic is perfectly explicable.

It would be wrong to claim that the tradition of Ptolemy and Aristobulus is worthless. As one would expect in the writings of first-generation historians with access to contemporary materials, there is a great deal of uncontroversial factual material—details of itineraries, embassies, appointments, and the like. But the information is not unique; the vulgate tradition often confirms and sometimes corrects. Above all there is a constant bias to encomium which needs the constant corrective of the vulgate tradition. It therefore needs to be asked why Arrian chose precisely these two sources and did not adduce other contemporary historians, notably Cleitarchus who also participated in the campaigns (it seems) and wrote after the king's death. His work is usually stigmatized as rhetorical and romantic, and Arrian has received many compliments for his preference for the supposedly sober and factual narrative of Ptolemy. But it is now clear that Ptolemy's narrative was as romantic as any other—and Arrian was far from averse to romance.⁵⁸ His account of Parthian pre-history is both sensational and romantic and contrasts most unfavourably with the alternative tradition preserved in Strabo and Justin/Trogus.⁵⁹ It is more likely to have been the over-all view of Alexander which attracted him. His task was to commemorate Alexander's *res gestae*, and the material provided by Ptolemy and Aristobulus, a virtually unbroken catalogue of success, was particularly adapted to his purposes.

Arrian did occasionally use sources other than Ptolemy and Aristobulus in his narrative portions, particularly in the sections on India which overlap his work in the *Indica*. His geographical material seems taken from Eratosthenes (cf. v 3. 1-4, v 5. 1, 6. 2), but significantly Eratosthenes seems not to have been used before Book v, for Arrian uses the new material to correct an earlier inaccuracy (cf. iii 28. 5 n.). Nearchus is also used from the beginning of Book vi both as a narrative source and a control source.⁶⁰ An appreciation of his material is out of place here and must be reserved for the second volume, but once again it must be stressed that there is no trace of Nearchus before the Indus journey. Arrian only used the portions of his work which were relevant for the *Indica*.

The sources for the *logoi* are wholly uncertain. Arrian only once mentions specific authors; the supposed Roman embassy is reported according to the accounts of Aristus and Asclepiades (vii 15. 5). Both authors are obscure, Asclepiades totally so. Aristus was known to Strabo as a historian much later than Aristobulus and Onesicritus, resident in

⁵⁸ Cf. v 5. 1: a major heading of the *Indica* is to be ἀπονα ζῶα.

⁵⁹ *Parthica* F 1; cf. Strabo xi 9. 2 (515); Justin xli 4. 4-10 with the excellent analysis of J. Wolski, *Berytus* xii (1956/7) 35-52.

⁶⁰ vi 13. 4, 24. 2, vii 3. 6, 20. 9. Cf. Schwartz, *RE* ii 1239.

Salamis in Cyprus.⁶¹ A handful of citations survive, none of any significance—apart from the report of the Roman embassy, and nothing can be inferred of the content of his work—or even of its date, beyond the fact that it appeared before Strabo and long after Alexander's reign. The possibilities remain open. Arrian could have selected the accounts of Aristus and Asclepiades because they gave the fullest version of the Romans' reception. Alternatively he could have used a later work which singled out Aristus and Asclepiades as sources. The latter is probably the case. There is little trace of intensive investigation of sources elsewhere in Arrian, and he seems to imply, wrongly, that only Aristus and Asclepiades referred to a Roman embassy; had he researched the matter closely he must have found the reports in Cleitarchus which were known to Pliny.⁶² Similarly the subsidiary report of the introduction of *proskynesis* runs exactly parallel in substance and language to Plutarch's narrative excerpted from Chares of Mitylene.⁶³ Plutarch is not used directly, for Arrian has a little additional detail;⁶⁴ but the similarity of wording is so close that we must accept that the two authors either used Chares direct or drew on precisely the same intermediary source. There is no other valid evidence. The rest of the *logoi* have little in common. Some are frequently attested throughout the tradition (e.g. ii 12. 6f., iii 10. 1), while others reflect a variant or even unique version (e.g. i 12. 1, iii 2. 1). The variety of sources at Arrian's disposal was far greater than the number known to us, whether extant or attested, and he could logically have used any of them in any combination. All that we can say with any confidence is that *logoi* are not likely to have been taken from a large number of direct sources.

Arrian's qualities as a historian can be called into question both in his selection of sources and in his use of them. It may also be doubted how extensive his historical knowledge was. He had none of the encyclopaedic crudition of Polybius, and when he leaves the narrow confines of Alexander and his chosen sources the knowledge displayed is at best superficial. The excursus on the fall of Thebes is based almost entirely on the two great classics, Thucydides and Xenophon; and Arrian's presentation is neither wholly accurate nor wholly lucid (cf. i 9. 3nn.). Whatever originally stood in his sources, the double attribution of the Peace of Antalcidas to the reign of 'Darius' shows scant appreciation of the facts of fourth century history (cf. ii 1. 4n.). His final character-study of Darius shows total ignorance of his reign,

⁶¹ Strabo xiv 6. 3 (682), xv 3. 8 (730) = *FGrH* 143 T 1, F 1. For a brief description of the fragments see Pearson, *LHA* 254 f.

⁶² Pliny, *NH* iii 57 = *FGrH* 137 F 31. Cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 218 ff.

⁶³ iv 12. 3–5 = Plut. *Al.* 54. 4–6 (Jacoby prints both versions as *FGrH* 125 F 14).

⁶⁴ He gives the father's name of Demetrius (Pythonax); Plutarch 54. 6 gives his pseudonym Pheidon.

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where its history did not impinge on the actions of Alexander (iii 22. 2 n.), and refers casually to the battle 'at Arbela', despite the fact that he devotes an excursus to correcting that very error (iii 8. 7, 22. 4 nn.). The combination of carelessness and lack of erudition is startling in a writer who has been regularly praised for his reliability and who himself claimed to be composing a definitive factual history (cf. vi 11. 2, 8).

4. ARRIAN'S STYLE AND POPULARITY

Arrian prides himself on his style above all, and he claims that the success of his history of Alexander will win him primacy in the sphere of Greek letters (i 12. 5 nn.; cf. *praef.* 3). Half a millennium later his claims were fully justified by Photius, who ended his précis of the *History of the Successors* with a glowing appreciation of his style (cod. 92: 72^b40ff. = Roos, *Arriani Scripta Minora* lxvif.): 'this man is inferior to none of the best writers of history'. He is praised for his conciseness and avoidance of newly coined vocabulary. Photius admires his skilful use of figures to vary his narrative and states explicitly that it is in the composition of the narrative that his innovations lie. The result of his writing, he thinks, is a happy mixture of stylistic virtuosity and conventional vocabulary, which produces an impression of lucid clarity. That is fair comment. Anyone who examines an extensive passage of Arrian's narrative, such as the review of the armies before Gaugamela (iii 11. 3-12. 5), will be immediately struck by the complex variation of word-order, construction, and vocabulary. Even in the most lengthy catalogue the construction is so subtly arranged that it is rare for two consecutive clauses to match each other in language. What in particular impresses Photius is Arrian's use of ellipse; he does not omit periods, rather individual words—and it is stylistically impossible to provide a supplement. Modern historians, more concerned with fact than style, might be less charitable in their reactions to Arrian's ellipses, which can pose baffling problems of interpretation,¹ but Photius' judgement remains a valuable corrective. Arrian was no slavish copier of sources, as modern scholars have tended to suppose, but a very expert and sophisticated stylist in his own right.

Arrian's prose is a very personal and artificial creation. It has been described as Attic, but it is far removed from the academic Atticism of the second-century A.D. There is a strong trend towards archaism; Arrian uses compounds in ξυν-, the reflexive pronouns οὖ and σφεῖς, and the archaic Attic plural -ῆς.² Some usages contravene the strict

¹ Note particularly vii 6. 4-5, where Arrian's extremely elliptical phrasing totally obscures the crucial question how far barbarian cavalry had been drafted into the ranks of the *hetairoi*: cf. P. A. Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 43 f.; E. Badian, *JHS* lxxxv (1965) 161.

² The archaic form only occurs sporadically in the manuscripts of Arrian, but it appears unambiguously in the second-century papyrus fragment of the *History of the Successors* (*PSI* xii 2. 1284, col. 82. 5; cf. K. Latte, *Kleine Schriften* (Munich 1968), 597).

canons of Attic prose; *αἰχμαλωτισθεῖσαν* was a notorious inelegancy (cf. iii 22. 4 n.), *καίτοι* is used with the participle instead of *καίπερ*, and *πρίν* with the infinitive occurs after a negative main clause.³ Significantly the last two usages, like many other departures from strict Attic, have parallels in Herodotus, and it cannot be too strongly emphasized that Arrian's chief stylistic debt is to Herodotus.⁴ Most of the particular characteristics of the Ionian historian are reproduced in Arrian's style. There is the same superfluity of expression,⁵ the same use of epanalepsis,⁶ the same use of resumptive clauses at the end of key stages of the narrative.⁷ There is the same looseness of construction, which Demetrius characterized as *λέξις εἰρομένη*; clauses are strung together by connecting particles with little or no binding from subordinate clauses⁸ and anacoloutha occur frequently, the construction often changing in mid sentence.⁹ Equally striking is a wide range of vocabulary shared between the two authors and often not attested elsewhere in Greek prose usage.¹⁰ One can speak of Arrian's style as literary reconstruction of Herodotus. The borrowing is of course explicit in the *Indica* where Arrian resurrects the Ionic dialect but it is implicit throughout most of his other work; the Ionicisms are eliminated but the style is distinctively Herodotean.

Arrian has debts to other authors, not least Thucydides. There are repeated echoes of Thucydides, particularly in speeches or historical excursuses. The comment on the fall of Thebes is strongly Thucydidean in phrasing; not surprisingly, since most of the examples chosen are based on his work (i 9. 1–3 with notes). But Thucydides can appear less intrusively; the debate at Miletus (i 18. 6–9) contains reflections of the speeches before the battle in the Great Harbour,¹¹ and Alexander's speech before Gaugamela is virtually a piece of free composition in

³ For a convenient list of non-Attic usages see the edition of K. Abicht, 16–18. For the divergent uses of *καίτοι* and *πρίν* compare Hdt. viii 53. 1, i 165. 3 (cf. Powell, *Lexicon to Herodotus* 317).

⁴ See particularly the excellent dissertation by H. R. Grundmann, 'Quid in elocutione Arriani Herodoto debeatur', *Berliner Studien* ii (1886) 181–268. This work supplements and largely supersedes earlier dissertations by E. Meyer, *De Arriano Thucydideo* (Rostock 1887) and C. Renz, *Arrianus quatenus Xenophontis imitator sit* (Rostock 1879).

⁵ Dozens of examples collected by Grundmann 200–2.

⁶ Cf. ii 10. 4 *ἡ διέσχε... ταύτη ἐμβάλλουσιν*; iii 18. 12 *ἀνθ' ὧν... ὑπὲρ τούτων*. See further Grundmann 206 ff.

⁷ Cf. i 19. 11, 20. 7, 25. 10, iii 12. 1, etc. Further examples Grundmann 211.

⁸ Good examples at i 1. 1 and ii 11. 5. Full discussion Grundmann 214 ff.

⁹ Cf. iv 4. 4 with the further examples in Grundmann 230 ff. For a particularly striking use of anacolouthon see the imitation of the Herodotean nominative absolute at i 9. 5 (cf. my note ad loc.). The Herodotean intrusive infinitives (above p. 21) should also be included in this category.

¹⁰ Note particularly *πόθος λαμβάνει αὐτόν* (i 3. 5 n.) and *οὐδὲν ἄχαρι παθεῖν* (i 17. 9 n.), both phrases which have been claimed for Ptolemy. See also the notes on the Herodotean verbs *ἐπιφρασθέντα* and *ἐπιλεξαμένους* (iii 2. 1–2). For a full and impressive list of such borrowings see Grundmann 248–56.

¹¹ Cf. Thuc. vii 62. 2, 67. 2.

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Thucydidean style (cf. iii 9. 6 n.). Key phrases from Thucydides also occur at appropriate points in Arrian's work (cf. i 12. 2 and vi 11. 8 with Thuc. i 97. 2). But Thucydides is a more occasional influence than Herodotus, who is an all-pervasive influence on style and vocabulary, and, perhaps surprisingly, Xenophon is even less obtrusive. Admittedly the opening of the narrative proper seems modelled upon the *Cyropaedia* (cf. i 1. 1 n.), but the stylistic debt to Xenophon is not pronounced. His characteristic use of *καί* with a demonstrative pronoun referring to the antecedent clause occurs frequently enough in Arrian¹² as do his temporal conjunctions (*καί ἐν τούτῳ, καί ἐνταῦθα*) and the repetition of a subordinate verb as the main verb of the following clause.¹³ There is also some imitation of Xenophon's vocabulary,¹⁴ but at a much lower level than his imitation of Herodotus.

These remarks might give the impression that Arrian's style is a pastiche. That would be unfortunate. Arrian had an artificial style, it is true, and the elements which constitute it can be isolated, but his work displays none of the flagrant parody such as is found in the passages of the 'histories' of Verus' Parthian Wars which are stigmatized by Lucian.¹⁵ On the contrary, his style is unitary, and, even though it is dominated by Herodotus, the effect is one of re-creation not crude borrowing. It is, if anything, a tribute to him that modern historians have so often been misled by the seeming simplicity of the style, and treated his carefully constructed narrative as an excerpt at two removes from Alexander's archives. Arrian might not enjoy the pre-eminence in Greek prose writing that he and Photius claim for his work, but he is without a doubt a most accomplished and sophisticated stylist and he should be treated as such.

Arrian regarded his work as definitive (vi 11. 2), and he seems to have been regarded as a model historian in antiquity. Lucian refers to him as a precedent for his attempt to write up the career of Alexander of Abonuteichos:¹⁶ even Arrian, a leading Roman and a life-long devotee of culture, wrote a history of the brigand Tillorobus. Nothing is known of this work, but, since the brigand in question ranged over Mysia and Mt. Ida, there is a fair probability that it formed part of the *Bithyniaca* or was issued as a supplementary opusculum like the *Indica*.¹⁷

¹² i 12. 7, 16. 4-5, 21. 2, etc. Full list of instances in Grundmann 184-6.

¹³ i 10. 6, 17. 2, etc. See further Grundmann 186.

¹⁴ Perhaps most strikingly at ii 10. 3 *τὴν κυμῆναν τῆς φάλαγγος*. See further the far from impressive list in Grundmann 191.

¹⁵ Cf. Luc. *de hist. conscr.* 15 (Creperius Calpurnianus and Thucydides); 18 (copying from Herodotus in bogus Ionic). See the commentary by H. Homeyer, *Lucian: Wie man Geschichte schreiben soll* (Munich 1965).

¹⁶ Luc. *Alexander* 2 = T 24 (Roos). The work was written after the death of Marcus in 180 (cf. *Al.* 48).

¹⁷ Tillorobus is only known from the reference in Lucian. There is no way of dating him and his depredations may well have occurred before the Romans annexed Bithynia—the terminal point of Arrian's *Bithyniaca*.

Lucian's formal justification lies in the rank and literary prestige of Arrian, but there are wider implications. He begins his work with a contrast between Alexander of Abonuteichos and Alexander son of Philip; the one was as pre-eminent in vice as the other in virtue. The reference to Alexander no doubt evoked the name of Arrian, and, Lucian implies, if the leading historian of that paragon of virtue could stoop to the biography of a brigand, there was every justification for his description of the career of the prophet of Abonuteichos. Lucian's remark in its context is ample evidence of Arrian's prestige immediately after his lifetime, as is the fact that Appian drew directly upon him for material on Alexander and the mysterious Amyntianus parodied his claims to literary supremacy.¹⁸ So far the evidence deals with the reign of Marcus Aurelius and its immediate sequel. But Arrian's reputation remained high in the third century. His fellow countryman, Claudius Cassius Dio Cocceianus,¹⁹ wrote a life of 'Arrian the philosopher', commemorated his achievements in Cappadocia, and used his *Parthica* as the primary source for Trajan's Parthian Wars.²⁰ That emphasis was to be expected in a native of Bithynia, but Arrian's prestige stood high elsewhere, notably in his adopted city, Athens. About the middle of the third century the Athenian historian P. Herennius Dexippus wrote a history of events after Alexander's death. Photius gives a summary of his version of the Babylon settlement, which follows very closely his summary of Arrian and adds the note that the rest of the work likewise agreed largely with Arrian.²¹ Dexippus clearly used his *History of the Successors* as a primary source for his own work; it must have been the definitive treatment of the subject.

In the fourth century the influence of Arrian is less explicit but it is none the less detectable. Themistius writing in 384 was well acquainted with the facts of Arrian's career and adduces him as a celebrated example of a philosopher active in public life.²² More importantly there exists from the time of Constantius II (340) an anonymous tract named the *Itinerarium Alexandri*.²³ It was composed at the beginning of

¹⁸ See the references above pp. 12.

¹⁹ For the full nomenclature see *AE* 1971. 430.

²⁰ For the biography see 'Suda' s.v. *Ἀλὼν ὁ Κάσσιος* (T 1) with G. Wirth, *Klio* xli (1963) 221-33; Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 166; for Arrian in Cappadocia see Dio lxix 15. 1 with Bosworth, *HSCP* lxxxi (1977) 218 ff.; for the use of the *Parthica* see A. G. Roos, *Studia Arrianea* (Leipzig 1912); K. Hartmann, *Philologus* lxxiv (1917) 73-91; Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian War* 1 ff.; Wirth, *Studii Clasice* xvi (1974) 194 ff.

²¹ Phot. cod. 82: 64^a21 ff. = *FGrH* 100 F 8. For the life and background of Dexippus see F. Millar, *JRS* lix (1969) 12-29.

²² Themistius 34. 8 = T 13. Cf. Bosworth, *HSCP* lxxxi (1977) 229 ff.

²³ For general discussion see Kubitschek, *RE* ix 2363-6. The most accessible (though far from satisfactory) text is that following Müller's edition of Ps.-Callisthenes in the appendix to Dübner's Arrian (Didot 1846: pp. 154-67). The edition of D. Volkmann (Programm Schulpforta 1871), which is allegedly a great improvement, has unfortunately not been accessible to me.

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Constantius' Persian expedition and purports to give the *itinerarium* of two earlier conquerors, Alexander and Trajan. The portion relating to Trajan has been lost, and what remains concerns Alexander alone. It is a brief and scrappy history, carelessly written and, despite the author's protestations, very rhetorically presented. But it is clear that the bulk of it (chs. 16–109) is extracted almost wholly from the first four books of Arrian's history of Alexander (thereafter the *Itinerarium* reverts to the tradition of the Alexander Romance). The selection of material is capricious and sporadic but there is no doubt that Arrian was used, however carelessly, as a direct source (cf. *Itin.* 18 with i 11. 3–5; *Itin.* 42 with ii 20. 1–2; *Itin.* 48 with iii 1. 1–5). Indeed there are peculiar additions which suggest that the text used was different from that of our archetype (see the notes to ii 14. 3, iii 2. 1). But, whatever minor divergences occur, the main fact is clear that the *Itinerarium* is a derivative of Arrian, and the author makes it clear that he has followed the sources whose reputation traditionally stood highest.²⁴ It seems unavoidable that the reputation of Arrian and his Alexander history was undiminished in the fourth century.

Arrian remained a classic in the Byzantine period.²⁵ Stephanus drew on his historical works, particularly the *Bithyniaca* and the *Parthica*, but also to a lesser degree the Alexander history. In the mid ninth century Photius read the Alexander history, the *Bithyniaca*, the *Parthica*, and the *History of the Successors*, and, as we have seen, placed Arrian in the first rank of historians. Arrian's works were a mine for the compilers of florilegia and commentaries. The 'Suda' refers repeatedly to all the historical works (with the exception of the *Bithyniaca*), and the *Parthica* is largely reconstructed from the fragments so provided. The same liberal use of Arrian persists as late as Eustathius in the latter part of the twelfth century AD; Eustathius drew upon the *Bithyniaca* and to a lesser extent the Alexander history in his commentaries on the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and Dionysius Periegetes. However harshly we may judge Arrian's talents as a historian, his works were undoubtedly used and admired as classics for a millennium after his death.

TEXT, TRANSLATIONS, AND EDITIONS

In 1904 A. G. Roos set the study of the textual tradition on an entirely new footing when he proved that all extant manuscripts were copied directly or indirectly from a codex in Vienna, the Vindobonensis gr. 4 (A), which dates from about AD 1200.¹ The manuscript like all others

²⁴ *Itin.* 2: *nec . . . vilibus usus auctoribus, sed quos fidei amicissimos velus censura pronunciat.*

²⁵ For documentation see the painstaking indexes of Roos (*Anabasis* xxxvi–xli; *Scripta Minora* 315–20).

¹ A. G. Roos, *Prolegomena ad Arriani Anabaseos et Indicae editionem criticam* (Groningen 1904), repeated as the *Prolegomena* of his *editio maior* of 1907.

observes the great lacuna at vii 12. 7, but Roos was able to show that it has lost a folium at the crucial point. The previous folium ends at the break and the following folium begins with the text after the lacuna (*ἡφαιστίων κτλ*). It is therefore demonstrable that the lacuna was originally caused by the loss of a folium in the Vienna codex, and, since all other manuscripts repeat the lacuna, they are necessarily derivative. Unfortunately the manuscript was affected by damp and parts of it were faded by the fifteenth century. Accordingly the opening of the Alexander history (to i 1. 8) and the end of the *Indica* (from 43. 10) have been lost, and a later scribe (A²) took upon himself the task of restoring the rest of the manuscript. Some passages he rewrote over the old traces but in an exceedingly careless and ignorant fashion. Twenty folia he tore out and replaced with faulty transcripts of his own, and elsewhere he rewrote faded passages on separate slips and glued them over the original. The secondary tradition cannot therefore be abandoned altogether; it must be adduced where the text of the Vienna codex is lost and mutilated. This tradition Roos divided into two classes, the second subdivided into three families, and his results have recently been corroborated in a study by H. Tonnet (*Revue d'Histoire des Textes* iii (1973) 39–55).

There is a subsidiary source of textual information in the Byzantine *excerpta*,² compiled in the tenth century, which deal with sieges, embassies, and *sententiae*. These *excerpta* preserve extracts of the text often several chapters in length (note particularly the *libellus de obsidione toleranda*, which gives extensive passages from the sieges of Tyre, Gaza, the Sogdian rock, and the rock of Chorienes: ii 18. 2–23. 6, 25. 4–27. 7, iv 18. 4–19. 4, 21. 2–6). There are also passages from commentators on other authors which shed independent light on the textual tradition (cf. iii 16. 8n.), but the variants are relatively few and very rarely give a significantly improved reading. Indeed there are relatively few textual problems which are of major importance for the historian. Aberrations and curiosities of spellings occur, but often these can be traced back to Arrian himself and the textual critic amends them at his peril (for classic instances see ii 23. 2 and iii 11. 9nn.). The most frequent type of textual corruption is the lacuna. Apart from the great omission in Book vii there are numerous smaller gaps in the text. The temptation is invariably to supplement such gaps with the absolute minimum of words, but, once a lacuna is established, it is totally a matter of conjecture how much of the original was omitted; the scribe may have glossed over a few words or a number of lines. There are some obvious cases where a quite substantial portion of the original text has been omitted (cf. i 12. 1, iii 8. 5nn.). If there are omissions, there are also scribal glosses—rudimentary and sometimes inaccurate comments

² The *excerpta* are fully discussed by Roos in his *Prolegomena* xxxvi–xli.

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upon the subject-matter, which have been absorbed into the text during the process of transmission (e.g. i 14. 2, ii 8. 9nn.). These phenomena are relatively rare but the historian should be on his guard against treating the text of Arrian as immaculately preserved.

The first known manuscript of Arrian brought to western Europe was owned by Giovanni Aurispa in 1421. This contained the history of Alexander, a work which proved popular in the fifteenth century, for no less than four Latin translations were made in the years between 1433 and the appearance of the *editio princeps* in 1535.³ Of these the most influential was that by Bartholemaeus Facius, completed after his death in November 1457 by Iacobus Curlus. Despite its many inaccuracies this translation became established as canonical and it was printed in various editions throughout the sixteenth century until it underwent a thorough revision at the hands of Vulcanius in 1575. The translation was successively revised by Blancardus and Gronovius, and finally in the nineteenth century formed the basis of the Parisian Didot editions.

The *editio princeps* was published at Venice in 1535 and edited by V. Trincavelli.⁴ The most important subsequent editions were by Vulcanius (Geneva 1575), Nicolaus Blancardus (Amsterdam 1668), and Iacobus Gronovius (Leiden 1704). Gronovius unearthed a manuscript (Laurentianus gr. plut. ix. 32) which he termed *optimus* and used it to fill a number of lacunae which had persisted in previous editions. It is in fact a transcript of the 'corrected' version of the Vienna codex with no independent value (cf. Roos, *Prolegomena* xxxi); but Gronovius' edition was a notable step forwards and his acute textual notes are still of value. Of subsequent editions that of Krüger (Berlin 1835) is valuable, but inclined to emend to excess; his volume of annotations (Berlin 1848) is largely a *florilegium* from earlier commentators. There are also editions by C. Sintenis (Weidmann 1867) and K. Abicht (Teubner 1871), both of which contain annotations in German, but the comment is largely confined to basic questions of language. The Didot edition by F. Dübner (Paris 1846) drew on some new manuscripts but its quality is mediocre; it nevertheless provided the basis for the notoriously inadequate Loeb edited by E. Iliff Robson (London 1929, 1933). Infinitely the best critical edition of Arrian is that by A. G. Roos (i: *Alexandri Anabasis*; ii: *Scripta Minora et Fragmenta*; second editions, revised by G. Wirth, Teubner 1967: 1968), which not only places the text on a totally new footing but supplies full and searching critical introductions. There are a few, mostly insignificant, modifications in his *editio minor* (Teubner 1910). Roos's text has been reproduced, with

³ See the full discussion by P. A. Stadter in *Catalogus Translationum et Commentariorum: Mediaeval and Renaissance Translations and Commentaries* (ed. F. E. Cranz) iii (Washington, DC: 1976) 1-17.

⁴ Full bibliographical details about the early editions are given by Roos, *Prolegomena* xlii-xlvi.

a few alterations and without critical apparatus, in the recent Loeb edition by P. A. Brunt (vol. i: London 1976), which contains a general literary and historical introduction, footnotes listing variant sources, and detailed appendices relating to historical *cruces*. It is the only edition of Arrian with a specifically historical orientation.

My own commentary is based upon Roos's text in the *editio maior* and the Greek lemmata are taken from Roos, whether or not my interpretation agrees with his reading. Wherever possible I have endeavoured to make my discussion intelligible to the Greekless reader; any person who uses the commentary alongside a translation is advised strongly to use Brunt's Loeb edition, where text and translation appear on facing pages and translation as well as text is marked off by paragraph numbers.⁵

⁵ Other English translations include that of the *Anabasis* and *Indica* by E. J. Chinnock (London 1893), which contains detailed critical notes, and A. de Sélincourt's somewhat free Penguin translation, which has been revised and supplied with introduction and historical footnotes by J. R. Hamilton (Arrian, *The Campaigns of Alexander* (London 1971)).

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Full discussion of Arrian's choice and use of sources is given in Section 3 of the Introduction. The commentary here deals with miscellaneous points of detail.

2. **πλείονες ἢ ἀξυμφωνότεροι** The large number of Alexander historians is often noted (Strabo xi 5. 4 (505); Cic. *pro Arch.* 24) and their disagreement is equally notorious. Strabo xv 1. 2 (685) complains about the contradictory reports even of eye-witnesses of the campaigns and despairs about their reports from hearsay. Even with his restricted range of sources Arrian is faced with disagreements about basic matters of fact and he repeatedly vents his irritation (ii 3. 8, iii 3. 6, iv 14. 3 f., vi 11. 2 ff., vii 14. 2).

βασιλεῖ ὄντι . . . ψεύσασθαι ἦν A famous verdict, echoed by Synesius (*FGrH* 138 F 11). C. Gorteman, *Chron. d'Égypte* xxxiii (1958) 256–67, has argued that the sentiment is taken from Ptolemy himself. That is unlikely. It is true that Hellenistic texts emphasized the desirability of truthfulness in a monarch (Hecataeus *ap.* Diod. i 70. 6; Aristes § 206; cf. Isocr. *Nicocles* 22); and Arrian himself quotes a dictum of Alexander to the effect that truth is a cardinal virtue for rulers and subjects alike (vii 5. 2; the Macedonians were not easily convinced!). But the stress upon truthfulness in rulers is a commonplace and occurs in the Roman context also (cf. Cic. *de Rep.* iii 3. 4; Pliny, *Pan.* 84. 1). There is no reason why Arrian himself should not have adduced Ptolemy's regal status as a reason for accepting his account. He does not state outright that there is no falsehood in Ptolemy's history; he merely suggests that he would have been eager to avoid the disgrace inherent in a detected lie.

ἢ τε ἀνάγκη καὶ ὁ μισθός The threat of coercion and desire for gain were familiar dangers of contemporary historiography. Lucian emphasizes both and cites Ctesias as a classic case of a historian affected by them (*de hist. conscr.* 39). He also quotes Alexander's remark on the venality of contemporary historians and contrasts popular belief in Homer's veracity because he wrote of no living man (40). The tendency to flatter living monarchs was a subject of frequent comment (cf. Diod. xxi 17. 4; Paus. i 7. 8, 15. 9), but it was also felt that what was still reported after the occasion for reward had passed had impeccable credentials (Tac. *Hist.* iv 81 *fin.*). Arrian does not mention the other aspect of the *topos*, the tendency of historians to malign a ruler after his death (cf. Jos. *AJ* xx 154 f.; Tac. *Ann.* i 1, etc.). He is well aware of the tendency (cf. vii 14. 2) but considered it irrelevant to the case of

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Ptolemy and Aristobulus. Unfortunately neither coercion nor reward ceased at Alexander's death (see above, p. 31).

3. ὅστις δὲ θαυμάσεται κτλ. For Arrian's claims to supremacy among Alexander historians see i 12. 1-5 with notes.

BOOK I

1. 1–3. *Alexander's Accession and First Expedition into Greece*

1. 1 λέγεται δὴ The source for this introductory passage cannot be determined. Schwartz considered Ptolemy's authorship certain, on the grounds that the indirect speech continues well into the narrative of the Danubian campaign (i 1. 5), a narrative derived principally from Ptolemy (*RE* ii 1241; so Kornemann 23). This argument is inconclusive, for it cannot be proved that when Arrian uses *oratio obliqua* he draws upon one source alone. There are instances where he explicitly uses both Ptolemy and Aristobulus and works material from them into a compound narrative, all presented in indirect speech (cf. ii 12. 3–5, iii 26. 1–27. 1). It is most improbable that either Ptolemy or Aristobulus would have omitted altogether the circumstances of Alexander's accession; Arrian may have begun with Aristobulus and switched to Ptolemy for the Danubian campaign.

Initially Arrian does not present the narrative on his own authority but gives the received tradition (λέγεται, λέγουσιν). It may be that this type of preamble was a convention of non-contemporary history in the imperial period. Dionysius of Halicarnassus starts his exposition in precisely the same way (*AR* i 9. 1). The ultimate model was probably Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, where the main narrative begins exactly as it does in Arrian: πατὴρ δὲ ὁ Κόρος λέγεται γενέσθαι Καμβύσου (*Cyrop.* i 2. 1).

ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Πυθοδόλου All manuscripts read Πυθοδήμου, a familiar corruption (cf. Dion. Hal. *Deinarchus* 4, p. 303. 17). The correct form, Πυθοδόλου is attested unimpeachably on Attic inscriptions (*IG* ii² 330. 29, 47, 1628. 350, 369). Corruption of archon names is a recurrent feature of the text of Arrian (cf. ii 11. 10, ii 24. 6, v 19. 3).

All sources agree that Philip's death fell in the Attic year 336/5, the archonship of Pythodelus (*Marmor Parium FGrH* 239 B2; Oxyrhynchus Chronicle, *FGrH* 255 (6); Diod. xvi 91. 1). Alexander is said to have reigned 12 years and 8 months (vii 28. 1; Diodorus i 17.5 has a variant 7 months), and, since his death at Babylon is exactly dated to 10 June 323, his accession should fall about October 336. Arrian provides a cross-check by his statement in the *Indica* (21. 1) that Nearchus' voyage from Patala, which he dates to the Attic month Boedromion, fell in the 11th regnal year of Alexander. In other words, Alexander began his 12th year after September 325. Beloch, however, argued that Philip was murdered in the summer of 336 (iii². 2 59), and his arguments have been accepted (e.g. Welles, *Diodorus* 100 n. 1; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 28).

The foundations of his hypothesis are extraordinarily flimsy, in particular his suggestion that Alexander followed Persian practice and dated his reign officially from the Macedonian New Year in the month Dios instead of the actual calendar date of accession in summer 336, and there is no reason to reject the consensus of the ancient sources. See now J. R. Fears, *Athenaeum* liii (1975) 114 n. 10.

Arrian says nothing about the murder of Philip and the turbulent circumstances of Alexander's accession. Like the entry in the Parian Marble (*FGrH* 239 B2) his narrative is confined to the bare statement of Philip's death. The fact of the murder and the delicate position of Alexander is only revealed subsequently as background to the story of Alexander the Lyncestian (i 25. 1-2: see the notes ad loc. for discussion and bibliography).

ἐς Πελοπόννησον Diodorus gives a fuller account of the events in Greece. Philip's death precipitated widespread unrest in Acarnania and Athens, as well as in the Peloponnese (Diod. 3. 5; cf. Justin xi 2. 4). This incipient uprising was promptly squashed by Alexander's march south with the Macedonian army (Diod. 4. 4).

ἄμφι τὰ εἴκοσιν ἔτη Other sources state that Alexander was twenty years old at his accession (Plut. *Al.* 11. 1; Justin xi 1. 9). That is confirmed by the precise statement of Aristobulus that the king lived for 32 years and 8 months (vii 28. 1 = *FGrH* 139 F 61); since he had a reign of 12 years and 7 or 8 months, his accession roughly coincided with his twentieth birthday. Plutarch, however, gives a precise date for Alexander's birth, 6 Hecatombaion, which he correlates correctly with the Macedonian month Loos (Plut. *Al.* 3. 5). This date, late July 356, is irreconcilable with the age given by Aristobulus, and although Aristobulus' figure has found some favour (Kacrst, *RE* i 1412; Jacoby, *Marmor Parium* (1904), 191), the tendency has been to reject it in favour of Plutarch's precise date. R. Unger (*Philologus* xli (1882) 82 n. 6) suggested the desperate expedient of emending Arrian's text to read 32 years and 10 months; recent theories hold that Aristobulus was misled by the supposed 'official' accession date of Alexander (Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 7; Lanc Fox 43). But there was no official accession date (see above); Alexander did in fact succeed in autumn 336. It is surely more probable that Plutarch's date is wrong. It is closely associated with Hegesias' famous synchronism of Alexander's birth and the conflagration of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus (*FGrH* 142 F 3; cf. Timaeus, *FGrH* 566 F 150). The date given by Plutarch may in fact be the date of the fire.

2. *Alexander and the Corinthian League.* For sources and full bibliography see H. H. Schmitt, *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* iii (Munich 1969) 3-14. For surveys of the problems involved see T. T. B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (1965), 150-62; J. Seibert, *Alexander der Große* (1972), 74-7.

Arrian's description of Alexander's installation as head of the

Corinthian league is very superficial, and his looseness of expression creates two main problems.

(a) Alexander is said to have been given the *hegemonia* of the expedition against Persia. That is what Diodorus also states; at a general meeting at Corinth the regular delegates voted him *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* of Hellas and agreed to campaign against the Persians in return for their wrongs against Greece (Diod. 4. 9). This is a repetition of his description of the vote for Philip in 337 (Diod. xvi 89. 1-3). Justin's notice is vague, merely stating that Alexander was installed in his father's place as *dux* (Justin xi 2. 5). None of the sources mentions the Common Peace, which was the basis of the Corinthian League, yet the Peace was important. It guaranteed the stability of southern Greece in the absence of the Macedonian king, and it takes first place in Arrian's later description of the League as a joint peace and alliance (iii 24. 5; cf. ii 1. 4). How can one explain the silence about the Common Peace?

It is first necessary to sketch in the background. Philip had established a permanent Council (*συνέδριον*) at Corinth, which is attested both administering the Common Peace and enacting legislation for the Persian War (iii 23. 8; cf. i 16. 6). At the same time, breaches of the Common Peace were dealt with by the Council; it was they who were first commissioned to deal with the Chian oligarchs in 332 (cf. iii 2. 7 n.). It is a major problem to explain how a Council established to police the terms of the Common Peace (Justin ix 5. 2; *SIG*³ 260. 19-22) was able to declare an offensive war against Persia and pass legislation for that war which was considered binding on all Hellenes. It is true that the Common Peace embodied clauses which obliged all contracting states to take the field against any person or city which breached its provisions, and in that case the League *de facto* became an alliance. One might even agree that the terms of the Common Peace presupposed an alliance to enforce them (cf. H. H. Raue, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des korinthischen Bundes* (Marburg 1937), 23 ff.; esp. 41-2). The terms of the Peace, however, do not provide a sufficient explanation for the declaration of war against Persia. In the Marathus correspondence Alexander does accuse Darius of aiming to sabotage the peace in Greece (ii 14. 6 n.), but the charge is secondary. The official pretext for war, proclaimed at Corinth in 337 and repeated in 336, was revenge for the sacrilege committed by Xerxes. Machinations against the Common Peace are a subsidiary charge in the letter and are nowhere else mentioned. The war, then, was a matter wholly separated from the Common Peace, yet the Council had power to deal with both issues.

The phenomenon can perhaps be explained if we compare the Council with the Council of the Second Athenian Confederacy. In 377 the allies of Athens had voted to form a common Council, and all

Greeks outside Asia Minor were invited to join the Athenians on terms which guaranteed autonomy to all on the strict basis of the King's Peace. The organization was explicitly an alliance directed against Sparta, but joining the alliance involved acceptance of the peace of 386. The Corinthian League may well have been similar (cf. Badian, *Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 51 f. with n. 60). The assembly at Corinth was an assembly of states which had established individual alliances with Philip before or after Chaeronea (C. Roebuck, *C. Phil.* xlii (1948) 73 ff.; A. B. Bosworth, *Historia* xx (1971) 611–13), and we may assume that the embassies sent to Corinth were plenipotentiary for their cities. It was therefore possible for them to function in two different ways. In the first place they could agree on the terms of the Common Peace with its sanctions against political change and intrigues against other cities. Then as allies of Philip they could vote war against Persia and formally forbid any Hellene to take sides with the Persian king. The allies of Philip may indeed have followed the Athenian model in swearing to be allies not only of Philip but of each other (*IG* ii² 42 (Tod 122); cf. Accame, *La Lega ateniese* (1941), 44 ff.). The result would have been the evolution of a Council of allies which could both vote a Common Peace as a necessary condition of the alliance and then declare war against Persia.

An interesting light is shed on the problem by the documents of the League of Demetrius and Antigonos, formed in 302. This league was modelled on the Corinthian League, and we are told that Demetrius was proclaimed *ἡγεμὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος* like Philip and Alexander before him (Plut. *Demetr.* 25. 3). Now this league is explicitly and repeatedly described as a *συνμμαχία*. The extant oath begins with a promise to remain within the *συνμμαχία* (*IG* iv² 1. 68, vv. 140–1), and in the fragmentary opening of the treaty there seems to be a provision ensuring that all participants in the Council remain in perpetual alliance with Antigonos and Demetrius (vv. 6–10). The *συνμμαχία*, however, was bound by the terms of the Common Peace of 337 (vv. 14–16, cf. *SIG*³ 260. 8–12; vv. 38 ff., cf. [Dem.] 17. 19). There is one extant reference to the Peace, and it is described explicitly as the *πατρώια εἰρήνη* (v. 13). Presumably the Common Peace of 337 was considered still in force and all Hellenes were bound by it. What was new was the establishment of alliances with Antigonos and Demetrius personally and their appointment to the head of the newly reconstituted Council. Then war could be declared, not upon Persia but upon Cassander and his allies, the object being the liberation of the Greek cities (Diod. xx 102. 1; cf. xvi 91. 2). As in 336 what was at issue was the renewal of alliance and the conferment of hegemonial status upon the Macedonian kings.

(b) The title conferred on Philip and Alexander is problematic. Arrian here speaks generally of *ἡγεμονία* of the expedition against the

Persians. At ii 14. 4 Alexander refers to himself as ἡγεμὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος, and at vii 9. 5 he describes his father as appointed ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ of all Greece for the expedition against Persia. Other sources are vaguer. Polybius and Plutarch describe Philip as ἡγεμὼν by land and sea (Polybius ix 33. 7; Plut. *Inst. Lac.* 42: 240 A; so the scholiast to Aelius Aristides p. 178. 16 (Dindorf)), and Demosthenes speaks of him as universal ἡγεμὼν. Diodorus, however, describes both Philip and Alexander as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος (xvi 89. 3, xvii 4. 9), and the Oxyrhynchus Chronicle follows suit (*FGH* 255 (5)). Most modern scholars therefore suppose that the Macedonian kings had two titles for two different functions. For the superintendence of the Common Peace their title was ἡγεμὼν; in this role they acted as the executive officers of the Council in the field (*SIG*³ 260. 21–2), whereas for the war against Persia they had free scope for action and were therefore termed στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ (see, most recently, G. Dobesch, *Grazer Beitr.* iii (1975) 76–9). Arrian therefore has conflated two distinct roles, perhaps seduced by a phrase of Xenophon (*Hell.* i 4. 20), which describes Alcibiades as ἀπάντων ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ (cf. Wilcken, *SB Munich* 1917 (x), 27 n. 2; Bengtson, *Strategie* i 8).

There are, however, weaknesses in the theory. In the first place, stylistic imitation of Xenophon is not sufficient explanation for Arrian's terminology. In matters of style Arrian is more influenced by Thucydides than by Xenophon, and Thucydides uses the term στρατηγοὶ αὐτοκράτορες to describe the Athenian generals in Sicily (Thuc. vi 8. 2; cf. 26. 1, 72. 5). On the other hand, it seems excessively legalistic to divide the king's functions in the League into two components. Given that the Corinthian League was a συμμαχία of allies, who had sworn to be allies of each other, there was no problem in the king's status as leader of the League. The allies voted war against Persia, and once war was voted the king as executive general had absolute power in the field. There might be similar votes of war in Greece proper, to punish breaches of the Common Peace. The Council would initially vote upon an expedition, but once the vote was taken, the king would be plenipotentiary in the field. Now the epigraphically attested title of Philip is ἡγεμὼν, and ἡγεμὼν is the better attested term in the literary tradition. If we can trust Plutarch, Demetrius was also made ἡγεμὼν of Greece for the war against Cassander in 302 (Plut. *Demetr.* 25. 3); in the treaty it is the king's deputy, left behind to supervise the Common Peace, who is termed στρατηγός (*IG* iv² 1. 68, v. 72). As so often, it is Diodorus whose terminology is inaccurate. He seems to use στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ as an all-purpose term (cf. xvi 24. 1, 32. 4 for the Phocian leaders). Cf. M. Scheele, *Στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* (Diss. Leipzig 1932) 12–19; Berve, *Gnomon* ix (1933) 310; Momigliano, *Terzo Contributo* (1966) 407 n. 19. Philip and Alexander had one title as head of the League and that was ἡγεμὼν.

ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου Diod. 4. 9 speaks generally of a meeting of the usual delegates at Corinth. This poses a difficulty. The regular delegates came from all areas of Greece. The extant fragment of the official list of members comprises states of northern Greece from Thessaly to Cephallenia (*SIG*³ 260b). Only a fraction of the delegates can have come from inside the Peloponnese.

J. A. O. Larsen (*C. Phil.* xx (1925) 316–17 n. 3) has drawn on Diodorus' more extended narrative to interpret Arrian's text. Alexander's march down to Corinth involved stops in Thessaly and at Thermopylae. According to Diodorus (4. 1), he persuaded the Thessalian League to vote him the ἡγεμονία of Greece previously conferred upon his father. Subsequently he convened the Amphictyonic Council at Anthela and persuaded them also to vote him hegemony over the Greeks. The meeting at Corinth may have been a partial meeting of the states which had not yet renewed alliance and conferred hegemony.

F. Rühl, however (*N. Jahrb. f. Philologie* cxxxvii (1888) 114) set a fashion when he suggested that what the Thessalians conferred upon Alexander was not the hegemony of the Corinthian League but merely the archonship of Thessaly, which had been conferred upon his father, probably in 352. That is what Justin implies; *exemplo patris dux universae gentis creatus erat* (xi 3. 2; cf. M. Sordi, *La Lega Tessala* (1958), 302 ff.). Wilcken observed correctly that the two votes are not mutually exclusive (*Berliner Akademieschriften* i 129). Alexander needed the Thessalian archonship but he also needed Thessalian support for the hegemony of the Corinthian League. The same assembly could confer both. Arrian, then, may be basically correct when he states that the delegates at Corinth came from within the Peloponnese, but it must be confessed that his terminology is very imprecise.

Λακεδαιμονίους κτλ. The Spartans had refused to join the Corinthian League in 337, even after an invasion by Philip and the dismemberment of her border territories between Messenia, Megalopolis, and Argos (Schaefer iii² 42–50; C. Roebuck, *C. Phil.* xliii (1948) 84–9). The refusal to acknowledge Alexander in 336 was famous and amply attested (Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 240 A–B; Justin xii 1. 6; Diod. 3. 4 'confusing Spartans with Arcadians'). This recalcitrance rankled with Alexander (cf. i 16. 7, ii 15. 5 nn.). The motive Arrian gives for the Spartan intransigence is reluctance to acknowledge the hegemony of any other power. That is plausible enough; the Spartans consistently refused to relinquish hegemony (cf. Hdt. vii 159; Isocr. 4. 18; 6. 110). There was another reason. Involvement in the Corinthian League meant involvement with Messenia and a pledge of non-interference in Messenian affairs. That the Spartans had always refused. In 362 they had withdrawn from a Common Peace which included the Messenians (Diod. xv 89. 1–2; Polybius iv 33. 8–9; Plut. *Ages.* 35. 3–4), and the

provisions of 337 were a far stricter guarantee of Messenian autonomy. The Spartans, it seems, merely refused to co-operate with Macedon (cf. i 10. 12). In 336, just after the death of Archidamus III in Italy and the Macedonian invasion of Laconia, they were hardly ready for confrontation with the full power of Macedon.

νεωτερίσαι δὲ ἅρτα For events at Athens see Schaefer iii² 88–97. Philip's death had been greeted with jubilation. The assembly voted sacrifices and even, it seems, conferred a crown posthumously on Pausanias, Philip's murderer (Aesch. 3. 160; Plut. *Dem.* 22. 2; Diod. 3. 1–2). There followed intrigues with Attalus in Asia (Diod. 3. 2, 5. 1; Plut. *Dem.* 23. 2), and embassies were sent urging other states to strike for liberty (Diod. 3. 2)—in other words, to overthrow the governments established by Philip after Chaeronea. These actions constituted breaches of the Common Peace (*SIG*³ 260. 11–14; [Dem.] 17. 10). Alexander could therefore invoke the forces of the League against Athens, and, if we may believe Aeschines (3. 161), the Thessalians had voted a campaign against the city before Alexander reached Thebes.

3. τῇ πρώτῃ ἐφόδῳ The Athenians sent an embassy to Alexander at the news of the king's arrival at Thebes, following a forced march from Thermopylae (Aesch. 3. 161; Diod. 4. 5). The Thebans were taken by surprise, and Athens stood alone against a king who had materialized in southern Greece sooner than Demosthenes had predicted was possible (cf. Aesch. 3. 160). There was no alternative but to begin the evacuation of Attica (Diod. 4. 5) and sue for the best possible terms.

καὶ πλείονα ἔτι No source states precisely what was offered Alexander. Diodorus says only that the embassy apologized for its tardy recognition of Alexander's hegemony (4. 6). We may assume also that the alliance concluded with Philip (Diod. xvi 87. 3) was renewed in Alexander's name, and the honorary citizenship voted after Chaeronea (Schol. Ael. Arist. p. 178. 16 Dindorf) may well have been confirmed with complementary grants of a golden crown and a statue in the Odeum (cf. Paus. i 9. 4).

1. 4–6. 11. *The Triballian and Illyrian Campaigns (spring to late summer 335)*


Arrian's account is the only extensive narrative of these events. It is unitary, taken from an eye-witness source (cf. i 5. 7). There is one explicit reference to Ptolemy (i 2. 7), and the story of the Celtic embassy closely follows the account in Strabo which is derived from Ptolemy (i 4. 6 n.). It is probable that the entire campaign narrative is taken directly from Ptolemy, who is avowedly Arrian's principal source.

Modern literature is mostly concerned with topographical problems, in particular Alexander's route through the Haemus (see the survey by Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 78). Most important are N. Vulič, 'Alexandre

le Grand sur le Danube', *Xenia: Hommage international à l'Université nationale de Grèce* (1912) 181-203; G. M. Columba, *Ricerche storiche* (1935) i 91 ff.; M. Neubert, *Petermanns Mitteilungen* lxxx (1934) 281-9. Arrian's account of the Illyrian campaign has recently been analysed in detail by N. G. L. Hammond, *JHS* xciv (1974) 65-87. A. Mócsy, *Acta Antiqua* xiv (1966) 87-112, gives a useful survey of the history of the tribes of the middle Danube. See now the full discussion by F. Papazoglou, *The Central Balkan Tribes in Pre-Roman Times* (Amsterdam 1978) 9-129.

4. ἐς Τριβαλλοὺς καὶ Ἰλλυριοὺς Arrian does not specify which Illyrians Alexander intended to attack. They were presumably not the peoples of the north-west, for Alexander did not hear of their rebellion until the end of his Danubian campaign (i 5. 1). Nor were they the Autariatae, the Illyrian people immediately west of the Triballians, for Alexander had not apparently heard of their existence before 335 (cf. i 5. 3). Arrian's phrasing may be inaccurate. Ptolemy may merely have spoken of Alexander's campaign against the Illyrians and Triballians, and begun his account with a report of general unrest in the north (so Diod. 3. 5). In that case Arrian will have concluded, wrongly, that it was the Illyrians and Triballians who were reported in revolt.

The Τριβαλλοί were a Thracian people of the lower Danube (cf. Polaschek, *RE* viA. 2392-2401; Mócsy, *Acta Antiqua* xiv (1966) 103-4). Their precise location is difficult to establish. In Thucydides' gazetteer of the Odrysian empire their territory is placed beyond the border peoples who lived north of Mt. Scombrus (Cherni Vrukh) and east of the river Oescus, the modern Iskur, whose tributaries flow through Sofia (Thuc. ii 96. 4). The Triballians, then, occupied the plain south of the Danube in the north-west of what became the Roman province of Moesia. That was their domicile in Roman times (Ptol. iii 10. 4-5). But in Alexander's time the Triballians may have extended further along the Danubian plain towards the Black Sea. According to Strabo (vii 5. 11 (318)) their territory began after the Agrianians of the Upper Strymon (i.e. near Sofia) and extended to the Danube, a fifteen days' journey. The distance involved is unknown, but it has been suggested that the fifteen days' journey was a distance of c.450 km, so that Triballian territory reached as far as Silistria and the Dobrudja (Polaschek 2396, following G. M. Columba, *Ricerche storiche* (1935) i 122 f.). Apart from the false location of the island of Peuce in the Danube mouth (cf. i 2. 2 n.), the hypothesis rests upon two pieces of evidence. The Triballians are attested at war with the Scythian king Ateas (Front. *Strat.* ii 4. 20; Polyaeus vii 44), and in 339 they demanded passage-money from Philip, then on his way home after a successful campaign against the same Ateas in the vicinity of Histria (Justin ix 3. 1-3; cf. Didymus in *Dem.* col. xiii 1-7). Neither incident proves that the Triballians were neighbours of Ateas. In the first place



they were quite prepared to travel far from their borders in search of plunder. The war with Ateas may have been an extended raid. Similarly we have no idea where the Triballians accosted Philip. He may have been well on his way home, following the Danube plain into the territory of the subject Triballians (see below), and perhaps intended to pass into Macedonia by the valleys of the Iskur and Strymon, the route Alexander was to take in 335 (cf. i. 5. 1 n.). There remains only Strabo's fifteen days' journey, a dubious figure from an unknown source. It is significant, however, that in the satrapy apportionment of 323 the Triballians were assigned to Macedon along with the Illyrians and Agrianians, not to Thrace (Dexippus, *FGrH* 100 F 8 [3]). Their territory is unlikely to have extended too far to the east of the Iskur.

The Triballians were a standing threat to Macedon in the days before Philip. In two of Alexander's speeches in Arrian they are listed as a menace alongside the Illyrians (v 26. 6, vii 9. 2; cf. Dio Chrysostom ii 9). Arrian's terminology (*νεωτεπίλειν*) suggests that the Triballians had come under Macedonian rule during Philip's reign. Demosthenes speaks vaguely of a campaign against the Triballians in the period after 346 (Dem. 18. 44; cf. Syncellus 263 c), and it is more than likely that Philip crossed the Haemus during the ten-month Thracian campaign of 342/1, which saw the establishment of Macedonian military colonies, notably Philippopolis, in the plain south of Triballian country (cf. Danoff, *RE* xix 2244–6). The Triballians cannot have been completely subjugated, for by their demands of passage-money in 339 they showed themselves both independent and hostile.

5. τῶν αὐτονόμων . . . Θρακῶν In Thucydides' day the autonomous Thracians were largely concentrated in the range of Rhodope (Thuc. ii 96. 2). The peoples attacked by Alexander apparently lived in the Haemus, the northern range of Bulgarian mountains (Stará Planina), which in Thucydides' time had separated the Getic peoples of the Danube from the Odrysian kingdom in the Hebrus valley (Thuc. ii 96. 1). These Thracians should probably be identified with the Tetrachoritae, a people subsumed by Strabo under the Bessi (Steph. Byz. s.v. *Τετραχωρίται*; cf. Strabo vii 5. 12 (318)). The Bessi were the dominant tribe of the Haemus range (cf. Eutropius vi 10. 1; Ruf. Fest. *Brev.* 9. 2–4; Amm. Marc. xxvii 4. 11). Now the Tetrachoritae were apparently the last Thracian people to fall under Philip's domination. At the time of the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium Philip's senior generals, Parmenion and Antipater, were in action against them. The campaign was recorded in book xlvii of Theopompus' *Philippica* (*FGrH* 115 F 217–18; cf. Polyaeus iv 4. 1), and should be dated to 340. Located in the recesses of the Haemus, the Tetrachoritae probably escaped the full force of the conquest of the Hebrus valley in 342/1, and a separate campaign was needed to subdue them. They may not have been

reduced to vassal status. Arrian terms them autonomous. Their subjugation was probably one of the unfinished tasks of Philip's reign. "Ὀρβηλον τὸ ὄρος Orbelus, like Haemus, seems to have been the name of a whole range of mountains. Mt. Orbelus proper seems to have been located above Lake Prasias on the upper Strymon, probably the modern Mt. Belatitsa. Strabo, however, pictures Orbelius as one of a series of continuous ranges extending across Illyria, Paeonia, and Thrace (Strabo vii F 10). Arrian's source clearly applies the name to the mountain ridge between Philippi and the Nestos plain, which was envisaged sweeping in a wide arc from Mt. Belatitsa down to the modern Kavalla (cf. E. Oberhammer, *RE* viii Suppl. 372-3; Hammond, *Macedonia* i 198-9).

διαβάς δὲ τὸν Νέστον (cf. *Ilín.* 16) Arrian says explicitly that Alexander crossed the Nestos and reached the Haemus after nine days' march. No other river is mentioned, and we can assume that Alexander did not continue east to the Hebrus valley, which gave easiest passage through the Rhodope mountains. On the other hand, Arrian speaks only of a crossing of the Nestos; Alexander did not apparently follow its course. One can easily see why. The Nestos valley in its lower reaches becomes a gorge, with sides descending precipitously to the water's edge (S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria* (1926), 9, 21-2). Theories which represent Alexander marching to the head of the Nestos (e.g. Vulič, *Xenia* 181 ff.; Wilcken 67) can therefore be dismissed. Alexander presumably crossed the Nestos plain as far as modern Xanthi, which gives access to one of the principal routes through Rhodope. This route was well fitted for Alexander's purposes. It would have taken him to the vicinity of Philippopolis (Plovdiv), just south of the main Haemus range.

There is a difficult corollary problem as to which pass across the Haemus Alexander used. Given that Alexander's crossing of Rhodope brought him to the vicinity of Philippopolis, only two passes are seriously in question, the Trojan and the Shipka. Both passes are described by M. Neubert, *Petermanns Mitteilungen* lxxx (1934) 281-2, who opts for the Shipka pass, the favourite of modern scholars (e.g. Wilcken 67; Hamilton, *Al.* 46; Schachermeyr² 111 n. 96). The Trojan Pass, however, seems to have been more frequented in antiquity. It carried the Roman road from Philippopolis to Oescus in Triballian territory (D. Tsontchev, *Latomus* xviii (1959) 154-70). According to the Tabula Peutingeriana there was a fortification, *Montemno*, apparently at the pass itself (Oberhammer, *RE* xiv 210). The Trojan was the more directly accessible from Philippopolis, and it is most likely to have been used by Alexander.

6. τῶν τε ἑμπορέων A *locus conclamatus*. Arrian's text suggests that the remote Haemus passes were thronged by merchants, who were prepared to take arms for the liberty of the native Thracians. Believers

in the manuscript reading have adduced the Thracian wagoners as proof that the defenders of the pass included merchants (e.g. Neubert, *op. cit.* 282–4). A slightly more acceptable suggestion is that by Roos in his *editio minor* (p. iii); <ἐκ τῶν> ἐμπορ<ι>ων. This presupposes that the ἐμπόρια attested near the Haemus at the time of Caracalla (*IGR* i 766) already existed in Alexander's day. But it is generally thought that the Thracian ἐμπόρια were specially created in the Roman period to supply the needs of the public post (Jones, *CERP*² 22–3); they cannot be traced back to the pre-Hellenistic period.

Scholars have usually opted for some conservative emendation: ἐγχωρίων (Gronovius), ἐκ τῶν ὁρῶν (Schmieder), *vel. sim.* Such suggestions result in pleonasm. Arrian has explicitly correlated two classes of people by means of his . . . τε . . . καί construction, and in the first position we need some people other than the autonomous Thracians, who would be designated by expressions such as ἐγχωρίων, etc. It is surely most likely that a proper name has been corrupted. If so, one can only guess at the corruption. There seems to me some likelihood that the original reading was τῶν τε Τρηρῶν. The Treres were a Thracian people to the north-west of the Odrysian empire and in Thucydides' time they were situated at the Triballian border (Thuc. ii 96. 4). Theopompus mentioned them (*FGH* 115 F 378), and presumably they fell under the sway of Philip. The Treres were certainly neighbours of the Tetrachoritae and it is perfectly possible that they sent contingents to help block Alexander's advance across the Haemus.

7. ξυναγαγόντες δὲ ἀμάξας The stratagem, and Alexander's response to it, recur in Polyaeus (iv 3. 11), whose account exactly tallies with Arrian and contains some verbal similarities (e.g. ὑπερπηδῶσας i 1. 9; ὑπερπηδᾶν Polyaeus).

8. τοῖς ὀπλίταις As at i 6. 2, Arrian is referring to the phalanx troops, who were light-armed in comparison with the Greek hoplites of the classical period (cf. G. T. Griffith, *PCPS* iv (1956/7) 7–10). The contrast, however, is with the Agrianians and archers who were unimpeded by the *sarisae* of the phalanx and far more lightly equipped than the men of the phalanx (cf. Berve i 130 ff.).

9. ὄσοι δὲ κτλ. The vocabulary is technical. Arrian is describing a variation of the formation known as *συνασπισμός*, in which the phalanx was compressed to its most compact, each man occupying in theory a mere 18 inches of frontage (Asclepiodotus 4. 3; cf. Aelian 11. 5; Arr. *Tact.* 11. 4). Arrian elsewhere uses *σύγκλεισις* to refer to the line of overlapping shields presented by this formation (i 4. 3, 6. 2, v 17. 7; *PSI* 1284 = *Arriani Scripta Minora* p. 324). *ξυννεύειν*, however, is a unique usage, describing the actual forming of the close order (cf. Theophr. *Ign.* 51 for the simple sense, 'converge'); Gronovius' *conferli* is the correct rendering (it is wrong to adduce vi 10. 2, where *ξυννεύειν* clearly means

'to collapse'). The terminology is presumably influenced by Homer's famous anticipation of the hoplite phalanx: *ψαῦον δ' ἱππόκομοι κόρυθες λαμπροῖσι φάλοισι | νευόντων, ὥς πυκνοὶ ἐφέστασαν ἀλλήλοισιν* (*Iliad* xiii 131 f.).

Arrian's description implies more than a single line of shields, rather a wall of interlocking shields like the Roman *testudo* (cf. Arr. *Tact.* 11. 4–5). Now the Macedonian shield was relatively small, as was necessary, since it was carried over the forearm in battle. According to the tactical writers it was a mere eight palms in diameter (Asclepiodotus 5. 1; Aelian 12), and the smallness of the shield explains the narrowness of the interval in *συνασπισμός* (cf. Reinach, *BCH* xxxiv (1910) 444–6; Studniczka, *JDAI* xxxviii/xxxix (1923/4) 68–72; Launey, *Recherches* i 354 ff.). A single shield would hardly even protect the entire trunk. The Macedonians were therefore forced to form a double shield-wall, a line of men lying on the ground and a second rank standing over them, their shields interlocking. The effect would have been an inclined ramp, composed of several successive tiers of shields. It is hard to see how the manœuvre could have been carried out as effectively as described.

2. 1. τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσῃ Beloch was surely wrong to identify these cities as Apollonia and Mesembria on the Black Sea coast (iii² 2. 353; so A. Suceveanu, *Dacia* x (1966) 342). In all probability they were Abdera and Maroneia, which Arrian later describes as ἐπὶ θαλάσῃ ὠκισμέναι (i 11. 4). They were situated on the coast east of the Nestos, within easy access of the route taken by Alexander through Rhodope (i 1. 5 n.), and had been captured by Philip, probably as early as 353 (Polyaenus iv 2. 22; cf. Dem. 23. 183). They were ideal centres, therefore, for shipping the spoils back to Macedonia. Similar arrangements were made for transporting the booty acquired at the Danube (i 4. 5).

Λυσανία καὶ Φιλώτα (Berve nos. 479, 805) Neither man can be identified. Lysanias is not mentioned again, and the name Philotas was so common in Macedonia that no identification is possible. Certainly he is *not* the famous son of Parmenion, who is mentioned in action in the immediate sequel (i 2. 5; Jacoby ii D. 501 identified the two). Both men must have enjoyed some eminence, for the officers entrusted with the spoils from the Danube were phalanx battalion commanders (i 4. 5).

τὸν Λύγινον ποταμόν The Lyginus is not mentioned elsewhere, and it cannot be located with any certainty. It is only named because it was the site of Alexander's first battle with the Triballians, and it could have been relatively minor. The battle-site cannot be placed too close to the Haemus passes. It was only a three-day march to the Ister, and there is no hint Alexander was in a hurry. I should be reluctant to place the Lyginus crossing more than 80 km from the Danube. If Alexander used the Trojan Pass and followed roughly the Roman road to Oescus,

his route would have taken him across the Kajtaka valley, an offshoot of the river Vit, close to the modern town of Pleven. There was a Roman station named Storgosia at the crossing-point (Fluss, *RE* ivA. 73; cf. Mihailov, *IG Bulgaria* ii 62 (no. 593)). This seems a convenient location for the encounter with the Triballians; it is certainly sufficiently close to the Danube.

2. Σύρμος (Berve no. 730) Syrmus is only mentioned in the context of the Danubian campaign (cf. Strabo vii 3. 8 (301); Plut. *Al.* 11. 2 calls him Σύρμιος). He had probably been the architect of the attack upon Philip in 339.

Πεύκη Strabo also names the island in a passage derived ultimately from Ptolemy (vii 3.8). Neither he nor Arrian gives clues for the island's location, and there are difficulties. There was an island named Peuce at the Danube mouth, a natural delta formed by two of its arms. It was described by Eratosthenes (*Geogr.* iii: Scholiast to Ap. Rhod. iv 310) and is mentioned repeatedly in later prose and verse (cf. Polaschek, *RE* xix 1384–90). If Arrian's Peuce is identified with this delta there are far-reaching consequences. Alexander's line of march must be taken far to the east, up the Hebrus valley via Edirne and across the Haemus at the extreme east of the range. What is more, the territory of the Triballians needs to be extended from the Iskur as far as the Dobrudja (cf. i 1. 4 n.). Both theories, the approach from the east and the Triballian migration, have been widely accepted (e.g. G. M. Columba, *Ricerche storiche* (1935), i 91 ff.; Tarn i 5), but they are unacceptable. If Peuce of Arrian and Strabo was the delta at the Danube mouth, it presumably fell in or near the domains of the Scythian king, Ateas, with whom the Triballians had recently been at war. Seeking refuge there, Syrmus was in danger of leaving the frying-pan for the fire. What is more, Arrian (i 3. 4) describes the island banks as abrupt and the Danube channel as narrow and rapid flowing, a description hardly appropriate to the delta land, which is flat and marshy and where the river is sluggish (Droysen i² 1. 122, n. 3; Polaschek, *RE* xix 1387).

In all probability Arrian's island of Peuce was located far upstream. It had the same name as the delta island and presumably received it for the same reason, its abundance of pine trees (διὰ τὸ πολλὰς ἔχειν πεύκας: Eratosthenes, loc. cit.). It is not possible to identify it with any of the present islands in the Danube (for a list of suggestions, see *RE* xix 1389), for the river has altered course strikingly within the last few centuries, let alone millennia, and several places have changed sides of it (E. Oberhummer, *Petermanns Mitt.* lxxxix (1935) 19).

5. Φιλώταν (Berve no. 802) This is presumably the famous eldest son of Parmenion, the commander of the Companion cavalry (i 14. 1); he is only assigned a portion of the cavalry, as later in Illyria (i 5. 9), and there is no explicit evidence for his command of the entire cavalry before the Hellespont crossing (cf. Diod 17. 4).

ἐκ τῆς ἄνωθεν Μακεδονίας Upper Macedonia was the generic name for the complex of kingdoms in the Pindus Mountains: Lyncestis, Orestis, Elimiotis, Parauaea, and Tymphaea (for a good geographical survey, see Hammond, *Macedonia*, i 93 ff.). These kingdoms had enjoyed a precarious independence of the monarchy at Pella until the first years of Philip's reign. Then the great victory at Lake Lychnitis had given Philip mastery over the entire northern Pindus (cf. Diod. xvi 4. 4-7), and in the aftermath he was able to absorb the kingdoms of Upper Macedonia into his monarchy (cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 97-102). By the end of his reign the area formed an important recruiting ground; three out of Alexander's six battalions in Asia came from Upper Macedonia (Diod. 57. 2; Curt. iv 13. 28), the so-called *asthetairoi*. This is the only reference to cavalry from Upper Macedonia, which is strange. The nobility at Alexander's court contained a large number of men from the old Pindus kingdoms (see Berve's list: ii 445), and their retainers would have comprised a sizeable body of cavalry. There is no reference to the Upper Macedonian cavalry during the Asian campaigns, and the most plausible explanation is that they were left with Antipater. Alexander's cavalry in Asia were the cavalry from the Aegean coast (see below).

Ἡρακλείδην δὲ καὶ Σώπολιν (Berve nos. 347, 736) Both men are listed (with their patronymics) as commanders of cavalry *ilai* at Gaugamela (iii 11. 8). Only Sopolis is mentioned in other contexts. He was one of the officers sent from Nautaca in winter 328/7 to procure reinforcements from Macedon (iv 18. 3). In that case he cannot have been father of Hermolaus, the leading figure of the Pages' Conspiracy (as Berve believes); that Sopolis was present at the trial of his son (Curt. viii 7. 2 ff.), which took place at the end of spring 327 (iv 22. 2-3).

This passage gives the regional affiliations of the two cavalry *ilai*: (i) *Βορτιαία*. The Bottiaeans had been expelled from their original home in south Macedonia between the Axios and Haliacmon as early as the seventh or sixth centuries (Thuc. ii 99. 3; Hdt. viii 127; cf. Hammond, *Macedonia* i 152-4). Their new home was on the west of Chalcidice, to the north of Potidea, and in 479 their territory extended as far as the plain of Olynthus (Hdt. viii 127; cf. M. Zahrt, *Olynth und die Chalkidier* (1972), 171-8). The new Bottiaeian territory is termed *Βορτικὴ* by Thucydides (ii 79. 2, 101. 5; so Diod. xii 47. 3). The old Bottiaeian country in Macedon proper retained its name; Thucydides calls it *Βορτία* (ii 99. 3) or *Βορτιαία* (ii 100. 4), and the usage persisted as late as Polybius' day (Polybius v 97. 4 *Βορτία*; Livy xxvi 25. 4 *Bolliaea*; Justin vii 1. 3 *Bollia*). It is difficult therefore to determine which area supplied the *ile* for Alexander's army. Oberhummer opted for the old district between the Axios and Haliacmon, on the grounds that the Chalcidice district is properly termed *Βορτικὴ* not *Βορτιαία* (*RE* ii 795; so Berve i 105). It is dangerous, however, to adduce a general rule from

a handful of instances in Thucydides and Diodorus. Philochorus, it should be noted, refers to the Chalcidian district quite unambiguously as *Βοττιαία* (*FGrH* 328 F 50). In 349 this territory fell into Philip's hands along with that of Olynthus (cf. Philochorus, loc. cit.), and there is unimpeachable evidence that land there was partitioned among new settlers, as happened at Olynthus. A rescript of Cassander (*SIG*³ 332) attests that land in Spartolus, the Bottiaeian capital, was conferred upon the family of Ptolemy, son of Ptolemy (*Arr. Succ.* F 1. 38) and land in Sinaea, again in Bottike, was given to Polemocrates, the father of the famous Coenus, as an ancestral possession. There is no conclusive argument on either side, but in my opinion probability inclines slightly towards the Chalcidian area. The new territories acquired by Philip seem to have been consciously developed as recruiting grounds, and of the four *ilai* of Alexander's army whose provenance is known three came from areas acquired in Philip's reign (Anthemus, Amphipolis, Apollonia—cf. 12. 7, ii 9. 3).

(ii) *Ἀμφίπολις*. Philip captured Amphipolis in autumn 357 (*Diod.* xvi 8. 1–2) and the city was incorporated into the kingdom of Macedon. Even though the city survived as a civic unit (*Tod* ii 150), there must have been widespread confiscations of land. We hear of Philon and Stratocles because they were condemned *in absentia* (cf. *Theop. FGrH* 115 F 42; *Dem.* 1. 8). Many more of the leading families, caught in the city, will have lost their lands if not their lives. In future men from Amphipolis were termed *Μακεδόνες ἐξ Ἀμφιπόλεως* (*SIG*³ 268 F), and some of the most prominent men of Alexander's court were given estates there—Nearchus of Crete, Erigyus and Laomedon of Mitylene, and Androsthenes of Thasos (*Arr. Ind.* 18. 4), as well as Apollodorus and his brother Peithagoras (*Berve* nos. 101, 618). Antigonos, son of Callas, also came in all probability from Amphipolis (*C. Koukouli-Chrysanthaki, Arch. Dellion* xxvi 1 (1973) 120–7; *Moretti* no. 113).

6. *πυκνή* Again the term is technical. According to the tactical writers, *πύκνωσις* was a half-way stage between normal order and the tightest possible formation, *συνασπισμός*; each man occupied 3 feet of the frontage (*Asclepiodotus* 4. 3; *Aelian* 11. 6; *Arr. Tact.* 11. 4).

οὐκ ἀκοντισμῷ ἔτι 'No longer using their lances but pushing with their mounts themselves' (cf. *Eclaxis* 31: *μὴ ἀκοντισμῷ ἔτι ἀλλὰ ταῖς σπάθαις αὐτοῖς συμφερόμενοι*). The Macedonian cavalry relied on a single lance of cornel wood (i 15. 5). No replacements were carried into battle, as is spectacularly revealed by Alexander's behaviour at the Granicus (i 15. 6). The technique was to stab repeatedly at the enemy's face and trunk (i 16. 1). The cavalry could not therefore use their lances as throwing weapons. Arrian's use of *ἀκοντισμός* is therefore very general, meaning no more than 'using the lance' (cf. v 17. 3; *Extaxis* 17. 26). In the situation described the cavalry are no longer engaging the enemy ahead of the phalanx. They had merged with the line of foot, and the

press of *sarisae* was such that the riders would have no need to use their shorter lances. Their mounts added to the momentum of the phalanx thrust and swept the Triballians back.

7. λέγει Πτολεμαῖος The Macedonian casualty figures are an integral part of the narrative. Arrian specifies the source probably because of their disproportionate smallness as compared with the Triballian losses (cf. ii 11. 8). There is little doubt that the entire battle narrative is taken from Ptolemy (cf. Schwartz *RE* ii 1238; Jacoby ii D. 500-1; Kornemann 43).

3. 1. τὸν Ἰστρον Arrian's digression is a deliberate imitation of Herodotus' famous description of the Danube (Hdt. iv 48-50). Herodotus had given a careful enumeration of the tributaries of the Danube together with the peoples of the north bank. Arrian was clearly inspired to bring his description up to date, and he accordingly lists the barbarian tribes which in his own day were to be found north of the river. This digression is irrelevant to the distribution of tribes in Alexander's time, and it has no relation to the surrounding narrative, dealing as it does largely with peoples to the north-west of the Triballians. It is a contrived digression for digression's sake, probably stimulated by Arrian's own experience of the Upper Danube. He claims knowledge of the Inn and the Save, rivers which faced respectively the territories of the Marcomanni and Iazyges (cf. *Ind.* 4. 15-16), and, as always, he is prepared to incorporate the fruits of his autopsy, however irrelevant (cf. ii 16. 6, iii 16. 8; *Ind.* 41. 2).

κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην The qualification is important. Herodotus had described the Danube as the greatest of all rivers, rivalled only by the Nile (iv 48. 1; cf. iv 50. 1). Arrian, however, considers the Indus and Ganges the largest rivers in the world (*Ind.* 4. 13-16). The Danube therefore could only be described as the greatest *European* river.

Κουάδους καὶ Μαρκομάνους The Quadi and Marcomanni had migrated to the Upper Danube in the reign of Augustus and occupied lands north of the river in modern Czechoslovakia. Arrian has the names in the wrong order. The Marcomanni were the closest to the Danube sources, neighbours of the Hermunduri (cf. Dio. lv 10a. 2) and centred in the vicinity of Prague. The Quadi were further east, between the rivers Morava and Váh (Tac. *Germ.* 42; cf. P. Goessler, *RE* xxiv 629).

2. Ἰάζυγας The Iazyges were a Sarmatian people, who had migrated from south Russia and reached the Lower Danube by the end of Augustus' reign (Ovid, *Ibis* 135; *ex Pont.* i 2. 79, iv 7. 9). By Claudius' reign they had migrated west of Dacia, to the plain between the Danube and Theiss (Tisza), where they are firmly attested by Pliny (*NH* iv 80). **Γέτας τοὺς ἀπαθανατίζοντας** Arrian means the Dacians, the Getic people of the Transylvanian mountains. The terminology is borrowed from Herodotus' description of the religious beliefs of the Getae south of

the Danube (Hdt. iv 93 f.). Arrian transfers the term to the northern Dacians who also believed in a continued physical existence after death and worshipped Zalmoxis (Russu, *RE* ixA. 2303 ff.). The usage appears elsewhere (Luc. *Conc. Deorum* 9; Julian, *Caesars* 327 C), and the fashion may have been set in the history of Trajan's Dacian Wars, published by the emperor's chief doctor, T. Statilius Crito of Heracleia in Caria. This work, produced in Trajan's lifetime, was entitled *Γερικά*, and the author seems consistently to have identified the Dacians as Getae (*FGrH* 200 F 1-8; I. I. Russu, *Studii Clasice* xiv (1972) 111-28). Crito at any rate stressed the *δεισιδαιμονία* of the Dacians and the hold which their kings exerted by their magic (*FGrH* 200 F 7; cf. Strabo vii 3. 11 (304)); he may well have stressed the belief in personal immortality and transferred the Herodotean description to the contemporary Getae.

Σαυρομάτας τοὺς πολλοὺς Arrian probably means the Rhoxolani, the Sarmatian people, who migrated like the Iazyges from south Russia to the Lower Danube. By A.D. 69 they were strong enough to attack the legionary winter-quarters in Moesia (Tac. *Hist.* i 79), and in the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian they apparently received regular *stipendia* from the Roman government (HA *Hadr.* 6. 6-8).

Σκύθας Despite the Sarmatian migrations of the first century A.D., the Scythians seem to have maintained at least a toehold in the Dobrudja (Ovid, *Tristia* iv 6. 46; Pliny, *NH* iii 149, iv 80; cf. Curt. vii 7. 3-4).

κατὰ πέντε στόματα Arrian repeatedly states that the Danube had five mouths (v 4. 1; *Ind.* 2. 5; *Periplus* 24. 1). This is the Herodotean figure (Hdt. iv 47), and it seems to have been widely accepted in the classical and early Hellenistic period (cf. Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 157; Scymnus 773). Strabo, however, had counted seven mouths and rejected Ephorus' figure of five (Strabo vii 3. 15 (305)). From the Augustan period seven became the canonical figure (e.g. Pliny, *NH* iv 79; Stat. *Silvae* v 2. 137; Tac. *Germ.* 1). Arrian is apparently unaware of this revision of geographical knowledge.

3. ἐκ Βυζαντίου Arrian does not imply that the warships were supplied by the Byzantines (as supposed by Schaefer iii² 105 and Berve i 159). The ships may equally well have belonged to the Macedonian war-fleet. In that case Byzantium will have served as a naval base in the same way as Chalcis in Euboea (cf. ii 2. 4, iii 19. 6). The city had become an ally of Macedon, probably in the aftermath of Chaeronea ('Suda' s.v. *Λέων*; cf. Schaefer iii² 51).

5. τοὺς Γέτας τοὺς πέραν τοῦ Ἰστρου The Getae were peoples of Thracian extraction living in the Danube valley north of the Haemus range. According to Strabo (vii 3. 2 (295), following Poseidonius?), the Getae lived on both sides of the Lower Danube. Arrian's account makes it clear that on the north bank they overlapped Triballian territory. Their home was the central Walachian plain, in the heart of what was later Dacia.

πόθος ἔλαβεν αὐτόν The language is again Herodotean (Hdt. i 165. 3; cf. ix 3. 1), and there are numerous parallels in late Greek literature for both vocabulary and construction (H. Montgomery, *Gedanke und Tat* (1965), 208–17). Although the formula recurs consistently in Arrian (e.g. ii 3. 1, iii 1. 5, iii 3. 1, iv 28. 4, v 2. 5, vii 1. 1, *Ind.* 20. 1), there is no reason to suppose that he copied the phrase from Ptolemy and Nearchus or that **πόθος** was Alexander's own coinage to describe his 'craving towards the unknown'. That was Ehrenberg's hypothesis (see, most conveniently, *Alexander and the Greeks* 52–61), but even Ehrenberg admitted that this first occurrence of the phrase cannot be derived from Alexander's own lips (op. cit. 56–7). The expression struck him as pleonastic, and Ehrenberg concluded that it was inserted inappropriately by Ptolemy himself, because of his familiarity with the king's later use of the phrase. This whole argument is unfortunately misguided. In the first place there is nothing pleonastic about the expression. There are two separate points made. Alexander crossed the river because of the challenge of the Getae; they had assembled men to prevent the crossing, and that in itself was a reason to cross. But quite apart from the immediate challenge, Alexander wished to cross the Danube as an end in itself. Secondly, Ptolemy need not have contributed anything to the wording of the passage: Arrian was stylistically independent of his historical sources.

Exactly why Alexander had the desire to cross the Danube is not stated. It may be significant that the pretext for Philip's Scythian war of 339 was the fulfilment of a vow to erect a statue of Heracles at the Danube delta (Justin ix 2. 10–13). There seems little doubt that he was claiming sovereignty over the territories as far as the Danube. If the river was the formal boundary of Philip's territories, we have a good reason for Alexander's desire to cross it. In his first major expedition he would pass the boundaries established by his father and extend the process of conquest in his own right.

6. τὰς δὲ διφθέρας Precisely the same method was to be used in the crossing of the Oxus in 329 (cf. iii 29. 4).

4. 1. λήϊον ... σίτου βαθύ Droysen i² 1. 124 n. 2 observed that the harvest in the Lower Danube reaches man-height by the middle of May. Unfortunately there is no guarantee that the climate and cycle of growth was the same in antiquity.

πλαγαίαις ... τὸν σῖτον 'Turning aside the corn with their *sarissae* held crosswise'. The *sarisa* was the characteristic weapon of the Macedonian infantry (Arr. *Tact.* 3. 2). It was a pike, at its longest 12 cubits (Theophr. *HP* iii 12. 2; cf. Asclepiodotus 5. 1), with a long iron blade and a spike of equal length for the butt. The metal fixtures of a *sarisa*, recently discovered at Vergina, indicate that the shaft had a thickness of 3–3½ cm and comprised two lengths of wood socketed together at the

centre so as to avoid the danger of excessive vibration (cf. M. Andronicos, *BCH* xciv (1970) 91-107; M. M. Markle, *AJA* xxxi (1977) 323-6). Arrian rarely uses the technical name (cf. iii 14. 3, iv 8. 9, 9. 2), preferring the more general word *δόρυ* (cf. i 6. 2-4).

2. *ἐν πλαίσιω* 'In rectangular formation' (*Tact.* 29. 7; Aelian 37. 8). The formation was not a perfect square, which Arrian, following Xenophon, calls *πλαίσιον ἰσόπλευρον* (iv 5. 6; *Tact.* 29. 7; cf. Xen. *Anab.* iii 4. 19). It was presumably an exceptionally dense formation, extending back to a depth commensurate with the frontage; the aerial view would have been of a dense oblong rather than an extended line. Compare i 6. 1, where the phalanx is described drawn up to a depth of 120 files.

Νικάνορα (Berve no. 554) This is the second son of Parmenion, who commanded the hypaspists in Asia (i 14. 2, ii 8. 3, iii 11. 9). The fact that he is given the phalanx command indicates that he already had that position (cf. i 2. 5 n.).

4. *ὅσον παρασάγγην* This is the only occasion where Arrian gives a distance in the Persian measurement, and its use is all the more strange as it comes in the description of Alexander's European campaign. Elsewhere he gives distances in stades or *σταθμοί* (e.g. i 2. 1, ii 6. 1), the units of measurement which were apparently conventional in Alexander's day. The royal surveyors published Journals known as *Σταθμοί* (Athenaeus x 442B, ii 67 A; Aelian, *NA* xvii 17), and the basic unit of measurement was the stade (*FGH* 119 F 2-3). The same seems true of the other Alexander historians.¹ Moreover, where Arrian cites measurements from the Alexander historians, such as the distance between Gaugamela and Arbela (vi 11. 5; cf. iii 8. 7), they are given in stades. It seems most unlikely that this single aberration comes from Arrian's sources; more probably it is a piece of deliberate antiquarianism. Ptolemy may have given a rough estimate of 30 stades for the distance of the Getic town from the river and Arrian converted it into parasangs (for the equivalence see Hdt. ii 6. 3, v 52 f., vi 42. 2). It is hardly surprising that Arrian introduced another echo of Herodotus in a passage so influenced by the master (cf. i 3. 1, 3. 5 nn.).

5. **Μελέαγρῳ καὶ Φιλίππῳ** (Berve nos. 494, 775) Both men appear as battalion commanders at the Granicus (i 14. 2-3), and like Nicanor and Philotas, they probably had their commands at or shortly after the death of Philip.

Θεοὶ κτλ. This was a regular ceremony. Alexander sacrificed both before the crossing of a major river, to elicit the gods' approval (cf. iv 4. 3, v 28. 4 = Ptolemy F 23), and after the crossing as a thank-offering to the deities involved (cf. v 3. 6). Zeus and Heracles were the ancestors

¹ Seleucus' admiral, Patrocles, did apparently give one distance in parasangs, but it was an isolated occurrence, needing an explanatory gloss from Strabo (Strab. xi 11. 5 (578)).

of the Argead house (cf. ii 5. 9, iii 3. 2 nn., vi 3. 2) and they figured as a matter of course in virtually all Alexander's religious ceremonies, the chief of his *θεοὶ πάτριοι*. Zeus is honoured in his aspect of Saviour, as was appropriate after an enterprise of some danger. Compare the later ceremonies in India and Carmania (*Ind.* 18. 11, cf. vi 3. 1-2; *Ind.* 36. 3, cf. 21. 2).

6. *ὅσα...παρὰ Σόρμου* So Strabo vii 3. 8 (301). The king's submission was lasting; there was a contingent of Triballians in the Macedonian army at the Hellespont crossing (Diod. 17. 3-4), at least one of whom appears to have settled at Ai-Khanum, far away on the Oxus (L. Robert, *CRAI* 1968. 418-20).

The other peoples who sought Alexander's friendship cannot be identified. They presumably included the Getic neighbours of the Triballians and perhaps even Scythians from the Danube delta (cf. vii 15. 4 for Scythian embassies in 323).

καὶ παρὰ Κελτῶν Strabo retails the same story and ascribes it explicitly to Ptolemy (Strabo vii 3. 8 (301-2) = *FGrH* 138 F 2). Both authors stress the motive of personal vanity in Alexander's question, but Arrian elaborates on the bare lines in Strabo. Secondly, the Celtic reply takes a slightly different form in Arrian. The envoys stress that their motive was not fear or expediency, but admiration; in Strabo's account they merely state that they value above all else Alexander's friendship. Strabo's version is the more concise; Arrian by contrast goes to some lengths to explain why the Celts had no fear of Alexander. The explanation most commonly given for the variants is that Strabo used an intermediary source, perhaps Poseidonius, so that Ptolemy's original narrative has become abridged and reshaped (Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD. 501; Strasburger 21; Kornemann 45-6). Pearson, on the other hand, suggests that it is Arrian who has added the unnecessary explanation (*LHA* 184 n. 176). There is a parallel in the treatment of Aristobulus' story that Alexander desired to become the third god of the Arabians. In that case Arrian appears to have reshaped the original for rhetorical purposes, whereas Strabo gives a more straightforward digest (Strabo xvi 1.11 (741); Arr. vii 20. 1). It seems unlikely, however, that either author merely copied the original source. Strabo clearly extracts what is relevant as an *exemplum* and ignores the rest. Arrian, on the other hand, may well have adapted Ptolemy's narrative to emphasize the Celts' lack of fear for Alexander. Neither author gives a faithful copy. *τῶν ἐπὶ τῷ Ἰωνίῳ κόλπῳ* Strabo calls them *Κελτοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀδρίαν*, apparently correctly. Since the time of Herodotus the Ionian gulf was the name given to the lower part of the Adriatic (Hdt. vi 127. 2, etc.; cf. Strabo ii 5. 20 (123)), whereas *Ἀδρίας* denoted the northern reaches of the sea (Hdt. i 163. 1, iv 33. 1, v 9. 2). Originally the entire sea was termed the Ionic gulf (Hecataeus, *FGrH* 1 F 91; Hellanicus, *FGrH* 4 F 4). Arrian may again be archaizing.

The Celts had invaded the Po valley some time around 400 B.C. (see, conveniently, H. H. Scullard, *Etruscan Cities and Rome* (1967), 217–20), and by the mid fourth century they had spread to occupy a narrow frontage of the Adriatic coast, at the deepest recess of the sea ([Scylax] 18–19). Celtic tribes had also penetrated the Balkan peninsula. In the early fourth century they had pushed inland from the Illyrian coast (Justin xxiv 4. 2–3), and by the time of Philip's accession they had inflicted a defeat on the Autariatae, the Illyrian neighbours of the Triballians (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 40; Polyaeus vii 42; cf. Mócsy, *Acta Antiqua* xiv (1966) 90 f.). It is these Celtic peoples rather than those of the Po valley who are likely to have been disturbed by Alexander's attack on the Triballians.

7. μήποτε ὁ οὐρανὸς αὐτοῖς ἐμπέσοι H. d'Arbois de Jubainville (*La Famille Celtique* (1905) 165–7, endorsed by Tarn i 6 n. 1) adduced parallels from oaths sworn in Celtic Ireland and suggested that the Celts swore to keep friendship unless the heavens fell, the earth shattered, and the sea moved its domain; Alexander merely asked which danger scared them most. But Strabo says that the conversation took place at a drinking session, not an oath-taking. There is a simpler explanation. The Celts were renowned as fearless warriors who faced even the elements intrepidly (Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 132; Arist. *NE* iii 1115^b26–8). Alexander was presumably well aware of their reputation for fearlessness, and it would be excellent propaganda if he could elicit a statement that men who did not fear the elements feared the Macedonian king above everything. The actual response of the Celts may indeed be based on formulae in oaths and imprecations, but nothing suggests that they had sworn a formal oath including the formula.

5. 1. ἐπ' Ἀγριάνων καὶ Παιδόνων The Paeonians were distributed north of Macedonia, between the Vardar and Strymon rivers (Strabo vii F 36; cf. Hammond, *Macedonia* i 78, 202). The Agrianians occupied the north-east corner of Paeonia, the headwaters of the river Strymon (Thuc. ii 96. 3; Strabo vii F 36–7). Alexander will have followed the main route from the Danube, keeping to the river Iskur as far as Sofia and continuing south-west to the Upper Strymon valley.

Κλεῖτον . . . τὸν Βαρδύλειον (Berve no. 426) Cleitus was the son of the formidable Illyrian king, Bardylis, who had defeated and killed Philip's brother, Perdiccas III. He was decisively defeated in 358 B.C. (Diod. xvi 4. 4–7; cf. [Lucian] *Macrob.* 10). It is not stated which branch of the Illyrians Bardylis ruled, but there is a very strong probability that it was the Dardani, the people north of Macedonia straddling the important strategic area between the Drin and the Erigon (Strabo vii 5. 7 (316); cf. Hammond, *ABSA* lxi (1966) 250–2). Their subjugation in Philip's reign is murkily attested by Justin (viii 6. 3).

Γλαυκίαν. . . τὸν Ταυλαντίων βασιλέα (Berve no. 227) The Taulantians are attested in the hinterland of Epidamnus as early as Thucydides (Thuc. i 24. 1; [Scylax] 26; Eratosthenes *ap.* Steph. Byz. s.v. *Δυρράχιον*; Strabo vii 7. 8 (326)), and Epidamnus remained their heartland through the whole of antiquity. Taulantian ambitions extended south, and in 314 B.C. we find them laying siege to Apollonia, at the mouth of the Aous (Diod. xix 70. 7; cf. 67. 6, 78. 1). This naturally brought them into contact with the Molossian federation. The power of Pyrrhus and his successors extended along the Adriatic coast north of Epidamnus (Appian, *Illyr.* 7. 17), and it is likely that the Taulantians were in danger of subjugation whenever the federation was strong. Their interests in 335 were to unite with the Dardanians against the united kingdoms of Molossia and Macedon. Glaucias was later to support Pyrrhus, descendant of the exiled Arrhybas, against the son of Alexander of Epirus (Plut. *Pyrrhus* 2-4; cf. Hammond, *Epirus* 567 f.).

Αὐταριάτας The Autariatae are described by Strabo as one of the three most powerful Illyrian tribes (vii 5. 6 (315)). Their territory bordered on Paenonia like that of the Dardanians and extended as far as the Bessi of the Haemus (vii 5. 1 (313), vii 5. 12 (318)). Arrian's narrative makes it clear that they were close enough to the Agrianians to make an invasion an easy affair but, on the other hand, they clearly had not been subjects of Macedon, for Alexander had no prior knowledge of them (cf. i 5. 3). We should therefore locate their country in the vicinity of the Niš and Morava rivers. In all probability their territory stretched a great distance west, for they are also attested as neighbours of the Ardiaei of the Adriatic coast (Strabo vii 5. 11 (317)).

2. **Λάγγαρος** (Berve no. 460) This is the only reference to the history of the Agrianians under Philip, which is surprising. They provided an indispensable unit of Alexander's army, used continually from the outset of the reign (i 1. 11, i 6. 7, etc.), and they must have been important in Philip's reign. Yet there is no explicit statement when they became subjects of the Macedonian throne. We know only that when Agis, king of the Paenonians, died in 358, Philip invaded the kingdom and forced the Paenonians to subjection (Diod. xvi 4. 2). It is probable, though nowhere stated, that these conquests included the Agrianians and that Langarus was Agis' successor. There is no further evidence about his embassy to the young Alexander. It is tempting, however, to date it to 340, when Alexander was regent of Macedonia during Philip's absence at Byzantium and suppressed an uprising by the Maedi (Plut. *Al.* 9. 1). The Maedi were neighbours of the Agrianians, occupying the lower valley of the Strymon (Thuc. ii 98. 2; Strabo vii F 36), and the Agrianians presumably co-operated with the Macedonian army.

μετὰ τῶν ὕπασπιστῶν 'With his bodyguards'. Arrian occasionally uses *ὑπασπιστής* in a non-technical sense, denoting not the troops of the

phalanx but the individual shield-bearers of the king (cf. i 11. 8; 'Suda' s.v. ὑπασπισταί. τῷ Χοσρόῃ ὑπασπισταὶ καὶ δορυφόροι ἅ ὑπήρχον—probably a fragment of Arrian's *Parthica*).

3. ἀπολεμωτάτους According to Theopompus, the Autariatae were notoriously dissolute and their ἀκρασία was ingeniously exploited by Celtic invaders (*FGrH* 115 F 40—with Mócsy's emendation *Αὐταριᾶται*; Polyaeus vii 42). Later they became a formidable military power. Under the stress of the Celtic migration they invaded Paconia and reduced King Audoleon to desperate straits. In 310 Cassander settled 20,000 of them in the vicinity of Mt. Orbelus (Diod. xx 19. 1). It must have been about this time that the Autariatae attacked the Triballians and occupied their lands between the Agrianian border and the Danube (Strabo xii 5. 11 [318]). As yet the Autariatae do not seem to have been under pressure and they were not formidable as a military power. Langarus expected no difficulties in his invasion and Arrian implies that he ravaged the land without serious opposition.

4. Κύναν (Berve no. 456) *Κύννα* is the more frequently attested form of the name (Satyrus *ap.* Athenaeus xiii 557 c; Diod. xix 52. 2; Diyllus, *FGrH* 73 F 1). In the *Successors* Arrian uses the form *Κυννάνη* (*Succ.* F 1. 22–3; so Polyaeus viii 60). Both forms of the name may have been used in her own lifetime (cf. O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedoner* 220).

Cynna was the half-sister of Alexander. She was the offspring of Philip's early marriage with the Illyrian princess, Audata (Satyrus *ap.* Athenaeus xiii 557 c), and became noted for her warlike temper (Polyaeus viii 40; Duris, *FGrH* 76 F 52). Shortly before Philip's death she was married to Amyntas, son of Philip's brother, Perdiccas III, a marriage which was terminated soon after Alexander's accession, when Amyntas was killed by the new king on charges of conspiracy (*Arr. Succ.* F 1. 22; Polyaeus, loc. cit.; cf. i 25. 1 n.). Cynna was free to marry Langarus by summer 335. Her husband was therefore dead, almost certainly liquidated before the Danubian campaign began in spring.

Cynna reappeared in 322/1 when she tried to press the claims of her daughter, Eurydice, as a wife for Philip Arrhidaeus and was murdered by Perdiccas' brother, Attalus (*Arr. Succ.* F 1. 22 f.; Polyaeus, loc. cit.). It was an enormously unpopular move, and Cynna's name may have been brought into the narrative of 335 for malicious purposes. Her name would recall to readers a crime laid at the door of Perdiccas, Ptolemy's arch-enemy (cf. i 8. 1 n.).

5. παρὰ τὸν Ἐριγόνα The river Crna. This is the principal tributary of the Vardar (Axios), making its confluence immediately south of Stobi, one of the main centres of the Paconians (a good map in Hammond, *Macedonia* i 180). Alexander had cut south-west from the head of the Strymon valley, probably following the ancient road through Kratovo and Štip. From Stobi he continued south-west towards

Lyncestis. Hammond (*JHS* xciv (1974) 78 n. 29) has suggested that Alexander took the route through the modern town of Prilep, actually keeping away from the Erigon; he translates 'near the Erigon'. That, I think, is impossible. Arrian is using the phrase with a verb of motion and the preposition implies direction; as at vi 15. 4, *παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν* must mean 'along the river'. Had Arrian wished to say that Alexander marched near the Erigon, he would have used a more explicit expression such as *οὐ πολὺ ἀπέχων τοῦ Ἐριγόνος* (cf. i 7. 9). Hammond, however, points out cogently that in its southward course from the Vardar the Crna passes through a series of extremely rugged gorges, which are intractable for a large army (*Macedonia* i 65; following L. Heuzey and H. Daumet, *Mission archéologique de Macédoine* (1876), 321–3). Alexander must have avoided that reach of the river, and it is highly probable that he marched via Prilep. He would then have impinged on the upper reaches of the Erigon in the vicinity of Cepikovo and followed the river south towards Florina and the central plain of Lyncestis, exactly the route taken in 200 B.C. by the Roman consul, P. Sulpicius Galba (*Livy* xxxi 39. 3–6). Once more Arrian has omitted a large portion of Alexander's itinerary, the entire march from the upper Strymon to the upper Erigon.

ἐς Πέλλιον πῶλιν It is generally assumed that the city is to be identified with the *urbs Pelion* occupied by Galba in 200 B.C. as a base for raids into Macedonia (*Livy* xxxi 40. 3–5). This latter city was located in Dassaretis, west of the Orestian city of Celetrum (Kastoria), in the vicinity of the river Devoll and the Tsangón Pass. The identification was made by Leake, who also suggested that Arrian's river Eordaicus is the present-day Devoll (W. M. Leake, *Travels in N. Greece* (1835), iii 281), and it has never been seriously questioned. N. G. L. Hammond has recently made it the basis of a detailed study of Alexander's Illyrian campaign (*JHS* xciv (1974) 66–87, esp. 76). He argues that the site of Pelion is Goricë on the upper Devoll, just south of the Tsangón Pass. This seems a perfectly satisfactory location for Livy's Pelion. As a site for Arrian's *Πέλλιον* it is far more dubious.

(i) The Eordaicus river ought to be connected with the Macedonian province of Eordaea, situated around Lake Ostrovo to the east of Lyncestis. The river Devoll, however, is on the western side of the watershed, far to the south-west of Eordaea. In the face of this difficulty scholars have conjured up a second Eordaea, supposedly located in Illyria around the sources of the Devoll (Oberhummer, *RE* v 2656–7; Hammond 76, *Macedonia* i 95). The evidence for this second Eordaea is flimsy in the extreme. Ptolemy lists three cities of the Eordaei, or Eordetae, which are otherwise unknown (Ptol. iii 13. 26 Nobbe), and the co-ordinates he gives for them indicate that they should be located west of the watershed, between the Apsus and Achelous. This is far from conclusive. Ptolemy places the Macedonian provinces of Orestis

and Elimiotis at the same longitude, far west of their actual positions, and there is a strong probability that Eordaea too is out of place (see the superb reproduction in C. J. Fischer, *Cl. Ptolemaei Geogr. ; Cod. Urbinus gr. 82* (1932), Pars altera, tab. XI). There is only one source, moreover, who mentions two districts of Eordaea. That is Stephanus of Byzantium, and he implies that the second lay in Mygdonia, between the Axios and the Strymon and far from Dassaretis (Steph. Byz. s.v. 'Εορδαῖαι). Hammond adds that there were Eordi called Amyri in Dassaretis, near Mt. Amyron. Once more the source is Stephanus (s.v. "Αμυρος), and the Eordi mentioned in the context seem connected with the Thessalian city of Amyrus; they have nothing to do with the Amyri of Dassaretis, who are only mentioned in a passing note from Eupolis. I conclude that there was no second Eordaea and that Arrian's Eordaicus river is to be connected with the familiar province of Eordaea in Macedonia. There is one point of corroboration. When Alexander broke off the campaign to move south to Thebes, he passed through Eordaea and Elimiotis. If he was travelling south from the upper Devoll, his shortest route was to Celetrum in Orestis and down the Haliacmon valley through Elimiotis to Grévena in Tymphaea. It was a pointless diversion to move east to Eordaea.

(ii) The form of the name in Arrian is important. Livy's Pelion seems the same as the Illyrian city of Πήλιον mentioned by Stephanus of Byzantium. Arrian's text, however, reads Πέλλιον; Πήλιον is a traditional 'correction', copied by Robson from Dübner's text and unfortunately followed by Hammond. Now the reference to Πέλλιον comes three lines below a reference to the Macedonian capital, Πέλλα, and it is quite possible that there might be an error of perseveration. A scribe may subconsciously have substituted the prefix Πελλ-, attracted by the familiar name of the capital. The name originally in Arrian's text may have borne no resemblance to Pellion. Compare the intrusion of the name Bessus at iv 7. 2 (cf. CQ xxiv (1974) 60 f.).

(iii) Cleitus was in all probability king of the Dardani (i 5. 1 n.). In that case his kingdom was due north of Macedon proper, straddling the territory between the Drin and the Vardar. To invade Macedon he needed merely to drive south through Monastir into Lyncestis. It was pointless to go further south-west to the Devoll valley; he would be separating himself further from his own territory without any compensating advantages. Given that Alexander 'marched along the Erigon and made his way to Pellion', it seems plausible that the river Eordaicus is one of the southern tributaries of the Erigon which rise around Florina, in the heart of ancient Lyncestis. For instance, one of the tributary streams of the Helleska, the Paléo, rises in the mountains between Eordaea and Lyncestis and from the village of Meliti gives access to Gornitsovo, the more northerly of the ancient passes into Eordaea (Hammond, *Macedonia* i 50-1). If 'Pellion' was in this area, the

Illyrians had occupied a site inside Macedonia, in Lyncestis itself. Lyncestis was not only a territory strategically salient for both Dardani and Taulantii; it had traditional links with the Illyrian kingdoms (Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 99), and in the aftermath of the execution of the Lyncestian princes (cf. i 25, 1 n.) there may well have been some local disaffection against Alexander. Tarn (i 6) was therefore right to suppose that the campaign was fought inside Macedonia.

8. ξὺν τῇ παρούσῃ δυνάμει An indication that Alexander did not take the entire Macedonian army into the campaign. At the Danube he had transported no more than 1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry across the river (i 3. 6), surprisingly few, seeing that he had thoroughly intimidated the Triballi and had the means of transporting as many men as he wished across the river. The Getae on the opposite side were superior in numbers, and it is unlikely that Alexander left behind the greater part of his army. Hammond's estimate of 25,000 men in the army at 'Pellion' (*JHS* xciv (1974) 79-80) seems to me an exaggeration.

12. δι' ὧν ἡ πάροδος ἦν Alexander was apparently forced to go through the narrows to leave the area of Pellion, and it needs explanation why he did not merely retreat in the direction he had come. That is an additional difficulty in the location of the campaign on the river Devoll. Alexander had a safe retreat back to Bilisht and Vatochorion, where he entered Macedonian Orestis. The narrows of the Gryke e Ujkut (Hammond 81-3) were a far more perilous route of withdrawal, and the dangers of harassment (*pace* Hammond 86) were equally great once Alexander had passed the narrows. Alexander was able to counter-attack only because the Illyrians did not follow him (cf. i 6. 9). On the other hand, if we locate Pellion near the passes leading to Eordaea, Alexander had no choice other than force the narrows. If he retreated north to the Erigon, he was leaving the Macedonian heartland exposed to the invaders. In the absence of exact information for the area there is no hope of pinpointing the exact location. It is worth noting, however, that Arrian does not speak explicitly of a mountain pass; the narrows were created by the river on one side and the mountain on the other. The whole action could have taken place in the Lyncestian plain.

6. 2. ὀρθά . . . ἐς προβολήν The *sarisae* of the phalangites were held upright until the moment of engagement, when the front ranks brought their weapons into horizontal position (cf. Arr. *Tact.* 12. 7-10). *προβολή* is the technical term for the *sarisae* in horizontal position, and Plutarch mentions it along with *συνασπισμός* (cf. i 1. 9 n.) as the principal characteristic of the Macedonian phalanx (*Flaminius* 8. 4; *Philopoemen* 9. 4).

καὶ νῦν μὲν κτλ. 'To turn now to the right and again to the left the line of interlocked pikes'. τῶν δοράτων τὴν σύγκλεισιν is an obscure

expression. What Arrian must mean is the overlapping pikes of the Macedonian front line. According to the tactical writers each man of the front lines was fenced in by six *sarisae* from the ranks behind (Arr. *Tact.* 12. 10; Aelian 14. 6), so that the enemy faced a wall of overlapping *sarisae* (cf. iii 14. 3 ταῖς σαρίσαις πεφρικυῖα). The manoeuvre described by Arrian is the change of alignment of this fence of *sarisae* preliminary to a change in the direction of march. The front ranks of the army would raise their *sarisae* to the vertical position, all would turn to the left or the right, and finally the men of the flank would lower their weapons, forming a new front.

3. οἶον ἔμβολον 'Making a kind of wedge out of the phalanx on the left'. Arrian elsewhere mentions formations of cavalry in wedge shape, and he always qualifies the metaphor as he does here (cf. i 15. 7, iii 14. 2). Once more the expression is technical. The military authors describe the ἔμβολος as a variation upon the so-called διφαλαγγία ἀμφίστομος, that is, a double column of march with the file leaders on the flanks. In ἔμβολος formation the leading ranks bunched together tightly while the succeeding ranks gradually opened order (Arr. *Tact.* 29. 5; cf. Aelian 37). The result was a wedge-shaped formation with a narrow, compressed head and with the sides composed of picked men. The wedge-formation was apparently a special predilection of Philip and he gave his armies particular training in it (Arr. *Tact.* 16. 6-7; cf. Aelian 18. 6). The formation used by Alexander was not the artificial ideal formation of the theorists but an improvisation in the actual field, like the ἔμβολος at Gaugamela (cf. iii 14. 2). All he would need to do was to bunch together the rearward ranks so that an apex was formed at the left front corner of the phalanx. The whole army could then be led diagonally, point first, at the enemy.

οὐκ ἐδέξαντο There were two stages in the attack. First the Macedonian phalanx approached in absolute silence, and the beginning of the attack proper, instead of parade-ground manoeuvres, was enough to dislodge the enemy from the foothills. The second phase began with the shock of the Macedonian war-cry, and the frightening contrast with the previous silence (cf. iii 9. 7-8) so demoralized the enemy that they made a complete withdrawal to the city. Only the Taulantii were involved; Cleitus' men, Arrian implies, were all invested in Pellion (cf. i 5. 7). There is no evidence for Hammond's interpretation (83) of the advance as a double movement, first on Dardanian remnants in the southern hills, and then an attack on Taulantii who had come down from the north to harass the Macedonian rear.

4. τοῖς δόρασι δουπῆσαι Alexander gave the same command at Gaugamela (Diod. 57. 6); and it must have been a regular part of the phalanx attack. The small circular infantry shield was fastened over the shoulder by a leather band (ὀχάνη; Plut. *Cleom.* 11. 3). In the prelude to battle it was drawn down the arm (Plut. *Aem. Paul.* 19. 2), so

that it could be shaken against the *sarisa* during the advance. It was possible to hold the weapon steady with the left hand while the right manipulated the shield (Curt. ix 7. 19; cf. Diod. 100. 6).

5. τοῖς σωματοφύλαξι As with the *ἐταῖροι*, there are two categories of Bodyguards. (i) The élite *agema* of the hypaspists is occasionally termed the Bodyguards (iii 17. 2 n. cf. iv 3. 2, iv 30. 3); naturally so, for when the king fought on foot they were the troops of his entourage. (ii) The group of high nobles who attended Alexander at court and enjoyed the highest military commands (cf. Berve i 25–30). Arrian is here describing a small skirmish, important only because it put Alexander in a position to protect the army crossing. The troops with him were few and entirely cavalry. The Bodyguards must therefore have been the nobles of category (ii), who retained their original functions in battle (vi 9. 3; Berve i 28).

ἀναλαμβάνοντας τὰς ἀσπίδας This passage suggests that cavalry were equipped with shields and used them on occasions like the present, when they might be expected to fight on foot. In plastic representations such as the Issus mosaic and the Alexander sarcophagus at Sidon the Macedonian cavalry are depicted without shields, and there is a tradition that Alexander himself used shield-bearers (i 11. 7–8; cf. vi 9. 3; Diod. 99. 4). Scholars have therefore often argued that the Macedonian cavalry did not use shields (e.g. Bauer, *Kriegsaltertümer*³ 432; Kromayer–Veith 109). Delbrück, however, observed that some traditions of the Granicus represent Alexander carrying a shield (Diod. 20. 3; Plut. *Al.* 16. 7). The decisive passage is probably iv 23. 2, which describes a mounted force of cavalry and infantry; Arrian emphasizes that the infantry are still equipped ξὺν ταῖς ἀσπίσι ταῖς πεζικαῖς. In other words, the cavalry had a shield of their own which differed from the small button shield used by the men of the phalanx.

6. ἐς δισχιλίους The Agrianians and archers are listed together in Diodorus' catalogue of troops at the Hellespont, where their combined total was only 1,000 (Diod. 17. 4). Alexander, however, was conducting a campaign close to Paeonia and had passed through Agrianian territory on his way back from the Danube (i 5. 1). He could presumably draw more heavily on Agrianian manpower for a short-range campaign than for the indefinitely protracted expedition in Asia (so Berve i 138).

ὅποτε δέ . . . φάλαγγα Arrian's language is not easy to understand. It looks as though the phalanx was still in its dense, rectangular formation, 120 ranks deep. They were approaching the narrows, only four shield-breadths wide according to Arrian (i 5. 12), and once the river was crossed the phalanx would have to be transformed into an extended line (so Krüger). The troops therefore had to be fed across the river in separate detachments in columns a few files across. On reaching the far bank they would wheel left and form a close-packed extended line. As

the crossing continued the phalanx was transformed from the massed rectangular formation into a compact line which served both as column of march and as a battle line if the Illyrians attacked from the opposite side.

8. τὰς μηχανάς These catapults had been intended for the siege of Pellion. It is interesting that Alexander was able to take them with him on his retreat, and some at least of the baggage animals must have been used (*contra* Hammond, *JHS* 84 f.).

οὐδεὶς ἀπέθανεν Compare i 1. 10 and i 4. 5. The Illyrians never came to grips with Alexander's forces at any stage of the retreat. The Macedonians launched three attacks and on each occasion the enemy fled without a blow.

9. τὴν Περδίκκου καὶ Κοίνου τάξιν 'The battalions of Perdiccas and Coenus' not 'the battalion jointly commanded by Perdiccas and Coenus' (so apparently, Hammond 85). The construction is used repeatedly by Arrian, and in no instance does it refer to a single unit with two commanders (cf. Tarn ii 144; Bosworth, *CQ* xxiii (1973) 252 n. 2). These two battalions were both recruited from Upper Macedonia.

11. μέχρι πρὸς τὰ ὄρη τῶν Ταυλαντίων The Taulantii occupied the hinterland of Epidamnus (i 5. 1 n.), and it is difficult to accept that their territory extended beyond the upper reaches of the Shkumbi river, around Elbasan. If Alexander's pursuit went as far as 'the mountains of the Taulantii', it involved his crossing the Pindus and taking the chase at least 100 km west of the battle site. Alexander, moreover, was on foot with a select group of infantry. It is possible that Arrian has garbled the information in his source. Ptolemy need only have said that the pursuit was continued to the mountains *leading to* Taulantian territory, in other words to the mountains to the west of the Lyncestian plain, which in Polybius' day formed the boundary between Macedonian and Illyrian territory (Strabo vii 7. 4 (323); Hammond, *Macedonia* i 27 ff.). See further Bosworth, *CQ* xxvi (1976) 124, and Hammond's reply, *CQ* xxviii (1978) 138-40.

Κλεῖτος . . . Ταυλαντίους Nothing more is known of Cleitus. We can assume that he did not stay long with Glaucias but returned to his own kingdom. Macedonian reprisals were unlikely in the immediate future, given the troubles in Greece in late 335 and the opening of the campaign in Asia. Ultimately Cleitus was succeeded by his son (?) Bardylis, whose daughter Birkenna became one of the brides of Pyrrhus (Plut. *Pyrrhus* 9. 1; cf. Hammond, *ABSA* lxi (1966) 246).

7. 1-9. 8. *The Theban Uprising*

7. 1. ἐπαγ(αγ)ομένων τινῶν Arrian gives the only full account of the outbreak of revolt, and he alone mentions the return of the exiles. His

story is perfectly plausible. After Chaeronea Philip had eliminated the political leaders of Thebes by exile and execution, and placed the government of the city in the hands of a junta of 300 former exiles (Justin ix 4. 7-8; Roebuck, *C.Phil.* xliii (1948) 80). The presence of the men exiled by Macedon was a necessary preliminary to the liberation of the city. The first stages of revolt were identical to the glorious revolution of 379, and from the outset involved violation of the Common Peace of 337 (cf. [Dem.] 17. 16: *μὴ ἐξεῖναι φυγάδας . . . ὅπλα ἐπιφέρειν κτλ.*).

Ἀμύνταν . . . καὶ Τιμόλαον (Berve nos. 62, 752) Arrian implies that both men belonged to the Macedonian garrison on the Cadmeia. This has long been disputed. Niehbuhr identified them as the leading Theban sympathisers with Macedon, Anemoetas and Timolaus (Dem. 18. 295; Polybius xviii 14. 4; Dein. 1. 72), and he proposed emending *Ἀμύνταν* to *Ἀνεμοίταν* (*Vorträge über alle Geschichte* ii (Berlin 1848) 431). The suggestion has been accepted by Berve, but wrongly. Demosthenes (18.48) suggests that Timolaus fell out of favour shortly after Chaeronea, and it is wholly plausible that two members of the Macedonian garrison, captured in the lower city during the outbreak of the revolt, were summarily lynched by the populace.

2. *ἐς δὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν* Diod. 9.1 gives an extended description of the Theban decision to resist Alexander. The leaders of the revolt first met in council and passed a *προβούλευμα*; the assembly then ratified the measure (*ἐπικυρώσαντος τὴν γνώμην*). The Thebans were acting as a democracy, with the *ecclesia* acting as the sovereign body, and the leaders of the revolt functioning as a probouleutic council. That contrasts completely with Philip's settlement, which had placed the city under the control of a Council of 300 (Justin ix 4. 8; cf. Busolt-Swoboda, *GS* ii 1431). There had almost certainly been a change of *πολιτεία*, a procedure utterly interdicted by the terms of the Common Peace (*SIG*³ 260. 12-14; [Dem.] 17. 10).

ἐλευθερίαν κτλ. There may be a small lacuna. The comment in apposition (*παλαιὰ καὶ καλὰ ὀνόματα*) is in the plural, and one expects at least two abstract nouns in the preceding phrase. Abicht's *<καὶ αὐτονομίαν>* is preferable to Krüger's *<καὶ παρρησίαν>*. According to Diodorus (9. 5) the rebels appealed to all comers to join them and the Persian king in the liberation of the Greek cities and the destruction of the tyrant of Greece. It was a platform different from that of the speaker of [Demosthenes] 17, who argued that the Macedonians had violated the Common Peace and were, therefore, liable to the common sanctions. The Thebans rejected the League of Corinth as an instrument of despotism, and claimed that the Persian king, not Alexander of Macedon, was the guarantor of independence. This proclamation recalls the actions of the Persian fleet in the Aegean in 334/3. Treaties of adherence to the League of Corinth were quashed and, in return, the

cities renewed the terms of the King's Peace (cf. Arr. ii 1. 4, ii 2. 2). The Thebans may well have been echoing Persian propaganda; if so, it is easy to understand Alexander's fury.

The deprecatory comment, *παλαιὰ καὶ καλὰ ὀνόματα*, is certainly Arrian's own. In the eyes of the Greeks of the late fourth century, *eleutheria*, the freedom from external constraints, was a worthy object of political struggle, not an outdated and specious slogan. We need go no further than the speeches and inscriptions of the Lamian War (Hyper. *Epitaphios* col. 16; *IG* ii² 467) or the famous inscription from third-century Priene: *ὥς οὐθὲν μείζον ἐστὶν ἀνθρώποις Ἑλλήσιν τῆς ἐλευθερίας* (*Inscr. Priene* 19. 18–20). On the other hand, the condescension of Arrian's expression is precisely what one would expect of an author of the second century AD (cf. Tac. *Hist.* iv 73. 3 Plut. *Galba* 22. 8). It was a world in which men of sense approached the idea of Greek *eleutheria* with caution and reality (e.g. Plut. *praec. reip. gerend.* 32: 824 C).

τῆς βαρύτητος . . . ἀπαλλαγῆναι Compare the Theban appeal to the Arcadians at the Isthmus (Dein. 1. 19). Arrian's language echoes, perhaps ironically, Demosthenes' words in the *De Corona*: *καὶ τῆς βαρύτητος ἀπαλλαγῆναι τῶν Θηβαίων* (Dem. 18. 35); neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus is likely to have referred too bluntly to the harshness of the Macedonian occupation.

τεθνηκέναι Ἀλέξανδρον Aelian (*VH* xii 57) mentions reports of the death of Alexander in his introduction to a list of prodigies before the fall of Thebes. The rumour was widespread; according to Justin, Demosthenes produced for the Athenian assembly a purported eyewitness of Alexander's death in Triballia (Justin xi 2. 8–9; note also the opening of Cleades' speech, xi 4. 1–2). The fatal effect of the rumour is strikingly illustrated by the Theban reluctance to believe that the Macedonian army of invasion was in fact led by Alexander himself (cf. i 7. 6 below).

4. *δι' ὑποψίας* For the Athenian actions in 336 see i 1. 2–3 nn. Alexander must have received a copy of Demosthenes' letter to Attalus urging revolt against the new king, which Attalus had forwarded to Pella in the panic of his last days (Diod. 5.1; cf. 3.2; Plut. *Dem.* 23. 2). In their public actions, however, the Athenians had been more cautious, refusing an offer of 300 talents from the Persian king (Aesch. 3. 239; Dein. 1. 10–11; cf. Cawkwell, *CQ* xix (1969) 176–7). Reports of Alexander's death induced the assembly to vote help for Thebes (Diod. 8. 6; Justin xi 2. 7–9), but forces were never sent, the Athenians being content to await further developments. Despite Demosthenes' personal initiatives (Diod. 8. 5; Plut. *Dem.* 23. 1; Cawkwell, op. cit. 174 ff.). Athenian policy stopped short of military intervention.

ταῖς γνώμας ἀφεστηκότες The Spartan attitude in 336/5 was one of proud independence (cf. i 1. 2 n.). Arrian is, however, incorrect to speak of revolt, even metaphorically. The Spartans were not signatories

to the Corinthian League or, in any case, allies of Macedon. Secondly, there can have been no question of Sparta allying herself with the city which had robbed her of Messenia. Certainly there is no trace, in the sources of any embassy from Thebes to Sparta, or of any vote of help from Sparta. In any case, Sparta herself needed consolidation after the death of King Archidamus in Italy and Philip's invasion of Laconia in 337; she was in no state to give any military commitment to her former enemy.

τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ The Thebans sent embassies to the Arcadians, to Argos, and to Elis (Diod. 8. 1). At Elis there seems to have been a minor revolution, resulting in the exile of Macedonian sympathizers (cf. i 10. 1), and the Arcadians sent a force to the Isthmus. This force stayed at the Isthmus awaiting events (Diod. 8. 6). The Arcadian generals rejected an embassy from Antipater, perhaps through the influence of Demosthenes (Dein. 1. 18; cf. [Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 851 B), but they also refrained from going to the aid of Thebes. According to Deinarchus, their general, Astylus (Berve no. 176), had not received the necessary 10 talents' bribe (1. 20-1); more probably he did not wish to intervene until intervention appeared necessary. Unfortunately, by that time Thebes was already doomed.

Αἰτωλοί Arrian alone mentions the involvement of the Aetolians. In 336 they had helped restore the Acarnanian exiles (Diod. 3. 3), and they were clearly hostile to Macedon. If it is true that their *κοινόν* had been dissolved (cf. i 10. 2 n.), Alexander had every reason to fear that they might join in the Theban uprising.

5. παρὰ τὴν Ἑορδαίαν . . . ἄκρα For the starting-point of Alexander's march see i 5. 5 n. Alexander moved south from the passes into Lyncestis, down through Eordaea towards modern Kozani. Hammond, *Macedonia* i 109, is probably right that he took the road through the pass of Siatista, leading to the headwaters of the Haliacmon, the heart of ancient Elimiotis. From there his route took him to Grévena, which is certainly located near the eastern border of Tymphaea (cf. Hammond, *Epirus* 680). From Grévena Alexander could have taken a direct route to the valley of the upper Peneus, which formed the boundary between Tymphaea and Thessaly (Strabo vii 7. 9 (327)). There is, however, a difficulty. Arrian mentions not only Tymphaea but Parauaea. This latter district was to the west of the Pindus watershed, centred around the headwaters of the Aous (Steph. Byz. s.v; Hammond, *Epirus* 680), far to the west of Alexander's direct route. Hammond suggests that Arrian's text is corrupt, and argues that *Πετραιβίας* should be substituted (*Epirus* 680 n. 4; *Macedonia* i 109 n. 2: 118). But once again Alexander is hypothesized making a loop east away from the direct route into Thessaly, and the probability of a random manuscript corruption from one geographical name to another, rarer, name is very remote. It is surely better to suppose that Arrian's source regarded

Tymphaea and Parauaea as a single geographical unit (cf. Plut. *Pyrr.* 6. 4). Arrian may indeed have distorted the original through excessive abbreviation. His source need only have said that Alexander passed along the south of the Pindus spine, which extends through Tymphaea and Parauaea.

Πέλινα Pelinna lay between Tricca and Pharcadon, to the north of the Peneus, situated at modern Palaiogardiki, some 14 km west of Trikkala (Strabo ix 5. 17 (438), Stählin, *RE* xix 327–38). Alexander need not have entered Thessaly at Pelinna (so Hammond, *Macedonia* i 118). The city was the terminal point of the march down the Pindus, and he may have paused briefly to gather forces. Pelinna was the principal fortress of the area, and its loyalty to Macedon was strikingly displayed when it alone of the Thessalian cities refused to join the Lamian War (Diod. xviii 11. 1). By contrast, the neighbouring cities of Tricca and Pharcadon had suffered in the reign of Philip, and exiles from both cities are denied amnesty in Polyperchon's edict of 318 (Diod. xviii 56. 5; cf. M. Sordi, *La Lega Tessala* 255–6).

ἐν Ὀγχηστῷ (Kirsten, *RE* xviii 412–17) Onchestus was situated on elevated ground close to Lake Copais and the plain of Tenerus (Strabo ix 2. 33 (412); Paus ix 26. 5). Its sanctuary of Poseidon was famous and, under the Macedonian domination, it served as the headquarters of the Boeotian League. The city lay at the summit of the ridge dividing the Thebaid from the plain of Lake Copais, and it was when he reached Onchestus that Alexander's presence was necessarily revealed to the Thebans. By that time he was barely three hours' march from the city (*RE* xviii 415).

ξὺν τῇ στρατιᾷ πάσῃ According to Diodorus 9. 3, Alexander had with him more than 30,000 infantry and at least 3,000 cavalry, all veterans of Philip's battles. That seems an exaggeration. Alexander's army at 'Pellion' was relatively small (cf. i 5. 8 n.). Diodorus' figure may include the Thessalian, Phocian, and Boeotian allies accumulated during the march south.

6. Ἀντιπάτρου It is clear from Deinarchus' account of events at the Isthmus that Antipater was left as regent of Macedonia (Dein. i. 18). The story spread by the insurgent leaders was obviously that Alexander and the main army had been lost in the north (cf. Justin xi 2. 8), so that the forces at Onchestus could only be part of the home army of Antipater.

Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀερόπου (Berve no. 38) For full discussion see the commentary to i 25. This Alexander was son-in-law of Antipater and, at this time, *strategos* in Thrace (i 25. 2). In Theban eyes, if an Alexander was reported in charge of an army at Onchestus, that Alexander was likely to be the son of Aeropus—Alexander the king was dead.

7. τὸ τοῦ Ἰολάου τέμενος (cf. Gomme, *ABSA* xvii (1910/11) 36; *RE*

vA. 1446-7) Paus. ix 23. 1 locates the sanctuary outside the gate Proetides, which faced towards Acraephia and Chalcis. It was clearly to the north-east of the city. Alexander, then, first directed his attention to the seaward side of the city and cut off naval communications (cf. Dein. i. 18).

ἐνδιδοὺς ... τριβὴν This delay, and Alexander's initial readiness to come to terms with the Thebans, is mentioned by the other sources (Plut. *Al.* 11. 7; Diod. 9. 2-4; Justin xi 3. 6). After a forced march Alexander needed some time to rest his army and also to construct the necessary siege-engines (cf. Diod. 9. 6). There seems no doubt, however, that Alexander would have preferred capitulation, and that the destruction of the city was mainly the result of the Thebans' own stubbornness (cf. Schachermeyr² 115-16).

8. οἱ δὲ ... ξόμβασιν 'So far from making any conciliatory move towards an agreement ...'. The following skirmish is described by Arrian alone. There seems a place for it in Diodorus' narrative (9. 4). After describing Alexander's initial eagerness for a peace settlement, he makes the king change his mind abruptly. A sortie on the lines described by Arrian would have supplied a very good reason.

9. τὰς πύλας ... Ἀττικήν Alexander moved to the south of the city, completely severing communications with Attica. For the location of the gates facing Eleutheræ and Attica see A. D. Keramopoullos, *Arch. Dellion* iii (1917) 280-4.

10. τὴν Καδμείαν ... ἐφρούρουν (Cf. Diod. 8. 4) The Cadmeia or citadel of Thebes is roughly 700 m from north to south, and 300 to 400 from east to west. In Roman times this was the only inhabited part of the city (Paus. ix 7. 6). In 335, however, the population lived in the plain below. The Cadmeia formed the nucleus of the fortifications, its south side forming the city wall, which was continued up into the hills on either side (F. Schober, *RE* vA. 1439-40). In other words three of the sides of the Cadmeia were enclosed by the circuit of the walls, and only the south side was vulnerable to penetration from the outside. It was here the Thebans established their double line of palisades, for it was vital to prevent a liaison between the garrison of the Cadmeia and the besieging army. Once the attackers entered the Cadmeia they could stream into the lower city from all directions.

ἐτι γὰρ ... ἤθελε At this stage the other sources place an ultimatum by Alexander. According to Plutarch (*Al.* 11. 7-8) the king demanded the surrender of Phoenix and Prothytes, and promised an amnesty for deserters. The Thebans replied with an ironical counter-demand for the surrender of Antipater and Philotas, and proclaimed an appeal for all to join τοὺς τὴν Ἑλλάδα βουλομένους συνελευθεροῦν. Diodorus has a similar story (9. 5-6; cf. i 7. 2 n.). In both authors the result of the Theban defiance is that Alexander decides on battle, and makes preparations for the siege. In Arrian, however, there is no reference to

the ultimatum and Alexander, in fact, maintains his desire for a negotiated settlement.

Most scholars have opted for Arrian's version (e.g. Droysen i² 1. 138; Schaefer iii² 117 n. 2; Berve nos. 661, 809). The other tradition, however, is very circumstantial. The fact that Antipater was probably not physically present at Thebes does not discredit the story (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 30); the Thebans were making a semi-serious demand to provoke Alexander, and they selected two of his chief ministers (Philotas is probably the son of Parmenion, not the commander on the Cadmeia). What is more, the riposte of the Thebans cleverly inverts Alexander's propaganda. Instead of a war of revenge upon Persia, they propose collaboration to liberate the Greeks of the mainland from Macedon. If historical, it is a clever and topical sally, and one can understand the rage into which Diodorus says it plunged Alexander. (The story is accepted by Wilcken 72-3 and Lane Fox 87.)

The main peculiarity of Arrian's narrative is the role of Alexander. He refuses to attack despite the Theban provocation (i 7. 9-10). He is only drawn in to save his commanders, who launch an unauthorized attack (i 8. 2); and the fate of the city is not his decision but made by a council of allies. There seems a conscious effort to justify the king and exculpate him from any responsibility for the fate of the Thebans. Part of the reason was, no doubt, the wide groundswell of sympathy for the Thebans once their city was destroyed (R. M. Errington, *CQ* xix (1969) 237). But that is not the whole story. In 316 BC Cassander restored Thebes, partially as a means to capture popularity in Greece (Diod. xix 53. 1-54. 3; Paus. ix 7. 1-2). Ptolemy sent large donations through his agent Philocles probably between 310 and 307 (*SIG*³ 337. 18 ff; cf. M. Holleaux, *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* i (1938) 29-36); he also dedicated an altar to Ammon (Paus. ix 16. 1). Now the refoundation of Thebes was a contentious issue. In his propaganda Antigonus represented it as one of Cassander's major crimes (Diod. xix 61. 2), and the assembly of Macedonians he had convoked passed a decree demanding the renewed destruction of Thebes. They clearly believed that the city had been destroyed as an act of policy by Alexander. If, as seems highly probable, Arrian's narrative is based on Ptolemy, the bias of the narrative is totally explicable.

11. *βοιωτάρχοντες* Before 338 Thebes had supplied at least four of the seven federal boeotarchs, and controlled the mechanism of the league (P. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie* 134-5). If Philip retained the league machinery after Chaeronea, he presumably reduced the number of Theban federal magistrates. He had proclaimed the restoration of Plataea, Orchomenus, and Thespieae (i 8. 8-9, 9. 10 nn.) and Plataea at least may have taken back the two boeotarchies she had lost in 427 (*Hell. Ox* 16. 3 (Bartoletti)). In the third century there were eight

boeotarchs only, no more than one from each state, including Thebes (Ἀρχ. Ἐφ. 1952, 181 ff.). Evidence from the period after the restoration of Thebes is, however, irrelevant to the time of Philip and Alexander.

This passage of Arrian is the only positive evidence about the league during the reign of Alexander (the supplement [B]ο[ω]τᾶν at Hypereides, in *Dem.* col. 18 is at best speculative: cf. A. Aymard, *REA* xxxix (1937) 7–10). There are two logical interpretations:

(i) The Boeotian League was continued in a reconstituted form after Chaeronea, the Thebans supplying at least two boeotarchs.

(ii) The Boeotian League had been dissolved, but the first act of the democracy of 335 was to elect (possibly) four boeotarchs, thus reviving Theban claims to supremacy in Boeotia. This happened in 379, when Pelopidas and three colleagues are said to have been elected boeotarchs immediately after the liberation of the lower city (Plut. *Pelop.* 13. 1, 14. 2; cf. M. Sordi, *Athenaeum* li (1973) 79–82).

Arrian's language inclines slightly towards the first alternative. He is giving the degree of guilt (in Alexander's eyes) of the Theban leaders, and at the top of the list are the boeotarchs. If Arrian is referring to men who had been elected *after* the revolution, their offence was not different in kind or greater in magnitude than supporting the revolution. If, however, these boeotarchs were originally the nominees of Philip and Alexander, it was a different matter. They owed their rank to Macedon yet collaborated with the exiles.

8. 1. ἀλλὰ λέγει Πτολεμαῖος(*FGrH* 138 F 3) Arrian's account of the attack on Thebes is unitary, and there is no doubt that this whole chapter is extracted from Ptolemy. It was only the opening statement about Perdiccas that struck him as controversial (Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD. 501; Strasburger 21–2), but it is an uncomfortable fact that his narrative differs from the other extant sources in almost every way. The fullest account is that of Diodorus (11–12. 5); Alexander divided his forces into three, one facing the palisades (before the Cadmeia), another facing the main battle line of the Thebans, and the third held in reserve. The Thebans placed their cavalry behind the palisades, the main force in front of the city, and a body of freed slaves and metics on the city walls. At first the battle was even, and Alexander brought up his reserves, which inflicted heavy casualties but did not turn the tide. Finally, Perdiccas was sent round to enter the city by a side gate deserted by its guard (12. 3). The Theban retreat only took place when the city was occupied, and the issue was decided by an irruption by the garrison on the Cadmeia. Plutarch's narrative is brief but he agrees that the battle was hard fought and even, and that the final act of the drama was the break-out of the garrison (Plut. *Al.* 11. 9–10). Finally, Polyaeus iv 3. 12 recounts a version of the side attack, which he claims was under the command of Antipater, not Perdiccas.

Some of this story is in Ptolemy/Arrian. He says nothing about the triple division of forces, but agrees that the object of Perdiccas' abortive attack was the palisade before the Cadmeia. He agrees that the Thebans had the advantage temporarily (i 8. 5) until Alexander brought up reserve forces, but the result of the intervention was that the Thebans were thrust back into the city. The advent of the second line, not any unsuspected penetration of the city, was the decisive event in the battle.

Most scholars have dismissed Diodorus' account as a rhetorical concoction (e.g. Droysen i² 1. 139 n. 1; Wilcken 73; Strasburger 22; Schachermeyr² 116 n. 103) or selected random details to conflate with Arrian's version (Berve ii 313 no. 627). But nothing suggests that the factual statements of Diodorus are invented for rhetorical purposes (Wilamowitz, *Hermes* xxvi (1891) 202 n. 1, suggested literary imitation of Eur. *Suppl.* 650 ff.—most unconvincingly). In particular there is no reason to doubt that the Macedonians fought in relays (Diod. 12. 1; cf. R. K. Sinclair, *CQ* xvi (1966) 249–55). But there are clear traces of apologetic in Arrian. The attack on Thebes is not planned, but an unauthorized sortie by Perdiccas. Far from there having been an equal battle, the only success of the Thebans was to repel the disorganized assault of Perdiccas. Once the main body of the Macedonian phalanx came into action, the battle was won immediately (i 8. 5). There is no hint of any surprise attack on a side gate or any attack on the Theban rear by the garrison of the Cadmeia. Two elements of propaganda predominate; the implication that the destruction of Thebes was forced upon Alexander (cf. i 7. 10 n.) and the portrayal of the Macedonians as effortless victors. Compare the very similar treatment of the major setback at Halicarnassus; in Arrian it reads as a Macedonian victory (i 22. 1–3).

It is interesting that Perdiccas is made instrumental in both the unauthorized attack and the limited defeat, and Perdiccas was the bitter enemy of Ptolemy down to his murder during the invasion of Egypt in 321 (cf. Errington, *CQ* xix (1969) 237–40). Not only Perdiccas. The brothers of Amyntas, also involved in the attack, were lieutenants of Perdiccas and enemies of Ptolemy, and we can trace bias against them elsewhere in Arrian's narrative (iii 14. 4, 27. 3).

3. τὸ δὲ ἄγῃμα τε καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς This is Schmieder's emendation of the manuscript reading τὰ δὲ ἀγῃματα. It should probably be accepted. In Arrian's usage ἄγῃμα tends to denote the king's foot guard, which was associated with the hypaspists under the command of Nicanor (cf. ii 8. 3, iii 11. 9, etc.). In the latter years of the campaign there was a cavalry *agema*, a horse guard corresponding to the infantry *agema* (cf. vii 6. 4, vii 11. 3). This was clearly the later nomenclature of the royal *ile*, used only after the reorganization of the cavalry in the years following Gaugamela. In the detailed battle lines of Issus and Gaugamela, Arrian mentions only one *agema*, that of the infantry; the

royal cavalry guard is named the ἵλη βασιλική (iii 11. 8). There are two possibilities, if the manuscript reading is retained:

(i) Arrian is referring to both cavalry and infantry ἀγήματα, but is using anachronistic terminology (so Tarn ii 149). Anachronisms of this kind do occur (cf. i 24. 3), but in this case Arrian's source is Ptolemy, and it seems unlikely that he would have referred on this occasion to a cavalry ἄγγμα when he could have used his usual terminology.

(ii) Arrian is referring to an ἄγγμα of non-Macedonian troops (so Berve i 124 n. 2). But there is no evidence that Alexander used Macedonian terms for units of his non-Macedonian forces; such a move would surely be interpreted as an insult to his own men (cf. vii 11. 3). Schmieder's emendation seems logically necessary, especially since Arrian refers a few sentences later to what was obviously the same body of troops and calls them τὸ ἄγγμα τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ τοὺς ὑπασπιστάς (i 8. 4); it is certainly a very easy correction.

τοῦ δευτέρου χάρακος The action is clearly localized in front of the Cadmeia (cf. i 7. 10). Perdiccas is represented trying to break through to link forces with the Macedonian garrison. This is quite different from his role in Diodorus, where he commands the flanking force which made its way into the city in the last stages of the battle (Diod. 12. 3). There are various possibilities:

(i) Perdiccas participated in the original attack on the palisades (cf. Diod. 11. 1), but was withdrawn for the surprise irruption into Thebes. In that case his wound was inflicted at the latter stage of the battle. Ptolemy, having suppressed his later achievement and accredited him with an unauthorized attack on the palisades, located his wound wrongly at an early stage of the battle.

(ii) The attack on the side gate was not led by Perdiccas, son of Orontes. That Perdiccas was wounded in the attack on the palisades (as Arrian), and another officer of the same name effected the entry into Thebes. That is unlikely, for Perdiccas is a name rarely found outside the royal house. Polyaeus may just be right that Antipater commanded this crucial assault, but in that case we have two problems, a mistake of nomenclature in Diodorus, and the difficulty of Antipater, Alexander's regent in Macedon, joining the lightning-swift march to Thebes. The difficulties of the first alternative strike me as less.

τὴν κοίλην . . . φέρουσιν The *koile hodos* is mentioned by Arrian alone. The temple of Heracles is located by Pausanias outside the city walls to the left of the Electran Gate (Paus. ix 11. 4); Pindar also mentions celebrations to Heracles Ἀλεκτρῶν ὑπερθεῖν (*Isthm.* iii/iv 79; cf. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* 340 n. 3). The most popular modern location is in the vicinity of the church of H. Nikolaos; immediately to the west there is a ravine, which may well be Arrian's *k. hodos* (cf. Keramopoulos, *Arch. Deltion* iii (1927) 329; *RE* vA. 1449).

4. Εὐρυβώτας (Berve no. 320) Eurybotas is not mentioned elsewhere.

It is interesting that a Cretan had overall command of the archers, but hardly surprising, considering that the Cretans were the largest and most effective component (cf. ii 9. 3; iii 12. 2 n.). In early 331 Ombrion, also a Cretan, was given command of the archers (iii 5. 6). There seems to have been a fairly high mortality among the commanders, again hardly a surprise in view of the frequency with which the archers were used (cf. i 22. 7, 28. 8, iii 5. 6). All these men seem to have been commanders of the entire body of archers. Berve (i 132) attempts to construct a hierarchy of command with a *strategos* in over-all command and two *τοξάρχαι* in charge of national contingents. This is untenable. In no case is there any reference to two commanders of archers holding office simultaneously, and Arrian's terminology is elastic: at iii 5. 6 Antiochus, obviously commander of all the archers, is termed ἀρχων τῶν τοξοτῶν, a description which Berve concedes is 'nicht ganz exakt'. But in that case it is totally arbitrary to single out the term *strategos*, which occurs only once (i 28. 8), as the title of the commander of the archers.

ἐβδομήκοντα According to Diodorus (14. 1), the Macedonian dead over the entire battle amounted to over five hundred. These are losses at least commensurate with those admitted for the battle of Gaugamela (cf. iii 15. 6 n.).

ὑπασπιστὰς τοῦ βασιλικού The entire hypaspist corps was apparently termed 'the Royal hypaspists' (cf. Tarn ii 139-40). It is a usage which confused Arrian himself, for at v 13. 4 he describes the infantry phalanx at the Hydaspes as comprising 'the Royal hypaspists, the Royal *agema*, and the other hypaspists'. 'The other hypaspists' are obviously the *pezhetairoi*, the men of the phalanx battalions. Having had a reference to the Royal hypaspists he (or possibly a copyist) assumed that there were other, non-Royal, hypaspists.

5. οἱ δὲ . . . πλῶν In Diodorus' account the mêlée at the gates takes place only after Perdiccas' surprise penetration of the city (12. 4-5). He claims the principal confusion was caused by the Theban cavalry riding down their own foot in order to get back to the city.

6. παρελθόντες Arrian envisages two simultaneous moves by the Macedonians. A portion of the army moved outside the walls to make their entry into the Cadmeia. Now that the Theban defenders had left the palisades, they could easily make their way to the Electran gate leading directly into the citadel (cf. Keramopoulos, 281-5). At the same time the Macedonian right stormed the city walls in the area of the gates captured during the Theban retreat. The force which had occupied the gates spread over the adjacent walls and helped their comrades over, so that the invading troops entered the city over a front wider than the gateway itself.

τὸ Ἀμφεῖον The Ampheion had served as a rallying point during the liberation of Thebes in 379 (Xen. *Hell.* v 4. 8). According to Plutarch

(*de gen. Socr.* 4: 577 B) it stood on elevated ground in the vicinity of the Cadmeia. For the site there seems no alternative to the hill immediately north of the Cadmeia, known as the *λόφος τοῦ Ταλάρου* (Keramopoulos 282 n. 1; *RE* vA. 1446).

ἐς τὴν ἀγοράν The *agora* was on low ground to the east of the citadel, in easy view of it (*Plut. De gen. Socr.* 34: 598 E); Keramopoulos located it in the area of Hagia Paraskeve, bounded to the north by the railway line (373; cf. *RE* vA. 1443-4).

8. *οὐχ οὕτως τι οἱ Μακεδόνες* Diodorus (13. 5) agrees that Alexander's Boeotian allies were responsible for some of the excesses of the sack, but he is quite categorical that the Macedonians did the main work of indiscriminate slaughter (13. 1: *ἀφειδῶς ἀνῆρουν*). It is hardly likely that the Macedonian troops, in the forefront of the action as they were, would have left the atrocities to their allies.

Φωκεῖς τε καὶ Πλαταιεῖς The fullest list is given by Justin (xi 3. 8), who names Phocians, Thespians, Plataeans, and Orchomenians (cf. *Diod.* 13. 5; *Plut. Al.* 11. 11). The Phocians had been driven by Theban aggression to seize Delphi in 356, and the Thebans had been their most persistent and bitter enemies in the Sacred War, which ended in 346 with the intervention of Philip and the dismemberment of the Phocian federation. The three Boeotian cities had each been destroyed in the great days of Theban hegemony: Plataea in 373, Orchomenus in 364, and Thespieae was cleared of its population after Leuctra (*Paus.* ix 14. 2; cf. *Diod.* xv 46. 6, 51. 3).

οὓς δέ ... τετραμμένους Arrian divides the victims into three categories: 'falling upon some in their houses, upon others who were in fact making a stand, and upon others actually seeking sanctuary in the shrines'. Sinenis took exception to the second category because it is in apparent contradiction to *οὐδὲ ἀμυνομένους ἔτι*, and because, in contrast to the clauses before and after, there is no statement where the action took place. The expression is slightly awkward, but perfectly tolerable. Arrian marks out a modification to his previous statement; the Thebans did in general submit, but some in fact defended themselves to the last.

9. 1-8. *Excursus on the Fate of Thebes*

Arrian's observations fall into two sections, the first attempting to prove that the Theban disaster was the greatest in magnitude in the entire history of Greece, and the second stating that the fall of the city was attributed to the wrath of the gods. The second section, presented as it is as historical fact, is unlikely to be Arrian's own invention. What is more, the list of Theban delicts corresponds to the accusation actually made during the deliberation of their fate (see commentary on 9. 7). Jacoby (*FGrH* ii D. 502) suggested that the passage is derived ultimately

from Aristobulus; he may be correct. Shortly after Alexander's death a pamphlet issued by Ehippus of Olynthus attributed Alexander's death to his excessive drinking, and suggested that it was the result of the wrath of Dionysus because of the destruction of Thebes (*FGrH* 126 F 3). Now Aristobulus reacted against the accusations of heavy drinking (Plut. *Al.* 75. 6 = *FGrH* 139 F 59). He probably knew Ehippus' pamphlet, and it would have been a nice touch to claim that it was Thebes not Alexander that the wrath of the gods destroyed.

The observations on the magnitude of the disaster are likely to be Arrian's own. The Thucydidean shaping of the subject-matter is certainly his work, and the subject itself seems to have been a literary *τόπος*. Polybius has similar excursus, trying to prove that the disaster of 146 BC was the worst in Greek history (Polyb. xxxviii 1-3). There is much common ground in the list of *exempla*; Polybius stresses the fall of Athens in 404, the decline of Sparta after Leuctra, and the destruction of Thebes itself. Arrian is reproducing a standard list, extracted, it seems, from the two great historical models, Thucydides and Xenophon. There is no reference to later calamities, such as the sack of Corinth in 146, and, most strikingly, no reference to the disaster which was most closely parallel to the fall of Thebes both in magnitude and in the revulsion produced throughout the Greek world—Philip's destruction of Olynthus. To contemporaries the parallel would have been obvious, and Thebes and Olynthus were in fact coupled together as partners in misery (cf. Hegesias, *FGrH* 142 F 7-8, 11). Arrian's digression, however, is a purely literary exercise, and the examples he chooses are familiar to readers of the great classical historians.

9. 1 καὶ πάθος τοῦτο κτλ The basic idea for the excursus was no doubt provided by Thucydides' preface, with its proof that the Peloponnesian War was the greatest hitherto (Thuc. i 1. 2: *κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μέγιστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο*). The actual shaping of the introductory sentence owes much to Thucydides' passing comments on the great disasters of the war (e.g. Thuc. iii 113. 5-6, vii 30. 3), above all, his verdict on the Sicilian expedition (Thuc. vii 87. 5). Arrian's introductory phrasing leads naturally to a discussion of the disaster of 413.

2. οὐ μείονα τὴν ξυμφορὰν According to Thucydides (vii 75. 5), more than 40,000 troops and camp followers began the fatal march from Syracuse, of whom no more than 7,000 even survived as far as incarceration in the quarries (Thuc. vii 87. 4). Isocrates accepts the figure of 40,000 for the losses in Sicily (Isocr. 8. 86). Arrian gives no figures for the casualties at Thebes, but the other sources state that 6,000 were killed and 30,000 enslaved (Diod. 14. 1; Plut. 11. 12; Aelian, *VH* xiii 7). On any reckoning the losses at Syracuse were far greater.

ξυμμαχικόν Of the original force sent out in 415, the Athenians

provided 1,500 hoplites out of a total hoplite force of 5,100, with an additional 700 *thetes* serving as marines (Thuc. vi 43. 2). In 413 the proportions were the same; Demosthenes' reinforcements contained 1,200 Athenian hoplites out of a total of 5,000 (Thuc. vii 20. 2, 42. 1). We have no detailed figures for the Athenian component of the rowers, but it is clear from Nicias' letter that a considerable proportion were allies (Thuc. vii 13. 2; cf. Thuc. i 121. 3, 143. 1).

ἐπὶ πολὺ . . . ἀντισχεῖν Cf. Thuc. ii 65. 12.

παθοῦσιν This of course refers to the Athenians collectively, not to their forces at Syracuse. Arrian is observing perfectly correctly that in 413 the Athenians could not possibly have had the same awareness of their losses in Sicily as the Thebans had of the sack of their city and their own enslavement (cf. Thuc. viii 1. 1).

3. παῖσμα ναυτικόν The thought is that the disaster of Aegospotami (405 BC) involved only the fleet whose composition was low-class and mainly non-Attic. In fact all the Athenian prisoners-of-war, numbering some 3,000, were executed after a vote by the Spartan allies (Xen. *Hell.* ii 1. 31/2; cf. Plut. *Alcib.* 37. 4; *Lys.* 11. 10).

δτι μὴ . . . ἀρχῆς For the terms of surrender in 404 see the sources collected by H. Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* ii 153–5 (no. 211). Arrian says nothing about the enforced return of the exiles (Plut. *Lys.* 14; Andoc. 3. 11) or Athens' incorporation in the Peloponnesian League (Xen. *Hell.* ii 2. 20).

σχῆμα τὸ πατριον The phraseology is again borrowed from Thucydides (cf. Thuc. vi 89. 6, viii 89. 3). Arrian says nothing about the rule of the thirty tyrants, implying that the defeat at Aegospotami involved no change in the political system of Athens. There is, however, a tradition that the peace granted by the Spartans involved the preservation of the πατριος πολιτεία (Arist. *AP* 34. 3; Diod. xiv 3. 2, 3. 6; cf. Xen. *Hell.* ii 3. 2). The implication of the clause was of course the substitution of a more limited constitution for the radical democracy; but it is possible that Arrian misinterpreted it as a guarantee of independence; his general knowledge of history does not seem profound (cf. ii 1. 4 n.).

ἐκτειχίσαι The rebuilding of the Long Walls began in 395, shortly after the outbreak of the Corinthian War, and continued until 392/1 (*IG* ii² 1656–64; Tod ii 107. The greatest contribution was supplied by Conon, who used the money and manpower of the Persian fleet he commanded (Xen. *Hell.* iv 8. 10–12).

αὔθις ἐπικρατῆσαι Athenian naval ambitions began almost immediately after the crushing defeat of the Spartan naval forces at Cnidus. As early as 390/89 Thrasybulus was re-establishing Athenian dominance in the Propontis (cf. R. Seager, *JHS* lxxxvii (1967) 95–115). It is, however, unrealistic to talk in terms of command of the sea until Chabrias' victory at Naxos in autumn 376 (cf. Diod. xv 35. 2: ταύτην πρώτην ναυμαχίαν ἐνίκησαν; cf. 38. 4).

ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων κινδύνων Arrian is presumably referring to the alliance concluded with Sparta in early 369 and the forces sent out that year (Xen. *Hell.* vii 1. 1–14; Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* ii 232, no. 274). Aelius Aristides also singles out this rather lukewarm support for Sparta as ὁ μέγιστον . . . καὶ θαυμαστότατον καὶ μόνον ὡς ἀληθῶς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄξιον (Arist. i 298–301).

4. Λευκτρα καὶ Μαντίνειαν The two battles were nearly ten years apart; Leuctra was fought in midsummer 371 and Mantinea in June or July 362. Both victories were won under Epaminondas' leadership, but it was Leuctra which was the great shock to the Spartans (cf. Plut. *Ages.* 29. 1: πταίσματος ἀπροσδοκήτου).

τῷ πλήθει τῶν [τε] ἀπολομένων There is no responsion to the τε, and the text is probably corrupt. A lacuna is possible, as Roos first thought, but it is hard to fill the gap; <καὶ τῶν ἀλόντων> is unacceptable, for there was a negotiated armistice after both Leuctra and Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* vi 4. 15, vii 5. 26), and there is no hint that the Spartans left prisoners in enemy hands. Reiske's <τό>τε, accepted in Roos's *editio minor*, is hardly better; the adverb is at best otiose and its use, referring to two battles ten years apart, is awkward. It seems best to accept that the τε is an intrusion, even though there is no obvious explanation.

Arrian is superficially correct when he minimizes the Spartan casualties. The losses at Mantinea are not known, and those at Leuctra amounted to 400 Spartiates out of 700 present at the battle (Xen. *Hell.* vi 4. 15). Numerically these are small but, as a proportion of Spartan manpower, calamitous. The 700 Spartiates at Leuctra comprised at least two-thirds of the fighting population of Spartiates, and it is quite possible that no more than 500 Spartiates below the age of 55 survived the battle (cf. A. J. Toynbee, *Some Problems in Greek History* (1969) 401–2; De Ste. Croix, *Origins of the Peloponnesian War* 332).

ἢ τε ξὺν Ἐπαμεινώνδῃ There were two invasions of Laconia led by Epaminondas, the first during the winter campaign of 370/69 (cf. J. Wiseman, *Klio* 1 (1968) 178–80), and the second immediately before the battle of Mantinea, in June 362 (Xen. *Hell.* vii 5. 9–14; Polyb. ix 8. 4–7; Diod. xv 83. 3–4; Plut. *Ages.* 34. 3 ff.). Arrian seems to be referring to the first invasion only. That was the occasion which the sources claim was celebrated because of the novelty of the invasion (Plut. *Ages.* 31. 3; Xen. *Hell.* vi 5. 28), and it was for the first invasion only that the Spartans had allies in Laconia (τοὺς ξυμμετασχόντας αὐτοῖς τῶν . . . πραγμάτων Xen. *Hell.* vi 5. 29; from Orchomenus, Phleius, Corinth, Epidaurus, and Pellene).

5. τῆς πόλεως . . . ἐγκαταληφθέντων There is certainly a small lacuna here; Arrian is discounting the fall of Plataea for two reasons, the smallness of the city itself and the small proportion of the population actually defending it, and, as the text stands, τῶν ἐγκαταληφθέντων is associated most awkwardly with τῆς πόλεως, so that the point is

obscured. Of the suggested supplements I prefer Van Leeuwen's <καὶ ὀλέγων ὄντων> τῶν ἐγκ., which gives the required sense and supplies a variation of construction wholly typical of Arrian.

Arrian concentrates on the events of 427 when no more than 200 Plataeans and 25 Athenians were executed (Thuc. iii 68. 2-3; cf. ii 78.3 f.); he says nothing of the second destruction in 373, which may have been a greater calamity.

καὶ ἡ Μήλου κτλ. This is a clumsy sentence. Arrian seems to be imitating Herodotus' use of the nominative absolute; ἡ ἄλωσις introduces the sentence without any strong syntactical connection (cf. Hdt. ii 9. 2). The mannerism had a considerable vogue in the second century AD, particularly in the work of Aelian (W. Schmid, *Atticismus* iii 95). Arrian, however, seems inconsistent: the second half of the sentence reads as though ἄλωσις were in fact the main subject. For once Arrian's archaism has produced real clumsiness of expression, and no emendation can relieve its awkwardness.

Thucydides describes succinctly the massacre of the male populations of Scione in 421 and of Melos in 416 (Thuc. v 32. 1, 116. 4). These were the most famous atrocities committed by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. Although Xenophon merely mentions them in a catalogue of cities destroyed by Athens (*Hell.* ii 2. 3), their fate had become the principal indictment of Athenian imperialism by the time of Isocrates, who tried lamely to justify the Athenian actions (Isocr. 4. 100-2; cf. 12. 62 ff.). In Arrian's own period Aelius Aristides devoted a large section of his Panathenaic Oration to the defence of Athens' destruction of Melos and Scione (Arist. i 302 ff.).

νησιωτικά Unlike Melos, Scione was not an island but, situated as it was on the Athenian-dominated peninsula of Pallene, it had all the characteristics of an island (Thuc. iv 120. 3). It is by no means certain what Arrian means by stressing the island nature of these cities. Probably he has in mind Thucydides' repeated statement that the Athenians felt particularly strongly about rebellion or independence in the islands (cf. Thuc. iii 91. 2, iv 122. 5, v 97. 99). Because Melos and Scione were island cities, everyone would have expected the Athenians to respond violently to any challenge, and their ruthless treatment came as no surprise.

7. προδοσίας The accusations listed here probably correspond to those made during the deliberations about the fate of Thebes. Diodorus (14. 2) says that Theban medism during Xerxes' invasion was extensively discussed, and Justin goes so far as to refer to the oath taken by the Hellenic coalition to destroy Thebes after their victory (Justin xi 3. 9-10). The punishment of Thebes for her old delict was a subject periodically reviewed in the propaganda of the fourth century (Xen. *Hell.* vi 3. 20, vi 5. 35); and it was the punishment of Thebes, and not any other medizing state, which was emphasized in the edition of the

oath of Plataea which was erected at Acharnae during the mid fourth century (cf. P. Siewert, *Der Eid von Plataiai* (Vestigia XVI: 1972), 63–75). The issue had more relevance in 335 when viewed against the official pretext for war against Persia: punishment for the sacrilege against the shrines of Greece. If the Persians could be punished for their old offences, the Thebans certainly could.

ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς The Theban attack on Plataea in early spring 431 was a formal breach of the peace of 446, and the official pretext for the Archidamian War. Thucydides emphasizes that the attack was a flagrant breach of the *σπονδαί* (Thuc. ii 2. 1, 7. 1), and he claims that even the Spartans recognized the action as totally unjustified (Thuc. vii 18. 2).

ἐν ὅτῳ . . . κίνδυνον In 429 the Plataeans had appealed to the guarantee of autonomy voted by Pausanias and the Hellenic allies after the battle of Plataea (Thuc. ii 71. 2; cf. iii 57. 3).

τῇ ψήφῳ ἀπώλλυον 'Tried to destroy Athens by their vote'. Xenophon speaks of a debate before the walls of Athens in 404. The Corinthians, Thebans, and others pressed for the destruction of Athens, which the Spartans flatly refused (Xen. *Hell.* ii 2. 19–20). He says nothing about a formal motion of enslavement (ὑπὲρ ἀνδραποδισμού . . . γνώμη). It is Plutarch who reports that there was a formal motion of enslavement after the Athenians showed reluctance to change their constitution, the most vocal speaker being Erianthus of Thebes (Plut. *Lys.* 15. 3). This tradition goes back at least to Isocrates (Isocr. 14. 31–2; cf. Dem. 19. 65), and seems to have been the version of the fourth-century orators, not of Xenophon. The divergence from Xenophon's account is some indication that the passage is taken from Arrian's sources rather than his own free composition.

8. πολλὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ For a full list of these portents, see Diodorus 10. 2–6, Aelian, *VH* xii 57. According to Aelian, the portents were observed, but interpreted as omens of disaster for Macedon (contrast Diod. 10. 5–6).

9. 9–10. 6. *The Aftermath of the Fall of Thebes*

9. τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι Arrian speaks quite generally of a trial before the allies who had participated in the campaign, and he seems to envisage an *ad hoc* convention such as that which decided the fate of the Athenian prisoners after Aegospotami (Xen. *Hell.* ii 1. 31). Diodorus, however, indicates that the proceedings were more formal: τοὺς δὲ συνέδρους τῶν Ἑλλήνων συναγαγὼν ἐπέτρεψε τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ (Diod. 14. 1). Justin (xi 3. 8) speaks merely of deliberations *in concilio*—a wholly neutral expression.

Wilcken (*Berliner Akademieschriften* i 32–3) argued that the verdict

was in fact passed by members of the League *συνέδριον* actually present in the army. That is theoretically possible; at least there is evidence for the period of the Lamian War that delegates were specifically sent to the military headquarters (*IG* ii² 467. 8–9 = *SIG*³ 327), and the fate of the Chian oligarchs in 332 and the Spartans in 330 was first discussed by the Council of the League of Corinth (cf. iii 2. 7 n.). Wilcken's position has therefore been largely accepted (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 30–1; Schachermeyr² 117), but there are practical objections. All sources stress the speed of Alexander's advance on Thebes (cf. i 7. 5), and it was hardly possible for any representative segment of the League's delegates to have gathered. Secondly, Diodorus is notoriously prone to describe any assembly of Greeks of different nationalities as a *κοινὸν συνέδριον* (e.g. xi 55. 5, xv 38. 3; cf. Heuss, *Hermes* lxxiii (1938) 178); he may well have turned an *ad hoc* gathering into a regular council. It seems more likely that Alexander submitted the trial to a court drawn from his Hellenic allies and, though breaches of the Common Peace could have formed the indictment, it appears that the onus of the accusation was medism. The Thebans had compounded their ancient collaboration by siding with Darius against the Macedonian crusade, and there was no reason why the old oaths of the coalition of 480 should not now be fulfilled (see above i 9. 7 n.). This was a verdict which Alexander's allies could pass. There was no need to convene the league *συνέδριον*. The king was not himself involved in the verdict, but there is no doubt that he endorsed it. Polybius has no hesitation in saying that the destruction corresponded to Alexander's wishes and intentions (Polyb. xxxviii 2. 13; cf. iv 23. 8), and Plutarch sums up the situation well when he says (like Polybius) that the destruction was a conscious act of terrorism, but Alexander used the façade (*καλλωπισαμένου*) of complying with his allies' accusations (*Plut. Al.* 11. 11).

τὴν μὲν Καδμεΐαν κτλ. Arrian gives the verdict in four heads: a garrison in the Cadmeia, destruction of the city, division of Theban land among her Boeotian neighbours, and enslavement of the surviving population. According to Hypereides (*Epitaph.* 17) all four parts of the sentence were still in effect during the Boeotian campaign of 323/2. At that time the Boeotian *rentiers* of Theban land sided with Macedon in the hope of retaining their ample incomes (Diod. xviii 11. 4; cf. Paus. i 24. 5).

ὅσοι ξένοι ... ἐγένοντο Plutarch speaks more vaguely of *ξένους τῶν Μακεδόνων* (*Plut. Al.* 11. 12). Arrian makes a distinction between the guest-friends of Philip and Alexander, who had enjoyed hospitality at the Macedonian court or entertained Philip while he was a hostage (Aelian, *VH* xiii 7), and the official representatives of Macedonian interests at Thebes (*πρόξενοι*). The same man might fill both roles (Paus. iii 8. 4; cf. Gschnitzer, *RE* Suppl. xiii 632). *Pace* Hampl, *Der König der Makedonen* (1934) 11–12, the passage is not evidence that the

Macedonian assembly was the constitutive body of state. Theban *πρόξενοι* represented the interests of individual Macedonian visitors; that does *not* imply that the *προξενία* was conferred by a Macedonian assembly. The title could have been, and almost certainly was, conferred by the kings as a matter of personal patronage.

ἀνδραποδίσαι Arrian gives no total for the Thebans enslaved, but other sources are unanimous that it was 30,000 (Plut. 11. 12; Diod. 13. 1; Aelian, *VH* xiii 7).

10. *καὶ τὴν Πινδάρου . . . οἰκίαν* This is a famous tradition; cf. Plut. *Al.* 11. 12; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 2. 33; Pliny, *NH* vii 109. W. J. Slater, *GRBS* xii (1971) 146–7, disputes that a house survived to be spared by Alexander, but on very flimsy grounds. The *λέγουσιν* does not necessarily mean that Arrian derived the story from his subsidiary sources; Aristobulus, or even Ptolemy, is a possibility (cf. i 1. 1 n.). Nor is the omission of the sparing of the house in Plutarch's account in any way significant; his narrative is very compressed compared with that of Arrian, and he may well have omitted the reference to the house. The sparing of Pindar's house is common to Arrian, Dio of Prusa, and Pliny, and the tradition should be accepted. We need not believe that the house actually spared by Alexander had actually been the house of Pindar; contemporary tradition would have alleged it.

αἰδοῖ Dio adds that Alexander remembered Pindar's encomium for his ancestor, Alexander the Philhellene (F 120–1 Snell). In that case Pindar was a *εὐεργέτης* of the Argead house, and Alexander naturally deferred to his memory (cf. H. U. Instinsky, *Historia* x (1961) 248–50). Compare his treatment of the Athenian, Iphicrates (ii 15. 4 n.). Slater *GRBS* (1971) 147 objects that the allies passing sentence had no *αἰδώς* for Pindar. True enough, but Alexander no doubt made his sentiments perfectly clear in advance.

Ὁρχομενὸν τε καὶ Πλαταιάς The resettlement of Orchomenus and Plataea had been begun by Philip after Chaeronea (Paus. iv 27. 10, ix 1. 8); the Orchomenians sent a *hieromnemon* to the Amphictyony in autumn 337 and spring 336 (P. de la Coste-Messelière, *BCH* lxxxiv (1960) 469, 475; Hennig, *RE* Suppl. xiv 342). The rebuilding must have been at a rudimentary stage in 335, for the vote of the allies implies that the cities had as yet no walls. As late as 331 Alexander could offer to rebuild Plataea at his own expense (Plut. *Al.* 34. 2; *Arist.* 11. 9—proclamation made at the Olympic Games (328?)).

10. 1. *βοηθήσοντες* According to Deinarchus (i. 18–19) the Arcadian forces did not commit themselves to the defence of Thebes until they were actually at the Isthmus. This coheres with the statement in the decree of Demochares that Demosthenes helped prevent the Peloponnesians assist Alexander at Thebes ([Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 851 B). Arrian, then, may be wrong that the Arcadians were sent out with the precise

intention of helping the Thebans. There must, however, have been men who pressed for that end and who were condemned after the fall of Thebes.

2. *κατὰ ἔθνη πέμψαντες* In 426 the Aetolians sent an embassy to Sparta consisting of one delegate from each of the three tribal groups (Thuc. iii 100. 1; cf. 94. 5). In 335 they seem to have behaved in the same way, and for years this passage of Arrian was taken as proof positive that the Aetolian *κοινόν* did not yet exist (cf. G. Klaffenbach, *IG* ix² 1. 1, pp. xiii–xiv). That is now conclusively disproved (cf. Tod ii no. 137); in the mid fourth century there must have been some federal organization with some sort of central government (cf. M. Sordi, *Acme* vi [1953] 419 ff.; esp. 425; cf. Larsen, *GFS* 196). But Arrian's wording is peculiar, implying that the Aetolians sent a separate embassy from each tribe, not a single embassy for the entire people. Sordi 434 therefore argued that the plurality of embassies gave the requests additional solemnity; it is hard to see why. It is more likely that the Aetolians in 335 were not a *κοινόν*. I have argued elsewhere (*American Journal of Ancient History* i. 3 (1977) 164–81) that Philip dissolved the Aetolian *κοινόν* in winter 338/7 after an unauthorized seizure of Naupactus and gave each component tribe a separate government. If that is correct, the Aetolians tried to revive their federal structure during the turmoil of 335. The fall of Thebes put an end to such ambitions, and the embassies sent to Alexander dramatically illustrated their change of heart. Each tribe now made its own representations.

μυστηρίων τῶν μεγάλων Plutarch (*Al.* 13. 1; *Camill.* 19. 10) also dates the fall of Thebes to the time of the Great Mysteries. They began on 15 Boedromion and continued until the 23rd, reaching their height around 20/1 Boedromion (S. Dow, *HSCP* xlviii (1937) 111–20). In the time of Alexander this corresponded to late September of the Julian year (Plut. *Al.* 31. 8; see below iii 7. 6 n.).

ἐσκευαγῶγον This was a regular Athenian response to the threat of invasion (cf. Aesch. 3. 80; Dem. 18. 36). After the fall of Thebes there was a crisis atmosphere in Athens, and extraordinary levies were exacted (cf. [Dem.] 34. 38).

3. *Δημάδου γράψαντος* No other source mentions this embassy explicitly. Justin, however, says that Alexander's anger was only mitigated to the point of demanding the surrender of the Athenian statesmen *secunda legatione* (Just. xi 4. 10); similarly Plutarch (*Phoc.* 17. 5) mentions two embassies sent after the demand. It seems that there were indeed two embassies, as Arrian states, which Justin and Plutarch have loosely grouped together. Arrian's account of the first embassy must be accepted (cf. Schaefer iii² 137 n. 1).

4. *φιλανθρώπως* Alexander's behaviour may have been more untrained. It is probably this embassy to which Plutarch refers when he

says that Alexander flung away the decree and turned his back on the ambassadors (Plut. *Phoc.* 17. 5).

ἐπιστολήν κτλ. Arrian alone mentions a letter being sent, and A. M. Zumetikos (*De Alexandri Olympiadisque Epistularum Fontibus* (Berlin 1894) 90–1) argued that the tradition is incorrect and the letter forged. That is nonsense. Alexander did not go to Athens in person, and the natural means of communication was to send a letter along with envoys to explain the content, if necessary (Diod. 15. 1; cf. [Dem.] 7. 46).

The tradition about the Athenians demanded by Alexander is very complex. Arrian lists precisely nine names, whereas Plutarch states that the ancient authorities varied between ten and eight (Plut. *Dem.* 23. 4; Diod. 15. 1 says that ten statesmen were demanded). More importantly, the lists of names which survive are inconsistent. The 'Suda' (s.v. Ἀντίπατρος: A 2704) lists eleven names, including all nine mentioned by Arrian (assuming Πατροκλέα to be a misreading of Μοιροκλέα). But there are two additions, Thrasybulus and a mysterious Κάσσανδρον, and the context of the list is Antipater's activity during the Lamian War. The entry is obviously abbreviated and garbled, and one cannot use it to supplement the text of Arrian (as attempted by Schaefer and Beloch). The differences between Arrian and Plutarch are more radical. Plutarch cites a list of eight names approved by the most and the best authorities (*Dem.* 23. 4). Six names are found in Arrian, but two are new (Demon and Callisthenes). Plutarch is not even consistent, for in the *Life of Phocion* (17. 2) he gives an incomplete list of four names and includes Hypereides, who is omitted by 'the best authorities'. The measure of agreement and disagreement is best expressed schematically:

Arrian	'Suda'	Plut. <i>Phoc.</i> 17. 2	Plut. <i>Dem.</i> 23. 4
Demosthenes	Demosthenes	Demosthenes	Demosthenes
Lycurgus	Lycurgus	Lycurgus	Lycurgus
Hypereides	Hypereides	Hypereides	
Polyeuctus	Polyeuctus		Polyeuctus
Chares	Chares		
Charidemus	Charidemus	Charidemus	Charidemus
Ephialtes	Ephialtes		Ephialtes
Diotimus	Diotimus		
Moerocles	'Patrocles'		Moerocles
	Thrasybulus		
	'Cassander'		Demon
			Callisthenes

(i) There is no reason to doubt any of the six names common to the three complete lists. Demosthenes' presence is attested by the speeches of friends and enemies alike (Dem. 18. 41, 322; Aesch. 3. 161; [Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 847 c), and the demand for Lycurgus is commemorated on an extant inscription (*IG* ii² 457b. 17–19; cf. [Plut.] 852 D; Dem. *Ep.* 3.

4). Polyeuctus of Sphettus (Berve no. 650) was a prominent supporter of the movement against Philip in 343/2 (Dem. 9. 72), and he was later active in the diplomacy leading to the Lamian War ([Plut.] 846 c-d). He enjoyed considerable prominence in Lycurgan Athens (cf. *Αρχ. Έφ.* 1917. 41 (328/7)), and it is no surprise to find him listed with Lycurgus as an enemy of Macedon. Both Charidemus and Ephialtes left Athens to join the mercenary forces of Darius (cf. Deinarchus 1. 32 f.). Of the six only Moerocles is not otherwise attested as an enemy of Macedon. He is, however, said to have been a prominent statesman (Harpocration s.v.), and there is no reason to doubt that he acted against Macedonian interests in 336 and 335.

(ii) Plutarch's list in the *Demosthenes* is surprising both for its omissions and additions. There is no reference to Hypereides, which is unexpected. He was the leading advocate of the Lamian War in 324/3, and his surrender was demanded by Antipater as part of the terms of peace [Plut.] 849 A-B; Plut. *Dem.* 28. 4). But his omission from the list of 335 seems justified. The *Lives of the Orators* attributed to Plutarch states correctly that Demosthenes and Lycurgus were demanded by Alexander (841 E: 847 c). There is no such statement about Hypereides; he is merely said to have spoken against the surrender of the στρατηγοί (848 E).

Of the names unique to Plutarch, Callisthenes is notable for his obscurity. Little is known about him except his proposal to evacuate Attica in 346 (Dem. 18. 37; cf. Kirchner, *PA* 8090), and there is no evidence elsewhere that he was an enemy of Macedon. Demon was a relative of Demosthenes, the speaker in the suit against Zenothemis ([Dem.] 32. 31) and the mover of the decree which recalled Demosthenes from exile in 323 (Plut. *Dem.* 27. 6; *Vit. X Orat.* 846 D). He was at least a coeval of Moerocles and Callisthenes (Athen. viii 341 F; cf. J. Goldstein, *Letters of Demosthenes* 47-8). As a relative of Demosthenes he was an obvious candidate for a fictitious list, but his is the only name in Plutarch which is at all suspicious.

(iii) The names unique to Arrian and the 'Suda' are Chares, Diotimus, and Thrasybulus ('Suda' only). Chares was an obvious candidate for any list, having had a command at Chaeronea (Diod. xvi 85. 2; cf. Beloch iii² 1. 566-8): he was later to collaborate with the Persian fleet in the Aegean (iii 2. 6 n.) and to act as mercenary general at Taenarum (Berve no. 819). He may not have been in Athens in 335. By the spring of 334 he was in his fortress refuge of Sigeum (i 12. 1 n.). It is possible that he left Athens immediately after the demand for his surrender. There is, however, no record of his presence in Athens after Chaeronea, and he may have retired to Sigeum late in 338 to escape the prosecution and condemnation that was the lot of his unfortunate colleague Lysicles (Diod. xvi 88. 1-2; [Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 843 D).

Diotimus is more obscure. He was the son of Diopieithes of the deme

Euonymon (for the family see J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* 161–5, no. 4386). Like Chares he was general in 338/7 (*IG* ii² 1628. 396–7, 1629. 915–16, 1631. 10–11), and he was crowned for a donation of shields which he made after the battle (*Dem.* 18. 114; cf. *IG* ii² 1496. 22–5). In 335/4, following a proposal by Lycurgus, he was placed in charge of a fleet for operations against pirates (*IG* ii² 1623. 276 ff. cf. E. Schweigert, *Hesperia* ix (1940) 340–1). Diotimus could have been included on a fictitious list because of his prominence in the year of Chaeronea and his association with Demosthenes in the opposition to Philip ([*Plut.*] 844 F; cf. *Dem. Ep.* 3. 31).

As for Thrasybulus (*Berve* no. 378; *Davies* 238–40, no. 7305), he played a prominent part in the Persian defence of Halicarnassus (*Diod.* 25. 6), and his name would have occurred to any compiler of a fictitious list.

(iv) The conclusion must be, as Schaefer (iii² 137 n. 2) argued, that Plutarch's list in the *Demosthenes* is correct. The question therefore arises what source Arrian used for his inaccurate list. Aristobulus seems excluded, for Plutarch knew his account of the transactions in Athens, and he cites it immediately after his exposition of the source disagreement (*Plut. Dem.* 23. 6 = *FGrH* 139 F 3). It seems highly probable that, had Aristobulus differed from the canon of eight found in the best authors, he would have noted the divergence along with the tradition of Duris and Idomeneus. It looks as though Ptolemy is Arrian's source, and it is interesting to find him in error over a matter both famous and public. Despite Jacoby's efforts (*FGrH* ii C. 124) there is no way of saving the credit of Ptolemy/Arrian. The basic core of six names was contaminated by the addition of Hypereides for his role in the Lamian War, and Chares and Diotimus because of their activity at Chaeronea; the obscurer figures of Callisthenes and Demon were omitted.

5. *ἔς τε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐς Φίλιππον* For Athenian jubilation at the death of Philip, and the public sacrifices voted, see i 1. 3 n. Demosthenes is said to have made abusive speeches against Alexander, terming him 'Margites' (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 29) and predicting that he would not stir from Macedon (*Aesch.* 3. 160; cf. Marsyas, *FGrH* 135/6 F 3). Alexander, however, had the last word in the exchange (*Plut. Al.* 11. 6).

6. *οὐκ ἐξέδοσαν*. Arrian is very cursory in his treatment of the Athenian rejection of the demand. Diodorus, by contrast, gives a full account of the impassioned debate in which Phocion demanded that the men named should sacrifice themselves for the public good (*Diod.* 15. 2–5; cf. *Plut. Phoc.* 17. 2–4; *Dem.* 23. 5–6). Finally, Demades with the tumultuous support of the people moved a decree interceding for the statesmen and promising their punishment under Athenian law—*ἀν ὧσιν ἄξιοι τιμωρίας* (*Diod.* 15. 4; cf. *IG* ii² 457 b. 17–19).

τυχὸν μὲν αἰδοῖ Compare Plutarch's more romantic explanation (*Al.* 13. 2; *Dem.* 23. 6). Arrian's is a minimalist interpretation, and his two motives are corroborated by other evidence. As the heir to the fifth-century crusade against Persia, Alexander could hardly act drastically against the city whose record against the Persians was supremely glorious. He had at least to profess αἰδώς for the city (cf. *Plut.* *Al.* 60. 6; *Arr.* i 16. 7, ii 15. 4). Similarly Alexander's enthusiasm for the campaign in Asia is understandable; Diodorus adduces it as a motive for his eagerness to come to terms with Thebes (*Diod.* 9. 4). Arrian's addition, however, is inept; had Alexander wished οὐδὲν ὑποπτον ὑπολείπεσθαι, he should have persisted in his demands and humbled Athens as he had Thebes. It was only too clear that Alexander was leaving Athens with full powers for doing mischief (cf. ii 17. 2). Strasburger 22 f. is probably right that the alternatives come originally from Ptolemy.

Χαρίδημον ... μόνον The third *Letter of Demosthenes* associates Charidemus with Philocles and Demosthenes himself, as men whom the Athenians had 'betrayed and cast away' (*Ep.* 3. 31), a statement which fits perfectly the Athenians' compliance with Alexander's demand (J. Goldstein, *The Letters of Demosthenes* [1968] 228). Why Charidemus was singled out for special treatment is not stated. We know only that he sent to Athens the first news of Philip's death (*Aesch.* 3. 77), and it has been plausibly suggested that he was acting as στρατηγός in the Thraceward area (Schaefer iii² 87; Berve no. 823). In that case, he may have indulged in the same kind of buccaneering that Diopceithes had attempted in the Chersonese over the winter of 342/1 (cf. Wüst, *Philipp II.* 114-17). The fact that Alexander insisted on his exile indicates that he was more deeply incriminated even than Lycurgus and Demosthenes, and I suspect that he had attacked Macedonian territory. Compare his prompt intervention in the Troad after the arrest of Artabazus in 360 (*Dem.* 23. 154).

Deinarchus (1. 32) says that Charidemus continued to work in the Athenians' interest at the Persian court. If he had any influence, however, it was short-lived, for he was executed shortly before Issus because of his outspokenness in Darius' presence (*Diod.* 30. 2-6; *Curt.* iii 2. 10-19). Ephialtes and Thrasybulus left Athens of their own volition to fight with Memnon's forces. That is presumably what Justin means when he says inaccurately that the Athenian orators remained but the generals were driven into exile (*Just.* xi 4. 11).

11. 1-5. *From Thebes to the Hellespont*

11. 1. ἐπανήλθεν So *Diod.* 16. 1. Plutarch (*Al.* 14. 1-7) claims that Alexander diverged to the Isthmus and Delphi; but he is clearly

conflating the events of 336 with those of 335 (Schaefer iii² 144 n. 2; cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 33).

ἐν Ἀλγῶνις The old capital of Macedon, to be identified with the site at Palatitsa-Vergina, which contains remarkably fine buildings of the Hellenistic period. Situated above the Haliacmon at the entry to the central plain, Palatitsa commands an important strategic position and is consistent with Theophrastus' location of Aegae north of Olympus (*De Ventis* 27; cf. Hammond, *Macedonia* i 155–8).

Arrian erroneously places both the sacrifice to Zeus and the Macedonian Olympia at Aegae. It is otherwise unanimously attested that the Olympia were held at Dium (full references in W. Baege, *De Macedonum Sacris* (Diss. Hal. xxii. 1: 1913) 10 f.). Diod. 16. 3 locates the sacrifices at Dium and combines them with the nine-day scenic competitions in honour of the Muses, founded by King Archelaus. This latter festival was in fact the Olympia (Schol. Dem. 19. 192; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 2. 2). Arrian's error probably derives from misunderstanding. The sacrifice to Zeus may have originated as a New Year ceremony, which Archelaus transferred from Aegae to Dium when he established the Olympia (cf. *CQ* xxvi (1976) 120 f.). Arrian may have inferred hastily that the sacrifice was founded by Archelaus and both events were celebrated at Aegae.

οἱ δὲ . . . ἐποίησε This variant probably comes from Aristobulus (Schwartz, *RE* ii 912; Strasburger 23). The festival for the Muses is clearly the Olympia itself (see the note above). Aristobulus, like Diodorus, did not give the official title of the festival, so that Arrian erroneously inferred that the contest in honour of the Muses was a different celebration.

2. τὸ Ὀρφέως Plutarch also mentions the incident (*Al.* 14. 8–9; cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 35 f.); and he locates it specifically at Leibethra, a city in Pieria (Hammond, *Macedonia* i 135 f.), which was intimately connected with the cult of Orpheus (Paus. ix 30. 9–11; Conon, *FGH* 26 F 1 (xlv. 4)).

ἰδρῶσαι The sweating of statues was a recognized portent of ill (cf. Diod. 10. 5). For full references see the note by A. S. Pease to Cic. *De Div.* i 98.

ἐπεθείαζον 'They made various prophecies relating to it'. The compound verb is rarely used in this sense with a direct object (the nearest parallel is Jos. *AJ* iv 118). The simple verb, however, is frequently used in the sense of 'prophecy', and in Arrian it occurs with the preposition ἐπὶ (ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ . . . ἐθειάσθη: vii 18. 6).

Ἀρίστανδρος (Berve no. 117) Alexander's chief seer. He appears to have been a client of the Macedonian court from the early years of Philip (*Plut. Al.* 2. 5). His prophecies are said to have failed only once (*Curt.* v 4. 1–2), but Alexander occasionally manipulated events to

preserve his reputation for infallibility (Plut. *Al.* 25. 2). On the location and mantic reputation of Telmissus in Lycia (?) see below ii 3. 3 n.

3. Ἀντιπάτρῳ ἐπιτρέψας It was a regular practice for a regent to deputize for the king whenever he was out of Macedonia (cf. Thuc. i 62. 2). Alexander had governed the kingdom during his father's Byzantine campaign (Plut. *Al.* 9. 1; cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 22), as Antipater himself did during the Danubian and Illyrian campaigns of 335 (i 7. 6 n.). For the functions of the regent see Berve i 224 ff.; Bengtson, *Strategie* i 26 ff.

τρισυρῶν . . . πεντακισχιλίων These are Ptolemy's figures (confirmed by Plut. *de Al. f.* i 3: 327 D = *FGrH* 138 F 4); Arrian does not even mention Aristobulus' variant figure of 4,000 cavalry (*FGrH* 139 F 4).

The precise numbers of Alexander's army are a notorious crux (cf. Berve i 177 f; Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 32–6). Plutarch (*Al.* 15. 1) notes that estimates range from 43,000 foot and 5,500 horse (Anaximenes) to 30,000 foot and 4,000 horse, the total given by Aristobulus (and by Livy ix 19. 5). An intermediate figure is provided by Diodorus' army list, which gives a sum total of 30,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry. Unfortunately the figures he gives for the individual contingents come to a discrepant total: 32,000 infantry and 5,100 cavalry (Diod. 17. 3–4). It is most unlikely that Diodorus took his detailed lists and the sum total from two different sources (as implied by Brunt 33); a comparable discrepancy occurs at xix 28. 4, where the individual figures and sum total must both be taken from Hieronymus of Cardia. There has almost certainly been some corruption of the numbers; and the most helpful suggestion remains that of Beloch (iii² 2. 324), which assumes that the figure for the Thessalian cavalry is corrupt, a mere repetition of the previous figure for the Macedonian cavalry. In that case there is near enough agreement between Diodorus' figures and Justin's total of 32,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry (xi 6. 2); this may well represent the tradition of Cleitarchus. A final complication arises from Callisthenes, who apparently gave the strength of the army at the Hellespont as 40,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry (Polybius xii 19. 1).

The infantry figures are relatively straightforward. There is some measure of agreement on a total of 32,000 (Ptolemy's 'not much more than 30,000'), scaled down to 30,000 by Aristobulus to emphasize the paucity of the army in relation to its achievements. The substantially higher totals are provided by Callisthenes and Anaximenes. Now Ptolemy/Arrian gives explicit figures only for the army which assembled in Macedonia in spring 334. Nothing is said about the expeditionary force in Asia under Parmenion, which had numbered at least 10,000, both Macedonians and mercenaries (Polyaenus v 44. 4; Diod. 7. 10). It is extremely likely that the higher infantry totals

include the forces already across the Hellespont in 334 (cf. Brunt 34; Milns, *JHS* lxxxvi (1966) 167).

The cavalry totals are more intractable. The expeditionary force presumably included cavalry, and it is significant that mercenary cavalry are not included in Diodorus' army list. If that force comprised 1,000 cavalry (Brunt 35), we have the explanation of the discrepancy between Anaximenes' figure of 5,500 and the vulgate figure of 4,500. But there remain two incongruities. Callisthenes gives a high figure for the infantry and a low figure for the cavalry, whereas Ptolemy combines a low infantry figure with a high cavalry figure. I can see no way of resolving the contradictions (Brunt somewhat desperately hypothesizes a contingent of 600 cavalry, which he supposes was omitted by Anaximenes, Callisthenes, and indeed every source but Ptolemy); and they are all the more perplexing in that they occur in primary authors and deal with a matter of basic fact. We can no longer dogmatically assume that Ptolemy's figure is correct (so Berve i 177). His cavalry total is unique (*pace* Brunt and Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 36, it should not be equated with the corrupt contingent figures of Diodorus); it bears no apparent relation to any other and cannot be explained in the present state of the evidence.

Κερκινίτιν The large lake which in antiquity lay immediately north of Amphipolis (Thuc. iv 108. 1; Mela ii 2. 30). Hammond, *Macedonia* i 193 n. 2, suggests that Alexander mustered his forces near Eidomene and marched to Amphipolis through the middle Strymon valley

4. **παρήμειβε τὸ Πάγγαιον** From Amphipolis Alexander travelled in reverse the route taken by Xerxes in 480, following the broad valley between the Pangaeum massif and the coastal mountain, Symvolos Oros (Hdt. vii 112; cf. D. Müller, *Chiron* v (1975) 6–7).

5. **Παιτικῆς** The Paitoi were the first Thracian people encountered by Xerxes (Hdt. vii 110). Arrian's *Παιτική* presumably refers to their territory, between the Chersonese and the river Hebrus (Oberhammer, *RE* xviii 2437).

Μέλανα The modern Kavaç Su, which reaches the sea near the western extremity of the neck of the Chersonese (Strabo vii F 51; Livy xxxviii 40. 5).

Ἑλαιοῦντα Elaeus faced Sigeum, some 40 stades across the Hellespont (Strabo vii F 51; xiii 1. 31 (595)). The tumulus traditionally called 'the tomb of Protesilaus' (cf. W. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* 123) was famous for its grove of elms, which shed their leaves prematurely (Philostr. *Heroicus* ii 1 (170 Kayser); Pliny, *NH* xvi 238). The shrine and its treasures had been plundered in 480 by Artayctes (Hdt. ix 116); and a visit by Alexander on the eve of his war of revenge was singularly appropriate (Instinsky 18 f.).

ὁ νοῦς κτλ. Alexander personally re-enacted the role of Protesilaus after his apotropaic sacrifice (cf. 11. 7). He seems to have shared the

view current since Herodotus that the Trojan War was the first great Panhellenic movement against the barbarians. The opening act of the drama was replayed, but under better auspices. Similarly Agesilaus in 396 had attempted to re-enact Agamemnon's sacrifice at Aulis—but with a more conventional victim (Xen. *Hell.* iii 4. 3–4; Plut. *Ages.* 6; Paus. iii 9. 3–4). See further Instinsky 22–6; Strasburger, *Gnomon* xxiii (1951) 85.

11. 6–8. *Alexander at the Hellespont*

6. Παρμενίων Parmenion had been in Asia since 336, commanding the Macedonian expeditionary force (see above, 11. 3 n.). Under the pressure of Memnon's counter-attack in 335 Macedonian operations appear to have been confined to the Troad, in the immediate vicinity of the crossing place (Diod. 7. 9–10; cf. Berve ii 299 no. 606; Badian, *Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 39–41).

Σηστοῦ ἐξ Ἀβυδον This was the crossing-place used by Xerxes (Hdt. vii 33 ff., ix 114), and its choice had obvious symbolic value. Strabo observes that, although Sestus and Abydus were 30 stades apart, the actual strait, locally called Ἀποβάθρα, was a mere 7 stades wide (xiii 1. 22 (591); cf. Cook, *Troad* 52). The crossing was easiest from the European side. From Sestus the prevailing current took vessels direct to Abydus (Strabo loc. cit.).

ἑκατὸν καὶ ἑξήκοντα The figure is repeated at i 18. 4. Diodorus 17. 2 speaks of sixty ships only, but associates them with Alexander's crossing, not that of the army. Justin xi 6. 2 says that 182 ships were present at the crossing.

Ἀλέξανδρον κτλ. Arrian reverts to indirect speech, claiming that his account represents the consensus (ὁ πλείων λόγος). Which authorities he used is a question impossible to answer. C. Vellay (*L'Acropole* vi (1931) 121; cf. Strasburger 23) was clearly wrong to infer that he worked from hearsay, using sources which he personally discounted. The key phrase, ὁ πλείων λόγος, recurs at iii 3. 6 (cf. vii 16. 3), where Arrian emphasizes that the consensus of authority supports Aristobulus against Ptolemy. In the case of Alexander at Ilium we can be sure that there were variants in the tradition, but we cannot say which sources contained the eccentricities (*pace* Schwartz, *RE* ii 1241, the resemblance between i 11. 8 and vi 10. 2 is insufficient to prove that the main thrust of Arrian's narrative comes from Ptolemy).

The whole episode is carefully contrived to lead up to the excursus in which Arrian justifies his decision to write a history of Alexander (12. 2–5). At 12. 1 the spotlight moves back to events immediately after the landing, while Alexander was on his way to the city (ἀνιόντα . . . ἐς Ἴλιον). The crowning of Alexander and of the tomb of Achilles leads directly to the apophthegm about Homer and the historiographical

excursus. This results in an inevitable dislocation of the chronology; Diodorus' account (17. 2–18. 1) presents the events in stricter sequence (cf. G. Radet, *RÉA* xxvii (1925) 11–13).

Ἀχαιῶν λιμένα The Achaeans' harbour was located at the mouth of the Scamander; in Strabo's day the site was some 12 stades from the city (Strabo xiii 1. 36 (598); Pliny, *NH* v 124; Mela i 93). For the identification of the site see W. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* 160 ff.; Cook, *Troad* 185 n. 2.

Alexander's actions were imitated in 190 BC by C. Livius Salinator, who put in at the Achaeans' harbour, moved up to Ilium and sacrificed to Athene (Livy xxxvii 9. 7; cf. 37. 2–3; App. *Syr.* 23. 113).

σφάξαντα . . . πόντον Alexander performed strikingly similar sacrifices at the Indus mouth for the safety of Nearchus' expedition (vi 19. 5; *Ind.* 20. 10); compare the beginning of the voyage down the Hydaspes (*Ind.* 18. 11, vi 3. 1).

Instinsky 44–53 has suggested that Alexander was directly influenced by Herodotus' description of Xerxes' libation to Helios immediately before his own crossing and still more by Xerxes' prayer to subjugate the whole of Europe. Alexander might have reversed the roles and symbolically declared his intention of conquering Asia in its entirety. The hypothesis is attractive but unacceptable (cf. Hamilton, *Al.* 52). The differences between the texts are more compelling than the similarities. The ceremonies are more probably based on Macedonian ritual. Alexander had every reason for his sacrifice, given that the main army was in transit to the north. A sudden storm might have been disastrous.

7. **πρῶτον** Alexander was explicitly re-enacting the role of Protesilaus (cf. *Iliad* ii 702). The vulgate tradition (Diod. 17. 2; Justin xi 5. 10–11) adds the famous story of Alexander casting his spear into the ground and claiming to have received Asia from the gods as a spear-won possession (cf. Instinsky 29–40; W. Schmitthenner, *Saeculum* xix (1968) 31–46; Schachermeyr² 163 n. 163).

βωμόδς ἱδρύσασθαι Justin xi 5. 4 claims that Alexander dedicated altars to the twelve Olympians before leaving the European shore. Arrian mentions only three deities, all appropriate for the occasion—Zeus (in his correct tutelary form), Athene, the patron goddess of Ilium, and Heracles, the ancestor of the Argead house. The ceremony recalls the sacrifices to Zeus and Heracles after the successful Danube crossing in 335 (i 4. 5). Justin's statement may be a reflection of the famous tradition that Alexander erected twelve altars at the Hyphasis to mark the eastern extension of his conquests (v 29. 1; cf. Diod. 95. 1; Curt. ix 3. 19).

Διδς ἀποβατηρίου The cult epithet denotes the successful protection of the seafarer (for examples see Robert, *Études Anatoliennes* 20 n. 1; *RÉA* lxxv (1963) 315; H. Schwabl, *RE* xA. 448–9). Compare *Inschr. Olymp.*

57. 35, where the Achaeans offer sacrifice to Zeus Apobaterios in honour of Hadrian.

Ἀθηνῶ θύσαι Xerxes had made a splendid sacrifice to Athene Ilias (Hdt. vii 43. 2), and Instinsky 58–9 has suggested that Alexander was emulating his action, winning over the goddess solicited by his enemy. The shrine, however, was a regular stopping-place, visited by the Spartan admiral Mindarus in 411 (Xen *Hell.* i 1. 4), and it was natural for Alexander to sacrifice there. His mission of revenge was primarily a crusade in the name of Athene (see below, i 16. 7 n.), and he seems to have sacrificed at all shrines of Athene which fell in his line of march (cf. ii 5. 9).

8. ὑπασπισταί ὑπασπιστῆς here has its literal sense of 'shield-bearer' (cf. Hdt. v 111. 1; Xen. *Anab.* iv 2. 20). The sacred shield can hardly have been borne by regular members of the hypaspist corps, for it was most frequently used in cavalry engagements like the Granicus. Peucestas who bore the shield at the siege of the Malli town (vi 9. 3) is explicitly termed εἰς τῶν ὑπασπιστῶν (Diod. 99. 4); yet he acted as trierarch at the Hydaspes (*Ind.* 18. 6) and clearly belonged to the nobility. It seems that there was a small group of ἑταῖροι who acted as shield-bearers for the king, a body distinct from the corps of hypaspists. Compare the two categories of Bodyguards (i 6. 5 n.).

Διὸς τοῦ Ἑρκεῖου Priam was murdered by Neoptolemus at the altar of Zeus Herkeios. It was a controversial subject, and the author of the *Little Iliad* claimed that Priam was only killed after he left the protection of the altar (Paus. x 27. 2). The tragedians, however, seem adamant that Priam was killed at the altar (Eur. *Troad.* 16 f; *Hec.* 23 f.), and the scene is vividly depicted in Pindar's Sixth Paean (vv. 110 ff.). Pindar's treatment of the subject was controversial, and he was forced to defend it in his Seventh Nemean (vv. 102 ff; cf. E. Tugendhat, *Hermes* lxxxviii (1960) 385–409; H. Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* xciii (1973) 131–7). Alexander honoured Pindar as a guest-friend of his house (i 9. 10 n.) and was probably familiar with his version of Priam's death. He was certainly intimate with Euripides' work (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 144), and he must have known the tradition of the sacrilege of Neoptolemus.

8 δὲ . . . καθῆκεν Neoptolemus was the legendary founder of the Molossian royal house, to which Alexander's mother, Olympias, belonged (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 355). The sources emphasize Alexander's Aeacid lineage (Arr. iv 11. 6; Justin xi 4. 5), and, according to Strabo (xiii 1. 27 (594)), Alexander himself commemorated his descent from the Aeacids and his kinship to the city through Andromache.

12. 1. Μενότιος (Berve no. 511) Instinsky (71 n. 1) maintains that the text is corrupt and that κυβερνήτης in fact conceals a domicile. But Alexander had taken the helm of his own ship during the passage

(11. 6), and it would have been a graceful act for his regular helmsman to honour him. The post of helmsman seems to have been prestigious; Onesicritus the ἀρχικυβερνήτης was honoured with a gold crown side by side with Nearchus after the voyage along the coast of the Makran (vii 5. 6; cf. Badian, *JCS* xxiv (1975) 157–67).

Χάρης . . . ἐκ Σιγείου Sigeum, the modern Yenisehir (*ATL* i 547 f.; Cook, *Troad* 178–86), had been occupied by Chares in 355 during the Social War (Schol. Dem. 3. 31; cf. Dem. 2. 28), and subsequently he spent considerable periods there when not serving as *strategos* in Athens (Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F 105; cf. Nepos, *Chabrias* 3. 4). Chares had probably been in retirement since the battle of Chaeronea (cf. i 10. 4 n.); and, given his previous record against Macedon, it was a prudent step to offer formal submission. For his later activities, see below ii 1. 1–2 nn.

οἱ δὲ, ὅτι κτλ. There is obviously a lacuna in the text. As it stands, there is no anticipatory οἱ μὲν and no verb introducing the ὅτι clause. Arrian was clearly balancing different traditions, ending with the crowning of Achilles' tomb. Those traditions may have included the vulgate story that Alexander visited all the tombs of the heroes (Achilles, Ajax, and the rest) and offered the appropriate ἐναγίσματα (Diod. 17. 3; Justin xi 5. 12). Arrian may have begun with the common story of the offering to the heroes and then focused his narrative on the crowning of Achilles' tomb. The first clause has fallen out, and there is no possibility of restoring it (the attempts by Roos and by Castiglioni, *Stud. il. fil. class.* xv (1909) 292, are unconvincing).

τὸν Ἀχιλλέως . . . τάφον Strabo xiii 1. 32 (596) locates the tomb in the vicinity of Sigeum, as apparently does Pliny, *NH* v 124–5. Cook's localization of the monument at Beşik Tepe (*Troad* 186) is therefore unlikely; that site is 7–8 km south of Sigeum, and 10 km south-west of Ilium. Despite the apparent lack of ancient monuments (Cook 185) we should look in the immediate neighbourhood of Sigeum/Yenisehir.

Alexander's actions were imitated in AD 214 by Caracalla, who repeated all the rites at the tomb of Achilles (Herodian iv 8. 4; cf. Dio lxxvii 16. 7). That was presumably the inspiration for Philostratus' romantic history of Thessalian rites at the tomb of Achilles (Philostr. *Heroicus* xix 15 (210 Kayser); cf. Radet, *REA* xxvii (1925) 81 ff., esp. 90–1).

Ἡφαιστίωνα This detail recurs only in Aelian (*VH* xii 7), and it has been justifiably suspected (cf. Berve ii 170, no. 357). Although Hephaestion was a boyhood friend of Alexander (Curt. iii 12. 16), he does not appear in the early years of the reign, except in the *logos* of the reception of Darius' womenfolk (ii 12. 6 n.). Alexander's passionate grief after Hephaestion died at Ecbatana explicitly recalled the parallel of Achilles and Patroclus (vii 14. 4; Ael. *VH* vii 8, etc.), and some sources may have retrojected the relationship to the time of the

Hellespont crossing. The tradition, however, was familiar in late antiquity, for Caracalla deputed one of his favourites to re-enact the role of Patroclus/Hephaestion (Herodian iv 8. 4).

12. 1-5. *Historiographical Excursus*

Cf. G. Schepens, *Ancient Society* ii (1971) 254-68; A. B. Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 164-8, 174-5.

Arrian makes his historical aims clear. His history is intended as a literary showpiece, to do for Alexander what Homer did for Achilles and Pindar for the Deinomenid tyrants. As a result of his writing, Alexander's achievements will be known to the public they deserve, not buried in the inferior literature of the first-generation historians. Arrian is totally convinced of the superiority of his own talents. At the outset he claims that his work will stand comparison with anything written previously (praef. 3), and he is quite sure that his history will become definitive (cf. vi 11. 2).

1. εὐδαιμόνισεν ... Ἀχιλλέα The anecdote was famous, and Cicero used it in his *Pro Archia* (24 = FGrH 153 T 1). See also Plut. *Al.* 15. 8

2. καὶ μέντοι ... ἐπαξίως 'And, to be sure, Alexander was right to count Achilles blessed, for this reason above all that, in his case, despite his otherwise good fortune, this field happened to be left free and his deeds were not published to mankind as they deserved'. The use of χωρίον in a purely metaphorical sense, to denote a field of study, is only paralleled by Thucydides' justification of his excursus into 'the pentekontaetia (καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου (cf. Arr. vi 11. 8) ἐποιοσάμην διὰ τόδε, ὅτι ... ἐκλιπές τοῦτο ᾗν τὸ χωρίον; i 97. 2). Arrian is blatantly imitating Thucydides, at the cost of some clumsiness of expression—αὐτῷ γε Ἀλεξάνδρῳ is very loosely attached to its context as a dative of interest.

οὐτ' οὐδὲ καταλογάδην οὐτε ... ἐν μέτρῳ For the sentiment compare Isocr. *Philippus* (5) 109.

The deficiencies of the historians of Alexander were a familiar theme in antiquity. Eratosthenes had condemned the first-generation historians as unscrupulous flatterers and peddlers in sensation (cf. v 3. 1-4 with FGrH 153 T 4). Arrian's criticisms, however, are based on style. It is the literary qualities of the works rather than their accuracy that he criticizes here (cf. vi 11. 2-10 for criticism of inaccuracies), and he seems representative of the taste of late antiquity. As writers the prose historians are consistently denigrated. Even Callisthenes was stigmatized by such critics as Cicero and the author of the *De Sublimitate* (FGrH 124 T 31 f.). Cleitarchus was even worse (FGrH 137 T 9-10). These were the more respectable stylists of the Alexander historians; writers like Hegesias of Magnesia were cited merely as classic examples of the ultimate in bad taste (FGrH 142 T 2-6).

If prose historians were lamentable, court poetry was execrable. We hear in passing of the epic poetry of Agis of Argos and Choerilus of Iasus (Berve nos. 16, 829). The latter is stigmatized as having produced a total of seven worthwhile verses (Porphyry on Horace, *AP* 357), and Alexander allegedly would have preferred to be Homer's Thersites rather than Choerilus' Achilles. Tarn (ii 55-62) argued that these poets were the originators of much of the propaganda associating Alexander with Hercules and Dionysus. Nothing, however, is known about their work except the penchant for flattery, which was in any case prevalent at Alexander's court, and the poets cannot be assigned the responsibility for any single motif. As far as we can see, the court poets were proverbial for their badness and were not read (Pearson, *LHA* 78).

Arrian probably intended his criticism to include contemporary accounts of Alexander's life, notably the works of Plutarch and Dio of Prusa. His phrasing was later echoed by Amyntianus (see further Introduction, p. 12).

Ἰέρων . . . Θήρων The Sicilian tyrants of the early fifth century BC. Gelon and Hieron were brothers, sons of Deinomenes, and ruled in Syracuse between 485 and 466 BC. Theron was the most celebrated member of the Emmenid dynasty at Acragas, holding power between 488 and 472 (T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* (1948) 412-13). Hieron and Theron were among the most brilliant patrons of the lyric poets Pindar, Simonides, and Bacchylides, and the victories of their horses and chariot teams are the subject of some of the most impressive odes of Pindar and Bacchylides (C. M. Bowra, *Pindar* 117-19). Gelon, however, was not a noted patron of the arts; there is in fact a tradition that he was ἄμουσος (Aelian *VH* iv 15; Plut. *Apophth. Gelonis* 4: 175 B). As a member of the Deinomenid family he appeared in ceremonial poetry and the battle of Himera, his most celebrated victory, is praised by Pindar in his most elevated style (*Pyth.* i 79-80). That in itself justifies Arrian's reference, but there is also a weak late tradition that Gelon, like Hieron, was the subject of hymns by Pindar and Bacchylides (Schol. Ael. Arist. p. 317.36 (Dindorf)).

3. ἡ τῶν μυρίων Arrian refers to three sections of Xenophon's *Anabasis*; the march from Sardes to Cunaxa (Book I), the murder of Clearchus and his fellow generals at the instigation of Tissaphernes (Book II, especially the necrologies at ii 6), and the retreat of the survivors to the Black Sea (Books III-IV). Xenophon is chosen as the prose equivalent of the Greek melic poets, and Arrian is once more representative of his age. According to Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 18. 14 ff.), Xenophon alone of the ancients is a wholly satisfactory author for the ἀνὴρ πολιτικός, and the work he singles out for special praise is the *Anabasis*. Dio's high valuation seems to be typical of the second century AD (cf. K. Münscher, 'Xenophon in der griechisch-römischen Literatur', *Philologus* Suppl. xiii 2 (1920) 106-81; Breitenbach, *RE* ixA. 1904-5).

4. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν κτλ. 'There is no other single man among Greeks or barbarians who has displayed achievements so many in number and so great in magnitude'. The superlatives are cumulative and extremely emphatic. From first to last Arrian makes it clear that in terms of sheer achievement Alexander was a phenomenon unique in history. Compare his final verdict: ἀνὴρ οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἑοικώς (vii 30. 2).

5. ὅστις δὲ ὦν κτλ. 'As to who I am who make this claim about myself, I have no need to record my name, for it is by no means unknown to men'.

This is a formal *recusatio*. It seems to have been standard practice in histories of the imperial period to include an autobiographical preface, giving place of birth and a brief summary of the writer's career (cf. Appian, *Prooem.* 15. 62; Josephus, *Bḡ* i 3 (cf. *AḤ* xx 266); Dion. Hal. *AR* i 7. 2; Diod. i 4. 1-5; Herodian i 2. 5). Arrian, however, states that in his own case he has no reason to give biographical details for his name is perfectly familiar. He assumes that the reading public already knows his work and the simple fact of the name Ἀρριανός upon the title will recommend the book without any further need for self-advertisement. See further Introduction pp. 11 f.

ἐν τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ In the context this can only refer to Arrian's home city, Nicomedia, where Arrian is known to have held the priesthood of Demeter and Kore (*Bithyniaca* F 1. 1). He here implies that he had also held local magistracies, the archonship and probably the posts of *agoranomos* and *agonothetes* (compare the career of his coeval C. Julius Severus of Ancyra: *IGR* iii 173-4). G. Wirth (*Historia* xiii (1964) 224) suggests that Arrian is referring to the Athenian archonship which he held towards the end of his life, in AD 145/6. That is impossible. Arrian is taking pains to express himself with the greatest force and clarity. In such close juxtaposition with the reference to πατρίδα ἥτις μοι ἔστιν, ἡ ἐμαυτοῦ can only be a synonym, a conscious variation upon πατρίς (cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 174-5).

At the time of writing Arrian seems not to have begun his career in the Roman senate. The *argumentum ex silentio* is not conclusive; Arrian invariably speaks as a non-Roman, referring to Romans as aliens (οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι), even in the monographs which he wrote while consular legate of Cappadocia (e.g. *Tact.* 2. 2, 4. 7, 18. 3, 19. 2, etc; cf. iii 5. 7, v 7. 3), and he might have been reluctant to stress his Roman career in a work so obviously aimed at a Greek public. But the fact remains that he deliberately adds the qualification ἐν τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ, which was unnecessary and misleading if he had held office outside Nicomedia.

ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἀναγράφω κτλ. 'But this I do set on record, that in my view my country and family and public offices are these works of mine and they have been so since my youth'. The language is again extremely forceful. Arrian places his literary activity above his private and public life, and rests his reputation upon it. His expression may well be based

on one of Epictetus' most memorable *dicta*: οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως φιλεῖν πέφυκεν ὡς τὸ αὐτοῦ συμφέρον. τοῦτο πατήρ καὶ ἀδελφὸς καὶ συγγενεῖς καὶ πατρίς καὶ θεός (*Diatr.* ii 22. 16).

The precise connotation of οἶδε οἱ λόγοι is uncertain. Arrian is unlikely to be referring to the Alexander history alone. This and other works he generally terms *συγγραφή*. Occasionally he uses the singular *λόγος* (*Ind.* 19. 9, 32. 1, 43. 14; *Cyneg.* 1. 4; *Tact.* 32. 3) but the plural is never used to describe a single work. The expression may possibly mean the individual stories about Alexander (so Brunt), but, given the context, the statement of Arrian's literary pre-eminence, it is best referred to his publications in general: 'these works of mine' (cf. *CQ* xxii (1972) 168).

οὐκ ἀπαξιῶ . . . Ἑλλάδι 'I do not count myself unworthy of the first place in Greek speech'. τῶν πρώτων is neuter plural, as is shown by the parallel passage at vii 12. 7 (cf. Lucian, *Demonax* 3).

εἴπερ οὖν καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον Kruger's correction *Ἀλεξάνδρον* is necessary. The manuscript reading *Ἀλέξανδρος* produces a puzzling ellipse (*ἄξιος ἦν* or the like has to be supplied). The conditional phrase is ambiguous. εἴπερ οὖν may merely be the equivalent of *καθάπερ*, as at vii 2. 3, in which case Arrian merely claims the supremacy in literature that Alexander enjoys in war. Alternatively it may be strictly translated 'if indeed I count Alexander supreme in war'; Arrian considers Alexander the supreme general, so that his history of Alexander is *ipso facto* the supreme military history (cf. G. Schepens, *Ancient Society* ii (1971) 262).

12. 6-7. *The Approach to the Granicus*

Arrian is the only source. For topographical discussion see Janke 128-36; W. Judeich, *Klio* viii (1908) 377-84; W. Leaf, *Geogr. Journal* xlvii (1916) 409-14.

6. Ἀρίσβην Arisbe was situated 7-8 km due east of Abydus, in an undulating plain well suited to accommodate a large army (W. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* 109).

Περκώτην Percote is stated to have been a harbour city (Xen. *Hell.* v 1. 25; [Scylax] 94), and in the Homeric Catalogue it is associated with Practius (*Iliad* ii 835; cf. Strabo xiii 1. 7 (588), 21 (590)). The Practius is a river (see note below), the modern Bergaz Çay; and Percote should be located towards its mouth. It is identified as the village of Bergaz, some 10 km along the coast east of Arisbe (W. Ruge, *RE* xix 864-5).


Λάμψακον παραμείψας Alexander skirted Lampsacus in the course of his second day's march. He did not stop or enter the city. His behaviour unfortunately sheds no light on the famous story that he had decided to destroy Lampsacus for medism (or alleged medism), but was dissuaded by the historian Anaximenes, himself a citizen of Lampsacus (Paus. vi 18. 2-4; cf. Val. Max. vii 3 *ext.* 4). Badian (*Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 63 n. 32) has

suggested that the city showed no enthusiasm for Alexander and was prepared to resist him. That is unlikely. If the city had been covertly hostile, Alexander would hardly have by-passed it with such apparent unconcern.

The Lampsacenes may well have been accused of medism before Alexander reached their territory. In 335 Memnon had operated near the Troad, attacking and ravaging Cyzicus (Diod. 7. 8). Lampsacus is said to have come under his direct control at some unspecified time when he was short of funds ([Arist.] *Oec.* ii 2. 29: 1351^{b1} ff.; cf. van Groningen 175). It is very tempting to associate the city's capture with the events of 335. In that case Lampsacus had been occupied in the Persian interest shortly before the Macedonian crossing. The city's enemies would naturally have alleged that the Lampsacenes sympathized with Persia (compare the case of Zeleia: i 17. 1-2); and, once Memnon's occupying force was withdrawn, the city was exposed to Macedonian reprisals for their real or imagined medism. In those circumstances Anaximenes may well have interceded with Alexander for his native city. The statue which the Lampsacenes erected in his honour at Olympia suggests that his services were quite exceptional (*FGrH* ii C. 105; Badian (cited above); *contra* Tarn ii 220).

ῥῶ Πρακτίῳ The reading of the archetype is *προσακτίῳ*, a name otherwise unattested. In 1648 Freinsheim suggested the simple emendation *Πρακτίῳ*, and his suggestion has been generally followed (the confused note of Lane Fox 515 is an exception). But the Practius is explicitly located by Strabo between Abydus and Lampsacus (xiii 1. 21 (590); cf. 1. 4 (583)). His details are consistent with one river only, the Bergaz Çay, which reaches the sea close to the ancient Percote. Alexander cannot have retraced his steps to his previous camping place and, if the emendation is accepted, there is only one explanation. Gronovius observed that the Bergaz Çay in fact flows in an east-westerly direction. Its upper reaches can be attained from Lampsacus; and one can follow its course up to the watershed and on to a gentle plateau leading directly to the Granicus. Janke therefore suggested that Alexander in fact struck inland from Lampsacus and encamped on the upper Practius just below the dividing range (128 ff.; cf. Judeich, *Klio* viii (1908) 378-9; E. Meyer, *RE* Suppl. xiv 476).

There is, however, an intractable difficulty. Arrian says explicitly that the river discharges into the Propontis—'between the Hellespont and the Euxine'. If the emendation is accepted, we must accredit Arrian with a glaring error. Freinsheim's emendation should therefore be rejected and with it the theory of Alexander's inland turn from Lampsacus. It is quite clear that ancient armies could and did march along the coastal road (cf. *Hdt.* v 117). What we must look for is a river beyond Lampsacus which flows into the Propontis. As Gronovius again saw, the most likely candidate is Strabo's Paesus, named after the city



of Paesus at the south-west corner of the Propontis (xiii 1. 19 (589)). It is possible that the manuscript reading *προσακτίω* is an alternative name: 'the river near the headland'. The Paesus is only a mile from the small headland at the outlet of the Hellespont, and the name would be appropriate.

Ἑρμωτον . . . Κολωνάς The name Hermotus does not recur. Various emendations have been suggested. Neither Holsten's *Γέργηθον* nor Gronovius' *Μέρμιττον* is palaeographically compelling; and neither settlement can be conclusively located. Kiepert's *Ἑρμαῖον* is more attractive, for Hermaeum was situated 70 stades from Parion and 200 from Lampsacus (Polyaenus vi 24). The coastline between Lampsacus and Parion far exceeds 270 stades and Hermaeum has been located inland (Judeich 381 n. 1). Alexander may therefore have followed the route of the crusaders of 1190, cutting eastwards from the Kemer Çay to the Granicus and avoiding the undulations of the coast (cf. Janke 135). See now C. Foss, in *Ancient Macedonia* ii (Thessaloniki 1977) 497 f.

Colonae is equally elusive. Strabo locates it 'above Lampsacus and in the *mesogaia* of Lampsacene' (xiii 1. 19 (589)). This indicates that it was situated inland, but there is no way of identifying it. The popular location at Arabadura depends on the theory of the inland turn at Lampsacus (cf. W. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* 101).

7. Ἀμύντας (Berve no. 59) For the prominent part played in the battle by Amyntas and his squadron see i 14. 6, 15. 1. He is mentioned again at i 28. 4, where he is attested in command of Alexander's left at Sagalassus, deputizing for the absent Parmenion. He was clearly a figure of some distinction, and it is all the more puzzling to find him identified as the brother of the Neoptolemus who is said to have died fighting for the Persians at Halicarnassus (cf. i 20. 10 n.). The difficulty is compounded if we identify his father Arrhabaeus with the son of Aeropus executed in 336 (as do Berve; J. R. Ellis, *JHS* xci (1971) 22-3). Given such a pedigree his loyalty must have been quite impeccable. That makes it more difficult to argue that his disappearance after Sagalassus is connected with the downfall of his uncle Alexander the Lyncestian (Berve; Ellis 22; Lane Fox 147); he had successfully survived the treason of his father and brother. Perhaps we should accept the Diodorus tradition that Neoptolemus in fact fell fighting on the Macedonian side (i 20. 10 n.). What is more, nothing in the sources suggests that Arrhabaeus, the father of Amyntas, was also son of Aeropus, and we should probably reject the identification.

ἑξ Ἀπολλωνίας This squadron is generally assumed to have been levied from Apollonia in Chalcidice, immediately south of L. Bolbe (Berve i 105; M. Zahrtnt, *Olynth und die Chalkidier* 157; for the location see Hammond, *Macedonia* i 195 f.). Strabo, however, mentions another Apollonia between Amphipolis and the river Nestos, which Philip destroyed—presumably in his first Thracian campaign of 356 (Strabo

vii F 33, 35). Both cities were annexed at roughly the same time, and either territory could have been distributed among Macedonian *ἐταῖροι* (cf. i 2. 5 n.). The Chalcidian Apollonia, however, had more plain land for cavalry rearing than the eastern Apollonia, whose territory was compressed by the foothills of Mt. Pangaeum.

τῶν προδρόμων This is the first reference to the problematic corps of the Macedonian cavalry known as *prodromoi*. The problems involved fall into three categories.

(i) Function. The *prodromoi* are also termed *σαρισσοφόροι*. The equation is clear and unchallenged (i 14. 1 and 6, iii 12. 3 with Curt. iv 15. 13). A difficulty immediately arises, how cavalry equipped with the 12-cubit *sarisa* could act efficiently in reconnaissance patrols, where manoeuvrability was a paramount consideration. Probably they were only equipped with *sarisae* during actual pitched battles; in scouting patrols they no doubt used lighter weapons. The hypaspists similarly need not have carried the *sarisa* in their more strenuous marches. The corps of *prodromoi* was probably able to act in two capacities, depending on the circumstances of the action (cf. iii 24. 1 n.).

(ii) Numbers. Our passage mentions 4 *ilai*, and at iv 4. 6 (329) Arrian refers to 4 *ilai* of *σαρισσοφόροι*. That gives a minimum of 4 *ilai*. Plutarch (*Al.* 16. 3) refers to Alexander charging across the Granicus with 13 *ilai* of cavalry and, taken in conjunction with Arr. i 14. 6, this passage has been thought evidence that there were 4 *ilai* of *prodromoi* and one of Paeonians in addition to the eight *ilai* of Companions (Berve i 130; P. A. Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 27; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 40). It is, however, debatable how closely Plutarch's account of the Granicus relates to that of Arrian, and we have no indication what bodies of cavalry his 13 *ilai* were meant to cover.

(iii) Nationality. Usually (as here) Arrian refers to the *prodromoi* without any ethnic (cf. Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii 27–8). At iii 8. 1, however, he refers to Paeonians as part of the *prodromoi*, whereas elsewhere he tends to differentiate the Paeonians from the *prodromoi* proper (i 14. 6, ii 9. 2, iii 12. 3 (but cf. 13. 3 n.)). The difficulty is compounded by Diodorus' army list, which refers to Thracian cavalry as *πρόδρομοι* (Diod. 17. 4). Tarn (ii 157–8) accordingly inferred that the *prodromoi* were Thracian, but others have argued that they were of Macedonian extraction (Berve i 129; Brunt 27–8; R. D. Milns, *JHS* lxxxvi (1966) 167). The text of Diodorus has been variously emended in order to dissociate the Thracian cavalry from the *πρόδρομοι*, but it is by no means certain that he used the word in a technical sense. The Thracians, like the Paeonians, may have been used as scouts and thus legitimately described as *πρόδρομοι* by our secondary authors, although the title itself was reserved for the Macedonian *ilai*. The word is used fairly frequently to denote scouting parties (Hdt. vii 203. 1; Thuc. ii 22. 2; Polyb. xii 20. 7), and it is hardly surprising that Arrian uses the word

in its non-technical sense (at iii 8. 1), while retaining it as a technical term for a unit of Alexander's army.

Πρίαπον Priapus was located on the site of the modern Karabiga, north-west of the Granicus mouth (W. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* 73 ff.; E. Olshausen, *RE* Suppl. xiv 482-4). Arrian says nothing about Priapus' larger neighbour, Parion (cf. Strabo xiii 1. 14 (588)), which may still have been in Persian hands.

Panegorus (Berve no. 602) is otherwise unknown.

12. 8-10. Council of War at Zeleia

8. **Περσῶν δὲ στρατηγοί** Diod. 19. 4 repeats some of the names (Arsam[en]es, Arsites, Spithridates, Rheomithres). Arrian's list is fuller but even so not exhaustive. At i 16. 3 he states that Mithrobuzanes, satrap of Cappadocia, fell in the battle together with three relatives of Darius, and at ii 11. 8 (a passage almost certainly from Ptolemy) he states that Atizyes, satrap of Greater Phrygia, was one of the leaders at the Granicus. These additional details are circumstantial and convincing. Unless Arrian's excerpting is exceptionally negligent, the names were not included in the account of the council at Zeleia which he found in his source. In all likelihood they come from Aristobulus, not Ptolemy (see Schwartz, *RE* ii 912; Strasburger 23).

(a) Arsames (Berve no. 149): satrap of Cilicia in 334/3 (ii 4. 5; *Itin.* 27; Curt, iii 4. 3). Leuze, *Satrapieneinteilung* 398-406, argued that Mazacus was still satrap of Cilicia in 334; Arsames was at best an under-governor. But he has no positive reason for extending Mazacus' tenure of Cilicia to 333; and his hypothesis involves rejecting the positive evidence of Diodorus (19. 4; so *Itin.* 27) that Arsames was satrap at the time of the Granicus.

(b) Rheomithres (Berve no. 685): probably the Rheomithres who performed a double defection in the Great Satrapal Revolt of 362 (Xen. *Cyrop.* viii 8. 4; Diod. xv 92. 1). Leuze, 403 n. 1, doubted the equation but on no good grounds. Rheomithres' son, Phrasaortes, was old enough in 330 to be appointed satrap of Persis (iii 18. 11 n.); and his father ought to have been active as a young man in the 360s.

(c) Petenes (Berve no. 632) and Niphates (Berve no. 573) are not attested elsewhere except in the casualty list (i 16. 3). They may have been generals specifically sent down for the campaign, or possibly large landowners in Asia Minor (cf. Schachermeyr² 167-8).

Σπιθριδάτης ... σατράπης (Berve no. 715) Spithridates' name and position are guaranteed by the satrapal issues struck in Asia Minor specifically for the Granicus campaign (BMC *Ionia* 327; E. Babelon, *Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines* ii 2. 126 ff.). His predecessor in the satrapy, attested in office in 343 (Diod. xvi 47. 1-2), was Rhoesaces; and Spithridates' brother, who also fought at the Granicus, bore the

name Rhesaces (Diod. 20. 1; Plut. *Al.* 16. 8; cf. i 15. 7). Berve considered that the evidence all relates to Spithridates' brother, who preceded Spithridates as satrap (no. 687: so Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 40); but he failed to explain why Rhesaces should have been deprived of his satrapy in favour of his brother and still fought alongside him at the Granicus. I prefer Beloch's explanation (iii² 2. 137), that the satrap of 343 was in fact the *father* of Spithridates and Rhesaces. The family may be descended from the Spithridates attested by Xenophon as a prominent magnate of Hellespontine Phrygia around 400 BC (Kahrstedt, *RE* iiiA. 1815-16).

Arrian refers to the conjunction of Lydia and Ionia again at i 17. 7 (Diod. 19. 4 merely calls Spithridates satrap of Ionia). The coastal areas of north-west Asia Minor had been variously subdivided during the fourth century. Ionia had been separated in the late 390s as a satrapy in its own right (*SIG³* 134a = Tod 113; Xen. *Hell.* iv 8. 17). Later in 362 we hear of a satrapy of Mysia, clearly carved from districts of Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia (Diod. xv 91. 1; cf. M. J. Osborne, *ABSA* lxvi (1971) 310). After the long revolt of Orontes, which may have lasted into the 340s (see, however, Osborne, *Historia* xxii (1973) 544 ff.), the satrapy of Mysia disappeared and Ionia became an adjunct of Lydia. Spithridates' father is firmly attested satrap of Lydia and Ionia in 343 (Diod. xvi 47. 2). For full discussion of the tangled evidence see H. Bengtson, *Philologus* xcii (1937/8) 124-55.

Ἀρσίτης . . . ὑπαρχος (Berve no. 151) Arsites is elsewhere attested *satrap* of Hellespontine Phrygia (Paus. i 29. 10) and in Arrian's account of the Zeleia debate he speaks as though he has primary responsibility for the satrapy. He must have been satrap, not an under-governor. The terminology is borrowed from Herodotus, who invariably uses *ὑπαρχος* to refer to the Achaemenid satraps (Hdt. iii 70. 3, iv 166. 1-2, etc.), and it is used as a conscious variation. See my observations in *CQ* xxiv (1974) 55-7 (cf. J. M. Bertrand in *Mélanges d'Histoire ancienne offerts à W. Seston* (Paris 1974) 25-34; L. Robert, *CRAI* 1975, 312 f.).

Ζελεία The city was located on the last foothills of the range of Ida, some 80 stades from the mouth of the Aescopus (Gönen): Strabo xiii 1. 10 (587). The location is only compatible with the modern village of Sari Köy, where a decree of the demos was discovered (*SIG³* 279). Zeleia was a Greek city with a landed population of native Phrygians, who paid an annual *phoros* (*SIG³* 279; cf. Jones, *CERP²* 384 n. 20). In Alexander's time it was ruled by a tyrant named Nicagoras, who may have headed a Persian-backed junta (so Berve no. 551).

9. Μέννων (Berve no. 497; cf. Schachermeyr² 132-4) The famous *condottiere*: brother of Mentor of Rhodes and related by marriage to the Persian noble Artabazus. The brothers had given their sister to Artabazus before 362; and their assistance in his recovery of his satrapy (Hellespontine Phrygia) resulted in the acquisition of estates in the

Troad (cf. Dem. 23. 157). Both Mentor and Memnon successively married a daughter of Artabazus, the captivating Barsine (see now P. A. Brunt, *RFIC* ciii (1975) 24–8). The brothers' paths diverged after the revolt of Artabazus from Artaxerxes Ochus in 359/8. Mentor continued in service with the Persian king, whereas Memnon apparently remained with Artabazus and shared his exile in Macedonia after the failure of the revolt (Diod. xvi 52. 4). Thanks to the services of Mentor during the recapture of Egypt in 343, the entire family was rehabilitated. By the time of Darius' accession Artabazus and his sons were enjoying the high position at court due to descendants of Pharnabazus and Artaxerxes Mnemon (cf. Berve no. 152). Mentor is thought to have died at some time between 342 and 336, for he plays no role in the war against Alexander (Kahrstedt, *RE* xv 964–5). Memnon alone was available for operations against Macedon, and given his long experience of Philip's court he was an obvious choice for the defence. At the Granicus, however, Memnon was merely one of the many generals appointed by Darius for the war (Diod. 7. 2).

πολὺ περιόντας According to Arrian there were 20,000 mercenary infantry in the Persian army (i 14. 4). He says nothing about native infantry, whereas Diodorus states that the Persian infantry amounted to 100,000 (Diod. 19. 5; Justin xi 6. 11 gives a total figure of 600,000 for the army). It is hardly likely that the infantry was solely represented by Greek mercenaries, and Arrian, whose figures for the Persian army are very sparse, may easily have passed over a reference to the native troops.

τὸν τε χιλὸν Destruction of fodder ahead of an advancing army was a regular practice (Hdt. iv 122. 1; Xen. *Anab.* i 6. 1). Memnon's advice was later considered more seriously (iii 19. 1 n.; cf. Curt. iii 4. 3) and finally implemented by Bessus in 329 (iii 28. 8 n.). Diod. 18. 2 adds that Memnon advocated transferring the theatre of war to Macedonia. It is dubious whether the proposal was ever seriously mooted, let alone voiced as early as the conference at Zeleia (cf. ii 1. 1 n.).

10. οὐκ ἂν περίδοι Arrian regards Arsites as the architect of the Persian defeat (cf. i 16. 3), as perhaps did Darius, who exiled his son, Mithropastes, to the Persian Gulf (Nearchus, *FGrH* 133 F 27–8). Why he was so vehement in opposing Memnon is not stated. The strategy of devastation was not in itself unthinkable for the Persian nobility (*contra* Schachermeyr² 169), for it was put into effect both before and after 334. E. W. Davis has suggested, probably correctly, that the Persians saw no reason to delay an encounter with the young Alexander, who was as yet relatively untried (*James Sprunt Studies* xlvii (Chapel Hill: 1964) 36). Certainly the Persian satraps had strong sentimental resistance to the devastation of land they considered their own (compare Pharnabazus' protest in 394; Xen. *Hell.* iv 1. 33). Arsites no doubt considered Memnon's proposal a supererogatory sacrifice.

13-16. *The Battle of the Granicus*

For bibliography see J. Seibert, *Alexander der Große* 83-5. The most important contributions are: Janke 136 ff.; W. Judeich, *Klio* viii (1908) 384-97; K. Lehmann, *Klio* xi (1911) 230-44; E. W. Davis, 'The Persian Battle Plan at the Granicus' in *Laudatores Temporis Acti* (James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science XLVI (Chapel Hill: 1964)), 34-44; P. Green, *Alexander of Macedon* (1974) 489-512; N. T. Nikolitsis, *The Battle of the Granicus* (Acta Inst. Ath. Regni Sueciae, Series in 4°, xxi (Stockholm 1974)); E. Badian, 'The Battle of the Granicus: a New Look' in *Ancient Macedonia* ii (Institute for Balkan Studies 155: Thessaloniki 1977) 271-93.

13. 1. τὸν Γράνικον The modern Biga Çay. According to Strabo (xiii 1. 11 (587); so Justin xi 6. 10) the battle was fought in the plain of Adrasteia, which opens out above the confluence with the Koçabaş Dere, 2 miles north of the modern town of Biga. For the topography see Janke 138-40; W. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* 70 ff.; Nikolitsis 10; C. Foss, in *Ancient Macedonia* ii 499-502.

Ἡγέλοχος (Berve no. 341) It is difficult to reconcile this passage with Arrian's previous statement (i 12. 7) that the scouting party was under the command of Amyntas. If Arrian is correct, there are two possibilities. Either Amyntas' party had returned and Hegelochus was sent out with substantially the same command—which would seem a wasteful reduplication of effort; or, as Berve suggests (ii 164), Hegelochus commanded a smaller group under the over-all command of Amyntas. Arrian, however, speaks as though there was only one reconnaissance party led by Hegelochus. It seems more likely that this passage, like the preceding report of the Persian council of war, is taken from Aristobulus. Aristobulus made Hegelochus commander of the scouting party, differing from Ptolemy, who placed them under Amyntas.

2. καὶ οἱ This is Krüger's emendation of the manuscript reading *καὶ οἱ*. It involves interpreting *οἱ* as a dative pronoun ('riding in haste from the scouting party, they reported to him'). Sintenis produced the same sense by deleting *οἱ*, whereas Abicht (so Brunt) reverted to the manuscript reading, arguing for the ellipse of some such verb as *προπεμφθέντες* ('the group send ahead from the scouting party'). The interpretations all assume that *σκοπῶν* is the genitive of *σκοπός*. It seems more likely to be the genitive of *σκοπή* ('the party from the watch-points'). The scouts had probably gone as far as the hills overlooking the plain of the Granicus, where the *σκοπαί* would have given a direct view of the Persian position.

Παρμενίων Plutarch (*Al.* 16. 3) records the proposal more briefly and differs in that Parmenion brings forward the lateness of the day as the reason for postponing the attack—a theme not in Arrian. It is possible

that both Arrian and Plutarch drew upon Aristobulus, excerpting the original in slightly different ways (so Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 27 n. 3; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 38). It is also arguable that the two versions come from different sources, in which case it is Arrian who drew upon Aristobulus—the source he uses consistently between i 12. 8 and 14. 4 (so Schwartz, *RE* ii 912).

This is the first of five dialogues in Arrian which represent Alexander rejecting advice proffered by the elderly Parmenion (cf. i 18. 6–9 (Miletus); ii 25. 2–3 (Euphrates frontier); iii 10. 1–2 (Gaugamela); iii 18. 12 (Persepolis)). With one exception their tendency is to portray Parmenion as pragmatic and over-cautious, a foil to the romantic impulsiveness of the young king. The ultimate source for them is usually considered to be Callisthenes, who represented Parmenion's generalship at Gaugamela as grudging and unimaginative (*FGrH* 124 F 37) and may well have developed his theme with a series of anecdotes (F. Cauer, *Jahrb. f. class. Phil.* Suppl. xx (1894) 33 f.; Strasburger 23, 25). The dialogue which is atypical is the debate at Miletus. There Alexander is cautious, echoing Parmenion's words at the Granicus (i 13. 5 n.). Ptolemy, who apparently respected Parmenion's memory (cf. iii 15. 1 n.), may have composed a debate of his own, showing that the old general was not invariably cautious. The rest of the dialogues were probably transmitted by Aristobulus.

Diodorus says nothing about a debate between Alexander and Parmenion but, most perplexingly, he speaks as though Parmenion's advice had been accepted. Alexander was encamped by the river, facing the Persians, who held a position in the foothills intending to attack the Macedonian phalanx as it was dislocated during the river crossing. Alexander, however, got his army across the river at daybreak before the Persians could launch their attack (Diod. 19. 1–3). In substance, and even in wording, Diodorus echoes Parmenion's prediction in Arrian that a dawn attack would be successful. This is a radical divergence and the possible interpretations are limited.

(i) Diodorus' account is wrong; either he or his source mistakenly inferred that Parmenion's advice was actually carried out. This is the most popular view (Judeich 394–5 n. 1; J. Keil, *Mitt. des Vereines klass. Philologen in Wien* i (1924) 15; Davis 40–2; Schachermeyr² 170 n. 174; Nikolitsis 18–19; Badian 272–4), and no one would doubt that Diodorus is capable of such a mistake. But he is at least consistent. At 23. 2 he refers to Alexander deliberately placing the river at his rear for the battle. Polyaeus iv 3. 16 also speaks of the Persians attacking ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου while Alexander was crossing the Granicus, a description certainly compatible with Diodorus' view of a Persian charge from the ὑπώρεια. In the confused and rhetorical narrative of the *Itinerarium* (20) there is a statement that Alexander began his attack *sub luce*. Superficially at least this corresponds to Diodorus' version. His story of

the battle is not a simple mistake but derived from his source. In that case, unless we admit *a priori* that Arrian used infallible sources (as do (e.g.) Keil and Davis), we are forced to compare the inherent probability of the two accounts. The most detailed attack on the credibility of Diodorus comes from Badian, who impugns his account on three counts: the inherent improbability of Alexander forcing a crossing in the face of the enemy, the vast numbers given for the native infantry, and the fiction of a full-scale Thessalian attack on the left (Diod. 19. 6). What matters is the possibility or otherwise of the Macedonians forcing a dawn crossing. Now Diodorus does not say explicitly that the Persians were encamped on the river's edge. They had occupied the *ὕπωρεια*, which can hardly be anything other than the hills running parallel to the river bank at an interval of 1½–2 km (cf. Janke 138–9). They were accordingly encamped away from the river, intending to ride down the Macedonians as they attempted to form a bridgehead. It was the same tactic which had been used—with partial success—to frustrate the Ten Thousand crossing the river Centrites (Xen. *Anab.* iv 3. 3–5). Strategy apart, it was a notorious fact that a Persian army would not encamp in the immediate vicinity of an enemy (cf. *Anab.* iii 4. 34–5; Lane Fox 122). At dawn the Persian cavalry would have been some distance from the bank, and it is plausible that Alexander was able to cross without serious opposition, especially if he had sent ahead an advance guard (cf. i 14. 6 n.).

(ii) Arrian's account is wrong. This is the minority view, espoused by K. Lehmann, Beloch, Lane Fox, and (with some serious modifications) Green. The main difficulty in Arrian's narrative has always been its strange picture of the Persian cavalry lined up along the river's edge (i 14. 4–5). The crucial problem is why they should have been arrayed in a stationary line, unable to generate any momentum in a charge. Interestingly the reconstructions which make most sense abandon Arrian at precisely this point, insisting that the cavalry must have been placed several hundred metres beyond the river in order to be able to charge the Macedonian crossing force (Judeich 389; Badian 283 f.). What is more, Arrian's account is not consistent. Although his general picture is of Alexander fighting to gain the bridgehead, there are episodes which only make sense if the fighting took place away from the river itself (i 15. 3–4, 7 nn). In my view, the Diodoran version is the more plausible. The Persians stationed themselves on the foothills, intending to overrun the Macedonians as they emerged from the river. Alexander's strategy was to circumvent the attack by sending ahead a force of cavalry under cover of the dawn, in the hope of stemming the Persian charge while the main body of his army effected the crossing.

3. καὶ ταύτῃ . . . καθίστασθαι Compare Diodorus' account of the actual crossing: ὁ δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος τεθαρρηκὼς ἅμ' ἡμέρᾳ περαιώσας τὴν δύναμιν ἔφθασε τοὺς πολεμίους (19. 3).

4. *πολλά . . . αἰ αὐτῶν*. Of the two hazards only one, the steepness of the banks, is taken up later in the narrative (15. 1–2). Plutarch goes further and says that there was general fear of the depth of the river and the rough and uneven nature of the far banks (*Al.* 14. 2). He also gives lurid details of the effect of the current (14. 4), a fact barely noticed by Arrian (14. 7 n.). The *Itinerarium* goes further still in its rhetoric (19–20). The modern Granicus does indeed have almost vertical clay banks 3–4 m high in its lower reaches; but Janke reported the existence of several gently sloping gravel beds on both sides of the river, which allow easy descent to, and ascent from, water level (Janke 138; Badian 218 f.). As for the depth of the river, Janke visited the locality in May (roughly the season of the battle) and experienced no difficulty crossing in either direction (Janke 140). Assuming that the topography has not changed radically, Arrian's description of the river exaggerates the difficulties it presented, as is clearly the case with his account of the crossing of the Pinarus (ii 10. 1 n.).

5. *σφάλμα* Compare i 18. 8 (Alexander speaking): οὐ μικρὰν τὴν βλάβην ἔσεσθαι ἐς τοῦ πολέμου τὴν πρώτην δόξαν.

6. *αἰσχύνομαι* In Plutarch's version (14. 3), which may be more accurate, Alexander says that he would feel shame before the Hellespont if he showed fear of the Granicus.

14. 1 *προετάχθησαν* Arrian uses *προτάττειν* in two senses: 'to draw up in front of' (cf. i 8. 1, 28. 4, ii 8. 10, 12. 3) and, more frequently, 'to draw up alongside, in the direction of the flank' (ii 9. 2, iii 11. 8, etc.). *ἐπιτάττειν* is used in exactly the same way. Here the verbs are used in the second sense. Arrian lists the Macedonian units in lateral order, first from the extreme right to the centre and then from the extreme left to the centre (compare the phalanx description at ii 8. 3–4).

τοξότας . . . Ἀγριῶνας There is no precise indication as to what position these units of light infantry occupied. Most reconstructions (e.g. Judeich 393; Nikolitsis 78) place them between the Companion cavalry and Amyntas' detachment; Fuller 150 puts them at the extreme right. It is possible, however, that they were stationed immediately in front of the cavalry as at Gaugamela (iii 12. 3). That would explain how light infantry came to be intermingled with the Macedonian cavalry after the river crossing (cf. i 16. 1 n.).

2. *ὕπασπισται τῶν ἑταίρων* Elsewhere the term *ἑταῖροι* is reserved for the Macedonian heavy cavalry. *τῶν ἑταίρων* is probably a marginal gloss which originally explained *τούτων* and was absorbed into the text at a later stage of transmission. There is an identical error at ii 8. 9, where the problematical and superfluous Macedonians are clearly a gloss upon *τούς τε ἑταίρους*.

ἡ . . . *φάλαγξ* By far the most frequent term used for the battalions of phalanx infantry is *τάξις*. The variant *φάλαγξ* is used on a small minority of occasions (cf. iii 9. 6, v 20. 3, 21. 5). It is not confined to

Arrian, for Polyaeus (iv 3. 27) uses it to refer to Perdiccas' battalion. The comparative rarity suggests that *φάλαγξ* is the term used by Arrian's subsidiary source Aristobulus. In the *Ectaxis contra Alanos* (5-6, 15) Arrian uses the term to refer to Roman legions—and he seems to have pioneered the usage. See further Bosworth, *HSCP* lxxxi (1977) 249.

ἡ Κρατεροῦ The name of Craterus, like that of Philippus, is repeated in Arrian's second list of phalanx battalions from left to centre (14. 3 *fin.*). The repetition of Philippus' name presents no problems; his battalion occupied a central position and could be mentioned as the final item in both lists. Craterus, however, is mentioned in two totally different positions, and there is no possibility of reconciling the statements unless we assume (as do Abicht and Nikolitsis 23) that there were two battalion commanders named Craterus. R. Köpke, *Jahrb. f. class. Phil.* xcix (1869) 263-5, deleted the first reference as an intrusive gloss (accepted in Roos's text and by Berve ii 220 n. 3). But it is impossible to see any reason for a gloss; and the scribal annotator must be supposed erudite enough to have supplied Craterus' patronymic accurately (cf. i 25. 9; *Ind.* 18. 5). It is more likely that Arrian's two major sources placed Craterus at different places in the battle line and that Arrian has failed to resolve the discrepancy (see my discussion at *CQ* xxvi (1976) 125). In that case Craterus' battalion should probably be located towards the centre. The author of the variant, whether Aristobulus or Ptolemy, assumed wrongly that it occupied the position at the extreme left which it was to have at Issus and Gaugamela (ii 8. 4, iii 11. 10).

ἐπὶ δὲ ὧν Φίλιππος . . . ἦρχε There is no justification for supposing a lacuna in the text or that the troops involved were anything other than phalanx infantry (contra Nikolitsis 23). Philippus (Berve no. 775) is an obscure individual. He is presumably to be identified with the Philippus who shared responsibility for the Getic booty with Meleager (i 4. 5). Philippus is not mentioned again. At Issus the battalion between those of Amyntas and Meleager was commanded by Ptolemy, son of Seleucus (ii 8. 4, 12. 2, cf. Berve no. 670).

3. Κάλας ὁ Ἀρπάλου (Berve no. 397) Diod. 17. 4 confirms that Calas commanded the Thessalian cavalry at the Hellespont. He had previously held a command in the expeditionary force (Diod. 7. 10; cf. Polyaeus v 44. 5, where the manuscript reading *Χάλας* is emended to *Κάλας*). Whether or not he was related to Alexander's treasurer, the famous Harpalus (as assumed by Berve and Badian, *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 18), cannot be determined. The comparative rarity of the name Harpalus tells in favour of the hypothesis, as does the importance of the commands assumed by Calas (cf. i 17. 1).

Φίλιππος ὁ Μενελάου (Berve no. 779) Diodorus claims that the allied cavalry were commanded at the Hellespont by Erigyus of

Mitylene (17. 4). Berve (ii 151 n. 2) argues that Diodorus is in error. His source has anachronistically retrojected Erigyius' later well-attested command of the allied cavalry (iii 6. 6, 11. 10, Diod. 57. 3). Badian (*ap. Brunt, JHS lxxxiii* (1963) 28 n. 9) contends that there is no error; Philippus held a temporary command at the Granicus.

Θρηῆκες The Thracians of Agathon's command were the modest troop of Odrysian cavalry (cf. iii 12. 4), who, together with the Paeonians, numbered only 900 (Diod. 17. 4). Arrian says nothing about the infantry contingent of Odrysians, Triballians, and Illyrians, even though they were 7,000 strong and must have played some role.

περὶ καὶ. 'The troops next to these were infantry, namely the battalions of Craterus, Meleager, and Philippus.' Nikolitsis 23-4 interprets the particle *τε* as connective; 'infantry *and* the battalions', etc., and assumes that a large unit of infantry came between the Thracian cavalry and Macedonian phalanx. That is impossible. Arrian virtually never uses *τε* as a simple connective (emendations have been suggested at vi 26. 1 and vii 11. 5); and where, as here, a substantive is followed by a string of nouns linked by . . . *τε* . . . *καί*, they are invariably in apposition (e.g. iv 6. 6, vii 11. 3).

What leads Nikolitsis astray is his determination to accommodate all known units of Alexander's army in the front line. In fact Arrian's battle order is seriously defective and contains no reference to the Hellenic infantry, 7,000 strong at the Hellespont, the equally strong contingent of Thracian infantry and the mercenary forces numbering at least 5,000 (Diod. 17. 3-4). These infantry forces totalled more than the Macedonian phalanx together with the archers and the Agrianians, who are the only infantry mentioned in the battle line. The most popular and cogent view is that the Hellenic infantry was used primarily as a reserve, in case the primary attack faltered (cf. Judeich 392 n. 2; Wilcken, *SB Berlin* 1922. 104; Berve i 142-3). At Gaugamela they must have formed the second line of infantry placed behind the phalanx (iii 12. 1 n.).

4. ἐς δισμυρίους Diod. 19. 4 gives cavalry numbers of 'more than 10,000', a very conservative figure compared with his total of 100,000 for the infantry (see above 12. 9 n.).

παρὰ τὸ ποταμὸν The picture of Persian cavalry lined up along the bank recurs in Curtius (iv 9. 22) and is presupposed by Plutarch's description of the battle (16. 6). For the Diodoran tradition see above 13. 2 n.

ὑπερδῆξια Plut. 16. 12 has a similar statement, that the mercenaries took their stand by a hill (*λόφος*). However, there seems to be no really high ground between the river and the foothills 1½-2 km to the east. Janke 139-40 reported a series of undulations, extending for several kilometres at a distance of 300-400 m from the east bank. This he suggested was the elevated ground mentioned by Arrian. But these

undulations rose only to 3 m above the level of the banks, a fact which seriously embarrassed Judeich, who remembered them as higher, some 10–15 m (384 n. 2). In Diodorus' account there is no problem. The Persians are established on the foothills, which rise some 150 m above the plain, and they charge from a distance. The apologetic tradition, derived from Callisthenes, placed the Persians at the water's edge. It followed that the rising ground on which the mercenaries stood had to be transferred to the immediate vicinity of the bank.

δῆλος . . . θεραπεῖα The language is strong; compare the use of ἐκπληξίς to describe the psychological effect of the sack of Thebes (i 9. 1–2, 10. 2). It implies that Alexander was treated with awe and dread by his court and suggests that there was something superhuman about him.

6. τοὺς μὲν . . . ἄγοντα This passage contains problems of text and interpretation.

(i) The main verb of the sentence is lacking and some verb of command must be inserted. The most popular solution (accepted in Roos' *editio minor*) is to emend καὶ μὴν to ἐσήμηνε. That produces a certain awkwardness; the reader naturally assumes that the *prodromoi* are the recipients of the order, only to find two lines later that the direct object is their commander, Amyntas. It is better to retain the manuscript and interpret καὶ μὴν as introducing a fresh item in the series (J. D. Denniston, *Greek Particles* 357 f.). In that case a verb such as ἔταξε or προσέταξε should be supplied after Ἀρραβαίου.

(ii) The distribution of commands is difficult. The *ile* of Socrates is detached from the over-all control of Amyntas and placed under Ptolemy, son of Philippos, who is otherwise unknown (cf. Berve no. 671). It could be that he was a temporary commander, deputizing for Socrates but, if so, it is strange that Arrian almost immediately speaks of Socrates taking part in the action (i 15. 1). That may be mere error, but we cannot assume it. It is more probable that Ptolemy, like Amyntas, was a senior officer, attached to no single unit but available for the command of larger composite forces. Berve may well be right to identify him with Ptolemy the Bodyguard, who died at Halicarnassus leading a mixed force of hypaspists and light infantry (i 22. 4–7). The τάξις of infantry associated with the *ile* of Socrates is mysterious. It has been identified as a chiliarchy of hypaspists (Berve ii 336; Badian 289), but the phrase is too elastic for certainty. As is well known, τάξις can denote any infantry unit, including light infantry (cf. vi 8. 7). Now the Agrarianians were stationed in close proximity to the *ile* of Socrates (i 14. 1) and they were troops eminently suitable for joint action with cavalry (cf. iv 4. 6). They or the archers could have supplied Ptolemy's τάξις of infantry.

(iii) The function of the forces of Amyntas and Ptolemy is unclear. Judeich 394–5 considered that Alexander planned a double attack, the

prodromoi heading for the extreme Persian left while he himself attacked obliquely to his left, aiming towards the Persian centre and avoiding the main mass of cavalry. This view has enjoyed some vogue (e.g. Wilcken 85–6; Fuller 157 f.), but it is quite untenable. Apart from the technical difficulty of the two bodies of cavalry intersecting each other's path, it is inconsistent with Arrian's narrative, which states explicitly that Alexander made for the main mass of enemy cavalry (i 15. 3; cf. Lehmann 234–5). Both bodies of troops had the same objective.

The forces of Amyntas and Philip must be interpreted as an advance guard. Nikolitsis 31 suggests that their function was to establish a bridgehead. Badian 289 f. has more ingeniously argued that they were intended to take the brunt of the first Persian charge. After forcing them back the Persians were stationary at the water's edge and vulnerable to Alexander's counter-charge. Once again the interpretation involves deserting its basis, Arrian's general narrative, which makes it clear that his source placed the Persians at the water's edge *before* the initial charge.

If, however, we accept Diodorus' narrative and abandon Arrian's picture of the fight in the river as encomiastic fabrication, the function of the advance party becomes clear. It was to cross as quickly as possible and to stem the charge of the Persian cavalry from the foothills. That gave Alexander the opportunity to launch a secondary charge and burst into the Persian cavalry after their momentum was spent.

τὴν ἡγεμονίαν The principle of rotating hegemony seems to have been a regular institution in the Macedonian army. It is attested in the phalanx (i 28.3 n.) and in the hypaspist corps (v 13. 4). Arrian's terminology is very unclear, and it is unlikely that he fully understood his sources. When he refers to the phalanx and hypaspists he seems to imply that the order of units in the battle line varied from day to day. Here he states that the *ἡγεμονία* of the entire body changed each day (Berve i 110). What is meant by *ἡγεμονία* is totally unclear. It can hardly mean the leading position on the right, for the *ile* of Socrates was stationed on the *left* of the cavalry.

7. λοξὴν . . . ρεῦμα Arrian suggests that Alexander crossed the Granicus in a diagonal line (compare his *λοξή τάξις* at Gaugamela; Diod. 57. 6; Arr. iii 13. 1 ff.), so that the head of the column was never vulnerable. It is unlikely that he could have crossed directly. The banks of the Granicus are perpendicular, 3–4 m high, and do not allow a crossing at speed except where the gravel beds slope down to the water's edge (see above 13. 4 n.). Alexander was forced to ascend and descend on the gravel beds, and it is unlikely that they faced each other across the river. A crossing was necessarily diagonal.

The text reads as though the army filtered over in a continuous line, moving to the right. That is how Polyaeus sees the movement (iv. 3. 16). There is, however, a qualification; *ἢ παρείλκε τὸ ρεῦμα* is usually

translated 'in the direction the stream drew them', 'downstream'. In other words, Alexander followed the course of the stream *leftwards* (so Janke 143; Nikolitsis 26). This would have entailed moving at an acute angle in the face of his own men. Badian argues for a limited tactical manoeuvre in midstream, which allowed the cavalry to filter left so presenting an extended front to fill the width of the gravel bed on the Persian side of the river. Arrian, however, suggests that the oblique order was continuous (ἀεὶ παρατείνων), not a tactical movement confined to the cavalry. As so often his language is insufficiently precise for us to gain a clear impression of Alexander's movements.

15. 3. πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον πελάζοντα This is one of several points which fits Diodorus' picture better than Arrian's. If the advance force was beaten down into the river while Alexander was actually crossing, they would have caused immense confusion in the confines of the river-bed. In the general context of Diodorus there is no problem. The *prodromoi* were forced back, but not back to the river. Alexander's cavalry came up to meet the Persian charge and in the level plain the refugees could pass into their ranks relatively harmlessly.

5. ξυστοῖς κρανεῖνοις Κράνεια (*cornus mas*: cf. Lane Fox 76; M. M. Markle, *AJA* lxxxi [1977] 324) was particularly prized as material for spears and javelins (Xen. *Hipp.* 12. 12). Theophrastus remarks on its hard core and extreme strength (*HP* i 6. 1, v 6. 4). The tree was, and is, common in Macedonia and was the natural wood for cavalry spears and infantry *sarissae* (Theophr. *HP* iii 12. 1-2). The use of cornel wood was not unique to the Macedonians; Xenophon notes that the Persians used the wood for their javelins, which proved highly resilient (*Hell.* iii 4. 14; *Cyrop.* vii 1.2). Evidently it was not the material of the weapons which gave the Macedonians their superiority but rather their length. As thrusting weapons they were better suited to hand-to-hand fighting than the lighter javelins of the Persians (cf. i 16. 1).

6. Ἀρέτην The manuscript reading *Ἀρετιν* should be retained. It is a legitimately formed Greek name (cf. *SEG* xvii 141; O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 179).

ἀναβολέα 'One of the royal attendants who helped the King mount'. The office of ἀναβολεύς is not attested elsewhere in a Macedonian context, but it was a familiar feature of the Achaemenid court (Xen. *Anab.* iv 4. 4; *Hipp.* 6. 12). In both Persia and Macedon the ἀναβολεύς was a man of distinction; Artaxerxes II was helped on to his horse by the famous Tiribazus. The Macedonian ἀναβολεύς was probably a senior member of the corps of Royal Pages, who were entrusted with the personal service of the King and had the specific duty of preparing his horse for battle (Curt. v 1. 42; cf. Berve i 38).

Δημάρατος Demaratus is usually identified with the famous Corinthian guest-friend of Philip who mediated between Alexander and his father

at the time of the Pixodarus affair (Plut. *Al.* 9. 12; cf. Berve no. 253; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 24). That is hard to accept. The guest-friend of Philip is explicitly stated to have been an old man at the time of his death, from infirmity, in 327 (Plut. *Al.* 37. 7, 56. 1-2); and Plutarch implies that he only joined Alexander's entourage at Susa in late 330 (Plut. 56. 1, glossed over by Hamilton 157). It is more probable that the Demaratus who fought at the Granicus was a different individual, one of the many *ἐταῖροι* drawn from all over Greece (Polyb. viii 9. 6-7 = Theop. F 224). He was probably a younger relative of the famous Demaratus.

7. **Μιθριδάτης** (Berve no. 525) Only Arrian and the derivative *Itinerarium* (22) describe Mithridates' role in the battle, though Plutarch was clearly familiar with the story (*de. Al. f.* i 2: 326 F). Diod. 20. 1-3 says that it was Spithridates who led the charge of the Persian *συγγενεῖς* (cf. iii 11. 5 n.), and claims that he was son-in-law of Darius as well as satrap of Ionia. It is possible that his source mentioned both names and Diodorus, confused by the similarity of spelling, conflated them.

προϊμπέοντα It is hard to see how Mithridates and his squadron could have been riding in advance of the Persian line, for the incident is placed in the thick of the battle, well after the two forces had joined. Such a move is difficult to envisage if the Persians were lined up along the river bank. This cavalry force would have needed to cross the rear of its own army and drive through the troops of the left in order to make contact with Alexander. If, as Diodorus suggests, the action took place on the plain, Mithridates could charge across the front of the Persian line and come at Alexander from the flank.

Ῥοισάκης (Berve no. 687) The brother of Spithridates (Diod. 20. 6; see above 12. 8 n.). Plutarch (16. 8) agrees that Rhoesaces attacked before his brother but gives a different account of the fighting. Alexander first breaks his spear on Rhoesaces' breastplate and finishes the action with his sword. Spithridates alone is said to use the cleaver and he delivers the blow which shatters Alexander's helmet (Plut. 16. 9-11). His account is related to Arrian's but it seems more consistent. Plutarch makes it clear that Alexander was engaged with the two brothers simultaneously. Arrian or his source may have inferred mistakenly that the blow on the helmet he received while engaging Rhoesaces was inflicted by Rhoesaces himself.

Diodorus' divergence is more radical. Spithridates is killed first, and Rhoesaces both shatters Alexander's helmet and has his arm amputated by Cleitus (20. 5-7). Curtius in a later flashback agrees on Rhoesaces' role (viii 1. 20), which proves that the story is derived from Cleitarchus, the common source. There must have been genuine divergence in the primary tradition.

8. **Κλεῖτος** (Berve no. 427) When referring to this formidable individual Arrian always uses the patronymic (cf. iii 11. 8, iv 8. 1),

whereas the other sources use his nickname, 'the Black'. Cleitus commanded the Royal *ile* at Gaugamela, and his proximity to Alexander at the Granicus suggests strongly that he already held the command. In all probability he was appointed by Philip, to whose memory he was strongly devoted (iv 8. 6; cf. Curt. viii 1. 23-37; Plut. *Al* 50. 12). His intervention at the Granicus was probably the inspiration for Apelles' equestrian portrait (Pliny, *NH* xxxv 93; cf. Berve ii 206).

ἀποκόπτει This is the version of the vulgate (Diod. 20. 7; Curt. viii 1. 20). Plutarch (16. 11) has the less dramatic story that Cleitus transfixed his opponent with a lance.

16. 1 τῶν ψιλῶν These light infantry 'intermingled with the cavalry' can only be the light infantry associated with Nicanor (see above 14. 6 n.). The passage cannot refer to *Persian* light infantry, as Badian (285 n. 46) suggests. Arrian is listing in order three areas of damage sustained by the Persians—that from the lances, from the momentum of the cavalry, and finally from the light troops associated with the cavalry. The first two clauses refer unambiguously to the Macedonians and the reader would expect the third also to do so. If Arrian had meant to say that the damage was inflicted by the Persians' own infantry, he would surely have used some reflexive construction (e.g. *ἀναμειγμένων σφίσι*).

2. χιλίους Diodorus 21. 6 mentions 2,000 Persian casualties; Plutarch 16. 15, following Aristobulus, gives 2,500. Gronovius therefore suggested reading *εἰς <δισ>χιλίους*, a simple correction which brings Arrian into line with the other texts.

μισθοφόρους The annihilation of the mercenaries is not mentioned by Diodorus (he gives the merest hint at 21. 5). Plutarch (16. 13-14), however, states that the mercenaries held their ground and sued for terms; Alexander, 'swayed more by anger than by policy', ignored their request and attacked. Arrian has no suggestion of any attempt at a parley and claims that the mercenaries were rooted to the ground by sheer amazement at the reverse (compare the wording at iv 26. 4). Plutarch seems to be right (so Schachermeyr² 173; Nikolitsis 50). It is difficult to see how they could have made a successful retreat beyond the foothills under constant cavalry harassment. Once their cavalry was routed it was logical to make an attempt at an armistice, and they doubtless hoped that Alexander wished to avoid a bloody struggle. The king continued the assault, however, and Plutarch may be right that he was in the grip of battle-fury.

ἐν μέσῳ . . . αὐτούς 'He massacred them quickly, surrounded as they were'. Plutarch more plausibly speaks of protracted resistance, during which Alexander's horse was killed and the Macedonians sustained their biggest casualties of the battle. The carnage was clearly

considerable on both sides, and it was a major miscalculation by Alexander to have forced battle. In future Greek mercenaries in Persian service fought to the last and refused to capitulate (cf. i 18. 4-6, ii 13. 1-4, iii 16. 2, 23. 8-9).

δισχιλίους The figure is repeated at i 29. 5. Diod. 21. 6 speaks of 20,000 prisoners, which is probably a slip (δισμυρίους for δισχιλίους).

3. ἔπεσον κτλ. Diod. 21. 3 gives a shorter list of casualties, mentioning Pharnaces and Mithrobuzanes but also including Atizyes, who fell at Issus not at the Granicus (ii 11. 8 n.). Mithrobuzanes (Berve no. 527) was clearly *satrap* of Cappadocia (as at i 12. 8, ὑπαρχος is used as a variant for σατράπης); cf. Diod. 21. 3. At the time of the Macedonian conquest Cappadocia was divided into two satrapies (Strabo xii 1. 4 (534)). The southern areas alone were governed by Mithrobuzanes (cf. ii 4. 2 n.).

Abrupales (Berve no. 106) was the son of Darius, eldest son of Artaxerxes II, who was executed c.362 for conspiracy against his father (Plut. *Artox.* 26-9; Justin x 1. 4-2. 7). Pharnaces (Berve no. 767) is otherwise unknown. His sister, the wife of Darius III, was not the celebrated Stateira, who was Darius' own sister (cf. ii 11. 9 n.). Berve, nos. 117, 767, must be right in arguing that Darius had an earlier marriage, otherwise unattested. Whether Pharnaces was connected with the Pontic royal house (as Berve suggests) cannot be established by the name alone. The name is also connected with the satrapal family of Hellespontine Phrygia (Thuc. i 129. 1, ii 67. 1, etc.), and a scion of the great Pharnabazus might be expected to have holdings in the vicinity of the Granicus.

Omares (Berve no. 832) is not elsewhere attested, but the name seems Persian (cf. *OGIS* 229. 104 f.; Omanes). The other known mercenary commanders on the Persian side are Greek, but it is possible that the arrangement used during the reconquest of Egypt (343) had become regular: each contingent of mercenaries had a Persian commander and a Greek general (Diod. xvi 47. 1).

4. εἴκοσι καὶ πέντε Arrian states that the men honoured in Lysippus' statue-group were confined to the 25 casualties of the first assault under Amyntas. According to Aristobulus (F5=Plut. *Al.* 16. 15) the statue-group comprised all the battle-casualties and included nine infantry as well as the 25 cavalry. There is no problem with the infantry (*pace* Hamilton 42): a unit of πεζοί participated in the first assault under Amyntas (i 14. 6) and must have sustained casualties. Arrian, however, is doubtless correct in limiting the statue-group to the first casualties. Amyntas' men had been virtually sacrificed to stem the Persian charge and deserved special honours.

ἐν Δίῳ In 146 BC the statue-group was looted by Q. Metellus Macedonicus and removed to Rome to adorn the *porticus Metelli*, later the *porticus Octaviae*, in the Campus Martius (Vell. Pat. i 11. 3-5; Pliny,

NH xxxiv 64; cf. E. Nash, *A Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Rome* ii (Tübingen 1962) 254–7). Arrian seems unaware of its contemporary location, a fact which is easier to explain if he had not yet begun his public career in Rome. Introduction p. 11.

Λύσιππον For sources and bibliography relating to Lysippus of Sicyon see Berve no. 482; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 9–10. Alexander's supposed order that he was to be sculpted by Lysippus alone is frequently and variously reported; *Plut. Al.* 4. 1; *de Al. f.* ii 2: 335 B; *Cic. ad. Fam.* v 12. 17; *Hor. Ep.* ii 1. 239; *Val. Max.* viii 11 *ext.* 2; *Pliny, NH* vii 125. See now, E. Schwarzenberg, in *Alexander le Grand: image et réalité* 248 ff.

5. ἀτέλειαν κτλ. The passage is virtually repeated in Alexander's speech at Opis (vii 10. 4), where it is suggested that exemptions of this nature were frequent.

This passage of Arrian contains virtually all the information available about the Macedonian fiscal system. Three types of obligation are mentioned:

(i) Dues upon landed property. Much of Macedonian territory, certainly all the lands annexed by Philip, was the property of the King, who conferred estates on individuals as his personal gift and gave the rights of inheritance and alienation (see the edict of Cassander: *SIG*³ 332). The dues here mentioned may be some sort of annual rent imposed upon such royal lands (see Berve i 307). It is, however, equally possible that a land tax was imposed upon all Macedonians, whether or not their land came originally as a royal gift.

(ii) Personal liturgies (τῷ σώματι λειτουργίαι). In contemporary Athens the term implied military service (*Dem.* 10, 28), as it seems to have done throughout the Hellenistic period (cf. K. M. T. Atkinson in *Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 27 f.). All Macedonians were under the obligation of personal military service at the King's command, and exemptions were not lightly given (cf. *Justin* xi 1. 10).

(iii) Levies upon property. This appears to be some sort of tax upon capital (κτήσεις); cf. *SIG*³ 332. 31 f., which gives exemption from export and import dues on movable property (τῶν ἐπὶ κτήσει). The word used for the tax, εἰσφόρα, has a strongly Athenian flavour. As is well known, the Athenian eisphora was an extraordinary levy upon registered capital, movable and immovable (*Polybius* ii 62. 7); a variable but small percentage of such declared capital was called upon in times of emergency (cf. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *Classica et Mediaevalia* xiv (1953) 31 ff.). The Athenian statesman, Callistratus of Aphidna, had spent some time in Macedon around 360, and he is said to have become involved in the royal finances ([*Arist.*] *Oec.* ii 2. 22: 1350^a 16–22; cf. [*Dem.*] 50. 46). It is likely that a system of eisphora payments on the Athenian model was introduced in Macedon at his suggestion.

6. αἰχμαλώτους There is a tradition that Alexander freed the Thebans while retaining the Athenians and Thessalians in custody (*Plut. Apoph.*

Al. 22: 181 B; cf. *Itin.* 23). The Athenian contingent appears to have been particularly large, and the city sued repeatedly for its release (cf. i 29. 5; iii 6. 2 n.).

7. **τριακοσίας πανοπλίας** Cf. *Plut. Al.* 16. 17. The temple of Athene at Athens had been the chief victim of Xerxes in 480, and Alexander necessarily sent there the first-fruits of revenge. He was also repaying with interest the armour taken from the temple of Athene Ilias (i 11. 7). Not surprisingly, Alexander paid especial honour to Ilium after the battle (*Strabo* xiii 1. 26 (593)).

ἐν πόλει 'On the Acropolis'. Cf. iii 16. 8; *Thuc.* ii 15. 6.

Ἀλέξανδρος . . . κατοικοῦντων Plutarch (16. 17) gives the epigram in identical words but somewhat different context. Possibly both Ptolemy and Aristobulus mentioned and quoted the epigram (taking the wording from Callisthenes?) but diverged on the circumstances of its inscription.

The epigram refers only to Alexander and the Hellenes and does not mention the Macedonians. F. Hampl accordingly argued that the Macedonians were deliberately omitted; Alexander was waging the war as *hegemon* of the Corinthian League (*Der König der Makedonen* 59 f.). But the epigram was explicitly directed towards the Greek world and stressed the consensus of Hellene against barbarian. The addition of the Macedonians would have spoiled the contrast. In any case it is arguable that the Macedonians were to be understood as Hellenes (cf. ii 14. 4 n.).

17. 1–2. *The Settlement of Hellespontine Phrygia*

17. 1 **Κάλαν σατραπέειν** Calas is the first satrap appointed (the use of the title goes back to Alexander's day: cf. *SIG*³ 302, 311). Alexander adopted the mechanism and nomenclature of the Achaemenid administration, merely substituting Macedonians for Persians in charge of the satrapies.

The appointment was logical, for Calas had acquired local experience during his command of the expeditionary force (cf. i 14. 3 n.). Little is known of his tenure of Hellespontine Phrygia, except that his control was extended over Paphlagonia in 333 (ii 4. 1 n.) and that he was defeated by the Bithynian dynast, Bas, some time before 328/7 (*Memnon, FGTH* 434 F 12. 4; for the date see, most recently, Chr. Habicht, *RE* × A. 448–9). He was superseded by Demarchus towards the end of Alexander's reign (*Arr. Succ.* F 1. 6; cf. Badian, *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 18).

2. **Ζελεΐτας . . . βαρβάρους** There is an ellipse in Arrian's narrative. Charges must have been formally laid against Zeleia in the same way as they had been laid against Lampsacus (*Paus.* vi 18. 2–4; see above, i 12. 6 n.). As the base for the Persian army Zeleia was particularly vulnerable to allegations of collaboration, and we must assume that

Alexander used the same mitigating considerations that he later applied to Sinope (iii 24. 4 n.). It is even possible that there had been a popular rising in favour of Alexander. A contemporary Zeleian decree mentions the turmoil caused when the acropolis was captured by the *demos* (SIG³ 279. 7). If the argument of *force majeure* had not prevailed, Zeleia would at the very least have suffered the savage pecuniary penalties later inflicted upon Soli (cf. ii 5. 5, 12. 2). Even though the city was pardoned, there is no hint that it was excused tribute.

Δασκύλιον Dascylium was the satrapal centre of Hellespontine Phrygia (cf. Ruge, *RE* iv 2220). The site is almost certainly the modern Hisartepe, some 32 km south of Cyzicus, where Greek settlement has been traced as early as the seventh century BC; see further J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas* 249, 254; A. J. Graham, *JHS* xci (1971) 39, 41 f.

17. 3-9. *Alexander at Sardes*

3. **Μιθρήνης** (Berve no. 524) Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 73. 2) confirms that Mithrines was citadel commander; Diod. 21. 7 erroneously terms him satrap.

οἱ δυνατώτατοι Arrian's vagueness of expression seems justified, for the city of Sardes apparently had no regular magistrates (SIG³ 273; cf. Jones, *CERP*² 38).

4. **τῷ Ἑρμῷ** For the topography of Sardes see Hdt. i 80. 1; Strabo xiii 4. 5 (625 f.). The city was situated to the south of the Hermus (Gediz), some 10 km from its confluence with the Pactolus. See now G. M. A. Hanfmann and J. C. Waldbaum, *A Survey of Sardis* (Cambridge Mass. 1975).

ἐν τιμῇ... ἦγεν Mithrines is attested in Alexander's entourage after Issus (Curt. iii 12. 6) and after Gaugamela he was sent out to the satrapy of Armenia (cf. iii 16. 5 n.).

Σαρδιανούς... ἀφήκεν Alexander's declaration is at first sight paradoxical, for the Lydians were spared neither direct government by a satrap nor the imposition of tribute. The same was to occur in the case of the Ariaspae, who were granted *eleutheria* and simultaneously placed under a governor (iii 27. 5). The explanation should probably be sought in the contemporary Greek view of the status of Persian subjects. All, including satraps (Xen. *Hell.* iv 1. 36; cf. Meiggs/Lewis 12. 4), were slaves of the Great King (cf. Arist. *Pol.* iii 1285^a 19; *de Mundo* 6: 398^a 30). Alexander's coming therefore entailed liberation. Even though the old institutions of satrap and tribute persisted, Alexander (so he implied) regarded his subjects as free men.

Arrian adds that the Lydians were permitted to live by their ancient laws, and there is some dispute precisely what the measure entailed. Schachermeyr² 182 assumes (without cogent evidence) that Alexander abolished the Persian feudal baronies, whereas Badian (*Anc. Soc. & Inst.*

44 f.) considers the gesture empty—the Lydians had never lost their ancient laws under Persian administration. Perhaps we should once more concentrate on what the Greeks believed rather than the reality of the Persian administration. There is a tradition in Herodotus that after Cyrus' conquest Lydian institutions were entirely remoulded in order to transform the people into pliant subjects (Hdt. i 155–7. 2). Alexander presumably wished to represent himself as the polar opposite of the Persian conquerors and therefore promised to restore the customs abolished by Cyrus. What those customs were he probably did not know, and may have left the satrap to carry out the settlement. The important thing was the propaganda of the moment. Alexander later promised to restore the Babylonian temple complex of Esagila, a promise similarly designed to contrast Alexander with the previous Persian administration (cf. iii 16. 4 n.).

5. ὑπερύψηλον The strength of the citadel of Sardes was proverbial. Hdt. i 84 describes it as sheer and impregnable even at the time of Cyrus' conquest, when the triple wall described by Arrian did not exist; and the capture of the Acropolis ranked as a proverbial impossibility (Luc. *De merc. cond.* 13). Polybius describes it with ample justice as 'the strongest place on earth' (viii 20. 12). It rose a sheer 200 m above the city with a flat space on the top and a single narrow saddle connecting it with the city below on the side facing Mt. Tmolus. The fortress itself was destroyed in the great earthquake of AD 17, so that now all that remains is a knife-edge ridge at the top of the Acropolis. See further H. C. Butler, *Sardis* i. 1 (1922) 17 ff.

Διὸς Ὀλυμπίου Wilcken 90 sees in the foundation a proclamation of Alexander's panhellenic ambitions, Schachermeyr² 182 recognition of the hellenized culture of Lydia. The Persian god Ahuramazda was apparently worshipped at Sardes in the guise of Zeus (cf. L. Robert, *CRAI* 1975. 308, 313–17), and Alexander might well have wished to set alongside the worship of the distinctively Macedonian Zeus Olympios (cf. i 11. 1 n.). His presence would also counteract the influence of Cybele, patron goddess of Sardes and victim of *Greek* sacrilege during the Ionian revolt (Hdt. v 102. 1, vi 101. 3, vii 8β. 2).

6. βρονταί κτλ. Similar portents were to occur at Gordium (ii 3. 8). In both cases Zeus bestowed marks of favour upon his lineal descendant. The treatment may stem from Callisthenes, who recorded previous captures of Sardes and stated explicitly that Cyrus was the last conqueror (*FGH* 124 F 29; cf. Pearson, *LHA* 39 f.).

7. ἐπιμελητήν Alexander continued the existing Achaemenid system of rigid separation of satrapal and garrison commands (Xen. *Oec.* 4. 5–11; *Cyrop.* viii 6. 1). For a list of phrurarchs (all mentioned by Arrian are styled *ἐταῖροι*) see Berve i 279.

τῶν δὲ φόρων . . . Νικίαν Two problems are involved: the status and functions of Nicias. (i) There is no hint whether or not Nicias was

subordinated to the satrapal authority of Asander. G. T. Griffith, *PCPS* NS x (1964) 25–30 (cf. Berve i 280; Tarn i 127 f.), has argued that the experiment was a conscious experiment by Alexander, its object to separate the satrap from his traditional function of tax collecting and so reduce the possibility of sedition. That is unlikely. Nicias (Berve no. 565) is an obscure figure, a Greek rather than Macedonian, and he is introduced without patronymic or title. It is unlikely that he would have proved an effective counterweight to the Macedonian officials (cf. Badian, *Greece and Rome* xii (1965) 173). (ii) Nicias' functions were egregiously mistranslated in Robson's Loeb: 'tribute, contributions and offerings' (reproduced by Lane Fox 128). The syntax is clear. τῶν φόρων can only be taken as subordinate to the following phrase: i.e. Nicias was entrusted with the σύνταξις and ἀποφορά of the tribute. G. Wirth, *Chiron* ii (1972) 91–8, has noted the correct construction, but he assumes that σύνταξις and φόροι are none the less contrasted, as in the famous Priene inscription (Tod ii 185; cf. Badian in *Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 57 ff.). Wirth believes that Nicias was commissioned to levy two separate imposts, which forces him to emend the text: φόρων <τε καὶ> συντάξεως <τῆς> ἀποφοράς.

The passage should be interpreted in the light of Arrian's own usage. At iii 17. 6 (explicitly taken from Ptolemy) he states that the Uxii were ordered φόρους ὅσα ἔτη . . . ἀποφέρειν and continues (cf. *Succ.* F 24 (230^r l. 18)) ὁ φόρος ὁ συνταχθεῖς. Clearly συντάττειν denotes the fixing of a particular sum and ἀποφέρειν the payment (for ἀποφορά used in this sense, see Pollux iii 94). The analogy indicates that Nicias' activity was exclusively associated with tribute and comprised both fixing the amounts (the apportionment among the districts of Lydia) and the supervision of the payment (so, e.g., Droysen i² 1. 198; Hamilton, *Al.* 58).

Ἀσανδρον δὲ τὸν Φιλῶτα (Berve no. 165) Berve assumed that Asander was a brother of Parmenion on the sole basis of the common patronymic, and he has been widely followed (e.g. Badian, *TAPA* xci (1960) 329; Schachermeyr² 182). Philotas, however, is one of the most common Macedonian names (Berve nos. 801–8), and it affords a very uncertain criterion for establishing a family relationship. On the career of Asander see further iii 6. 7 n.

τῆς ἄλλης . . . ἀρχῆς 'The rest of Spithridates' satrapy' was *Ionia* (cf. i 12. 8), and it would appear that Asander's authority extended to the Greek cities of the coast. That in itself was no infringement of Greek autonomy. Asander's primary function was military; and, given the imminent arrival of the Persian fleet (cf. i 18. 4) he would necessarily need to operate on the coast, using the Macedonian-backed democracies as bases. Once those cities had been 'liberated' they would naturally work voluntarily with the Macedonian forces and even, if necessary, admit alien troops for garrison purposes (cf. ii 1. 4 n.).

8. *Κάλαν δέ κτλ.* This may be the incident referred to by Polyaeus iv 3. 15; Alexander's officers were instructed to spare Memnon's estates in order to create resentment against him among the Persian nobility. The action would have been particularly appropriate after his advocacy of a scorched-earth policy (i 12. 8). The story, however, may be apocryphal; it bears a suspicious resemblance to the famous tradition about Pericles and his estates (Thuc. ii 13. 1; Plut. *Per.* 33; Polyaeus i 36. 2).

Memnon's territory probably lay in the Troad. He and his brother had occupied Scepsis and Cebren as early as 360 BC (Dem. 23. 157), and the cities may have been retained as feudal fiefs, their possession confirmed by Artabazus and Artaxerxes Ochus (cf. Schachermeyr² 133). Scepsis and Cebren lay in the upper Scamander valley (Cook, *Troad* 327 ff.; 345 ff.), and Alexander had no time to deal with them during his brief visit to Ilium.

The allied troops were led by the past and present commanders of the Thessalian cavalry (cf. i 25. 2 n.). The commander of the allies is not mentioned, and Antigonus, who is later attested in that role (i 29. 3), was at Priene during the high summer of 334 (Tod ii 186). Possibly Antigonus had not yet been appointed *strategos*. Arrian's record of appointments and promotions is far from exhaustive.

πλὴν Ἀργείων This is the sole reference to an individual city contingent of infantry. Cavalry units are more frequently attested: i 29. 4 (Elis); Diod. 57 2-3; Curt. vi 13. 29 (Achaea, Phthiotis, Malis); Tod ii 197 (Orchomenus); *Anth. Pal.* vi 344 (Thespieae). It is interesting to find an entire contingent detailed for garrison work, a contingent moreover from a city which had acted suspiciously in 336/5 (Diod. 3. 5, 8. 5). But Sardes was a key position, and Alexander can have had no doubts about the loyalty of his Argive troops (Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 32).

17. 9-12. *Stasis in Ephesus*

The passage affords valuable evidence for the political struggle in Ionia before the advent of Alexander. It is clear from the charges made against Syrphax and his family (17. 11) that there had been an earlier democratic uprising in Philip's reign, in all probability during Parmenion's opening campaign in summer 336 (Schaefer iii² 114; Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* 303 n. 1; Badian, *Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 40). This may well be the period when the Ephesian orator Delius visited mainland Greece to support the crusade against Persia (cf. Berve no. 251). But the Macedonian attack faltered, and in 335 Memnon won an important victory at Magnesia (Polyaeus v 44. 4; cf. Badian, *op. cit.* 63 n. 20). That doubtless was the immediate occasion of the oligarchic counter-revolution. As a result the ruling democrats were exiled, all public memorials of the pro-Macedonian uprising were destroyed, and

a Persian garrison was introduced to support the oligarchic junta. The pattern closely resembles Memnon's actions at Chios and Mitylene in 333 (cf. ii 1. 1-5).

9. Ἀμύντας ὁ Ἀντιόχου (Berve no. 58) The background to Amyntas' flight is mysterious. Together with his namesake, the son of Perdiccas III (Berve no. 61), he was honoured with *προξενία* at Oropus (Tod ii 164), and the most probable occasion for such an honour is the aftermath of Chaeronea, when they may have collaborated in an embassy (cf. R. M. Errington, *JHS* xciv (1974) 26 f.). If the two men were politically connected, it would explain Amyntas' flight from Macedonia—he could not feel safe after the murder of his royal associate (so Berve; see below i 25. 1 n.). Curt. iii 11. 18 claims that Amyntas had been a *praetor Alexandri*; and Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 51, inferred that he held a command in Parmenion's expeditionary force, taking flight after the murder of Attalus. That seems excluded by the explicit statements of Arr. and Diod. 48. 2 that he fled ἐκ Μακεδονίας. παθεῖν . . . ἄχαρι. The expression is frequently used by Arrian (cf. ii 14. 2, vii 23. 8; *Parthica* F 90-1), and it is an obvious borrowing from Herodotus, the only writer systematically to use the phrase (cf. Grundmann 252; G. T. Griffith, *PCPS* ns xiv (1968) 34 f.).

10. τοὺς τε φυγάδας κτλ. Alexander issued a similar decree at Chios in 332/1, restoring exiles and imposing a democracy (Tod ii 192. 3). Even though Ephesus became a democracy, it was dominated by Macedonian partisans, and it was possible to create a junta within the democratic framework. Polyaeus vi 49 mentions a 'tyrant' Hegesias who was murdered at Ephesus, a crime which resulted in immediate Macedonian intervention. Tarn ii 171 f. denied categorically that Alexander could have supported a tyrant, and Badian (*Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 64 n. 36) has suggested, somewhat implausibly, that Hegesias was one of the ex-tyrants amnestied by Alexander (if so, why did his murder cause such a violent Macedonian reaction?). It seems quite possible that Hegesias was originally the head of the democratic faction and his position, buttressed by the Macedonian administration, was such that hostile sources could describe him as a tyrant.

τοὺς δὲ φόρους . . . ἐκέλευσεν Arrian gives no reasons for the order. Tarn i 33 supposed that Alexander was punishing the democrats for their excesses; but there is no reason to think that he thought the treatment of Syrphax and his family excessive—it is of a piece with his own treatment of oligarchic 'tyrants' (cf. iii 2. 7 n.). Badian, op. cit. 45, suggests that Alexander was acting out of pique because of the Ephesians' refusal of his offer to dedicate the rebuilt temple of Artemis in his own name (Strabo xiv 1. 22 (641)). As Alexander did in fact dedicate the temple of Athene Polias in neighbouring Priene (Tod ii 184), the theory has its attractions. Unfortunately there is no evidence for the date of Alexander's offer. His promise to pay all building

expenses past and future (Strabo, loc. cit.) suggests a date somewhat later than the impoverished first year of the campaign; and the fact that Apelles' greatest painting of Alexander was dedicated in the Artemisium (Pliny, *NH* xxxv 92; cf. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*² 18) suggests that the relations between king and city were not particularly cool. It is perhaps best to interpret Alexander's allocation of tribute to Artemis as a *privilege*. The Ephesians may have been thankful that the money which would otherwise have been paid to the central treasury at Sardes was retained for the adornment of their own famous temple.

11. ἐπαγομένους The present participle can only be translated, 'those who were trying to bring in Memnon' (so Ellendt, Roos). What must be meant is the original appeal by the oligarchs in 335, when Memnon was operating in the area and in an excellent position to intervene. Krüger's emendation ἐπ(αγ)αγομένους is simple and necessary.

τὴν εἰκόνα τὴν Φιλίππου The Ephesians had in the past paid similar honours to Lysander and his fellow nauarchs and also to Timotheus (Paus. vi 3. 15-16; cf. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*² 143), and the establishment of a statue in the sanctuary was more in the nature of an exceptional honour than the formal institution of a cult as σύνναος θεός. Arrian accordingly speaks only of an εἰκών, not a regular cult statue or ἄγαλμα (as at i 11. 2, vii 19. 2; cf. Habicht 245; A. D. Nock, *Essays on Religion and the Ancient World* (Oxford 1972) 246 n. 243).

12. γνοὺς . . . ὁ δῆμος The verdict upon democracy is interesting, and Kornemann 105 has no hesitation in attributing it entirely to Ptolemy. Strasburger 24 is more hesitant and admits that the last sentence of the chapter may be Arrian's own comment (cf. i 24. 2). But, when Arrian inserts a passage of moral appreciation, he generally presents it as parenthetical comment in his own name (e.g. ii 12. 8, iii 18. 12, iv 9. 1-2). This comment is a specific factual statement about the attitude of the Ephesian demos in 334 and it probably comes from Arrian's source. It is notable that where Ptolemy had a free hand, in Cyrene in 321, he established oligarchic exiles in power and apparently imposed a strictly limited franchise (Diod. xviii 21. 6-9; *SEG* ix 1. Cf. Taeger, *Hermes* lxxiv (1929) 455; Ehrenberg, *Polis und Imperium* 523; contra Jones, *CERP*² 355 f.; 495 f.).

18-19. The Capture of Miletus

18. 1 Μαγνησίας . . . Τράλλεων Magnesia on the Maeander was a neighbour of Ephesus, some 20 km to the south (Strabo xiv 1. 39 (647); 2. 29 (663)). Tralles was situated around a strong acropolis some 25 km up the Maeander valley from Magnesia (Strabo xiv 1. 42; cf. Diod. xiv 36. 2). The two cities were closely associated (*Inscr. Magn.* 85. 3), and

they offered joint submission to other victorious powers (cf. Livy xxxvii 45. 1).

The forces sent out with Parmenion appear surprisingly large: 5,000 infantry, including Macedonians and mercenaries. It looks as though the majority of his forces, the mercenaries at least, were intended for garrison work.

Ἀλκίμαχον (Berve no. 47) There is a fair probability that Alcimachus was one of the brothers of Lysimachus (the patronymic otherwise is limited to the family: cf. vi 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 3; *SIG*³ 373). It was presumably this Alcimachus who was honoured by the Athenians in early 336 (Tod ii 180; Hypereides F 77 Jensen) and who figured in a debate with Demosthenes in Book II of Anaximenes' history of Alexander (*FGH* 72 F 16; there is no warrant for the common attribution of the speech to events after the destruction of Thebes).

There is no evidence how long the mission lasted. T. Lenschau, *Klio* xxxiii (1940) 201, identified him with the Alcimachus mentioned in a fragmentary letter of Alexander to the Chians and supposed that he was placed over the investigations into medism conducted after the island's surrender (so Tod ii, p. 267). It is far more probable that the Alcimachus of the inscription was a native Chian who had been implicated in the charges and was vindicated by Alexander (cf. Wilhelm, *Klio* Beiheft xlviii (1943) 1-16; W. G. Forrest, *Klio* li (1969) 204 f.).

ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰολίδας . . . ἦσαν Alexander's march inland from the Granicus to Sardes and Ephesus had left the Greek communities of the northern seaboard untouched and in some cases still occupied by the enemy (see above 17. 8 n.). Alcimachus' area of competence was presumably the coastline between Adramyttium and Ephesus. His main sphere of activity will have been the Aeolic communities clustered around Cyme in the area between the rivers Caicus and Hermus (Jones, *CERP*² 28). The principal Ionian cities were Phocaea, Clazomenae, Erythrae, Teos, Lebedus and Colophon. It is not known which cities retained Persian garrisons, but Alcimachus' task cannot have been a sinecure. Aeolis at least had suffered at Macedonian hands. Gryneium was stormed and its inhabitants enslaved (Diod. 7. 9). Memnon had been active in the area and Persian strongholds must have remained. One was probably Larisa, where extensive fortifications of the late fourth century have been discovered (K. Schefold, *Larisa am Hermos* i (1940) 42). Given some bitter memories and a Persian presence in the area, Alexander was well advised to make generous promises.

2. **ὀλιγαρχίας . . . ἀπέφερον** The commission falls in three parts.

(a) The universal dissolution of oligarchies and establishment of democracies. The process is epigraphically attested at Erythrae (*OGIS* 223. 22 = Welles, *RC* 15), Colophon (*AJP* lvi (1935) 361), and, above all, Priene (Tod ii 185-6). Even in remote Pontus, never visited by

Alexander in person, the king instituted a democracy at Amisus and claimed that it was the city's *πάτριος πολιτεία* (App. *Mithr.* 8. 24, 83. 374). Democracy certainly became the predominant political form in Asia Minor, but it was largely imposed upon Alexander by the Persian practice of supporting oligarchies (cf. 17. 10 n.).

(b) The grant of autonomy. Tarn (ii 208 f., 216 f.) laid great stress on Arrian's use of the verb *ἀποδοῦναι* as opposed to the simple *ἔδωκε* used in the case of the Lydians. This he considered was conclusive evidence against Bickermann's thesis (*REA* xlvii (1934) 363 ff.), that the grant of autonomy to the Greek cities was precarious, that is, revocable at the whim of Alexander. Since Alexander 'gave back' autonomy he considered that the Greeks had an inalienable right to it. This conclusion, however, is untenable:

(i) There is indeed a difference between the case of the Lydians and that of the Greek cities. The Lydian laws had lapsed long ago and Alexander gave permission to revive them. The Greek democratic institutions were regarded as temporarily in abeyance and Alexander brought them back into effect. But in both cases Alexander did the giving, and the fact that the Greeks had enjoyed autonomy in the past did not make it any the less a gift. The king was to prove to the Aspendians that his grant of autonomy was entirely revocable (i 26, 3, 27. 4), and Arrian himself stresses that the liberty of the Milesians was a direct gift (*ἔδωκε*: see below 19. 6 n.).

(ii) We may not assume that Arrian's wording in any way reproduces Alexander's original command. There was a distinction in emphasis between the views of benefactor and beneficiary, as the Athenians showed in 343, when they demanded that Halonnesus should not be given to them, as Philip promised, but given *back* ([Dem.] 7. 5–6). Now Macedonian dynasts often claimed to 'give' even when they merely confirmed or restored what had been enacted by a predecessor; cf. Diod. xviii 56. 7, Polyperchon's *diagramma* (I cannot accept Hamilton's argument, *CQ* iii (1953) 155, that the wording has been deliberately tampered with); *SIG*³ 332, Cassander's donation to Perdiccas, son of Coenus. On the other hand, the beneficiaries might commemorate the grant as a restoration of what had been previously theirs. Compare the decree of the Nesiotic League in praise of Ptolemy (*SIG*³ 390. 15).

(c) 'to remit the tribute which they used to pay to the barbarians' (for this use of *ἀνείναι* see ii 12. 2 with ii 5. 9). The grant of *ἀφορολογησία* was not to be universal. In Alexander's reign the known exceptions are Ephesus, Aspendus (both before and after its revolt), and Soli; and it is clear that in the Seleucid period exemption from tribute was far from general (cf. Welles, *RC* 15. 26 ff.; P. Herrmann, *Anadolu* ix (1965) 138 ff.). In Ionia and Aeolis the exemptions were necessary to win over cities that might otherwise be recalcitrant. There would necessarily be

Macedonian military activity in the area and in all probability garrisons would be imposed—the order to Alcimachus is suspiciously silent on the subject (cf. Tibiletti, *Athenaeum* xxxii [1954] 12 f.).

Alexander gave orders for the restoration of democracy and, although the immediate context of the order is the mission of Alcimachus, it has been assumed that the order characterized his policy to all Greek cities. Badian, *Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 46, supposes that it marks a turning-point in Alexander's career; subsequently liberty and autonomy were to be general principles and tribute was officially abolished. Certainly the policy was continued. Alexander granted liberty and immunity to the cities between Miletus and Halicarnassus (Diod. 24. 1). But, given the incomplete pacification of the Ionian coast, the presence in force of the Persian fleet, and the imminent siege of Halicarnassus, he could not afford to alienate the area. What is more, the capture of Sardes and its treasury meant that Alexander, financially unembarrassed for the moment, could afford to be more lavish in remitting tribute. Ehrenberg (*Al. and the Greeks* 15) observes correctly that Alexander's policy could vary according to the political attitudes of the cities he encountered and the general military situation. Whereas he was hailed in Ionia as a liberator, his presence at Soli was long remembered as a time of unparalleled exactions (Heberdey and Wilhelm, *Denkschr. Akad. Wien* xliv (1896) Abh. vi no. 101). The mission of Alcimachus is therefore best seen as a limited response to the military situation of 334.

3. τῶν τε πεζῶν κτλ. Alexander's forces as listed by Arrian are no more than 10,000 strong. If we subtract the forces with Parmenion and Alcimachus the remaining phalanx infantry totalled c. 7,000. Only four of the eight *ilai* of Companion cavalry were present, c. 900 strong, and the Thracian cavalry totalled no more than 900 (Diod. 17. 4). The archers and Agrianians again totalled about 1,000. Some units are not accounted for. The allied troops were still operating in the Troad (cf. 17. 8 n.), but there is no clue as to the whereabouts of the *prodromoi* and the Thracian and Illyrian infantry (a contingent of Thracians appear from nowhere to garrison Lade: 18. 5). Either Arrian's list of troops with Alexander is defective or there were more subsidiary campaigns than our sources care to mention.

τὴν μὲν ἕξω[δον] . . . πόλιν Miletus is situated on a promontory which is now surrounded by the alluvial plain of the Maeander but which in antiquity formed a peninsula jutting into the Latmian gulf (for detailed maps see *Milet* ii. 4 (1968)). The outer city must have been situated towards the neck of the peninsula, but no traces of it have yet been discovered. It may have been an extension of the city proper, spilling out of the walls (Mayer, *RE* xv 1636), or an independent fortification separate from Miletus and indefensible against an army the size of Alexander's (A. von Gerkan, *Milet* ii. 3 (1935) 122 f.).

ἀποτειγίζειν Like the Athenians in 412 BC (Thuc. viii 25. 5) Alexander

intended to wall off the city across the neck of the peninsula. In 334 the task was complicated by the fortification system, which then projected southwards to form an enclave surrounding the eminence of Kalabak Tepe (von Gerkan 120 ff.). It was therefore impossible to drive across a wall at the point where the two gulfs were closest together.

4. τῷ Περσῶν στρατῷ Darius had begun assembling his fleet as early as 336/5 (Diod. 7. 2), but at first he was hampered by the Egyptian revolt which had erupted in 338 after the death of Artaxerxes Ochus. Over the winter of 336/5 Darius launched an invasion with a considerable fleet and succeeded in penetrating the Delta, despite the fortifications erected by the native dynast, Chababash (*Urkunden des ägyptischen Altertums* ii 16–18; F. K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrh.* (Berlin 1953) 110, 185). The Cypriot and Phoenician contingents which formed the bulk of the fleet (18. 7) were not available for action in Asia Minor until 334. But, though belated, the Persian fleet was formidable—some 400 ships as against Alexander's 160 (cf. 11. 6 n.).

Νικάνωρ (Berve no. 555) The patronymic is not given, and there is no possibility of identification with any of the numerous Nicanors. This man is only attested as fleet commander (cf. i 19. 3).

Λάδη Lade was a small offshore island in the Latmian gulf to the west of the city of Miletus (Strabo xiv 1. 7 (635); Pliny, *NH* v 135). Thanks to centuries of silting it is now an outcrop in the plain land at the mouth of the Maeander.

5. πρὸς τῇ Μυκάλῃ The Persian position by Mt. Mycale was established in one of the bays of the Trogilian promontary, in the vicinity of Glauce (Thuc. viii 79. 2; cf. Keil, *RE* xvi 1004). This was some 15 km from the city proper. Nothing better illustrates the crucial importance of the Macedonian occupation of Lade. It was a superb strategic position as Philip V proved in 201 bc. (Polybius xvi 15. 5). Had the Persians arrived earlier and taken Lade they would have had a safe base for parrying the Macedonian siege activity. As it was, they could only operate inconclusively, based far enough away to be safe from immediate attack by the Macedonian land forces (cf. 19. 8).

6. Παρμενίων κτλ. The debate turns on the precise question whether or not to risk a sea battle before Miletus. We cannot argue that it represents in microcosm a difference of opinion over the value of the fleet (so Strasburger 25; see below 20. 1 n.). Interestingly Parmenion is represented as the impetuous party and Alexander as the more pragmatic, and the debate forms a complete contrast with the rest of the series recorded by Arrian (see above 13. 2 n.). Whether or not the exchange rests upon fact, it is impossible to say. Parmenion's advice has been considered impossibly foolhardy (F. Cauet, *Jahrb. f. Philologie* Suppl. xx (1894) 34; Lane Fox 132), but most scholars have wisely refrained from judging (e.g. Berve ii 300 n. 2; Strasburger 25). Arrian

does not give the context of Parmenion's proposal, and he probably envisaged something more sophisticated than a simple battle in mid ocean with all forces committed.

καὶ τὴν καὶ θεῖον Cf. ii 18. 1, i 25. 6. As the symbol of Zeus the eagle was considered favourable for Alexander. It is interesting that such an important divergence of interpretation was not referred to Aristander (cf. 11. 2 n.) for an authoritative ruling.

7. οὐ μεμελητηκότι The Hellenic fleet must have been very heterogeneous. Even the Athenians had supplied a mere twenty ships (Diod. 22. 5), and most cities will have supplied at most a handful (ii 20. 2; cf. U. Köhler, *SB Berlin* 1898. 123). The resulting fleet will have had little cohesion and no collective fighting experience. On the other hand, the Persian fleet had a Cypriot component of 120 ships, and the Phoenician cities of Byblus and Aradus together with Sidon supplied 80 (cf. ii 20. 1-3). They had greater numbers, greater cohesion, and more recent experience of fighting in Egypt (see above 18. 4 note).

8. τὴν τε ἐμπειρίαν τῶν Μακεδόνων This can only mean that Alexander's naval tactics depended heavily on Macedonian marines and relied on boarding and sheer weight of numbers. At Tyre he packed his warships with hypaspists in anticipation of a battle dominated by grappling tactics (ii 20. 6). It is clear that naval warfare had degenerated from its high point in the Peloponnesian War, and Alexander automatically resorted to the tactics of boarding which had only been used in dire emergency by the Athenians at Syracuse (Thuc. vii 62. 2; 67. 2). The same applied when he ordered his warships at Miletus to ram the enemy head-on (ἐμβάλλειν ἀντιπρώρους i 19. 10). Once more that had been a tactic of the less skilful Syracusan crews, who could not compete with the complex circling manoeuvres of the Athenians (cf. Thuc. vii 36. 3-5).

νεωτεριεῖν A decisive point against attributing the debate to Callisthenes. No contemporary propagandist would lay emphasis upon instability and discontent in mainland Greece.

19. 1 Γλαύκιππος (Berve no. 229) This man was presumably the father of Leucippus and Chrysippus who are attested eponymous magistrates in Miletus for the years 340/39 and 336/5 (*Inscr. Milet* 122. ii 75, 78). He must have been the senior statesman of the Milesian oligarchy.

2. ἐπιστήσας τῷ τείχει κτλ. Arrian implies that the assault upon Miletus was effected in a single day without any serious setback. Diod. 22. 1-2 speaks of inconclusive attacks launched daily against the walls. The siege engines were only used at a comparatively late stage. It is quite possible that the siege train was late in arriving. Alexander had expected the city to surrender (18. 4), and, as at Halicarnassus (cf. 20. 4 n.), he may have arrived without siege engines. At least there is no

a priori reason for excluding Diodorus' narrative. Arrian's account omits the unsuccessful assaults and concentrates on the final attack, stressing its rapidity (δι' ὀλίγου) and efficiency.

ἔφομαρτοούντων . . . ξυμμάχους 'with the Persians shadowing the action from Mycale, little more than observers of the investment of their friends and allies'. Arrian's language is very imprecise. The obscurity resides in the verb ἐφομαρτεῖν. In prose it seems confined to Arrian's work, almost a personal idiosyncrasy of the author (cf. iv 13. 5, vi 25. 3; *Cynegēt* 16. 8; *Phys.* F 6, p. 194, 11). But how could the Persians simultaneously 'follow' the battle and observe it? The closest parallel is vi 3. 4, where Arrian describes the Indian observers of Alexander's fleet following the ships at a safe distance from the river. At Miletus the Persians followed Alexander's assault and the passage of Nicanor's fleet from Lade, but always at a distance under the protection of Mycale.

3. ἐπέπλεον . . . ἀποκεκλείκεσαν The variation of tense is significant. There was already a blockade at the harbour-mouth, presumably established when the fleet first occupied Lade. Nicanor now moved to reinforce the blockading triremes and to launch an attack on the city from the exposed harbour. The topography is somewhat difficult. Strabo xiv 1. 6 (635) speaks of four harbours in Miletus. Of these the most significant, the Lion Harbour, had an extremely narrow mouth, capable of being closed by a chain (cf. *RE* xv 1624), and it can hardly have been the harbour penetrated by Nicanor. Von Gerkan, *Milet* ii. 3. 123, supposes that the action took place in the more southerly theatre harbour, which was in full view of Mycale.

ἀντιπρώρους . . . ὀρμίσσαντες 'mooring triremes closely packed together with their prows facing the enemy'. The wording recurs at ii 20. 8 (cf. *Parthica* F 21). In both cases Arrian envisages a barrier of triremes moored broadside to each other with prows facing the potential assailant. The terminology is borrowed from Thucydides' description of the Spartan defence at Sphacteria (iv 8. 7: τοὺς . . . ἔσπλους ταῖς ναυσὶν ἀντιπρώροις βύζην κλήσειν ἔμελλον). For a similar imitation see Appian, *Lib.* 123. 582.

4. ἐς νησιῶδα This islet is presumably one of the offshore islands, Dromiscus and Pernes. They became connected to the Milesian promontory as early as Pliny's day (*NH* ii 204).

ἀπώλοντο This is Krüger's emendation of the manuscript reading ἀπώλλυντο, which gives a more sinister meaning: 'the majority kept on being slaughtered'. Diod. 22. 4 claims that the Milesians fell before the king as suppliants immediately the walls were breached. That refers to the civilian population, who saw their sole hope of salvation in immediate surrender. The fighting men could still have been massacred after the city was formally surrendered. Alexander drew a distinction between the Milesian *demos* and the garrison which controlled the city's policy (18. 4, 19. 1), and, while the civilians could be spared as

unwilling accomplices, the defenders proper paid the full penalty of their contumacy.

6. οἶκτος . . . ἀνδρῶν Like the famous formula πόθος λαμβάνει αὐτόν, the expression is modelled upon Herodotus (cf. Hdt. i 165. 3, iii 14. 11, v 92γ. 3). The Herodotean examples alone explode Tarn's dogma (ii 65 f.) that Alexander's pity was something unique.

ὥς αὐτῷ ξυστρατεύειν These were the terms offered in 330 to mercenaries who enlisted with Darius before the Hellenic alliance was concluded (iii 24. 5). They were clearly exceptionally generous and offered only to those mercenaries who surrendered on the island. The rest of the defenders were either killed or enslaved (Diod. 22. 4: they are described as Persians but see Brunt, *CQ* xii (1962) 147, 149).

ἀφῆκεν . . . ἔδωκεν The phraseology recalls the Lydian settlement (cf. 17. 4 n.). This is a clear case where the grant of *eleutheria* was merely a guarantee not to enslave the population. Miletus had been captured by storm, but Alexander renounced the privileges of conquest, and it could not be clearer (against Tarn ii 208 n. 3) that the grant of 'liberty' was his regal gift. Diod. 22. 4 merely says that he treated the Milesians generously, in contrast with the slaughter and enslavement of the garrison. Presumably Alexander introduced his own garrison forces and imposed tribute. Nothing is stated about immunity and in the light of Strabo's comment about Miletus' ill fortune in being captured by Alexander (xiv 1. 7 (635)) it is most improbable. The fact that Alexander was appointed *aesymnetes* for the year 334/3 (*Inscr. Milet* 122. ii 81) proves nothing. It was merely a gesture of submission offered to the victor by the vanquished. It is more significant that the Milesians dated their restoration of *eleutheria* and *autonomia* from the actions of Antigonus in 313/12 (*Inscr. Milet* 123. 2-4).

The Milesians were treated differently from the Thebans partly because they surrendered at the eleventh hour (Bickermann, *REA* xlvii (1934) 358); but there were reasons of propaganda. Miletus had been sacked by the Persians in 494 and its inhabitants transplanted (Hdt. vi 18). Callisthenes devoted an excursus to the city's tragic history and mentioned the fine imposed on Phrynichus for his *Sack of Miletus* (*FGrH* 124 F 30, after Hdt. vi 21. 2). In other words Callisthenes gave full coverage of the Persian excesses and presumably contrasted them with Alexander's forbearance.

7. τὰς δὲ νύκτας Triremes were dependant upon a shore base overnight (Xen. *Hell.* vi 2. 28-30; [Dem.] 50. 22; cf. A. W. Gomme, *Essays in Greek History* 192 ff.). This episode provides the classic instance of the helplessness of a fleet without a friendly land base.

8. ἐς Σάμον The only mention of the island in Arrian's historical narrative (it appears as a geographical co-ordinate at v 5. 2). In 334 Samos was an annex of Athens. Timotheus had occupied it in 365 and established an Athenian cleruchy (Isocr. 15. 111; Diod. xviii 18. 9),

which was reinforced in 361/0 and 352/1 (Schol. Aesch. i 53; *IG* ii² 1437. 20; *FGrH* 328 F 154). The native Samians were forced into exile, where they remained until the restoration in 321 (Chr. Habicht, *Ath. Mitt.* lxxii (1957) 154 ff., no. 1). Philip confirmed the occupation in his settlement after Chaeronea (Diod. xviii 56. 7; Plut. *Al.* 28. 2). In Alexander's reign the island seems to have been delegated to an Athenian general (*Inscr. Priene* 5. 18; Habicht, op. cit. no. 1. A3-9) and the cleruchs are specifically termed ὁ δῆμος ὁ ἐν Σάμῳ (*IG* ii² 1437. 20, 3207. 20). It is somewhat strange to find the Persian fleet reprovisioning in Samos without any overt opposition. Perhaps the cleruchs shared their city's distaste for the Macedonians and actively welcomed the Persian fleet. If so, Alexander had some justification for his decision of 324 to restore Samos to its previous inhabitants (see now R. M. Errington, *Chiron* v (1975) 51-7, E. Badian, *ZPE* xxiii (1976) 289-94).

9. πρὸ τοῦ λιμένος There are two harbours at issue. The first, the objective of the bulk of the Persian fleet, was clearly the theatre harbour which had been occupied by Nicanor during the storming of the city (19. 3 above). The second harbour between Lade and the Macedonian camp must have been outside the city proper. Von Gerkan, *Milet* ii 3. 123 identifies it with the large gulf west of Değirmen Tepe.

11. Ἰασσέων The name is spelled with a single *sigma* in contemporary inscriptions (*SIG*³ 169, 312 cf. *OGIS* 441. 159, 520, 522). The second *sigma* intrudes in literary texts of the second century AD (cf. App. *Mithr.* 63. 263), and Arrian here probably followed contemporary usage.

The city was situated on a peninsula (Am Kale) to the north-east of the Gulf of Mandalya. For the geography see G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *ABSA* lii (1957) 100-5. Iasus had belonged to the satrapy of Caria and suffered as a result of a conspiracy against Mausolus (*SIG*³ 169; cf. Tod ii 116). In 334 it was under the control of Orontobates, the Persian satrap of Caria (i 23. 8), and it was forced to supply a contingent for the Persian fleet.

Iasus soon reverted to Alexander (cf. i 20. 2), and two brothers from the city, Gorgus and Minnion (Berve nos. 236, 531) achieved high distinction at the Macedonian court (cf. Tod ii 190).

ἄπρακτοι On this occasion the Persians were unsuccessful. Thanks to Alexander's dismissal of the Hellenic fleet and the absence of his main army they were able to regain and garrison the city (Curt. iv 1. 37; cf. Arr. ii 13. 4-5). The city was finally secured by the Macedonian forces about the time of the capture of Tyre, in late 332 (Curt. iv 5. 13; cf. Berve no. 759).

20. 1 *The Demobilization of the Fleet*

Arrian gives five reasons: (i) shortage of money, (ii) the fleet was no match for the Persians, (iii) Alexander's unwillingness to risk the loss

of any part of his force (this goes grammatically with argument (ii) and may be Arrian's own comment), (iv) in addition (ἄλλως τε in Arrian does not denote the major point in the series, as it does in Attic prose: cf. i 15. 2, iii 29. 4) Alexander considered that he had no further need of a fleet, since he controlled Asia with his land forces, (v) by capturing the coastal cities Alexander intended to deprive the Persian fleet of replacements for its crews and bases on land.

The argument is closely connected with the debate with Parmenion (18. 7-9), where motifs (ii) and (iii) are developed in the narrower context of a possible sea battle at Miletus. Argument (v) recurs at i 24. 3 as justification for Alexander's expedition into Lycia and Pamphylia. These thematic links are taken by Strasburger 24 as proof positive that Ptolemy is Arrian's source. It is just as easy, however, to suppose that the links come from Arrian himself. The resumptive reference to the eagle omen could be his own work; and at i 24. 3 the reference to Alexander's argument (v) is not wholly apposite—Macedonian operations in Lycia were mostly *inland*, not directed against the coast. Diod. 23. 1-3 also includes a digression on the value of Alexander's decision. He gives only the favourable views (ἐνιοι δὲ λέγουσι κτλ.), but it seems that his source gave arguments on both sides. In Cleitarchus' day there was probably a fairly animated argument about the quality of Alexander's strategy at this point, and Ptolemy may well have gone out of his way to give a detailed rationale of Alexander's action. Arguments (i) and (iv) recur briefly in Diod. 22. 5, and they at least could be authentic. But, whatever their authenticity, all the arguments are unconvincing.

(i) Shortage of money has been widely accepted as a determining factor (Wilcken 92; Tarn i 18; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 37). But Alexander should not have been financially embarrassed. At Gordium in winter 334/3 he was able to disburse 500 talents for the expenses of a new fleet and 600 talents for the expenses of garrisons in Greece (Curt. iii 1. 20), and there is no reason why his financial situation should have improved dramatically.

(ii) The Persian fleet was indeed numerically superior and had battle experience in Egypt (18. 4, 7 nn.). This was a reason not to fight a formal sea battle, as Alexander argued at Miletus, but not a reason for the dismissal of the entire fleet. The abandonment of the fleet would leave the islands, not to mention the Greek mainland, at the mercy of the Persians. The answer to Persian naval superiority was primarily to build more ships.

(iv) This is totally specious. Though Asia could be overrun by the Macedonian infantry, there was nothing to prevent the Persians attacking vulnerable points in their rear. The most telling incident is the surrender of the loyal Tenedians because of the absence of Macedonian naval support (ii 2. 3).

(v) The successful action at Mycale (19. 8) had shown the effectiveness of land forces against a shore base. But the strategy involved harrying the Persian fleet at close quarters, and was invalid once the Macedonian army moved south.

Schachermeyr² 182 attributes to Alexander a more grandiose plan, to cut off materials and money by capturing the home ports in the Levant. It is true that the Persian forces were finally crippled by the withdrawal of the Phoenician contingent after Issus (ii 20. 1), and the point is explicitly made in Alexander's speech before the siege of Tyre (ii 17. 3). But it is difficult to suppose that Alexander saw so far ahead when he dissolved his Hellenic fleet. In any case the bulk of the fleet came from Cyprus, which was in theory unaffected by Alexander's policy of neutralizing the bases on the continent.

The motive not stated by Arrian is fear of disaffection in the Greek fleet (Berve i 159; Andreotti, *il problema politico* 65 ff.; Hamilton, *Al.* 60). But, if the unreliability of the fleet was the main reason for its dissolution, it is difficult to see why Alexander took the trouble to reconstitute it in 333 (cf. ii 2. 3; Curt. iii 1. 19 f.). After the Macedonian army had withdrawn to the east desertions were far more probable than when Alexander himself presided over the theatre of war. Presumably most of the arguments mentioned by Arrian came into play. The Persian fleet *had* been effectively contained at Miletus and Alexander may have thought that the same tactics would work elsewhere. If so, he committed a colossal error, which the Persians exploited but not fully enough.

20. 2–23. 8. *The Siege of Halicarnassus*

20. 2 ὅσαι δὲ ἐν μέσῳ Alexander probably took the coastal road, passing by Pyrrha on the Latmian Gulf, Iasus, and Bargylia. Freya Stark, *JHS* lxxviii (1958) 104–6, reviews the alternative inland routes, arguing that Alexander followed the Marsyas valley via Alabanda. Unfortunately she assumes that Alexander visited Ada at Alinda, whereas it is clear that it was she who met him when he entered Caria (i 23. 8; Diod. 24. 2).

ἐξ ἐφόδου λαβὼν 'capturing them on his approach march'. Cf. i 18. 3, 24. 4, iv 2. 3 with ii 17. 3 (ἐξ ἐπίπλου).

ἐς πέντε . . . σταδίους G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *ABSA* 1 (1955) 91, argue that the camp was sited in the pass of Yokuşbaşı, about 800 m north of Halicarnassus and directly on the line of march from Bargylia.

3. ἡ . . . φύσις τοῦ χωρίου The city was proverbially strong. Vitruvius ii 8. 11 describes its aspect, probably from autopsy, as resembling a theatre with walls encircling the central acropolis (Gök Tepe) and abutting on to Salmacis in the west and the royal palace on the east. There were two subsidiary citadels, Salmacis and the island of Zephyria

(i 23. 3; cf. Strabo xiv 2. 17 (657)). The circuit of walls followed the natural line of the surrounding hills rising to a salient at the north-east corner (cf. Bean and Cook 89-91).

ἀποδεδειγμένος . . . ἡγεμών The statement is recapitulated at ii 1. 1, where Memnon is said to have been given command of the fleet and the entire παραλία. According to Diodorus (23. 6) Darius sent letters to the dwellers by the sea, directing them to take orders from Memnon. The appointment resembles Cyrus' position as *karanos* in 407 (Xen. *Hell.* i 4. 3; cf. *Anab.* i 9. 7, 1. 2), but the competence of individual satraps is described in similar terms (cf. Thuc. viii 5. 4; Xen. *Hell.* iv 8. 17). In 343/2 Memnon's brother was appointed 'satrap of the παραλία in Asia' (Diod. xvi 52. 2). Modern scholars may be right in following Diodorus' statement that Memnon had over-all command of the war in Asia Minor (Diod. 23. 6, 29. 1; cf. Bengtson, *Philologus* xcii (1937) 134), but it is interesting that when Memnon works with the Carian satrap, Orontobates, he acts as an equal (see below 23. 1). Even if Memnon had been given titular superiority over the Persian satraps, it was prudent to respect their *dignitas* and defer to them in their own territory.

4. ἐκδρομή Neither this first attempt nor the abortive attack on Myndus are recorded by Diodorus, who speaks generally of unsuccessful assaults by the Macedonian forces operating in relays (for other instances see Sinclair, *CQ* xvi (1966) 249 ff.). The story rings true. Alexander's siege train was being transported by sea (Diod. 24. 1) and may have arrived late (Brunt, *CQ* xii (1962) 148 argues unconvincingly that such transport was impossible, given the Persian command of the sea. The ships presumably hugged the coast, close to such safe havens as Iasus and Bargylia). In that case there may well have been early inconclusive assaults, the Macedonians attempting to scale the walls with ladders alone and using mines (cf. 20. 6).

5. καὶ . . . Μυνδίῳ Myndus (cf. Bean and Cook 110-12) lay opposite Cos near Cape Termera (*ATL* i 522). In the fifth century it was of minimal importance but Mausolus added strong defensive walls, making use of the natural ridges and crests. It was mostly important as a harbour and it was basically the anchorage which was fortified. The city was at least 16 km away from Halicarnassus and useless for the actual siege operations. Its principal importance would be in hindering Persian communications with Cos, but, given Alexander's naval inferiority, it would have been impossible to disrupt communications seriously.

8-10. The beginning of the siege proper. Diodorus (24. 4-25. 5) gives a far more vivid picture of this stage of the siege, and the technical details he gives seem authentic (cf. E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* (Oxford 1969) 100-2). What is more, his source gives Memnon the advantage in the fighting, a complete contrast to Arrian's picture of Macedonian superiority throughout the siege. His picture of the

superior firepower and numbers of the Persian forces during the sortie may well be correct. Arrian's narrative, on the contrary, is marked by the repetition of phrases like οὐ χαλεπῶς (20. 9, 21. 4, 22. 2 and 4) and concentrates on a few episodes where the Macedonians had the upper hand, totally ignoring the setback which was almost fatal (Diod. 26. 7). Arrian's sources are the more likely to be biased, once more representing the Macedonian success as an effortless victory.

8. τὴν τάφρον According to Aeneas Tacticus (37. 1–3) the primary purpose of such a moat was to frustrate mining operations. Diod. 24. 4 adds that Alexander protected the workers filling the trench by means of movable sheds (χελῶναι). These devices are described by Athenaeus *Mechanicus* 16 f. (Schneider, *Abh. d. Kön. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen*, N.F. xii (1912) 20 ff.).

10. Νεοπτόλεμος (Berve no. 547) Diod. 25. 5 mentions Neoptolemus' death in the same context but places him on the *Macedonian* side. Most scholars opt for Arrian and assume that Neoptolemus belonged to the Lyncestian royal family and fled Macedon after the execution of his supposed father (Droysen i² 1. 213; Berve; Schachermeyr² 103 n. 87; Lane Fox 137). But Neoptolemus' brother enjoyed a position in 334 which is most extraordinary if his father was a regicide and his brother a traitor (cf. 12. 7 n.). There are two possibilities. Either Diodorus has inferred mistakenly that Neoptolemus as a Macedonian fought on the Macedonian side or Arrian's information is erroneous. Now it is unlikely that Ptolemy or Aristobulus placed Neoptolemus on the wrong side. If, as Welles thought, Diodorus' account is to stand, we must assume a misunderstanding in Arrian. His source may have presented the casualty list in such a way that he mistakenly associated Neoptolemus' name with the Persians rather than the Macedonians. The note about his desertion must then be Arrian's own addition. For comparable slips see Introduction p. 19 f.

τριακοσίους Cf. v 24. 5. The Macedonians were roused from sleep (20. 9) and forced to fight without proper body armour. This tells against the theory of G. T. Griffith, *PCPS* ns iv (1956/7) 3–7, that the phalangites wore no breastplates (cf. Lane Fox 511 f.).

21. 1 δὺο . . . ὀπλῖται Diod. 25. 5–6 gives a briefer version of this episode, agreeing that the soldiers belonged to Perdiccas' battalion and were drunk. There is complete disagreement about its success. Arrian represents the sortie as an unqualified success which almost captured the city (21. 4). In Diodorus the incident is an unqualified defeat.

τὴν ἄκραν τὴν πρὸς Μύλασα Alexander approached from the Mylasa road (cf. 20. 4) and the brunt of the siege work seems to have been borne by the fortifications on the north-east (Bean and Cook 91).

3. καὶ ἄλλοι Diod. 25. 6 claims that Alexander and his staff took part in the fighting. Arrian confines the participants to Perdiccas' battalion,

and his apology at 21. 4 implies that there was no general engagement. In Diodorus the original participants are more numerous and a wider conflict ensues after the first repulse.

παρ' ὀλίγον . . . πόλις The same claim is made at 22. 7, and in both cases it is an exaggeration. In the next paragraph Arrian mentions that there was a defensive lunette of brick behind the crumbling walls. This would have effectively repelled any attackers who surmounted the outer fortifications. Diod. 25. 6 claims that Alexander made a formal request to remove his men's bodies under truce. If so, it was an event almost unique in the reign (cf. Curt. v 4. 3; see below iii 18. 3 n.); but there is no obvious motive for invention and the detail should be accepted (so Lane Fox 138). Once more Arrian's account seems tendentious, glossing over what was at best a failure and at worst a defeat.

4. δύο πύργοι καὶ μεσοπύργιον 'two towers and the intervening curtain wall'. Diod. 25. 5 says that two curtain walls were overthrown, which coheres with Arrian's statement that a third tower was shaken and about to fall. Alexander presumably concentrated his attack on a three-tower stretch of wall, just as Demetrius at Rhodes was to direct his attack at a four-stade front of seven towers and six *μεσοπύργια* (Diod. xx 91. 8).

πλινθινον μηνοειδές This type of counterwall, designed to strengthen an imminent breach in the outer defences, was a standard device of siege technique, previously used against Philip's attack at Perinthus (Diod. xvi 74. 3). During Demetrius' siege of Rhodes the defenders constructed three successive lunettes, the last covering the entire portion of walls imperilled by the attack (Diod. xx 93. 1, 97. 4). The technique was one of progressive attrition. All the enemy fire-power was concentrated on one stretch of the walls, while the defenders strengthened their defences with interior lunettes, begun as soon as the outer walls showed signs of stress. See further Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* 100 ff.

ὑπὸ πολυχειρίας A *topos* of siege descriptions: cf. Thuc. ii 77. 3; Xen. *Cyrop.* iii 3. 26; Diod. xx 92. 1.

5. τῶν . . . γέρρων These were defensive screens made of wickerwork and covered with hides (cf. Polybius ix 41. 3), designed to protect the men using the rams. They approximate to the *χελῶναι κριοφόροι* constructed by Demetrius for the siege of Rhodes (Diod. xx 91. 8; for a description of the developed siege works see Athenacus *Mechanicus* 21. 2 ff.).

Φιλῶταν τε καὶ Ἑλλάνικον (Berve nos. 807, 298) A Philotas and a Hellanicus are mentioned in the list of eight selected for their valour to hold junior commissions in the hypaspist corps (Curt. v 2. 5; cf. 22. 4 n.). Berve accordingly identifies them with the successful defenders at Halicarnassus. Hellanicus probably is identical. The name is Macedon-

ian (cf. *IG* x² 2. 421 with Edson's note) but very infrequently attested (cf. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 195). Philotas, however, is an extremely common name, and there is no good reason to identify our man with the Philotas Augaeus mentioned by Curtius.

ὥς δὲ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος Alexander's mere appearance is enough to cause the enemy to drop their weapons and flee (cf. i 28. 6, ii 4. 4). This stress on the terrific aspect of Alexander (cf. 14. 4 n.) presumably originated in the contemporary propaganda of Callisthenes.

6. καίτοι . . . ἐπεκράτουν Arrian stresses the advantages enjoyed by the defenders of Halicarnassus. They were particularly assisted by their defensive lunette, which began from the towers on either side of the threatened stretch of walls and retreated inwards, forming a concave bulge. The towers then provided natural fire bases at the enemy flank, and torsion engines could fire missiles into the rear of the troops attacking the central part of the lunette. Sulla made the same painful discovery during his investment of Peiraeus (App. *Mithr.* 37. 146). At Halicarnassus the defenders had the added advantage of a vast wooden tower mounted on the lunette and equipped with dart throwing catapults (23. 2; cf. Diod. 26. 6).

22. The final sortie of the defenders. Diodorus (26. 1–27. 4) gives a more extensive description of the main attack, adding that it was proposed and led by the Athenian mercenary leader, Ephialtes (cf. 10. 4 n.). It seems that his source, Cleitarchus, was particularly interested in the Greek mercenary leaders (cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 90–2), and we need not dispute that much of Diodorus' narrative derives ultimately from the besieged (cf. Brunt, *CQ* xii (1962) 141 ff.).

1. πανδημεί This guarantees the identity of the sortie described by Arrian and Diodorus. It was certainly the defenders' most massive counter-attack. Both sources agree on the site of the fighting, near the lunette. Diodorus says explicitly that both sides engaged with contracted front (26. 4) and within range of the great catapult (26. 6).

κατὰ τὸ Τρίπυλον Bean and Cook (*ABSA* 1 (1955) 91–2) locate Tripylon on the west side of the city on the Myndus road. It was clearly some distance away from the main siege work, for there is no mention of Macedonian siege engines and the defensive moat was not filled in. Ptolemy's forces moreover were small, two chiliarchies of hypaspists and some light infantry (22. 4). They were not intended to make any serious attempt on the city but merely to intensify the land blockade.

ἢ οὐδὲ πάνυ . . . ἦν Cf. Thuc. ii 60. 1, vi 46. 2.

2. οἱ μὲν i.e. the forces directed against the siege works (as opposed to the sortie from the Tripylon gate (22. 4)). This account differs completely from Diodorus' version (26. 5–7), that the Macedonians quenched the fire but were worsted in the actual fighting, harried by Persian catapults. There is little doubt that Diodorus' more circumstan-

tial account is correct. The Macedonian counter-attack probably occurred at the end of the engagement, when the tide of battle had turned in their favour.

ταῖς μηχαναῖς . . . ἑξακοντιζομένων This is the first attested use in a formal siege of stone-throwing catapults (Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* 101). In this instance they are used against personnel, but there is no reason to think (cf. Marsden 103) that they were not also used to bombard the walls, as was to happen at Tyre.

οὐ χालεπῶς The principal divergence from Diodorus, who claims that the Macedonians were first forced back and the momentum increased when Memnon joined the attack, so that even Alexander himself was helpless (26. 6–7). It was only the Macedonian veterans held in reserve who managed to stem the tide of battle and routed the enemy (27. 1). The core of the story recurs in Curtius (v 2. 5, viii 1. 36) and it is doubtless derived from Cleitarchus. It is easy enough to explain the divergence in Arrian. The general picture of Macedonian troops worsted and refusing battle (Diod. 27. 2; Curt. v 2. 5) was unthinkable as propaganda, and the official tradition presumably excised the major part of the engagement, concentrating upon the ultimate repulse of the sortie.

4. Πτολεμαῖος ὁ σωματοφύλαξ (Berve no. 672) This Ptolemy is mentioned only here and below at 22. 7. It is attractive to identify him as the father of the Ptolemy appointed Bodyguard in 321 (Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 38; *SIG*³ 332).

τὴν τε Ἀδαίου καὶ Τιμάνδρου . . . τάξιν Two units are involved (for the usage see i 6. 9 n.), but they belong to the same category. It is only companies of the same type which Arrian describes as a single *taxis*. When units of different categories are grouped together they appear as separate *taxeis* (cf. iv 24. 10, with *CQ* xxiii (1973) 252 f.). The units at issue here cannot be phalanx battalions, for the commands of five of the six battalions are stable between the Granicus and Gaugamela (cf. Berve i 114). It is more tempting to identify them as units of the hypaspists, for Adaeus is termed *χιλιάρχης* (22. 7) and the corps was divided into subdivisions called chiliarchies (cf. iii 29. 7, iv 30. 6, v 23. 7). In Arrian's lax usage *χιλιarchía* and *τάξις* may be used interchangeably (cf. iv 24. 10, v 23. 7). The most popular view therefore is that the *taxeis* under Ptolemy's command were hypaspist chiliarchies (E. H. Craemer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte Alexanders d. Großen* (Diss. Marburg 1893) 46 f.; O. Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 189 n. 100; Berve i 127).

There is a major difficulty. Curtius (v 2. 2–5) claims that in late 331 Alexander reorganized his infantry, appointing men as chiliarchs *virtutis causa*. That was the first appearance of chiliarchies; previously the men were organized in *quingenariae cohortes*. If we accept the statement at face value we must either accept that Arrian's reference to Adaeus' chiliarchy is anachronistic (so Berve no. 22) or that his

command was not a hypaspist command (R. D. Milns, *Historia* xx (1971) 189 f.). But there are major incongruities in Curtius' statement. It is clear that pentakosiarchies were not abolished by the reform (vii 25. 6; Plut. *Al.* 76. 6). More seriously, Curtius lists eight men appointed to chiliarchies in 331. That gives a total of 8,000 men under their command, which is far too large for the hypaspist corps and too small for the entire body of the phalanx. Finally, all eight of Curtius' officers are men of singular obscurity, and none of them are later attested commanding hypaspist chiliarchies. If the eight men were appointed pentakosiarchs there is little trouble. Their commands can be explained as subdivisions of four chiliarchies, the probable complement of the hypaspist corps (cf. iv 30. 6, v 23. 7—I cannot accept the arguments of Tarn ii 150 and Milns 191). What is more, there is an exact correlation with the cavalry reforms described by Arrian precisely at this juncture. Alexander divided each squadron of Companion cavalry into two sub-units (λόχοι) then instituted for the first time. The new subdivisions were given commanders chosen κατ' ἀρετήν, not, as hitherto, for their regional affiliations (iii 16. 11). The hypaspist reforms, mentioned by Curtius in the same context, may have had a similar object. One would certainly expect that both cavalry and infantry reforms followed similar lines, dividing larger commands and diversifying the hierarchy.

We may therefore accept that as early as 334 the hypaspist corps was divided into chiliarchies, perhaps based on recruiting areas as were the phalanx battalions. It remains the most likely hypothesis that Adaeus and Timander were hypaspist commanders. They are obscure figures. Adacus (Berve no. 22: for the correct form of the name cf. *SIG*³ 700. 50; *SEG* vii 636, 714) may conceivably be identical with the general of Philip surnamed Ἀλεκτρύων (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 249; Duris, *FGrH* 76 F 35), but the name was not uncommon in Macedonia (cf. Hoffman, *Die Makedonen* 190 f.). Timander (Berve no. 746) was perhaps the father of Asclepiodorus, who is mentioned in the list of trierarchs from Pella (*Ind.* 18. 3).

6. ἡ ξόγκλεισις This seems to be the sole use of the noun in an active sense. Elsewhere in Arrian it refers to the close-locked formation of the phalanx (i 4. 3, 6. 2; *PSI* xii 1284. 11; cf. Thuc. v 71. 1). Arrian, however, is repeating almost verbatim his description of the irruption into Thebes (i 8. 5), and he subtly varies his construction, turning the verb of closing into a Thucydidean abstract noun. For other examples of the phenomenon see i 18. 7 and 20. 1 (ξυμβλήσευσιν ἐβάλλον); iii 9. 6–7 (ἐξορμᾶν ἐξόρμησιν).

7. ἔτι διασῶσαι . . . ἐνδοθεῖη Diod. 27. 4 mentions the recall, but attributes it to the onset of night. If that is correct, we must assume that Arrian's ultimate source was embarrassed by the fact that the fighting lasted a whole day and devised an alternative explanation for the recall. As for Alexander's confidence in internal treachery, it is true

that any Greek city had disaffected elements who might turn renegade during a siege and Alexander might have received the same overtures that had come from Myndus (cf. 20. 5). But, even so, it is difficult to envisage Alexander holding back his men when they were in a position to capture the city. Arrian's picture of the scrupulous Alexander bears a suspicious resemblance to his account of the siege of Thebes (cf. i 7. 10 n.). What is more, his scruples, if they existed, were very short-lived; he did not hesitate to raze the city outside the acropolis once he had gained possession (23. 6 n.; Diod. 27. 6).

Ἀδαῖος <δ> χιλιάρχης οὗτοι καὶ ἄλλοι As the text stands, οὗτοι is resumptive, summing up the preceding names. That is not impossible, but Arrian tends not to use the demonstrative resumptively (cf. ii 10. 7) and if the reading is accepted one has to add a definite article in the preceding phrase (so Schmieder and Roos). Pflugk (cited by Krüger) emended to Ἀδαῖος, χιλιάρχης οὗτος which produces a neat variation in keeping with Arrian's usage elsewhere. Cf. i 16. 3 καὶ Φαρνάκης, ἀδελφὸς οὗτος.

23. 1 Ὀροντοβάτης (Berve no. 594) The spelling of the name attested on contemporary coinage is Ῥοοντοπάτης (*BMC Caria* lxxxiv; Head *HN*² 630). Orontobates was satrap of Caria and related by marriage to the Hecatomnid house (see below 23. 8). He is named as joint commander with Memnon, a logical enough position for him to have held, for Halicarnassus had been the satrapal capital since its synoecism by Mausolus.

2. τὸν... ξύλινον πύργον Diod. 26. 6 describes this formidable construction. It was 100 cubits high and crammed with missile-discharging catapults. Mounted on top of the lunette it commanded the whole area threatened by the Macedonian siege engines. Arrian thus supplies confirmation of one of the more vivid details in Diodorus' story of the final sortie of the defenders (cf. 22. 1 n.).

τὰς στοάς 'arsenals': cf. Xen. *Hell.* v 4. 8; Plut. *Pelop.* 12; Polybius v 8. 9. Such στοαί could be used as communicating paths between siege works (Diod. xx 95. 1).

3. τὴν ἄκραν τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ This citadel has traditionally been identified as Arconnesus (Kara Ada), the offshore island south-west of Halicarnassus (Strabo xiv 2. 16 (656)), and Gronovius supplied the name in Arrian's text. Bean and Cook (*ABSA* 1 (1955) 85, 91 n. 34) argue instead that the citadel was established on the island of Zephyria, the primitive site of Halicarnassus now dominated by the fortress of St. Peter. This was the island of Halicarnassus described by Ps.-Scylax 99 which by Pliny's time was connected to the mainland by an isthmus. The isthmus may have existed in Alexander's time; he probably severed it before he left Halicarnassus (Diod. 27. 6; Bean and Cook 87 f.).

τὴν Σαλμακίδα Salmacis was at the western extremity of the circuit of fortifications (Vitruvius ii 8. 11; cf. Bean and Cook 93-4). In the fifth century it appears to have been an independent community with its own civic officials (*SIG*³ 45 = Meiggs/Lewis 32; cf. Bean and Cook 94), although both communities are described jointly as Halicarnassians (v. 41). In Alexander's time Salmacis was merely a citadel, and both Arrian (ii 5. 7) and Diodorus (27. 6) describe it and the island fortress as a single *ἄκρα* (cf. Strabo xiv 2. 17 (657): *ἀλούσης τῆς πολέως πλὴν τῆς ἄκρας*—*διττὴ δ' ἦν*).

4. σῶζειν παρήγγειλεν Alexander waived the rights of conquest, as he did at Tyre in the case of the refugees in the temple of Melqart (ii 24. 5). Unlike the defenders of Thebes and Gaza (ii 27. 7; Curt. iv 6. 30), the inhabitants did not resist to the last and a massacre was avoided. But the Halicarnassians were totally at the mercy of the victor, and their fate after the destruction of the city is uncertain. After Alexander's death Halicarnassus is first mentioned in 309, when it was besieged by Ptolemy and relieved by Demetrius (Plut. *Demetr.* 7. 5). But the date of resettlement is unknown. Droysen i² 1. 217 stated that Alexander redistributed the population among the old Lelegian cities of the peninsula. That is a guess, but a plausible guess. Callisthenes gave a detailed description of the synoecism by Mausolus (*FGrH* 124 F 25) and the most likely context for it is Alexander's settlement after the siege, when he probably reversed the process. Pliny (*NH* v 107) attributes a synoecism to Alexander, but his material seems garbled. Of the six cities allegedly amalgamated with Halicarnassus one, Theangela, was inhabited continuously throughout the fourth century (Rostovtzeff, *REA* xxxiii (1931) 5 ff.; L. Robert, *Coll. Froehner* i [Paris 1936] 69 ff. no. 52; Bean and Cook 146). At the very least Pliny has compressed his material to the point of unintelligibility and he has probably confused Alexander with Mausolus (Bean and Cook 144). The error is easiest to explain if his ultimate source stated that Alexander revoked the synoecism of Mausolus.

6. ἐς Τράλλεις Cf. i 18. 1. Alexander later followed his siege train in the direction of Phrygia (a detail not noticed in Freya Stark's reconstruction, *JHS* lxxviii (1958) 107). At Tralles Alexander resolved the problem of Atizyes in Phrygia (i 25. 3, 29. 1), sending Parmenion into Phrygia while he moved south to Lycia (cf. 24. 3 n.).

ἐς ἔδαφος κατασκάψας It was primarily the dwelling houses and walls which were razed, in order to prevent the city being reoccupied (so Diod. 27. 6). Some famous monuments, notably the Mausoleum, survived the destruction (Vitruvius ii 8. 10-14; Strabo xiv 2. 16 (656); Pliny, *NH* xxxvi 30 f.). The demolition could not be total, for the forces remaining needed quarters to continue the siege (Tarn ii 217 f.).

23. 7–8. *Excursus on the Hecatomnid Dynasty*

The note is inserted as a commentary on Ptolemy's military appointment (cf. Berve no. 674). Arrian mentions Ada's position as civil satrap and gives her history up to that moment. Some details recur in Diodorus (24. 2–3; cf. xvi 69. 2, 74. 2: these later references come from Diodorus' chronological source (cf. Schwartz, *RE* v 665–8) and supply a backbone of reliable dates). Strabo xiv 2. 17 (656 f.) also has a history of the Hecatomnid house, also set in the context of Alexander's siege of Halicarnassus. The ultimate source for both Strabo and Arrian may well have been Callisthenes.

7. *σατραπείην* Greek sources emphasize that the Carian dynasts had been subjects of the Persian throne (Dem. 15. 27; Plut. *Al.* 10. 3; Gell. x 18. 2). Satrap was the official title of the house since the days of Hyssaldomus, father of Hecatomnos (L. Robert, *Études Anatoliennes* 572 ff.; *Le Sanctuaire de Sinuri* no. 76. 7–9).

Θυγατέρα ... *Ἰδριέως* Ada (Berve no. 20) was the fourth child of Hecatomnos, the Carian dynast attested in power between 391/0 and 377/6. He was succeeded by his eldest son Mausolus who ruled until 353/2 and transmitted his power to his wife and sister, Artemisia. Artemisia died in 351/0, and Idrieus, the second son of Hecatomnos, succeeded to the satrapy. He ruled for seven years with Ada as his consort. The pair are commemorated together in monuments erected at Tegea and Delphi (Tod ii no. 161 A–B). For the early history of the dynasty, see further Tod ii pp. 113 f.; G. Bockisch, *Klio* li (1969) 117–75.

κατὰ νόμον τῶν Καρῶν Apart from the earlier marriage between Mausolus and Artemisia there are no known instances of brother–sister liaisons in Caria. In the fifth century the family appears to have been exogamous (Hdt. v 118. 2; cf. Bockisch 124 n. 3). Kornemann argues that the practice originated in Caria and spread outwards (*Mitt. der Schlesischen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde* xxiv (1923) 17–45, esp. 30–4). If so, we must suppose that endogamy was practised in the lower classes of Caria, just as it was among the peasantry of Roman Egypt (H. Thierfelder, *Die Geschwisterehe im hellenistisch-römischen Ägypten* (Münster 1960) 90 ff.) and the Hecatomnids eventually adopted the national custom. But Herodotus, who was a native of Halicarnassus, cites no example of endogamy within Caria, despite his interest in the subject (cf. Hdt. iii 31). It is more likely that the so-called Carian custom was confined to the Hecatomnid house. The Carian satraps may have aped their Achaemenid overlords, who had contracted brother–sister marriages regularly since the time of Cambyses (Kornemann, op. cit. 25–30).

Πιξόδωρος (Berve no. 640) Pixodarus was the youngest son of Hecatomnos (Diod. xvi 74. 2; Strabo xiv 2. 17). After his sister had

enjoyed four years of sole rule he drove her into exile and ruled for a further five years (340–335/4: Diod. xvi 74. 2 takes his reign down to Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont). The chronology has been complicated by an important new inscription discovered in the Letoon at Xanthos. Parallel texts in Greek and Lycian deal with the establishment of a cult of *Βασιλεὺς Καύνιος*, and there is an Aramaic rescript by Pixodarus giving his official sanction (articles in *CRAI* 1974 by H. Metzger (Greek text, pp. 82–93); E. Larouche (Lycian text, pp. 115–25); A. Dupont-Sommer (Aramaic text, pp. 132–49)). The Aramaic text explicitly describes Pixodarus as satrap of Caria and Lycia, and it is dated explicitly to the month of Siwan, year 1 of Artaxerxes. The editor accordingly assigns it to the first regnal year of Artaxerxes III Ochus (358), far too early for the Diodoran dates for Pixodarus' reign. He suggests that Mausolus was deposed temporarily for his part in the satrapal revolt of the 360s. Pixodarus reigned briefly but was replaced by Mausolus (*CRAI* 1974. 139–42). It is more economical to suppose that the Artaxerxes of the Aramaic text is in fact *Arses*, the son and successor of Artaxerxes Ochus. In that case Artaxerxes was adopted on succession as the regnal name. This had become routine during the fourth century (cf. Ctesias, *FGH* 688 F 15. 50, 55, F 15a = Plut. *Artox.* 1. 4; Diod. xv 93. 2), and, when Bessus usurped the throne in 330, he assumed the name Artaxerxes (cf. iii 25. 3). If Artaxerxes is taken as the regal title of Arses, we may date the Xanthos inscription to 337/6, firmly within the known termini of Pixodarus' reign. See now E. Badian, in *Greece and the E. Mediterranean* 40–50.

8. Ὀροντοβάτης κτλ. Strabo xiv 2. 17 gives somewhat fuller details. Pixodarus had turned to Persia (*περσίᾱς*) and asked the king for a satrap to share the rule of Caria. Orontobates was accordingly sent out and received the hand of Pixodarus' daughter, the younger Ada (Berve no. 21). Neither Arrian nor Strabo retails the curious story in Plutarch (*Al.* 10. 1–5), which tells of Pixodarus offering his eldest daughter to Philip's son Arrhidaeus and Alexander himself making a counter-proposal (cf. Badian, *Phoenix* xvii (1963) 244 f.). If their joint source is Callisthenes the silence is totally explicable; there was every reason to gloss over the dark time when Alexander was ready to contract a morganatic marriage.

Pixodarus was probably continuing the separatist ambitions of the Carian house (Diod. xv 90. 3; Isocr. 5. 103; cf. Dem. 15. 11 ff.). In 338 he may have been tempted to follow Egypt's example and revolt openly (so Judeich, *Kleinas. Stud.* 252 f.). The intrigues with Philip were intended to secure an alliance (Plut. *Al.* 10. 1), but they were frustrated by the dynastic explosion at Pella. Pixodarus then had no alternative to submission to the Achaemenid house; hence his offer to share power with a satrap appointed by the Persian court.

Ἄλινδα The modern Demirci Deresi, on the eastern ranges of the Latmos massif. The identification of the site was made in 1847 when Fellows discovered Alindan coins there (Head, *HN*² 607 f.; L. Robert, *Villes d'Asie Mineure* 22, 363 n. 8). The late fourth century was Alinda's period of splendour, when its building flourished, thanks to the patronage of Ada (E. Fabricius, *Festschrift für H. Kiepert* (1898) 133). It was an excellent fortress, and Arrian's description is perfectly apt. According to Robert, *La Carie* ii 290 n. 2, there was a garrison in the city during the reign of Antiochus III ('inscription inédite' cf. A. Laumonier, *BCH* lviii (1934) 291-8).

The city may well be identical with the Alexandria by Latmos which is mentioned by Stephanus (Droysen iii² 2. 198-9; cf. Paton and Myres, *JHS* xvi (1896) 240; Laumonier, op. cit. 298; *ATL* i 468; Robert, *Le Sanctuaire de Sinuri* i 59 n. 3); Ada could have renamed it in honour of her adopted son. If so, the nomenclature was evanescent; inhabitants of the city continued to be called Alindians (*Inscr. Magn.* no. 3; *IG* vii 420. 40). Cf. R. M. Errington, in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 165 f., n. 4.

παῖδά οἱ τιθεμένη Plutarch (*Al.* 22. 7) confirms the adoption, which was a neat move to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the native Carians (for the eastern tradition of descent through the female line see H. Gelzer, *Rh. Mus.* xxxv (1880) 515-17). The adoption both committed Alexander to Ada and secured Carian support for the struggle against the Persian fleet.

ἄρχειν ἀπάσης Strabo adds that Ada was put in charge of the siege of Halicarnassus, which is most unlikely. It is clear from the later report of the city's capture (ii 5. 7) that it was Ptolemy who did the serious fighting, and as military commander he must have had much of the real power. Nothing further is known about Ada, not even the date of her death. A Philoxenus is attested satrap in 324/3 (vii 23. 1; [Arist.] *Oec.* ii 2. 31, 1351^b36), and in all probability he was Ada's immediate successor (see further iii 6. 4 n.).

24. 1-3 *The Return of the Neogamoi*

The newly married Macedonians were sent back from Caria, most probably from Tralles, where Alexander moved after the siege of Halicarnassus (23. 6). There was little time available. They left in autumn 334 (cf. 24. 5: Alexander's Lycian campaign took place in midwinter), and their return to Gordium cannot be later than May 333 (cf. i 29. 4). The return journey was some 800 km (cf. Beloch iii² 2. 312). Alexander's concern for the morale of his men (and the procreation of a new generation of phalangites) was secondary to the need for immediate reinforcements. Coenus and Meleager were phalanx commanders (cf. i 6. 9, 14. 2-3) and had a personal interest in

their recruiting. Despite their short stay in Macedon they managed to raise 3,000 phalanx infantry and 500 cavalry (cf. 29. 4).

24. 1. Πτολεμαῖον τε τὸν Σελεύκου (Berve no. 670) This Ptolemy was to command the phalanx battalion of Tymphacans at Issus (ii 8. 4, 10. 7). As he is termed *σωματοφύλαξ* and is distinguished from the phalanx *στρατηγοί* we may assume that he had not yet received his phalanx command. Ptolemy is an obscure figure, as are most of the Bodyguards attested in the early years of the reign (see the list in Berve i 27).

αὐτοὶ τῶν νεογάμων ἦσαν Of these marriages only that of Coenus is known. He had married a sister of Philotas and daughter of Parmenion (Curt. vi 9. 30).

2. Κλέανδρον (Berve no. 442) This is the brother of Coenus, here mentioned for the first time (for his later career see iii 12. 2, 26. 3, vi 27. 4 with Badian, *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 21 f.). Curtius also mentions his mission to the Peloponnese, but places it at the same time as the settlement of Lycia and Pamphylia in spring 333 (iii 1. 1). Cleander returned with 4,000 mercenaries half-way through the siege of Tyre (ii 20. 5; Curt. iv 3. 11) after an absence of more than a year. The long interval may have been caused by recruiting difficulties. King Agis of Sparta was beginning to concentrate a mercenary army at Taenarum (cf. ii 13. 6), and service close to home may have had more attraction than Alexander's Asiatic adventure.

3. Παρμενίωνα κτλ. Parmenion was sent into Phrygia, where the Persian satrap Atizyes maintained his independence (cf. 25. 3, 29. 1). Parmenion did not in fact winter at Sardes (Droysen i² 1. 219; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 43 f.), for it is clear from the narrative of the 'conspiracy' of Alexander the Lyncestian that Parmenion was operating in Phrygia during midwinter (cf. 25. 9 n.). Arrian merely states that Parmenion approached Greater Phrygia by way of Sardes (and the Hermus valley: cf. *Hell. Ox.* 12. 1-4); there is no hint of a prolonged stay.

ἱππαρχίαν This reference seems anachronistic (so Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 29). In the early years of the reign the Companion cavalry was brigaded in *ilai*, and the larger unit of the hipparchy is not otherwise attested until 329 (cf. iii 27. 4 n.). Griffith, *JHS* lxxxiii 70 f., has argued that Arrian may in fact be correct and that Parmenion was given a number of *ilai*, hipparchy having its basic sense of a group of units. But, if Arrian was so pedantically scrupulous in his expression, it needs explanation why he refers quite unambiguously to groups of *ilai* on other occasions (e.g. i 18. 3, ii 20. 4) when he would expect the use of the collective hipparchy. It is more convenient to suppose that his source was anachronistic, using the term hipparchy throughout the reign. In Diodorus' account of Gaugamela there is a clear instance of substitution of hipparchy for *ile* (57. 1), and the wording most probably derives

from his source. Now Aristobulus' military terminology differed markedly from that used by Ptolemy (see above 14. 1-3), and the anachronistic reference must be his responsibility.

ἐπὶ Λυκίας τε καὶ Παμφυλίας Arrian takes up the motivation he has expounded at i 20. 1, and the comment here may be his own addition. It is certainly not apposite. Alexander's route took him through the interior of Lycia and he totally avoided the areas of Caria which were in Persian hands and indispensable bases for their fleet.

24. 4-6. *Alexander in Lycia*

For the early history of Lycia see, most conveniently, Jones, *CERP*² 96 ff. The history of Lycia before the advent of Alexander was dominated by the struggle between the native princes and the Hecatomnid dynasty in Caria. The most striking figure is Pericles of Limyra who fought a successful war in the 370s against Artembares, a dynast of western Lycia (*TAM* i 104b. 2-3). His successes ranged from Telmissus in the north-west (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 103 *fin.*) to Phaselis (Polyaenus v 42); Theopompus, loc. cit., calls him 'King of Lycia'. The Carian dynasts brought an end to the independence of Lycia. Mausolus was able to impose a lieutenant named Condalus over some at least of the Lycian communities (Arist. *Oec.* ii 2. 14: 1348^a28 ff.). Pixodarus is attested satrap of Caria and Lycia on the new Xanthos trilingual (cf. 23. 7 n), and he was able to place the Lycians under two ἄρχοντες and establish a city governor in Xanthos itself (see also *TAM* i 45).

Arrian mentions only the fact of the Lycians' submission. He says nothing of Alexander's settlement. It is only later that we hear of Nearchus' appointment as satrap of Lycia and Pamphylia (iii 6. 6 n.), a post which he held until 329/8, when he arrived in Bactra/Zariaspa with a contingent of mercenaries (iv 7. 2). Lycia and Pamphylia were then incorporated in Antigonus' satrapy of Greater Phrygia (Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 6, 37; Diod. xviii 3. 1; Curt. x 10. 2; cf. Berve i 256). Pamphylia at least was placed under satrapal authority in winter 334/3 (cf. 27. 4), and it is overwhelmingly probable that Lycia received the same treatment.

4. Ὑπαρνα This fortress does not appear elsewhere in recorded history, nor has its site been located.

εἰσβαλὼν The archetype reads εἰσβάλλον 'while he was invading Lycia'. Telmissus was a border town and at some periods lay outside Lycia proper (cf. Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 103 *fin.*). It is perfectly plausible that it surrendered precisely when Alexander was crossing the border. The present participle should therefore be retained.

Τελμισσέας ... προσηγάγετο Telmissus was located at the modern town of Fethiye, one of the largest and best harbours in Asia Minor (W.

Ruge, *RE* v. A 410–15; Magie, *RRAM* i 516 f.). For the city's mantic traditions see below ii 3. 3 note.

By the third century B.C. Telmissus had distinctively Greek institutions (*TAM* ii 1, 17 f., 53; cf. L. Robert, *Documents de l'Asie Mineure méridionale* (Geneva/Paris 1966) 54 ff.). There is, however, no record whether Alexander treated it as a Greek city, conferring liberty and immunity. In view of its strategic position it must have received a garrison, and it may even have passed out of Macedonian hands during the Aegean War. According to Polyaeus v 35 Nearchus captured the citadel of Telmissus from an old friend of his named Antipatrides. The incident is usually placed after Alexander's death but there is no record of Nearchus' presence in Lycia outside his period as satrap (Justin xiii 4. 15 is hopelessly garbled). On the other hand, Telmissus was adjacent to Caunus, which became a Persian base during the Aegean War (cf. ii 5. 7). It may well have been occupied for a time in 333/2. In that case Antipatrides was a renegade Macedonian like Amyntas son of Antiochus.

περάσας . . . ἔλαβε The cities attested form an itinerary from Telmissus to the south Lycian coast. Pinara lay at the head of the valley of the Xanthos, occupying an impressive site at the foot of Mt. Cragus (Ruge, *RE* xx 1391; Robert, *Documents de l'Asie min. Méridionale* 14 f.). Xanthos lay further south, about 8 km from the sea (Demargne and Metzger, *RE* ix A. 1375 ff.). Patara lay on the coast, occupying a sizable harbour to the east of the Xanthos mouth ([Scylax] 100; Strabo xiv 3. 6 (666); Acts 21: 1; cf. G. Radke, *RE* xviii 2555). But Arrian's geography is uncomfortably vague. He makes Alexander cross the Xanthos river before receiving the submission of Pinara, although the Xanthos (or Sirbis) river flows well to the east of the city. If Arrian is correct, we must assume that Alexander crossed to the Xanthos valley to the north of Pinara and there received the submission of all the communities of the area (compare the embassies from Phaselis and lower Lycia, which were sent as far afield as Milyas: 24. 5–6). We are not told that Alexander visited any of the cities in person. Appian's story (*BC* iv 80. 338) that the Xanthians immolated themselves rather than submit is clearly apocryphal.

5. ἐς τὴν Μιλυάδα The precise location of Milyas is problematic. According to Strabo (xiii 4. 17 (631), xiv 3. 9 (666)) the territory commanded the pass above Termessus in Pisidia and extended as far north as Sagalassus. Pliny, *NH* v 147, assigns to Milyas the area around Baris, north of Sagalassus. So far there is relative agreement that the eastern boundary of the territory abutted on Pisidia, to the north of the Pamphylian plain (cf. Polybius v 72. 5 with Walbank's commentary). How far west the territory extended is not stated. Pliny, *NH* v 95 places Arycanda in Milyas and Ptol. v 3. 7 assigns to it various cities in central Lycia (Podalia, Neisa, Choma, Candyba: cf. S. Jameson, *RE* Suppl. xiii

268). If all these data are amalgamated, it would appear that Milyas was an extensive mountain area on the north-west border of the Pamphylian plain, describing a wide arc from Sagalassus in the north to the passes by Termessus and then westwards to the Lycian territory near Arycanda (Jones, *CERP*² 410 n. 4 is misleading). Alexander's route into Milyas must have taken him in an eastward direction from the Xanthos valley, in the direction of Elmalı, where the passes rise over 2,000 m. Arrian gives no clue to Alexander's itinerary or to the reason for the line of march. Freya Stark's hypothesis (*JHS* lxxviii (1958) 110-12) that he was attempting to open up communications with Parmenion is an unverifiable guess.

Φασηλιτῶν Phaselis was a maritime city with a triple harbour at the eastern extremity of the Lycian coast (Strabo xiv 3. 9 (666)). It is clearly visible with its three harbours on a small peninsula some 3 km north of the village of Tekir Ova (Ruge, *RE* xix 1883; Robert, *Documents de l'Asie Mineure méridionale* 40-3). The city was founded by the Rhodians of Lindus in the early seventh century B.C. (Philostephanus of Cyrene *ap.* Athenaeus vii 297 F; cf. Magie, *RRAM* ii 1370 n. 3). Phaselites participated in the Hellenion at sixth-century Naucratis (Hdt. ii 178. 2) and the city was a member of the Athenian Empire from 466, paying a large tribute of 6 or sometimes 3 talents (R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* 556 f.). After 411 the city reverted to Persian control, and in the following century it held out against Pericles of Limyra (Polyaenus v 42). It finally concluded a treaty with Mausolus (*TAM* ii 1183; Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* ii no. 260).

Λυκίων τῶν κάτω The 'lower Lycians' must have included the major cities of south-eastern Lycia: Olympus, Myra, Phoenixe, Limyra, and Rhodiapolis.

6. **ὅλιγον ὕστερον** Arrian's narrative is at its vaguest and worst. He gives no hint of the duration of the interval, what Alexander did in the meantime or how he made his way to Phaselis. Freya Stark, *op. cit.* 113-15, suggests, most implausibly, that Alexander retraced his steps to Xanthos and then traversed the south Lycian coast.

φρουρίον ὄχυρόν Not to be identified, but clearly in the close vicinity of Phaselis. For suggestions see Freya Stark 116, the most plausible of which appears to be Saraycik, an acropolis in the Climax gorge. This stronghold may be identical with the rock of the Marmares, whose destruction is vividly described by Diod. 28. 1-5, but Diodorus' description rather suits an impromptu attack, caused by a surprise raid on the Macedonian marching column (28. 1), not a premediated assault with local support. The incident is better placed in the context of the mysterious march into Milyas.

25. *The Arrest of Alexander the Lyncestian*

25. 1. Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἀερόπου (Berve no. 37) Cf. i 7. 6; i 17. 8 nn. Arrian inevitably refers to this man as the son of Aeropus; the vulgate tradition equally invariably refers to him by his ethnic *Λυγκηστής* (Diod. 32. 1, 80. 2; Curt. vii 1. 5, viii 8. 6; Justin xi 2. 2, 7. 1, xii 14. 1). Nothing is known of the father, but his brother Arrhabaeus bears a name attested in the royal house of Lyncus, and it has been thought that the sons of Aeropus belonged to the Lyncestian royalty (Beloch iii² 2. 77; Badian, *Phoenix* xvii (1963) 248; etc.). That is not proven but is highly plausible. Alexander, son of Aeropus, was son-in-law of Philip's senior statesman, Antipater (Curtius and Justin, loc. cit.).

Recent suggestions that the Lyncestian brothers were potential rivals of Alexander himself seem unfounded. The Lyncestian royal house had only been incorporated into Macedon since the early years of Philip's reign and could never command the broad base of support enjoyed by the Argead house. There were other scions of the royalty of Upper Macedonia in Alexander's entourage, such as Perdiccas (Berve no. 627) and the sons of Machatas (no. 143), but nothing suggests that they ever presented a challenge to the throne (cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 96). See, however, J. Rufus Fears, *Athenaeum* liii (1975) 130 ff.).

ἐπιβουλεύειν It is stated outright that Alexander L. was conspiring, although the evidence cited merely suggests that he was a conspirator potentially. Cf. iii 26. 1 n.

τῶν ξυνεπιλαβόντων Curt. vii 1. 6 agrees that it was proved (*pro comperto fuit*) that Alexander L. had conspired with Pausanias but was spared because of his timely salutation of the new king and because of the intervention of his father-in-law, Antipater (so Justin xi 2. 2). Both Arrian and the vulgate sources imply that there were several conspirators against Philip, most of whom were executed soon after his death (cf. Diod. xvii 2. 1; Justin xi 2. 1; Plut. *Al.* 10. 7). This detailed information contrasts with the romantic story that Pausanias murdered Philip for purely personal reasons (Diod. xvi 93. 3-94. 4; Justin ix 6. 4 ff.), a story which first appears in the contemporary Aristotle (*Pol.* v 1311^b2-3). Aristotle, however, is concentrating upon the character and motivation of the assassin. What he says does not exclude Pausanias having had accomplices. In fact the only evidence that Pausanias was an isolated assassin is Diodorus' unsupported and romantic statement that he was killed by his pursuers (Diod. xvi 94. 4; for discussion of the source tradition see *CQ* xxi (1971) 93-6). Arrian, however, states it as fact that the sons of Aeropus were involved in the murder, and he is supported by Curtius and Justin. There seem only two possibilities. Either they were involved in the conspiracy or the charges were immediately fabricated.

There is some slight evidence that the Lyncestian brothers were

associated with Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, the nephew and former ward of Philip. Plutarch (*de Al. f.* i 3: 327 C) says that among the problems facing Alexander on his accession was the state of Macedon—‘festering and looking towards Amyntas and the sons of Aëropus’. This state of confusion cannot have lasted long. Amyntas’ wife, Cynna, was a widow before the revolt of Thebes (i 5. 4 n.). Justin also, for what he is worth, implies that all the alleged conspirators except Alexander L. were executed at Philip’s funeral (xi 2. 1–2). These facts rule out of court the recent attempt to date the sedition mentioned by Plutarch to the period of the Theban revolt (J. R. Ellis, *JHS* xci (1971) 20–4; see now R. M. Errington, *JHS* xciv (1974) 26–8). Both Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, and the brothers of Alexander L. were dead by the end of 336. It is, however, possible that Arrhabaeus and Heromenes supported Amyntas against the son of Philip, precipitating a bloodbath in which they and Amyntas lost their lives. That has been thought to explain why the Lyncestian brothers were accused of complicity in the murder of Philip (so Lane Fox 37). But Amyntas was accused of attempting the life of Alexander himself, and the charge appears to have achieved the status of fact by the time of Philotas’ trial (Curt. vi 9. 17, vi 10. 24–5). If charges needed to be fabricated, those of conspiracy against Alexander were ready to hand. It was superfluous to accuse them as accomplices to Philip’s murder, unless there was good reason for the charge.

2. ἐν πρώτοις This is confirmed by the vulgate tradition (Curt. vii 1. 6; Justin xi 2. 2), which adds that Alexander L. was considerably helped by the advocacy of his father-in-law, Antipater. The sons of Aëropus were clearly divided in their loyalties and it was equally clearly the connection with Antipater that swayed Alexander L. towards his namesake.

τὸν θώρακα συνενδύς An enigmatic phrase, thanks to our ignorance of the precise situation after Philip’s death. Arrian’s language suggests that the Macedonians immediately divided into armed factions and that there was actual physical conflict in the capital itself (Philip was murdered at Aegae; cf. Diod. xvi 92. 1).

στρατηγὸν . . . ἐπὶ Θράκης Alexander L. is the first attested general in Thrace. It is unknown precisely when the command was established and what its scope was. It probably originated in the reign of Philip after the ten-month campaign in 342/1 (cf. Diod. xvi 71. 2) and consisted of military supervision of the area between the river Nestos and the Black Sea (Strabo vii F 33). The general’s competence was probably confined to matters of security; Thracian dynasts still apparently retained political power in their ancestral territories (cf. Berve i 227–8; Bengtson, *Strategie* i 38 ff.). Alexander had presumably taken up his command by 335, for the Thebans at least did not expect him to be in the entourage of the Macedonian king (i 7. 6 n.). He may

have been appointed at the outset of the Balkan campaign, when his father-in-law was viceroy in Macedon, and, like his successors, he will have acted under Antipater's ultimate authority (cf. vii 12. 4).

3. Ἀμύντας αὐτομολήσας For the 'desertion' of Amyntas, son of Antiochus, see i 17. 9. He had escaped from Ephesus after the Granicus and taken refuge at Darius' court (ii 6. 3 n.). Whether he bore communications from Alexander L. is, however, dubious. Alexander L. was in high favour from the outset of the reign, before Amyntas took flight, and it is highly unlikely that he compromised himself by communicating with Persia. Secondly, if he had sent messages to the Persian court through the intermediary of a renegade, it was a heinous act of treason, and an amazing act of clemency merely to place him under arrest.

Σισίνην This form of the name (the manuscript reading is ἀσισίνην) is guaranteed by *Anecdota Bekkeri* i 173. 29.

Curtius mentions another Sisines, who had retired to Macedon after being sent as an envoy by the satrap of Egypt (Pherendates (?); cf. Diod. xvi 51. 3). Shortly before Issus he received a letter from the Persian chiliarch Nabarzanes, entreating him to act in a way worthy of his lineage. This letter was intercepted, and, although he attempted to reach the king's presence, he was eliminated as a suspect (Curt. iii 7. 11-14). Berve ii 268 no. 543, argued that Curtius' story is merely a garbled version of the arrest of Alexander L. That is impossible. The stories differ in almost every particular, and, most decisively, Curtius does not mention the Lyncestian in the context of Sisines' letter. His story, moreover, is highly circumstantial and convincing in detail. It looks as though there were *two* men named Sisines. The name is not uncommon in the Achaemenid period (e.g. Josephus, *AJ* xi 12, 89 ff., satrap of Syria under Cyrus: Nepos, *Dal.* 7. 1, 'Sysinus', Datames' eldest son). It is, however, a strange coincidence that both men are associated with Persian intrigues against Alexander's life. If Arrian's story does derive from the accusations made at the trial in 330 (cf. i 25. 10 n.), the Persian agent may have been intentionally given a name which was suspect and connected in Macedonian minds with Persian plotting.

παρὰ Ἀτιζύην (Berve no. 179) Atizyes is a little-known figure. He seems to have participated at the Granicus (ii 11. 8; cf. i 12. 8 n.), and in early 333 he fell back to join Darius' army for the battle of Issus. The capital of Celaenae he had previously garrisoned with a strong force (i 29. 1). During the winter of 334/3 Atizyes was in the front line of hostilities against Parmenion, and he must have been in regular communication with the Persian court.

4. ξυναγαγόν ... φίλους This Council of friends is an obscure institution (cf. Berve i 33-4). It was a regularly constituted body, elsewhere termed ὁ ξύλλογος τῶν ἐταίρων (ii 25. 2; cf. ii 6. 1). The Council functioned primarily as a forum for voicing ideas. There is no

record of any formal vote and no hint that decisions were in any way binding upon the king. It was presumably analogous in the political sphere to the council of ranking officers summoned before major battles (cf. ii 7. 3, 16. 8, iii 9. 3-4). The Council was also consulted before the arrest and the torture of Philotas (Curt. vi 8. 1 ff., vi 11. 9-10).

6. **καὶ τι καὶ θεῖον** No source except the derivative *Itinerarium* mentions the swallow omen; it does not figure in Aelian's anecdotes of warnings given by swallows to Hellenistic dynasts (*NA* x 34).

8. **σύντροφον κτλ.** These characteristics of the swallow were proverbial. Aelian also describes the swallow as *φιλάνθρωπος*, delighting in its association with man (*NA* i 52). There was a Pythagorean *dictum*, *μηδὲ χειλιδόνας ἐν οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι*, standardly interpreted as a warning against the garrulous (Diels, *Vorsokr.* i 466. 1 f.). In Aristander's view the twitterings of the benevolent swallow were most likely to portend the revelation of a conspiracy.

9. **τῶν Περγαίων τινάς** Amphoterus obviously travelled north from Perge, following the route into Phrygia later taken by Alexander himself (i 27. 5). At the opening of the chapter, however, Arrian claims that Alexander was in the vicinity of Phaselis when he received the news about the Lyncestian, and *a fortiori* he had not reached Perge. Admittedly Alexander may have specifically sent ahead for guides from Perge, but nothing in the context suggests that he did. In any case the people of Phaselis could surely have provided guides for the journey. I suspect that the whole chapter is a digression from Aristobulus, very loosely attached to the main narrative from Ptolemy.

10. **οὕτω ξυλλαμβάνεται** There are two different traditions about the arrest. The vulgate tradition apparently places it in 333 B.C., in the immediate prelude to Issus. Diodorus (32. 2) claims that Olympias warned Alexander against his Lyncestian namesake, and, when confirmatory evidence came to light, Alexander L. was arrested and kept in custody. Towards the end of 330 he was brought to trial in the aftermath of the Philotas affair and executed. This story appears as a whole in Diodorus alone, but both he and Curtius agree that Alexander L. had spent three years under close arrest (Diod. 80. 2; Curt. vii 1. 6). This three-year interval supports the story of an arrest before Issus rather than in winter 334/3. Curtius seems to know of the other tradition of the arrest. At vii 1. 6 he refers back to an earlier account of the arrest (*ut supra diximus*), an account not found in the extant narrative, which begins with Alexander's departure from Pamphylia in early 333. His account of the arrest must have been placed in his lost book ii, and it will have occurred roughly where Arrian places it. Curtius also repeats a fragment of Arrian's narrative in his version of Alexander's letter to Darius (Curt. iv 1. 12; cf. Arr. i 25. 3). Justin also places the arrest in winter 334/3, before the arrival in Gordium (xi 7. 1). Diodorus then stands alone in dating the arrest

before Issus, but, unlike Curtius, he is consistent in his chronology and his account is compatible with a three-year period of close arrest.

Berve (ii 18 no. 37) attempted to conflate the two traditions, supposing that Alexander L. was merely deposed from his command in Phrygia and placed under arrest some ten months later. That ignores the explicit statements of Arrian and Justin (xi 7. 2) that Alexander L. was placed under strict custody immediately he fell under suspicion (*ξυλλαμβάνειν* implies actual imprisonment; cf. iii 29. 6). As always, the problem can only be resolved by investigation in detail of the credibility of the two traditions. Now it must be confessed that Arrian's story is not intrinsically plausible. In particular his account of Sisines' mission is difficult to understand. Sisines was ostensibly (*πρόφασιν μὲν*) a courier between Darius and his satrap of Greater Phrygia, but in reality he was to urge Alexander L. to murder his king. One must assume that his capture was deliberate policy. Worse, why should Sisines have blurted out his real purpose to Parmenion (cf. Schachermeyr² 188), when communications with Atizyes were a perfectly satisfactory explanation of his presence in Phrygia? A final perplexity is the secrecy of Amphoterus' mission. Why such precautions if all at stake was the arrest of Alexander L.? Parmenion already suspected him and had him under observation. Above all, it remains problematical why Alexander L. was kept under arrest for four years after being so deeply compromised. Admittedly he was Antipater's son-in-law, and, as Justin xi 7. 2 suggests, his execution might have caused tension in Macedon. But the protracted arrest was itself a source of tension.

The trial and execution in 330 is obviously important. Arrian says nothing about it, but it is unimpeachably attested in the vulgate tradition. Alexander L. was brought to trial as a conspirator whose case was still pending (Curt. vii 1. 5; Diod. 80. 2). He had been accused in the past, Curtius says, by two witnesses (*a duobus indicibus delatus*) but had been left under close arrest. Now, confronted with the accusation, he was taken aback, and, unable to defend himself, was condemned and executed (Curt. vii 1. 8-9 (summary execution); Diod. 80. 2). We are told nothing of the particular charges, but it is significant that Alexander L. was bewildered and inarticulate, unlike Philotas and Amyntas (cf. iii 26. 2, 27. 2 nn.) or even Demetrius the Bodyguard (Curt. vi 11. 35). Presumably charges were specially concocted which were new to the defendant himself. It is at least arguable that Arrian's story contains some of the allegations of 330. No doubt a Persian agent was actually captured by Parmenion during the winter of 334/3 and sent to Alexander for interrogation by the bilinguals on his staff (cf. iii 6. 6 n.). The actual movements may be historical but the implication of Alexander L. a later calumny. Given Arrian's *πρόφασιν* alone, both the mission of Sisines and the secret commission of Amphoterus are totally explicable. We have a rare instance of liaison between Alexander

and his lieutenant on an independent operation, and it is no surprise that matters of high strategy were tackled so carefully and confidentially. But the allegations against Alexander L. seem superimposed, and Sisines transformed from agent between king and satrap into a much more sinister figure—the intermediary between Darius and Alexander L. in a plot against the life of the Macedonian king. How convincing is Diodorus' story of accusations before Issus? It is not improbable that Olympias sent letters attacking Alexander L. The Queen Mother was hostile to Antipater and pursued an epistolary vendetta against him (Plut. *Al.* 39. 11; *Mor.* 180 D; Arr. vii 12. 5 ff.; Diod. 118. 1; Just. xii 14. 3). It is hardly surprising if she warned her son of possible danger from Antipater's son-in-law, and, if so, her letters probably featured in the formal accusation in the same way as in the accusation of Amyntas (Curt. vii 1. 12, 36–40). That Alexander reacted by arresting his namesake is again not surprising. The prelude to Issus was a period of acute tension in the Macedonian camp (cf. iii 6. 7 n.), and Alexander may have been more than usually susceptible to accusations of treason.

Arrian's does not mention the trial of 330 and clearly Ptolemy and Aristobulus both omitted it. The one passage dealing with the arrest presents Alexander L. as a traitor justifiably removed from his command and placed in custody. The apologetic tendency of the narrative suggests that its source was Aristobulus (so Strasburger 25; on the fantastic hypothesis (Lane Fox 146) that Aristobulus fraudulently alleged that Alexander L. was killed at Thebes (cf. *FGrH* 139 F 26) see Badian, *JHS* xcvi (1976) 229), Ptolemy probably did not mention either arrest or trial. Like Alexander L. he was a son-in-law of Antipater, having married Eurydice in the aftermath of the congress at Triparadeisos (cf. J. Seibert, *Hist. Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen im hellenistischen Zeit* (1967), 16 f.). He was also Antipater's ally against Perdikkas and the ally of his son, Cassander, against Antigonos. It can hardly have suited his purposes to represent Antipater's son-in-law as a traitor to Alexander. Even to mention the Lyncestian was to focus the contemporary reader's attention upon the growing rift between Antipater and Alexander, and that was a topic Ptolemy must have avoided. It would have been incongruous, to say the least, if he had stressed any tension between the late king and his future close ally.

26–7. 4. *Alexander in Pamphylia*

26. 1. ὁδοποιήκεσαν . . . πᾶροδον Strabo xiv 3. 9 (666) agrees that the inland route is circuitous and steep. For a description see Freya Stark, *JHS* lxxviii (1958) 115; *Geogr. Journal* cxxii (1956) 298 f. The improvised path constructed by the Thracians is attested again by

Plutarch (*Al.* 17. 8; a letter of Alexander). Polyaeus iv 3. 23 describes the techniques used in his story of the construction of 'Alexander's ladder'.

τῶν ἀπ' ἕρκτους Strabo, loc. cit., confirms that the coastal path was submerged when the waves were high and passable only in calm weather (ταῖς μὲν νηνεμίαις). The details about the effect of the wind are unique to Arrian, and they seem authentic. In the gulf of Antalya south winds tend to accumulate large waves and endanger shipping, whereas north winds produce a flat calm (cf. Schachermeyr² 186).

2. τῷ δέ . . . παρέσχον Arrian stresses the role of the supernatural, as did most of the Alexander historians, who are arraigned by Plutarch (*Al.* 17. 8) for gross sensationalism (compare App. *BC* ii 149. 622; *Fragm. Sabb.* *FGrH* 151 F 1. 2 and for further examples see Mederer 1-8). Arrian's story revolves around the miraculous intervention of the gods, a recurrent feature of his narrative (ii 6. 6 n.; iii 3. 3-4). There is no reference to Callisthenes' famous description of the Pamphylian sea offering *proskynesis* (*FGrH* 124 F 31). Callisthenes clearly mentioned the change in weather and compared the appearance of the waves to an act of prostration. The propaganda implications were clear. At Phaselis Alexander passed the coastal boundary of the Persian empire established by the Athenians in the fifth century (Diod. xii 4. 5; Isocr. 4. 118, 7. 80; cf. Callisthenes F 16), and the barbarian sea offered *proskynesis*, the act of obeisance associated with the Persian king. The elements themselves were acknowledging Alexander as the new lord of Asia (cf. Josephus, *AJ* ii 348). Callisthenes' description was not taken up by later historians, who may have cherished bitter memories of Alexander's attempts to introduce *proskynesis*. Instead Arrian's sources confined themselves to the less controversial motif of divine protection, which may also derive from Callisthenes (Pearson, *LHA* 37).

Strabo xiv 3. 9 (667) has a more sober story: Alexander set out before the waves had slackened, with the result that his men marched through the sea for the whole day. Schachermeyr² 187 whimsically attributes the story to a contemporary who had caught a cold during the march. Certainly Strabo has no suggestion of divine intervention and his account conflicts fundamentally with that of Arrian. The source of this divergent account is a matter for guesswork. The most popular suggestion is Aristobulus (Kaerst i³ 355 n. 4; Tarn ii 353; Schachermeyr² 187 n. 199), but Cleitarchus seems more probable. Strabo elsewhere draws on his work (*FGrH* 137 F 16, 20, 26, 28), and the fact that the coastal march is not mentioned in any vulgate source suggests that Cleitarchus' account was not sensational. Otherwise Diodorus with his passion for paradox (cf. 27. 7, 47. 6, 49. 4) must have mentioned the episode. Alexander's march probably was cold and uncomfortable. We may still believe that the wind changed during the march and made the going easier. Alexander, as Arrian states, probably hailed the change

of weather as a sign of divine favour and gave Callisthenes the inspiration for his propaganda. The hardships of the march were accordingly glossed over (for a similar example, where Strabo supplies the corrective to Arrian, see iii 28. 6 n.).

ἐκ Πέργης Perge is located by its inscriptions and by Strabo's description (xiv 4. 2 (667)) at Murtana, some 7 km west of the R. Cestrus (Ak Su); cf. Ruge, *RE* xix 703; Walbank, *Polybius* i 599. Sited at a salient road and water junction to the west of the Pamphylian plain the city formed a natural base for Alexander's operations (cf. 27. 5). According to Greek tradition, Perge like the rest of the Pamphylian cities was a Hellenic foundation, settled by Amphilochoi or Mopsus after the Trojan War (Hdt. vii 91; Strabo xiv 4. 3; Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F 103. 15). The actual dialect spoken, as attested by inscriptions (*SGDI* 1265 f.; Schwyzler 686; cf. *SEG* ii 705), is very primitive, akin to that of the Cypriot Greeks (A. Meillet, *REG* xxi (1908) 413-25; Schwyzler, *Gr. Gramm.* i 89), and indicates that the migration was indeed early, before or during the Dorian invasions (Jones, *CERP*² 123; cf. Beloch *1²* 2. 107-9). See now Cl. Brixhe, *Le Dialecte grec de Pamphylie* (Paris 1976) 3-9, 147-50.

Ἀσπενδίων The Aspendians were alleged to be a colony of Argos (Strabo xiv 4. 2; Mela i 98), and their dialect was similar to that of Perge and Sillyum (Schwyzler 686 a. 3; Head, *HN*² 699 f.; Brixhe, *Le Dialecte grec de Pamphylie* 191 ff.). The city probably joined the Delian League after Eurymedon (*ATL* iii 260 f.; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* 58, 102). In 411 it was a base for the Persian fleet (Thuc. viii 81. 3, 87. 1) and apparently remained loyal to the royal authority (cf. Nepos, *Dal.* 8. 2).

3. πεντήκοντα ... μισθόν This exaction corresponds to the wartime *syntaxeis* demanded by the Seleucid kings (P. Herrmann, *Anadolu* ix (1965) 104); and the *synaxis* mentioned in the Priene decree (Tod ii no. 185) was most probably a non-recurrent contribution to Alexander's campaign chest (iii 6. 4 n.). There is no reason to think that the demands made of the Aspendians were unique; Alexander's remission of a garrison suggests that they received, if anything, favoured treatment (cf. 26. 5). Many other large cities will have paid similar contributions to help finance Alexander's reservoir of mercenaries (given the competition from Persian paymasters he could not default on wages), and some, like Soli (cf. ii 5. 5, 12. 2) were more harshly treated. Aspendus, moreover, was famed for its wealth, acquired from salt (Pliny, *NH* xxxi 73) and oil (Strabo xii 7. 1 (570); Philostr. *VA* iii 15). In 390/89 Thrasybulus had made a diversion from Rhodes to extort money from the city (Xen. *Hell.* iv 8. 30; Diod. xiv 99. 4), and Alexander doubtless saw it as a tempting source of funds.

δασμόν The original Persian system of tribute was a levy of annual gifts (Hdt. iii 89. 3). Under Darius I these were transmuted into a

regular charge, usually paid in bullion (Hdt. iii 96. 2; see further O. Murray, *Historia* xv (1966) 150-4). The use of *δασμός* is unique in Arrian, and it is possibly taken from his primary sources, which may have distinguished the old royal 'portion' of the produce of the land from the regular tribute of bullion. It is, however, more probable that he borrowed the term from Xenophon (cf. Murray, op. cit. 154) and used it as a variant for *φόρος*. In the second century A.D. the two words are used synonymously (Plut. *Am. Narr.* 774 c; Lucian, *Tox.* 44).

Pamphylia like the other horse-rearing areas of the empire (Hdt. iii 90. 3, viii 113. 2; Strabo xi 13. 8 (525)) was subject to an annual payment in kind as well as the regular tribute. This tribute of horses would have been an invaluable source of remounts (Alexander collected it immediately: 26. 5), and it was presumably imposed elsewhere.

4. *ἐπὶ Σίδης* For a description of the site and remains of Side see Lanckoroński i 126 ff. The city was supposedly founded from Aeolic Cyme ([Scylax] 101; Strabo xiv 4. 2). Eusebius gives a foundation date of 1405 B.C. On the other hand, Hecataeus (*FGrH* I F 262) claimed that Side was daughter of Taurus and wife of Cimolus. No doubt Side was originally a barbarian settlement, infiltrated in historical times by settlers from Cyme.

τὴν μὲν Ἑλλάδα . . . ἑβαρβάριζον The fourth-century coins of Side bear bizarre legends which still elude satisfactory interpretation (Head, *HN*² 703; S. Atlan, *Kadmos* vii (1968) 67-74). Bilingual inscriptions have, however, been discovered at Side and permit at least partial decipherment (H. Th. Bossert, *Parola del Passato* v (1950) 32-46; cf. Robert, *BE* 1951. 191 f.). The language seems to bear the characteristics of the native tongues of Asia Minor (Lycian, Lydian, and Phrygian): it is inflected, there is aphaeresis of an initial α, and ρ and λ are interchanged. In common with Lydian and Phrygian the writing is from right to left. Certainly the Sidetan dialect does not appear as unique as Arrian suggests. The aphaeresis of α is shared with the Greek dialect of Pamphylia (Bossert 42). Perhaps the Greek immigrants gave a peculiar twist of their own to the local Pamphylian dialect, blending in some elements of Greek (the Greek letters Α and Θ are used in the Sidetan script). The language was transformed, not merely adapted, as at Aspendus and Sillyum. For recent contributions to the decipherment of the script see G. Neumann, *Kadmos* vii (1968) 75-93; Cl. Brixhe, *Kadmos* viii (1969) 54-84, 143-57; V. V. Ševeroškin, *Kadmos* xiv (1975) 154-66.

5. *καταλιπὼν δὲ φρουράν* The Sidetans were famous sailors, classed with the Phoenician cities (Livy xxxv 48. 6), and they must have sent a contingent to the Persian fleet. Alexander doubtless wished to ensure their loyalty in his absence and prevent their harbour being used as a Persian base (cf. L. Robert, *Hellenica* v (1948) 69-76).

Σόλλιον The form of the name varies wildly; coins of the city read *Σελυφίως* (Head, *HN*² 705; cf. Schwyzer 686), which is variously represented in the literary sources. Arrian's spelling seems the most common, but inscriptions give the form *Σόλλιον* (Ruge, *RE* iiiA. 100). The city is located by Strabo xiv 4. 2 within view of Perge about forty stades above the sea; its site is established at the modern village of Yanköy. See further Lanckoroński i 63 ff.

27. 1. τὰ μὲν πολλά . . . ῥεῖ The acropolis of Aspendus comprised two hills separated by a depression but surrounded by a single set of walls. At either side of the depression, to the east and south, were gates. All around were steep cliffs with an almost vertical face for the last 10 m. Given the natural strength of the position, extensive fortifications were only required at the three natural access-points, the sites of the north, east, and south gates. The south gate was the key to the defences. It abutted on to the main *agora* and overlooked the mouth of the Eurymedon and the road from Perge to Side. In modern times the Eurymedon has bent away from the acropolis, coming no closer than 500 m. The plain, however, is alluvial and the river could well have changed its course (cf. Lanckoroński i 87 f.).

οὐκ ὀλίγαι . . . οὐ μέγα No traces of houses or wall have been discovered, and the earliest buildings outside the inner walls have been dated fifty years after Alexander (Lanckoroński i 91). Could he have razed the outer suburb as an additional reprisal?

3. παρ' ἐλπίδα ἤκοντα This is surely incorrect. Sillyum is only 15 km from Aspendus, and after they had excluded Alexander's emissaries the Aspendians must have expected reprisals.

4. πεῖθεσθαι τῷ σατραπίῃ The satrap was Nearchus who had been given the joint command of Lycia and Pamphylia (cf. i 24. 4-6). It is hard to say what this subordination entailed, for we have no explicit evidence for relations between satrap and city in Alexander's reign. Asander, satrap of Caria in 314, is said to have had many cities under his control (Diod. xix 62. 2), and, when Antigonos expelled his garrison from the acropolis of Miletus, the city is said to have regained its autonomy (Diod. xix 75. 4). Furthermore the list of Milesian *stephanephoroi* attests Asander as eponymous magistrate in 314/13 and the following year states that the city was granted freedom and autonomy by Antigonos and its democracy was restored (*Inscr. Milet* 123. 1-4). Despite the emotive language it seems clear that the Milesians had been politically inhibited by the garrison, and their rights of assembly may have been curtailed. The Aspendians must have received a garrison which would directly impose the satrap's wishes upon the city's organs of government.

ὅπερ τῆς χώρας διακριθῆναι Hostility between Aspendus and Side is attested in 218 B.C. (Polybius v 73. 4), and the cause may well have been land disputes. The reassignment of peripheral land was an obvious

punitive measure, used by Philip in 338/7 against Sparta (Polybius ix 28. 6-7); cf. Roebuck, *CP* xliii (1948) 86 f.) and Thebes (Roebuck 80 n. 48).

27. 5-29. 6. *From Pamphylia to Gordium*

5. *παρὰ Τελμισσὸν πόλιν* The correct form of the name is *Τερμησόος*. It is attested in inscriptions and on coins of all periods including that of Arrian (cf. *OGIS* 566. 25; *CIL* i² 2. 589; Head, *HN*² 712). The misspelling recurs throughout Arrian's narrative and Roos ascribes it to Arrian himself. However, it is common in manuscripts of the Byzantine period (e.g. Polybius xxi 35. 4; cf. Heberdey, *RE* vA. 733 f.), and its occurrence in Arrian is best attributed to corruption in the tradition.

The site is at Güllük, about 30 km north-west of Antalya, and Lanckoroński ii 21 describes it as the most impressive in all Pisidia—'ganz wie in einem Adlerhorst'. It is in a narrow valley over 1,000 m high, approachable only from its northern end (Magie, *RRAM* i 263 f.). *Πισίδαι* The Pisidians were never subject to the Persian satraps of Asia Minor (Xen. *Anab.* i 1. 11, 2. 1, 9. 14; *Hell.* iii 1. 13). The people is never mentioned by Herodotus, and was clearly a thorn in the side of the Persians. Alexander's campaign was too brief and indecisive to induce them to change their habits of brigandage (cf. Diod. xviii 46. 2, 47. 2). 6. *καθήκει . . . ὄρος* This is Güldere Dağ (Mt. Solymos) on whose west side lay Termessus. Its north side forms a gradually rising pass connecting with the neighbouring mountains. Heberdey identifies the pass described by Arrian as Yenice Boğaz (*RE* vA. 740, 748; so Freya Stark, *JHS* lxxviii (1958) 119).

28. 1. *Σελγέων πρέσβεις* Selge (modern Serik) is located in a flat, crescent-shaped valley some 1,000 m above the Pamphylian plain (Lanckoroński ii 173 f.; Magie, *RRAM* i 264 f.). Strabo xii 7. 3 (570) gives a full description of its territory, probably derived from Artemidorus (cf. xii 7. 2). He commends its fertility and productiveness (cf. Pliny, *NH* xv 31, xxiii 95) and stresses its inaccessibility at the head of the Eurymedon and Cestrus valleys. Strabo claims that the Selgians were politically more advanced than their Pisidian neighbours and states that the city was a Spartan foundation (so Polybius v 76. 11; Dionys. Per. 860; Steph. Byz. s.v.). This claim is clearly untrue, for Selgian coins of the fourth century bear barbarous native legends (Head, *HN*² 711).

καὶ αὐτοὶ μάχιμοι Cf. Polybius v 73. 8, 76. 11.

πολέμιοι τοῖς Τελμισσεῦσιν Selge was at loggerheads with most of her neighbours. She was willing to help Alexander against Sagalassus, and it was a Selgian attack on the Pisidian city of Pednelissus that caused the intervention of Achaeus in 218 B.C. (Polybius v 72. 1; cf. 72. 9).

Selge's size and wealth would always have ensured her a plentiful supply of enemies.

2. ἀπέγνω ἐλεῖν αὐν According to Strabo xiv 3. 9 (666) Alexander destroyed Termessus, wishing to open up the narrows into Milyas (see above 24. 5 n.). This is clearly erroneous. Strabo presumably misunderstood a statement in his source to the effect that Alexander *intended* to destroy the city. Strabo also talks of Alexander's wish to open up the narrows. If true, this implies more than securing his immediate route into Anatolia. Alexander's object may have been to remove a notorious bottleneck in communications. After Termessus the road continued via Isinda and Cibyra to Laodicea and the headwaters of the Maeander (cf. B. Levick, *Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor* (Oxford 1967) 13 f.). If the city were destroyed communications and the conveyance of mercenaries between Caria and Pamphylia would be greatly facilitated. But the enterprise was a failure. The Termissians remain secure in their eyrie and continued to dominate the passes (cf. Diod. xviii 47. 1 ff.).

ἐπὶ Σαγαλασσοῦ Alexander marched via Döseme and the ancient Ariassus, and proceeded across the plain of Kestel Göl to Sagalassus, the modern Ağlasun (cf. Levick, *op. cit.* 15). Alexander may have retraced his steps from Termessus some 8 or 9 km to the ancient crossroads (Freya Stark, *JHS* lxxviii (1958) 120). Sagalassus is sited on a spur some 200–300 m wide, jutting southwards from the mountain range (Lanckoroński ii 127; cf. Ruge, *RE* iA. 1732–3; Magie, *RRAM* ii 1139 n. 17). Its valley was fertile in antiquity and so impressed Cn. Manlius Vulso that he extorted an indemnity of 50 talents from the city (Liv. xxxviii 15. 9–11; Polybius xxi 36).

τὸν λόφον . . . πύλωος The spur on which Sagalassus stands terminates in a conical hill which provides a natural defence for the city. Lanckoroński's expedition found no trace of the wall mentioned by Arrian, and he suggested that the city always relied on its natural position for defence (ii 128). It may well be that Arrian has wrongly represented a statement in his source that the hill afforded a defensive position no less strong than a wall.

3. τοὺς πεζεταίρους The term recurs at vii 11. 3 (see further ii 23. 2 n.), and Arrian applies it to the phalanx battalions, excluding the hypaspists. The nomenclature is rarely used (cf. *CQ* xxiii (1973) 251) and the ancient commentators give different explanations:

(i) Anaximenes, *FGrH* 72 F 4 (Harpocration and the 'Suda'), stated that a king Alexander gave the name to the majority of his men whom he had formed into companies.

(ii) Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 348 (Schol. Dem. 2. 17), apparently stated that the *pezhelairoi* were a select group of infantry who acted as the royal bodyguard (the same interpretation occurs in an unnamed fragment preserved in *Etym. Magn.* 699. 47 f.).

Against the second interpretation is the fact that the hypaspist *agema* acted as the royal guard when Alexander fought on foot (cf. i 8. 3, iii 17. 2 nn.) and the hypaspists supplied the guards at court (Plut. *Al.* 51. 6; Diod. 110. 1; Phylarchus, *FGrH* 81 F 41; cf. Berve i 123). Lammert, *RE* xix 1413, therefore argued that the nomenclature originally reserved for the actual bodyguard was later applied to the entire infantry. This does not explain Arrian's clear distinction between hypaspists and *pezhetairoi*. But the Anaximenes fragment is no more helpful. It connects the origins of the *pezhetairoi* with the introduction of the title *ἐταῖροι* for the cavalry, and both measures are placed in the remote past when the king involved 'accustomed his most illustrious subjects to cavalry service'. Either Anaximenes was giving a very vague sketch of Macedonian prehistory casting Alexander I in the role of lawgiver (the fragment is assigned to the first book of the *Philippica*), or the substance of what he said has been garbled in transmission. See further A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* 8–10; R. D. Milns, in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 89 ff.; P. A. Brunt, *JHS* xcvi (1976) 151–3.

Other evidence is inconclusive. Demosthenes' disparaging reference to Philip's *pezhetairoi* (2. 17) is compatible with either a select bodyguard or the entire phalanx infantry, and we have only the fact that in Alexander's army the *pezhetairoi* were the phalanx battalions. The name ('foot companions') implies the priority of another group of companions, the cavalry; and it is a reasonable supposition that a Macedonian king gave the term to the whole body of his infantry in order to flatter them and attach them to his own person. Such an action can have only occurred when the infantry was a disciplined body, not a heterogeneous rabble. That presupposes a time after the Peloponnesian War (cf. Thuc. iv 124. 1) and probably after the military reforms of Archelaus (Thuc. ii 100. 2). The exact date is a matter for conjecture.

ὥς ἐκάστοις . . . ἦν Arrian's terminology is unclear. He is not, as Berve i 118 f. supposes, referring to the rotation of hegemony of the entire body (as at i 14. 6). What seems to be at issue is the rotation of commands within the phalanx; the actual order of battalions varied each day (as is explicitly stated at v 13. 4).

4. Σιτάλκης (Berve no. 712) Sitalces remained in command of the Thracian javelin-men until 330, when he was left with Parmenion at Ecbatana (iii 19. 7 n., iii 26. 3). His name implies that he belonged to the Odrysian royal house (cf. Thuc. ii 29 f.; Diod. xii 50; *GIL* vi 26608). Alexander is said to have denuded Thrace of chieftains, giving them places of honour at his side in order to preclude revolt at home (Front. *Strat.* ii 11. 3).

5. λόχοις The most favoured interpretation, dating back to the early commentators, is *ex insidiis* (Vulcanius, Dübner, Robson), which is neither Greek nor sound sense; there was hardly scope for ambushes on

this exposed outcrop. Krüger resorted to emendation and suggested <ὀρθίοις τοῖς> λόχοις (i.e. 'in column'). The phrase is used by Xenophon in the context of an attack on a hill (*Anab.* iv 2. 11), but it refers to Greek hoplites attacking, not to the barbarian defenders. Pflugk's emendation, ὄχλοι, is more attractive but it violates Arrian's normal usage; βάρβαρος is elsewhere a substantive. It is best to retain the text and translate loosely 'in bands' (so Abicht and Brunt). The Pisidians, we must assume, launched a flurry of small groups of warriors in the hope of breaking the Macedonian line at its most vulnerable points.

6. ἐγγύς ... ἐφαίνετο This explains why the Agrarians held their ground. They and the rest of the light infantry on the wings were intended to break up and disarray the enemy while the phalanx was making its ascent (compare the passage of the Haemus: i 1. 11–13). Given the weight of the twelve-cubit sarisae, which Arrian himself stresses (διὰ βαρύτητα τῶν ὀπλων: see further i 4. 1 n.), it would have been virtually impossible for the phalangites to preserve an unbroken line while advancing uphill under fire. The screen of light infantry was a necessity, but its function ceased once the phalanx reached the brow of the hill.

7. ἐς πεντακοσίους ... κοῦφοι γάρ The introductory μέν and explanatory γάρ necessitate the assumption of a lacuna, in which the small number of prisoners is contrasted with the casualties. Roos's supplement, ζῶντες δὲ ὀλίγοι ἐλήφθησαν, gives the required sense and is a standard formula (cf. i 1. 13, 2. 7).

8. αἰρεῖ κατὰ κράτος So Strabo xii 6. 5 (569). The hill captured by Alexander was the principal bastion of the city (Lanckoroński ii 128). Once it fell, Sagalassus lay exposed to its attackers.

τοὺς ἄλλους Πισίδας There is no possibility of identifying the communities attacked by Alexander. Pisidia was honeycombed with small fortresses and, for that reason, Alcetas chose it as his place of refuge (Diod. xviii 46. 1).

29. 1. λίμνην ... Ἀσκανία The modern Burdur Gölü, Alexander's route led from Sagalassus to Isparta, touched the north-east corner of Burdur Gölü and proceeded via Keçiborlu to the ancient Celaenae (cf. Magic, *RRAM* i 266, ii 1139 n. 16). The saline properties of the lake became famous in the Hellenistic period ([Arist.] *de mir. ausc.* 53: 894^a 31–3; Callimachus F 407. 105 (Pfeiffer); Pliny, *NH* xxxi 110). In fact Burdur Gölü has a saline content considerably lower than that of the lake immediately to the west, Acı Göl (X. de Planhol, *De la Plaine pamphylienne aux Lacs pisidiens* (Paris 1958) 60), and it is somewhat surprising that it emerged in literature as the paradigm salt lake of Anatolia. No doubt it owed its fame to its good fortune in crossing Alexander's itinerary; his historians seem to have been interested in salt evaporation (cf. iii 4. 3).

ἐς Κελαινάς For description of the site (the modern Dinar) see G. Hirschfeld, *Abh. Berl. Akad.* 1875 (with map); Sir W. M. Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia* ii (1897) 396 ff.; W. Ruge, *RE* xi 133 f.; Magie, *RRAM* ii 983 n. 18). Celaenae was the satrapal capital of Phrygia (cf. Xen. *Anab.* i 2. 7 f.); the sources stress the natural curiosity of the river Marsyas welling out of the base of the acropolis and flowing through the city to join the Maeander (for full discussion see D. G. Hogarth, *JHS* ix (1883) 343–9). One of the most important crossroads in Asia Minor, traversed successively by Xerxes, Cyrus, and Alexander, it was the natural choice for Antigonos' capital (Diod. xviii 52. 1; xix 69. 2, 93. 4; Plut. *Demetr.* 6. 3); and Eumenes made it his winter headquarters in 321 (Plut. *Eum.* 8). Antiochus I resettled the city closer to the confluence with the Maeander and renamed it Apameia in honour of his mother (Strabo xii 8. 15 (577 f.)).

πάντη ἀπότομος So Curt. iii 1. 7. The acropolis is steep, but hardly precipitous, and it is connected by a neck of land to the mountain behind, easily accessible from the south-east (Hogarth, op. cit. 349; Ramsay ii 418 f.). Hogarth indeed suggested that the position occupied by the Persians was not the acropolis but a steep conical hill further up the valley, but he later retracted his suggestion as untenable. It is more probable that the Alexander sources have exaggerated the strength of the citadel to anticipate any criticism of Alexander's failure to pursue the siege (cf. Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 111 f.; Bosworth, in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 24 f.).

Κάρες μὲν χίλιοι The Carians were traditionally warlike and their fighting was Greek in style (Hdt. i 171. 3 ff.). They were prized as mercenaries during the archaic period and used in Egypt from the time of Psammetichus I (M. M. Austin, *PCPS* Suppl. ii (1970) 21). Indeed the Carian language is largely known from graffiti scrawled by mercenaries in Egypt (J. Friedrich, *Kleinasiatische Sprachdenkmäler* 90–107; L. Robert, *Hellenica* viii (1950) 5 f.). They were later displaced in popularity by Greek hoplites, but they continued to be used in the Hellenistic period, particularly in Egypt, where the old colony at Memphis still survived (Aristagoras, *FGH* 608 F 9; Polyaeus vii 3; cf. Launey, *Recherches* i 457–60, ii 1215–19).

2. καὶ οὗτοι πρεσβεύονται According to Curtius (iii 1. 6–8) the populace of Celaenae took refuge in the acropolis and ridiculed Alexander's threat of drastic punishment. They only made their offer to surrender (after sixty days) when he had begun to besiege the acropolis. Arrian's source omitted Alexander's ultimatum and its rejection, probably because the story shows him abandoning his initial position (cf. Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 101–6). But Arrian does mention a stay of ten days (29. 3), which corresponds to the interval in Curtius between Alexander's ultimatum and the embassy of the defenders. Curtius adds that the garrison did in fact surrender after the stipulated

interval (iii 1. 8), but we have no evidence about the city's fate (the anecdote of Seneca, *De Ira* iii 22. 4, cannot be referred either to Celaenae, or to Antigonos Monophthalmos: cf. Briant 106 f.).

3. **Ἀντίγονον τὸν Φιλίππου** (Berve no. 87) Antigonos was born about 382 B.C. (Hieronymus, *FGrH* 154 F 8; cf. App. *Syr.* 55. 279), and he clearly belonged to the Macedonian aristocracy. If the tradition is reliable, he was the half-brother of Marsyas the historian (*FGrH* 135/6 T 1; cf. Berve no. 489) and presumably domiciled in Pella. It is possible that his wife, Stratonice (the mother of Demetrius), belonged to one of the royal houses of Upper Macedonia (Plut. *Demetr.* 2; cf. Briant 17 ff.; esp. 24 n. 3), but the claims of his descendant, Philip V, to Argead lineage are at best exaggerated and probably mendacious (Polybius v 10. 10; cf. Walbank, *Philip V* 258 f.; *CQ* 1943. 5 n. 6). At the time of his appointment to Phrygia Antigonos was some forty-nine years old and had the advantage of long experience under Philip (Justin xvi 1. 12— not wholly reliable).

Arrian states that Antigonos was already general of the allies. He probably means the allied infantry, for Philippus, son of Menelaus, commanded the cavalry (i 14. 3). This command may have been conferred in late 334, for Antigonos was honoured at Priene in midsummer, when his troops were campaigning in the Troad (Tod ii no. 186; cf. i 17. 8 n.). In early 333, however, the allied infantry was serving with Parmenion (i 24. 3), and Antigonos, like Amminapes in 330 (cf. iii 22. 1 n.), was probably appointed to his satrapy *in absentia* (Koehler, *SB. Berlin* 1898. 127; Berve ii 43; the objections by Briant 35–7 are unconvincing).

Arrian later refers in passing to Antigonos' death (vii 18. 5—Aristobulus), but omits his important victory over the Persian remnants from Issus (Curt. iv 1. 35) and his conquest of Lycaonia (Curt. iv 5. 13). The omission may have been the deliberate work of Ptolemy, in no mood to emphasize the achievements of a rival (Tarn ii 110 f.; see, however, R. M. Errington, *CQ* xix (1969) 234 f.).

Βάλακρον (Berve no. 199) Balacrus is mentioned again at iii 5. 5 where Arrian mentions his appointment as general in Upper Egypt.

ἐπὶ Γορδίου ἐστέλλετο No incident is recorded by any source between Celaenae and Gordium (Curt. iii 1. 11 merely notes the absence of towns). But the journey involved a march across half the breadth of Asia Minor and it must have taken about one month. The dearth of noteworthy incidents is startling (compare the march to the Cilician Gates: ii 4. 1–2); and we may perhaps assume that Alexander was marching through pacified territory. Parmenion may have been active in the area, and the satrapal forces under Atizyes had probably been withdrawn (Atizyes joined the royal army before Issus: cf. ii 11. 8 n.).

4. **οἱ νεόγαμοι κτλ.** Cf. i 24. 1–2. This is the first detachment of reinforcements recorded in Arrian (see the tables in Berve i 179–82).

Although Arrian mentions no others, it seems clear that there was a wave of new levies conveyed to Alexander through the summer of 333. Forces from Macedonia reached him at Ancyra (Curt. iii 1. 24), and, according to Callisthenes (*ap.* Polybius xii 19. 2), 5,000 infantry and 800 cavalry arrived, again from Macedonia, when he was on the point of invading Cilicia (cf. Bosworth, *Phoenix* xxix (1975) 42–3). Alexander was apparently expecting further forces on the eve of Issus (Curt. iii 7. 8). These latter reinforcements are not mentioned by Arrian, but they should not be rejected. Arrian is not exhaustive and makes no claim to record everything in his sources (cf. Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 34 ff.; Bosworth, *loc. cit.*). The details, moreover, are consistent and persuasive. Darius was known to be assembling an imperial army in Babylon, and it is perfectly credible that Alexander attempted to squeeze every last drop of available manpower from Macedonia.

Ἡλείων The Eleans were no friends of Macedon, and they had supported Thebes in 335 (i 10. 1), and were later to side with Agis against Megalopolis (Aesch. 3. 155; Dein. 1 34; Curt. vi 1. 20). The presence of 150 virtual hostages in Alexander's army made no difference to their attitude. Perhaps the contingent comprised exiles recalled to Elis in 335 for their pro-Macedonian bias (cf. i 10. 1). There were good precedents for such an action (cf. Xen. *Hell.* iii 1. 4).

5. **τὸ δὲ Γόρδιον . . . ἐφ' Ἑλλησπόντου** Stephanus of Byzantium places Gordium in Greater Phrygia, but Justin xi 7. 3 agrees with Arrian in placing the city on the borders of Greater and Hellespontine Phrygia. The city was earlier under the control of Pharnabazus, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia (Xen. *Hell.* i 4. 1; cf. Friedrich, *RE* xx 802).

Since 1950 Gordium has been excavated by an American team under Rodney S. Young (cf. *Archaeological Reports* 1959/60, 35–7, 1964/5 41–3). The old Phrygian capital was destroyed by the Cimmerians towards the beginning of the seventh century B.C. The main mound remained unoccupied until the Persian conquest, when the city was rebuilt in stone with walls apparently 12 m high. It occupied a salient position on the Royal Road between Sardes and Cilicia, and a stretch of ancient road some 6 m wide with stone kerbs at either side has been unearthed (Young, *Proc. Am. Phil. Soc.* cvii 4 (1963) 348). The site was shaken by an earthquake in the mid fifth century, but the settlement continued and in 394 Gordium withstood a six days' siege by Agesilaus (*Hell. Ox.* 21. 6). After Alexander the city declined. The site was unwallled and the houses poorer. Polybius dismisses it as a mere *πολισμάτιον* (xxi 37. 8 = Livy xxxviii 18. 11) and in Strabo's day the old Phrygian settlements, including Gordium, were mere villages (xii 5. 3 (568)).

πηγαὶ ἐκ Φρυγίας According to Strabo xii 3. 7 (543), the Sangarius has its sources at Sangia, a village near Pessinus, and then flows through Phrygia Epictetus and Bithynia. For a modern description of its course

see Magic, *RRAM* i 38 f. Gordium is just above the main confluence with the Thembris.

This brief digression on the Sangarius, the principal river of Bithynia, one would expect to be a parenthetical note by Arrian himself, who later included the local myths about the river in his *Bithyniaca* (F 42 Roos; cf. *Periplus* 13. 1). But Arrian refers to his countrymen by their fourth-century nomenclature, as Bithynian *Thracians* (Hdt. iii 90, vii 75; Xen. *Anab.* vi 4. 2). This is probably a piece of deliberate archaism (cf. i 3. 2 n.).

ἐνταῦθα καὶ Ἀθηναίων Cf. Curt. iii 1. 9–10. For the second, successful, Athenian embassy see iii 6. 2 n.

BOOK II

1-2. *Memnon in the Aegean*

Arrian gives the story of the Aegean War in three sections; the narrative begun in these chapters is continued at ii 13. 4-6 and iii 2. 3-7. The last of these sections is explicitly presented as a report to headquarters by the Macedonian admiral, Hegelochus, but in the first two sections the narrative interrupts the main thread of Alexander's actions. According to Strasburger (26-8) this information derived in its entirety from Hegelochus' report in 331, which Ptolemy wrote up in a single great excursus and Arrian broke up to more manageable lengths, co-ordinating the segments with his main narrative by means of synchronisms in the original excursus. This theory is, however, vitiated by Strasburger's obsession with Ptolemy as the sole source with first-hand information. He admits, for instance, that Curt. iv 1. 36-7 contains material not found in Arrian (the activities of Aristomenes in the Hellespont and Pharnabazus at Miletus), but assumes that the material is obtained by contamination from Ptolemy. That is unlikely. The passage is embedded in an account of hostilities by the Persian survivors of Issus, which has its counterpart in Diodorus (48. 5-6; cf. Tarn ii 73). The whole segment of Curtius (iv 1. 27-40) seems to come from a unitary source which contained details of the island war, details independent of Arrian. There are, moreover, breaks in Arrian's narrative. There is no explanation how or why Pharnabazus moved from Tenedos (ii 2. 3) to Chios (ii 13. 4), and indeed Hegelochus' report has almost no point of contact with Arrian's previous narrative. It seems more likely that the distribution of the events of the Aegean War is not Arrian's own idea but taken from his source.

1. 1. τοῦ τε ναυτικοῦ . . . ξυμπάσης This is a resumptive note, taking up the earlier statement at i 20. 3. Diodorus has a similar note at the same stage of the narrative (29. 1; cf. 23. 6).

ὥς ἔς Μακεδονίαν . . . πόλεμον According to Diodorus this was part of Memnon's strategy as early as the conference at Zeleia (Diod. 18. 2; cf. i 12. 9 n.), and he attributes the general plan to Darius himself (Diod. 30. 1). A. R. Burn, *JHS* lxxii (1952) 82 f., has argued that the over-all Persian strategy was geared to extrude Alexander from Asia in order to defend his kingdom. But there is no evidence that such a strategy was implemented. After the evacuation of Halicarnassus in late 334 Memnon had a relatively free hand. His death came in late summer 333, when Alexander was in Cappadocia (Plut. *Al.* 18. 5; cf. Curt. iii 1.

21), and, even if he spent the winter building ships and acquiring mercenaries, the summer of 333 was not devoted to the grand design. With his 300 ships (Diod. 29. 2, 31. 3) he had complete naval ascendancy, and he could have attacked Macedonia proper or at least fomented revolt in southern Greece. But before his death Memnon made no move outside the eastern Aegean, and after his death Darius immediately reversed the policy—if it *was* ever policy (cf. Wilcken 97).

There were certainly rumours in plenty during the early part of 333. The cities of Euboea anticipated an invasion (Diod. 29. 3) and Alexander himself was deeply disturbed at the possibility (Diod. 31. 3–4). Antipater considered the rumours important (cf. ii 2. 4), and as late as 332 Alexander himself was still worried by the prospect of Persian intervention in Greece (ii 17. 2). But the feared intervention never eventuated. It may be that the grand strategy only existed in rumour. *Χίον . . . ἐνδοθεῖσαν* For Chian history after the Social War see Tod ii p. 265. Like Rhodes and Mitylene, the island was governed by an oligarchy after 355 (Dem. 15. 19), and around 346 it fell, or was rumoured to have fallen, under the sway of the Carian dynast Idrieus (Dem. 5. 25; cf. Aen. Tact. 11. 3). In 340 there was a clash with Philip, when the Chians honoured their symmachical obligations to Byzantium (Diod. xvi 77. 2; Front. *Strat.* i 4. 13). On that occasion Philip made overtures of peace, which, Frontinus claims, were a mere front to lull his enemies into acquiescence. But Chios and Rhodes may have come over to Macedon. If so, it would help to explain Diodorus' extravagant statement that Philip made peace at Byzantium (xvi 77. 3). Neither Chios nor Rhodes is known to have continued hostilities (Schaefer ii² 516 n. 1; Wüst, *Philipp II* 144 f.).

At some stage Chios joined the Corinthian League (Tod ii 192 = *SIG*³ 283. 15; cf. Ehrenberg, *Al. & the Greeks* 27). The date is uncertain. It is usually thought that there was a democratic revolution in 336, at the time of Philip's invasion of Asia Minor (Lenschau, *Klio* xxxiii (1940) 201 ff.; Tod ii p. 265). A. J. Heisserer, *Historia* xxii (1973) 191–204, argues that Memnon intervened in 335, installing an oligarchy, and that Alexander's edict to Chios was issued in 334. It is, however, possible to argue that the existing oligarchy went over to Philip as early as 340 and was perpetuated by the terms of the Common Peace of 337 (as happened in Lesbos; cf. [Dem.] 17. 7). In that case Chios was betrayed to Memnon by the governing oligarchs, and there was no intervening period of democracy. At least when Alexander occupied Chios in 332, democratic institutions had to be re-enacted by a special board of *νομογράφοι* (Tod 192. 3–5).

For the capture of Chios in 332 and the fate of the Chian oligarchs see iii 2. 3–7 with notes.

τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις Diod. 29. 2 mentions the capture of Antissa,

Methymna, Pyrrha and Eresos. Details survive only in the case of Eresos, thanks to the famous dossier dealing with the trials of Agonippus and Eurysilaus (Tod ii 191 = *IG* xii 2. 526; cf. *IG* xii Suppl. pp. 65 ff.). There is much obscurity but two landmarks stand out:

(i) There were two separate groups of 'tyrants' at Eresos, the brothers Hermon, Heraeus, and Apollodorus, and then Eurysilaus and Agonippus. The families of both groups were exiled in 332/1 (Tod 191. 135 ff.).

(ii) Eresos had come under Philip's influence and altars were erected to *Zeus Philippios*.

It is generally assumed that the first group of tyrants were expelled by Philip around 343 and that the restored *demos* erected altars to him out of gratitude for his role as liberator. Agonippus and Eurysilaus then came to power in the early years of Alexander. They were ejected after the Granicus but restored by Memnon (cf. H. Pistorius, *Beiträge zur Geschichte von Lesbos im 4. Jahrh. v. Chr.* (Jenaer Hist. Arb. V: 1913) 60–76; Berve ii nos. 19, 325; Tod ii pp. 258 f.; Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*² 15 f.). There are, however, serious doubts. The double tenure of power by Agonippus and his group is particularly vulnerable, the only evidence being the statement by the speaker of [Dem.] 17 that Alexander expelled the tyrants of Antissa and Eresos as an abomination despite the fact that their tyranny began before the covenant of the Corinthian League ([Dem.] 17.7). This proves only that Antissa and Eresos had belonged to the Corinthian League and at the time of their adherence to the Common Peace they were governed by tyrannies. So, the speaker argues, the tyranny was guaranteed by the peace and ought to have been preserved. The date of Eresos' adherence to the League is not given, but the city could have been one of the signatories at the constitutive meeting in 337. That would explain the erection of the altars to Zeus Philippios; Agonippus and his group both established them as an act of loyalty to Philip and destroyed them to appease Memnon. There is in fact no reason to posit a *series* of expulsions and restorations. The two groups of tyrants may have succeeded each other without an intervening period of democracy (the law against tyranny mentioned repeatedly in the dossier was probably *post factum*, passed in the interval between the capture of the city by Hegelochus and the arrival of Alexander's rescript regulating its affairs). The more elaborate traditional hypothesis cannot be disproved, but it is more economical to assume that Agonippus and his family both joined the Corinthian League and later medized when Memnon invaded Lesbos. The various atrocities mentioned in the indictments of Agonippus and Eurysilaus (Tod 191. 1 ff., 44 ff.) probably were committed in collaboration with the Persian mercenary garrison.

The capture of Methymna may be documented by Polyaeus v 44.3. According to this anecdote Memnon relieved Methymna from blockade

by Chares. The incident is usually dated to the period before 340 when Memnon was in Persian service and Chares was operating in the Thraceward area as an Athenian general (cf. Schaefer iii² 171 n. 1). But in 333 Chares had taken up residence in Sigeum (i 12. 1 n) and by 332/1 he had taken command of the Persian mercenary forces at Mitylene (see below iii 2. 6 n.). It is quite possible that Chares acted on his own initiative, perhaps to avenge acts of piracy from Methymna (cf. Tod ii 170; Bosworth, *Phoenix* xxix (1975) 33). His action was unfortunately simultaneous with Memnon's invasion of the island, and he lifted the blockade. The effectiveness of Memnon's intervention may well have caused Chares to change sides.

2. **χάρακι** ... **ἀπετείχισε** Mitylene was built on a promontory with harbours to the north and south and connecting with the acropolis, which was originally an island (Strabo xiii 2.2 (617); cf. Gomme, *HCT* ii 257). In 427 the Athenians had first blockaded the harbours from camps on either side of the city and then invested the city with a single wall (Thuc. iii 6. 1, 18. 4). Not surprisingly Memnon followed the same strategy.

τὸ Σίγριον The extreme western tip of Lesbos (now Cape Sigri), from which the Persians could command the north-western and southern coasts of the island (Strabo xiii 2. 2; Ptol. v 2. 29; Agathemerus 18).

προσβολή ... **ὀλκάσιν** Merchantmen, as opposed to triremes, would not hug the coast but rather cross the open sea from cape to cape (cf. A. W. Gomme, *Essays in Gk. History and Literature* 190 ff.). Thucydides (iii 3. 5) indicates that the run from Geraestus to Lesbos was the first stage in the voyage to the Hellespont. Similarly Cythera, off Cape Malea, was a recognized landing place (**προσβολή**) for merchantmen on the runs from Egypt and Libya (Thuc. iv 53. 3). Chios is not elsewhere attested as a landing-place, but all headlands off the Ionian coast would serve the function (cf. Thuc. viii 35. 2; a good parallel for Memnon's operations).

The point of Arrian's parenthesis is clear. It was in Memnon's interest to waylay any convoys of grain putting in at Sigrium and divert them to his own use (cf. Thuc. viii 35. 2; Diod. xiv 79. 2). It is interesting that one of the charges against the Eresian junta, who ruled in the immediate proximity of Sigrium, was co-operation with pirates (Tod ii 191. 11 ff., 51 ff.). Cf. Cawkwell, *Phoenix* xv (1961) 74.

ἀποστείλας The archetype reads **ἀποκλείσας**, which cannot be sensibly translated (Gronovius' repunctuation—**ἀποκλείσας τὸν παράπλου**—is impossible). The accepted emendation **ἀποστείλας** (Reiske and Krüger) gives good sense, but the process of corruption is difficult. If the manuscript reading is retained, one must postulate a lacuna containing an extra verb and an antecedent for the participle: 'the rest of the fleet he sent to Cape Sigrium and kept the coast under observation, intercepting the convoys of supplies'. I would tentatively suggest

ὀλκάσιν <ἐπεμψε καὶ τὰς ἐφόδους τῶν ἐπιτηδείων> ἀποκλείσας . . . (cf. Xen. *Hell.* ii 4. 3).

3. ἐν τοῦτῳ . . . τελευτᾷ Diod. 29. 4 agrees that Memnon died of an illness, but he places his death after the capture of Mitylene. Arrian's account is more detailed and self-consistent.

The verdict on Memnon is shared by all sources (cf. Plut. *Al.* 18. 5; Diod. 29. 4, 30. 7, 31. 3; Curt. iii 1. 21, 2. 1), and the vulgate sources agree that his death was a severe blow to Darius.

Λύτοφραδάτης (Berve no. 188) Nothing is known of his origins or previous career. Whether, as Berve suggests, the anecdote in Polyaeus (vii 27. 2) refers to him is uncertain. All three stratagems listed by Polyaeus probably relate to the satrap of Lydia who was prominent at the time of the Satrapal Revolt of the 360s (Diod. xv 90. 3; Dem. 23. 154 ff.).

Φαρνάβαζος ὁ Ἀρταβάζου (Berve no. 766) Pharnabazus was the nephew of Memnon (cf. i 12. 9 n.). For the other sons of Artabazus see ii 15. 1 and iii 23. 7 with notes.

4. ὁμολογίας ἐποίησαντο Diodorus (29. 2, 31. 3) speaks of a capture *by storm*. Arrian, however, gives a detailed narrative of the process of surrender which there is no reason to reject.

τοὺς μὲν ξένους κτλ. Arrian's narrative has a marked bias against the Persians, who *mutatis mutandis* did exactly what Alexander himself did with the cities of Asia Minor, imposing a partisan government, a mercenary garrison, and a levy of 'contributions'. It is interesting that the Persians allowed the enemy mercenaries to depart freely, in strong contrast to Alexander's policy of extermination or forced enlistment (cf. i 19. 4 and 6). This may well have contributed to the wide success of the Persians during the Aegean War.

καθελεῖν . . . στήλας The report of the capitulation of Tenedos (2. 2) mentions treaties with Alexander *and the Greeks*. The omission here of a reference to the Greeks *could* mean that Mitylene was not a member of the Corinthian League; it may merely have had symmachical relations with Alexander. This is the argument of Ehrenberg (*Al. & the Greeks* 20. 22), who adduces Curtius' report of Alexander's generosity to Mitylene; *pecuniam quam in bellum impenderant remisit* (iv 8. 13). But we cannot conclude that Mitylene supplied no troops to the League forces. Alexander merely remitted the expenses of the war as an act of grace, perhaps recompensing the city for the extortions of Pharnabazus. As with the reciprocal enlargement of the city boundaries (Curt. loc. cit.) we have to do with a personal benefaction of Alexander; there is no evidence for formal League obligations. The difference in Arrian's two reports is presumably due to stylistic variation; the wording of the reference to the King's peace is also carefully varied.

ἑυμμάχους . . . Δαρεῖον Substantially the same wording recurs at ii 2. 2; Darius is twice mentioned as the reigning king at the time of the

peace of Antalcidas in place of Artaxerxes II Mnemon, who in fact reigned in 387/6. The double reference to Darius excludes the possibility of textual corruption or scribal gloss (as posited by Ellendt). The error presumably derives from Arrian or his source. In that case the simplest explanation is that Arrian misunderstood his source. There may have been an extended reference not only to the Peace of Antalcidas but also to the agreements concluded between the Peloponnesians and the representatives of Darius II in 411. These agreements anticipated the famous clause ceding the cities of Asia Minor to the Persian throne (Thuc. viii 37. 2, 58. 2) and they might well have been recalled by the Persians in 333. In 411 Mitylene had been a Spartan ally, as in all probability had Tenedos; and they could have been interpreted as still bound by those agreements. Arrian's source could have referred to two separate treaties which Arrian conflated as a single episode (for further instances of this trait see i 11. 1 and iii 16. 9 with notes ad loc.).

H. H. Schmitt, *Staatsverträge* iii 16, observes that the Peace of Antalcidas in fact guaranteed the autonomy of the island cities and that the Persian actions contravened its provisions (so Brunt, ad loc.). But the peace explicitly recognized Asia as the king's dominion and prescribed autonomy for all the Greeks, threatening war against transgressors (Xen. *Hell.* v 1. 31; Diod. xiv 110. 3). The people of Mitylene agreed to be allies of the Persian king and co-operate in the recovery of his rights. Moreover the autonomy clause of the Peace could be interpreted as a blow against Alexander, an implication that the machinery of the Corinthian League was a form of Macedonian tyranny (cf. [Dem.] 17. 29, where Alexander apparently figures as *ὁ τύραννος*). The Peace had been used before as an instrument of propaganda, its stress on autonomy being slanted against the ruling power of the day (cf. Tod. ii no. 123. 9 ff.; 133. 24 ff.), and in 335 the Thebans had invited all Hellenes to join them and the Persian king in destroying the tyrant of Greece (Diod. 9. 5; cf. Plut. *Al.* 11. 8). The Persians could use the autonomy clause to parade themselves as the liberators of mainland Greece, while their claims to control Asia Minor were guaranteed.

ἐπὶ τοῖς ἡμίσεσι This may have been a regular provision. In 324 exiles returning to Tegea were guaranteed the *paternal* property they possessed at the time of banishment (unmarried women their *maternal* property), and in certain disputed cases they were granted precisely one-half the sum at issue (*IG* v. 2. 1 = Tod ii no. 202. 5-9, 39-40). For the Mitylenean regulations of 324 see Tod ii no. 201.

5. *ὡς παρῆλθον ὑπαξ κτλ.* Arrian certainly regards these measures as a breach of the terms of the surrender (note the . . . *μὲν* . . . *δέ* contrast), as do modern scholars (Schaefer iii² 170; Ehrenberg, *Al. & the Greeks* 20). But in 404 Athenian exiles were recalled as one of the terms of surrender and the assembly then passed the package of constitutional

changes drafted by Dracontides and proposed by Theramenes (Lysias 12. 73-6; Plut. *Lys.* 15). The Persian action was indeed harsh and cynical, but there *may* have been no formal violation of the agreements. **Λυκομήδην** (Berve no. 476) Nothing further is known about Lycomedes. As a Rhodian he was presumably a friend of Memnon; and Rhodes may indeed have supplied a contingent for the Persian fleet (cf. ii 20. 2 n.). Lycomedes was either superseded or reinforced by Chares who is said to control the city in 332 (iii 2. 6 n.).

2. 1. **Θυμώνδαν τὸν Μέντορος** (Berve no. 380) The son of Mentor of Rhodes, the brother of Memnon (cf. i 12. 9 n.). Thymondas led the entire mercenary contingent at Issus (Curt. iii 8. 1, 9. 2). He cannot have been very old; his father is described as a youth in 360 (Dem. 23. 157) and Curt. iii 3. 1 terms him *iuuenis*. Berve may be near the truth when he places his birth around 355.

τοὺς ξένους . . . παραληψόμενον Curt. iii 3. 1 (cf. 8. 1, 9. 2) has an identical note, placed in the context of Darius' preparations for war. The Persian king had set his aims on a decisive victory in the field and concentrated the largest possible number of Greek mercenaries in his army, hoping to establish a counterweight to the Macedonian phalanx (cf. Curt. iii 9. 2); the final number in the army is said to have been 30,000 (cf. ii 8. 6 n.). This action was a complete reversal of Memnon's alleged strategy (above 1. 1 n.), and the vulgate sources imply that Memnon's death caused Darius to rethink the entire plan of the war (Diod. 30. 1; Curt. iii 2. 1). That is unlikely (*pace* Schachermeyr² 194-6). Memnon died in late summer 333. Very soon after his death Pharnabazus moved to Lycia to transfer mercenaries to Thymondas, and in the aftermath he carried out extensive operations around Tenedos and then Cos and Halicarnassus. All this took place before the meeting at Siphnos, when the news of Issus broke (ii 13. 4-5 with notes). There is a lot of action to be fitted into the period between late summer and November, and we may suspect that advance notice to surrender the mercenaries had been given before Thymondas was sent out, perhaps even before Memnon's death.

2. **Δατάμην** (Berve no. 245) Perhaps a descendant of the famous Datames, satrap of Cappadocia during the great revolt of the 360s. The bare qualification **ἄνδρα Πέρσην** suggests no pedigree, but Arrian's source may have been ignorant or careless of his filiation (cf. vi 29. 3, where the Median pretender Baryaxes is merely termed **ἄνδρα Μῆδον**). **ἐπὶ Τενέδου** For the geography of the island see W. Leaf, *Strabo on the Troad* 214-16; Fiehn, *RE* v A. 494-8. Tenedos had been one of the most loyal members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, remaining allied long after the Social War (cf. Tod ii no. 175; *IG* ii² 752b). Arrian reveals that Tenedos, like Mitylene, was a member of the Corinthian League. The fact that Alexander's name and not Philip's appears on

the treaty does not prove that Alexander had liberated the island from Persian domination before 333 (so Tod p. 222; Fiehn, *RE* v A. 477). It is more likely that Tenedos followed the example of her great patron and joined the League in 338/7. The agreements made with Philip were later renewed in Alexander's name (cf. i 1. 1-2 with notes).

Tenedos' strategic position made it an obvious target for the Persians. It was an excellent watching point for Abydos, the Macedonian bridgehead (cf. Polyaeus ii 24; Polybius xvi 34. 1) and also an excellent base for depredations upon grain ships (cf. [Dem.] 17. 20; Livy xlii 28).

τὸν Βορείον The main city of the island lay to the south-east as does the modern town. The 'northern harbour' presumably lay on the north coast, some distance away from the city and out of view. In 168 bc Pergamene grain ships were intercepted on Tenedos by a Macedonian fleet based in the city. The harbour they occupied was sited *in latere altero* (Livy xlii 28. 4) and must surely be Arrian's 'northern harbour'.

3. Τενεδίοις . . . μᾶλλον For the idiom see Thuc. ii 8. 4 (also imitated by Appian, *BC* i 82. 374).

ἔτι . . . ναυτικὴν This is Arrian's only reference to the reconstitution of the Macedonian fleet (cf. i 20. 1 n.). According to Curt. iii 1. 19-20 Alexander commissioned the new fleet on his march from Gordium to Ancyra (summer 333) and assigned Amphoterus to the Hellespont; Hegelochus was directed to recover Lesbos, Chios, and Cos. In effect, Amphoterus seems to have been under Hegelochus' command (iii 2. 6: for Amphoterus' abilities see Plut. *Apoph. Philippi* 10, 177 F.).

4. Πρωτεύας ὁ Ἀνδρονίκου (Berve no. 664) Proteas later arrived in Tyre to report his success (ii 20. 2), and that report is doubtless the foundation for Arrian's very detailed narrative. Nothing further is known about Proteas; he may possibly be identical with the son of Lanice, Alexander's boyhood friend and drinking companion (Berve no. 665: cf. Schachermeyr² 145 n. 133).

περὶ Σίφνον Siphnos was a hub of Persian activity in 333 (cf. ii 13. 4; Curt. iv 1. 37). Apart from its salient position on the western edge of the Cyclades there is no apparent reason for the choice. The goldmines which had made the island's fortune in the sixth century were long exhausted (Hdt. iii 57; Paus. x 11. 2; Antipater, *Anth. Pal.* ix 421; Dem. 13. 34) and its history in the fourth century is obscure (cf. Büchner, *RE* iii A. 429; Hiller von Gaertringen, *IG* xii 5 (2). pp. xi-xxii).

3. *The Gordian Knot*

Cf. Plut. *Al.* 18. 2-4; Curt. iii 1. 14-18; Justin xi 7. 3-16; Marsyas, *FGrH* 135/6 F 4. Mederer 9-14; Tarn ii 262-5; Schachermeyr² 191-3; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 46-7; E. A. Fredricksmeyer, *CP* lvi (1961) 160-8; L. Schmidt, *Antaios* i (1959) 305-18; Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Alexander* 84-92.

The sources for the episode are usually assumed to have been Aristobulus and the subsidiary sources (Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 511; Strasburger 28; Kornemann 112 f.); and it has become orthodoxy that Ptolemy omitted the episode (see, however, Brunt, *Arrian* 130 f., n. 3). There is, however, no valid reason for the assumption. The story of the knot is indeed separated from the notice of Alexander's arrival in Gordium (i 29. 4-6), and Arrian appears to resume at ii 3. 1: *ὡς ἐς Γόρδιον παρήλθε*. But the distribution may be Arrian's own. He had digressed to give a report of the Aegean War and now reverts to the story of the knot. Not unnaturally he includes a resumptive note to indicate that the narrative is once again in Gordium. The reports of the arrival and the knot may be taken from the same source, and that source may be Ptolemy. Nor can it be said that the citation of variants at ii 3. 7 implicitly excludes Ptolemy (see the note ad loc.). In any case the hypothetical omission causes problems. It is assumed that Ptolemy thought the episode trivial (Tarn ii 263; Hamilton 47; Schachermeyr² 192) or that he was reluctant to stress Alexander's claims to world empire (Fredricksmeyer 168 n. 41). If the latter, why did Ptolemy bother to write a history of Alexander? The former is also difficult. Alexander himself did not consider the episode trivial (cf. ii 3. 8); and, if Callisthenes made a feature of it, it was a standard part of the tradition and readers would have expected its inclusion. It seems likely that Ptolemy did give the story, though not perhaps at such length as Aristobulus.

3. 1. *πῶθος λαμβάνει αὐτόν* For the idiom see i 3. 5 n. The vulgate sources use very similar language and speak explicitly of Alexander's desire (Justin xi 7. 4; Curt. iii 1. 16), although they connect the desire with the fulfilment of the oracle rather than the mere viewing of the chariot of Gordius.

Fredricksmeyer (art. cit.) has argued that Alexander was primarily influenced by the tradition that Midas originally ruled in Macedonia and after the advent of the Argeads led his people to Asia, changing their name from Briges to Phrygians (Hdt. vii 73—Macedonian tradition; viii 138; Strabo vii F25; cf. Hammond, *Macedonia* i 407-14). The story that Midas held sway in Macedonia was certainly fashionable in the fourth century (cf. Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 75; Aristotle F 44 Rose). But none of the sources indicates that the tradition had anything to do with Alexander's actions. The legends quoted are all local legends and there is no hint of a Macedonian origin. Marsyas of Philippi described the wagon 'which bore Midas to Asia' in the first book of his *Macedonian History* (*FGrH* 135/6 F 4), and he may well have connected the episode of the knot with the tradition of Midas' migration. But he was a late writer, some 150 years after Alexander (Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 481; Pearson, *LHA* 253), and he may have made the connection on his

own initiative, adding the story of the knot as a digression on the migration.

2. λόγος . . . κατέῤχε As the tense of the verb shows, the story is taken from Arrian's main source, reporting the local Phrygian tradition; it is not a *logos* from a subsidiary source (Plut. *Al.* 18. 2 has a similar formulation). Justin xi 7. 4 ff. agrees that the legend of the knot came from the native Phrygians, but he differs in detail from Arrian.

3. τοὺς Τελμισσέας τοὺς μάντις There are two cities named Telmissus, one on the Halicarnassian peninsula (Bean and Cook, *ABSA* 1 (1955) 151-5) and one in Lycia, the modern Fethiye (cf. i 24. 4 n.). Both cities unfortunately have a tradition of prophecy. For Carian Telmissus see *JHS* xiv (1894) 378 (Cicero, *de Div.* i 91, 94 may be confusing Carian with Lycian Telmissus; cf. Ruge, *RE* v A. 414). The Lycian city was the more famous and celebrated its prophetic reputation on its coinage (BMC *Lycia* 86; Head, *HN*² 698). Cicero (*de Div.* i 25) claims that the Lycian augurs were famous, and Gordius' problem was one of augury.

4. Αὐτὸ τῷ βασιλεῖ The head of the Phrygian pantheon was identified as Zeus and later worshipped under the composite title Zeus Sabazios (Welles, *RC* 66. 8, 67. 5; Nilsson, *Geschichte d. gr. Religion* i² 566 f., ii 630 ff.). The term Zeus Basileus recurs at iii 5. 2 and it could have been used by the Alexander historians as an ecumenical term for foreign manifestations of Zeus. Cf. Bosworth, in *Greece and the E. Mediterranean* 55.

6. ὅστις λύσειε . . . τῆς Ἀσίας Curt. iii 1. 16 and Justin xi 7. 4 both agree that the untying of the yoke fastening implied the lordship of Asia. Plutarch (*Al.* 18. 2) speaks of dominion over the world. Schachermeyr² 192 has suggested that success in the ordeal originally designated the King of Phrygia and that Alexander acted as he did to legitimize himself in the eyes of the native populace. Callisthenes then expanded the incident into a portent of world empire. But it is not impossible that the Phrygians themselves exaggerated the importance of their local prophecy. Fredricksmeier, art. cit., has suggested that it was the Gordian oracle which first inspired Alexander to conquer the Persian empire. At most it added fuel to his ambitions.

7. ἐκ φλοιοῦ κρανίας 'made from cornel bark' (so Plut. *Al.* 18. 2). According to Marsyas (*FGrH* 135/6 F 4) the yoke was bound to the wagon pole with a vine-shoot. All sources confirm that the ends of the fastening were invisible (cf. Curt. iii 1. 15, 17; Justin xi 7. 16), but there was probably more than a single knot. The problem was the removal of the entire yoke fastening (δεσμός or ζυγόδεσμον), which was wound around the wagon-pole so skilfully that neither end was apparent. Plutarch alone mentions a σύναμμα, a very rare word (cf. *LSJ*²) which could denote the entire yoke fastening. Both Curtius and Justin mention a plurality of knots.

ξίφει διέκοψε Curt. iii 1. 18 repeats this version; Alexander cuts

through the fastening and claims to have fulfilled the oracle. The story does not make Alexander 'cheat' (so Tarn ii 264; Hamilton 47); he rather quibbles, using an expanded interpretation of the verb λύειν (so Curtius: *nihil . . . interest quomodo solvantur*), just as he was to quibble over the surrender at Massaga (Diod. 84. 2; cf. Plut. *Al.* 59. 6–7). Plut. *Al.* 18. 3 and Justin xi 7. 16 both claim that Alexander cut through the fastening *as a first stage*; once the ends were revealed the fastening was more easily removed. That may be the original version. The more drastic solution of cutting the knots appealed more to later rhetoric.

Ἀριστόβουλος . . . ζυγόν Plut. *Al.* 18. 4 cites Aristobulus in almost identical terminology. The vocabulary is clearly modelled on Homer's description of the harnessing of Priam's mule-cart (*Iliad* xxiv 270–5; cf. Schmidt 312 f.). Aristobulus represented Gordius' wagon as equipped with a single pole with a yoke attached, fastened vertically by a pin (*hestor*), passing through both pole and yoke, and horizontally by the yoke-fastening (for representations on Attic Black Figure see Beazley, *ABVP* 332). The yoke-fastening prevented the yoke lifting while the *hestor* kept it firmly in position on the pole. Alexander accordingly removed the *hestor* and levered the yoke over the end of the pole. The fastening could then be slipped off the pole without it being untied. The problem of 'loosing the fastening' was thus solved. The truth cannot be unravelled. In both versions Alexander circumvents the problem, but Aristobulus makes the method a little less drastic.

8. οὐκ ἔχω ἰσχυρίσασθαι As at ii 4. 7 Arrian makes no choice between Aristobulus and the consensus of other sources. Does this mean that Ptolemy omitted both incidents (so Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 511)? The problem is complex, and we must avoid the unproven assumption that Arrian would automatically have accepted Ptolemy's version had he given the story. Elsewhere Arrian tends to distinguish by name any disagreements between his major sources. At iii 3. 5–6 Ptolemy is contrasted with Aristobulus and the majority view, and Arrian is again agnostic. But the parallel we require is Ptolemy and the majority view explicitly contrasted with Aristobulus, and no such parallel exists. There is, however, a direct parallel for an omission by Ptolemy and Aristobulus' version contrasted with subsidiary *logoi* (vi 28. 1–2). Here Arrian begins with the version of the subsidiary sources, which he claims he disbelieves, and then observes that there is no trace of the story in either Ptolemy or Aristobulus. Finally he gives Aristobulus' version of events in Carmania, and we may assume that Ptolemy's narrative was skeletal or non-existent. This test case suggests that, had Ptolemy omitted the events in Gordium, Arrian would have opted for Aristobulus, rejecting the variant as an uncorroborated *logos*. The fact that he is uncertain indicates that Ptolemy did give the sword story in some form.

τοῖς φήνασι θεοῖς The plural is peculiar; one would have expected

only Zeus Basileus to be named. Fredricksmeier 165 suggests that there was reluctance to name the author of the manifestation, but such reluctance is hardly characteristic of Alexander or the Alexander sources. Either Alexander sacrificed to a number of gods or to Zeus under several manifestations. The former seems the more likely. Compare i 4. 5 (sacrifices to a number of gods, although only Istros was directly involved); i 11. 7, etc.

4. *From Gordium to Tarsus*

4. 1. Ἀγκύρας τῆς Γαλατικῆς So Curt. iii 1. 22. This is the first emergence of the city in history even though it was an ancient Phrygian foundation, and later claimed Midas as its founder (Paus. i 4. 5).

The location of the city in Galatia is anachronistic. The Gallic invasion of Asia Minor took place in 279 BC (cf. Brandis, *RE* vii 523 ff.; Jones, *CERP*² 110 ff.). According to Apollonius of Aphrodisias (*FGrH* 740 F 14) the invaders settled around Ancyra during the joint reign of Mithridates of Pontus and his son Ariobarzanes, which ended in 266/5 (Diod. xx 111. 4; cf. Beloch iv² 2. 215). No doubt Arrian superimposed the terminology of his own day, as he did in the case of Coele Syria (cf. ii 13. 7 n.).

πρεσβεία . . . Παφλαγόνων The Paphlagonians were the most developed and organized of the tribes of the Pontic shore. They had been subject to Persia from the time of the conquest of Asia Minor. But the power of the local king remained strong and often displaced the writ of Susa. In 395/4 King Gyes/Thys/Otys (for the variants see *Hell. Ox.* xxii. 2 with Bartoletti's apparatus) was on the brink of revolt and was easily drawn into alliance with Agesilaus (Xen. *Hell.* iv 1. 2-3, *Ages.* 3. 4; Plut. *Ages.* 11. 3). The revolt lasted until the 370s, when Datames was able to capture the insurgent king and bring him in chains to Susa (Nepos, *Dat.* 2-3; cf. Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 179). In 334 the Paphlagonians formed part of Hellespontine Phrygia, contributing forces to the satrapal army (Diod. 19. 4).

Arrian represents the embassy surrendering to Alexander and asking him not to enter Paphlagonia (compare the case of Aspendus: i 26. 2). Curt. iii 1. 22-4 says that Alexander *did* enter Paphlagonia, which surrendered immediately. Could it be that Arrian's source conflated two embassies, the first proposing a non-aggression pact (cf. Xen. *Anab.* vi 1. 2) and the second unconditional surrender after a very brief campaign? Curtius mentions the taking of hostages and subjection to the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, but also remission of tribute.

The subjection of Paphlagonia was not decisive. By 331 the people were again in revolt (Curt. iv 5. 13) and they may have remained independent. In 323 they were attached not to Hellespontine Phrygia

but to Cappadocia, the recalcitrant area assigned to Eumenes for conquest (Diod. xviii 3. 1; Arr. *Succ.* F 1a. 5; Plut. *Eum.* 3; Curt. x 10. 3; Justin xiii 4. 6).

2. *ξύμπασαν... πολλήν* Although the sources tell us nothing of Alexander's operations in Cappadocia, this statement must be taken as an exaggeration. Alexander can hardly have left Gordium much before May. Issus was fought in early November at latest and was preceded by the long illness at Tarsus. There is hardly more time available than would accommodate the march. Alexander presumably followed the Halys south, passing by the eastern shore of Lake Tatta to the area of Tyana.

Strabo xiii 1. 4 (534) claims that Cappadocia was divided into two satrapies at the time of the Macedonian conquest, Pontic Cappadocia and Cappadocia by the Taurus. It was the southern satrapy which surrendered to Alexander; the northern area remained independent (Cappadocian horsemen fought with Darius at Gaugamela: iii 8. 5, 11. 7). But even the southern satrapy was insecure. After Issus it was occupied by the remnants of the Persian army, who were only with difficulty defeated by Antigonus (Curt. iv 1. 34-5; cf. iv 5. 13). Even after the victory there were difficulties. Ariarathes, king and satrap of Pontic Cappadocia since Persian times (Diod. xxxi 19. 3; cf. Berve no. 113), was able to expand his domains southward, so that Eumenes and Perdiccas were forced to fight a major campaign in 322.

Σαβίκταν (Berve no. 690). Curt. iii 4. 1 claims that the name of the satrap was Abistamenes. This statement comes in the same context as that of Arrian, and it is most unlikely that we have two satraps appointed in close succession (so Berve nos. 4, 690). There seem to be two versions of the same native name and there is no telling which comes nearer to the original.

3. *τὸ Κύρου... στρατόπεδον* According to Xenophon (*Anab.* i 2. 21) the army of Cyrus the Younger waited for a day in the plain below the Cilician Gates. That must be Arrian's camp of Cyrus. Curiously Curt. iii 4. 1 explains the name by reference to Cyrus the Great, who allegedly encamped there on his way to defeat Croesus. Kornemann 113 suggested the reference to Xenophon was an addition by Arrian himself. The disagreement could go back to Alexander's day. The name, 'Cyrus' camp', could easily have inspired discussion which of the two great expeditions had used the area as a base.

The camp is usually identified with the plain south of Pozanti, which is large enough to accommodate a field army and lies at the strategic junction where the road to the Gates veers south-west away from the Çakıt valley and mounts to the watershed (cf. Janke 98; Ramsay, *Geogr. Journ.* xxii (1903) 386). Schachermeyr² 666 locates the site closer to the summit, near the modern station of Tekir Beli, where the Persian positions would be visible.

φυλακαῖς ἰσχυραῖς Again there is a conflict with Curtius, who claims that the Persian satrap of Cilicia had decided to devastate Cilicia and denuded the passes of defenders, leaving only a few to watch over the paths (Curt. iii 4. 3–5). In other words, Arsames had abandoned the project of defending Cilicia and intended to fall back to Syria, making Alexander's acquisition as unprofitable as possible. That was at least logical. The Cilician Gates could be turned if necessary. There were ways of circumventing the narrows (Ramsay, *Geogr. Journ.* xxii (1903) 381), and Alexander could at least make a detour to Laranda and strike southwards into the Calycadnus valley, which was what Menon had done in 401 BC (Xen. *Anab.* i 2. 20–1). On the other hand, Syria was notoriously well defended from attack from Cilicia (cf. Cic. *ad. Fam.* xv 4. 4), and Arsames presumably felt it more prudent to concentrate his satrapal forces with Darius' army.

Arrian knows something of the scorched-earth policy (4. 5) but he describes the passes as heavily guarded. That is implausible. There was no reason to budge even in the face of Alexander's night attack, let alone flee so precipitately. Compare the heavy fighting at the Persian Gates where there really was a strong force of defenders (iii 18. 2 ff.). Once more the difficulties seem exaggerated in order to enhance the personal glory of Alexander.

βαρύτερον ὀπλισμένοι The hypaspists are dissociated from the heavily armed phalanx infantry. This is the main passage adduced against Tarn's hypothesis that the phalanx battalions and hypaspists had identical armament (cf. Hamilton, *CQ* v (1955) 218). But it is dangerous to draw conclusions from this single passage. In the first place the hypaspists are associated with indubitable light infantry, the archers and Agrianians; Arrian may be making his contrast with a part only of the flying force (so Milns in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 123). Alternatively the hypaspists may have divested themselves of their *sarisae* for this arduous operation and used only their javelins. On other occasions they could be combined with the phalangites using the same weapons (see further iii 21. 8 with note).

6. **δρόμῳ ἦγεν** For a slightly different account of the relief of Tarsus see Curt. iii 4. 14–15. From the Gates proper to Tarsus is approximately 55 km, a manageable day's stint for the advance column.

7. **ὥς μὲν Ἀριστοβόλῳ** Plutarch (*Al.* 19. 2) gives the same variants without naming Aristobulus. As at ii 3. 7 Arrian contrasts Aristobulus' version with the consensus of other sources, probably including Ptolemy. The vast majority of sources repeat the consensus version in more or less detail (Curt. iii 5. 1 ff.; Justin xi 8. 3; *Itinerarium* 28; Frag. Sabb. *FGrH* 151 F 1. 6; Lucian, *De Domo* 1; Val. Max. iii 8, *ext.* 6); and Aristobulus was probably unique in explaining Alexander's illness by heat fatigue. He *may* have been attempting to exculpate Alexander from charges of folly in blindly diving into the Cydnus without testing

the water temperature (Pearson, *LHA* 157). There is no reason for the alternative story of the bathe in the Cydnus to have arisen.

Κόδνος For ancient descriptions of the Cydnus, now the R. Tarsus, see Xen. *Anab.* i 2. 23; Curt. iii 5. 1; Strabo xiv 5. 12 (673). After devastating floods in Justinian's reign the stream bed was diverted (Procop. *de aedif.* v 5. 14–19). Now it flows to the east and north of the town of Tarsus (cf. Ruge, *RE* Suppl. iv 1124). Arrian's description is quoted by Eustathius (*ad* Dion. Per. 867 = Müller, *GGM* ii 369).

The coldness of the stream apparently had therapeutic qualities for swollen sinews in men and cattle (Strabo, loc. cit.) and for the gout (Pliny, *NH* xxxi 11; Vitruv. viii 3. 6). All the major rivers fed by the snows of the Taurus had similar qualities. The emperor Frederick Barbarossa succumbed and drowned in the chilly waters of the Calycadnus on 10 June 1190.

8. σπασμῶ . . . ξυνεχεῖ This is the most explicit description of the symptoms: cramp, violent fever, and consistent insomnia. The *Fragmentum Sabbaiticum* also speaks of cramp, which later turned to fever (*FGrH* 151 F 1. 6; cf. Curt. iii 5. 3). Schachermeyr² 202 suggests inflammation of the lungs, Peter Green (*Al. of Macedon* 220) bronchial pneumonia.

Φίλιππον δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνα (Berve no. 788) From Arrian's description it is clear that Philippus was a Companion and had military as well as medical competence. Curt. iii 6. 1 adds that he had been a boyhood friend. Presumably Philippus was one of the many Greek adventurers attracted to the Macedonian court by his famous namesake. His Acarnanian background perhaps made him vulnerable to charges of disloyalty (cf. Diod. 3. 3; Tod ii no. 178).

Philippus is also mentioned at Gaza, treating the king for an arrow wound (Curt. iv 6. 17). Subsequently he appears only in the tradition of Medius' banquet—at which Alexander was rumoured to have been poisoned (Ps.-Call. iii 31; Metz Epitome 97).

9. ἐν τούτῳ According to Arrian Alexander received the letter while Philip was in the process of preparing the potion (so, more dramatically, Val. Max. iii 8, *ext.* 6). In other sources there is a time-lag (Plut. *Al.* 19. 5; Curt. iii 6. 8).

ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ Παρμενίωνος The historicity of the letter has been disputed on the ground that Parmenion was still in camp (Berve ii p. 388). But in all probability Parmenion had already been sent on to occupy the passes (cf. ii 5. 1 n.); Justin xi 8. 5, for what he is worth, says that the letter came from *Cappadocia*. Seneca, *de ira* ii 23. 2 strangely states that the letter of warning came from Alexander's mother. But Olympias is said to have warned against Alexander the Lyncestian (Diod. 32. 1) and Seneca may have conflated the two communications. **διεφθάρθαι . . . χρήμασιν** Other sources claim that Darius merely promised a gift of 1,000 talents (cf. i 25. 3) and the hand of a blood

relative (Curt. iii 6. 4; *P. Oxy.* 1798 = *FGrH* 148 F 44 col. i; Plut. *Al.* 19. 5; Justin xi 8. 6).

11. *ῥαῖσαι* 'The illness lifted'. There is a change of subject; the verb refers to the illness slackening (see the parallels from the Hippocratic corpus in *LSJ*²).

5. 1-4. *Alexander's Activities in South Cilicia*

5. 1. *ἐκ δὲ τούτου... φυλάσσειν τὴν πάροδον* The chronology of Parmenion's mission is difficult. Diodorus (32. 2) states that he was sent out at the news that Darius was only a few days away. This is hardly likely to be literally true. If Darius' arrival was imminent (the rumour at Curt. iii 5. 10; but cf. iii 7. 1), Alexander's campaign in Rough Cilicia becomes an inexplicable diversion. It seems that Parmenion was away from Tarsus at the time Alexander's illness reached its height (ii 4. 9 n.). He had probably been sent out at or before the beginning of Alexander's illness to occupy the passes out of Cilicia. In that case Arrian's *ἐκ δὲ τούτου* must be understood as a weak transitional phrase (Schachermeyr² 203 n. 220).

Parmenion had at least a month to occupy and reconnoitre the plain of Issus. By the time the Persian army was reported at Sochi he had installed outposts as far as the mountains beyond Issus and returned to report to Alexander at Castabulum, a day's march east of Mallus (Curt. iii 7. 5-7; cf. Arr. ii 6. 1 n.).

The 'other gates' (as opposed to the Cilician Gates in the Taurus) are widely attested as the boundary of Cilicia and Syria (Callisthenes *ap.* Polybius xii 17. 2; Xen. *Anab.* i 4. 4; Strabo xiv 5. 19 (676)). They are often simply referred to as *Πύλαι* (Strabo loc. cit.; Diod. xiv 21. 3, xvii 32. 2). What the ancients understood as the Gates comprised the whole extent of the coastal defiles north of İskenderun. These defiles terminate in a spur of rock which reaches down from the Amanus to the sea and is known as the Pillar of Jonah (cf. Janke 12-31). This mountain barrier is what Arrian takes as the Gates proper (ii 6. 2 *ὑπερβαλὼν τὰς πύλας*; ii 8. 2 *κατῆει ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν*). In 401 B.C. the crucial portion of the Gates was the northern entrance. Here the coast road was blocked by two defensive walls, built from the foothills to the sea; they were 3 stades apart and situated on either side of the river Carsus, probably the modern Sarisaki Su (Xen. *Anab.* i 4. 4). These fortifications were a thing of the past when Ventidius fought at the Gates in 39 B.C. (Dio xlviii 41. 2), and there is no hint that they were occupied or still existed in Alexander's day. Arsames may have left a small holding force in the passes (Curt. iii 7. 7), but there is no indication that this force was entrenched in fortifications.

Parmenion's activities were concentrated in the southern part of the plain of Issus, and it is clear that he anticipated a Persian advance

through the modern Belen Pass, which leads from the Amik Plain to the coast south of the Gates. It is all the more surprising that Darius' march into Cilicia caught Alexander off his guard (ii 7. 2; Curt. iii 8. 17). The Persians entered Cilicia by the northern Bahçe Pass (ii 7. 1 n.). This is an easier route than that across the Belen and it was well known in antiquity (cf. Cic. *ad fam.* xv 4. 4). Alexander and Parmenion, however, remained ignorant of it (cf. Schachermeyr² 203). The locals were intimidated by the approaching Persian army (Diod. 32. 4; cf. Jos. *Αἵ* xi 315 f.) and were unlikely to have been informative. The main Persian road seems to have followed the Belen Pass (cf. Xen. *Anab.* i 4. 6 ff.) and the Macedonians concentrated their attention on the more familiar route.

2. ὕστερος is the reading of the archetype. In temporal expressions of this type Arrian uses the adverb (i 20. 5, 21. 1, 22. 1, etc.); Roos's citation of i 18. 4 is inapposite. I prefer Vulcanius' ὕστερον. The corruption came about by attraction into the form of the surrounding nominatives.

ἐς Ἀγγιᾶλὸν πόλιν Strabo gives the name as Ἀγγιᾶλη (xiv 5. 9 (672); so Steph. Byz. s.v.), and he locates the city above the coast between Zephyrion and the Cydnus river. In Alexander's day Anchiale was a shadow of its former self.

Σαρδανάπαλον κτίσαι. For the evolution of the Sardanapalus myth see E. Meyer, *Forschungen* i 203 ff.; Weissbach, *RE* iA. 2436-75.

The Alexander historians were the first to associate Sardanapalus with Anchiale. Previously he had only been known as an Assyrian king at Nineveh; indeed the bematist Amyntas had located the celebrated epitaph at Nineveh (*FGH* 122 F 2). The problem remains what exactly was the monument which Alexander and his entourage saw at Anchiale. Here Weissbach's interpretation, though it cannot be proved, is exceedingly attractive (*RE* iA 2466). In 696 B.C. Kirua, ruler of Illubru in Cilicia, revolted against Sennacherib of Assyria, and he was joined by the inhabitants of Tarza and Ingira (Tarsus and Anchiale). The revolt was short-lived and fateful. Illubru was stormed and destroyed. Sennacherib presently resettled the place; 'the weapons of my lord Asur I let dwell there. I had a monument of alabaster prepared and erected it before them' (Luckenbill, *Ancient Records of Babylon and Assyria* ii 286-9). The same treatment seems to have been meted out to Tarsus and Anchiale, and the Assyrian depredations extended as far south as Al Mina (Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas* 70). The memorial which Alexander saw at Anchiale was most probably a relief of Sennacherib, celebrating the conquest and rebuilding of 696 B.C.

It is clear that we are faced with an *interpretatio Graeca*. When the cuneiform inscription was interpreted, Alexander's followers conflated the unfamiliar Sennacherib with Sardanapalus, the most famous Assyrian name known to the Greek world. Once this conflation took

place, it was almost inevitable to add the sense of the famous epitaph in praise of pleasure to the original statement of the rebuilding of Tarsus and Anchiale. It is tempting to ascribe this interpretation of the Anchiale monument to Callisthenes, who devoted space to learned digressions on Homeric sites in Pamphylia and the Troad (*FGrH* 124 F 32, 28; cf. Pearson, *LHA* 41 ff.); the discovery of a copy of the famous Sardanapalus epigram would fit into the same pattern. Unfortunately the relevant entry in Photius is corrupt and cannot safely be attributed to Callisthenes (cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* 124 F 34, 687a F 2; Pearson, *LHA* 26).

3. *συμβεβληκώς . . . συμβάλλονται* Arrian's description of the figure of 'Sardanapalus' is unique. Aristobulus said that the figure appeared to be snapping the fingers of its right hand (Athen. xii 530 A; Strab. xiv 5. 9 (672) = *FGrH* 139 F 9). The finger-snapping is attested elsewhere (cf. 'Callisthenes', *FGrH* 124 F 34; Plut. *de Al. f.* ii 3: 336 C; Clearchus *ap.* Athen. xii 529 D), and there are parallels from Assyrian reliefs, including those of Sennacherib's reign (Meyer, *Forschungen* i 204 f.; cf. Weissbach, *RE* iA. 2467). Arrian's version of the epigram is identical to that of Aristobulus, except that it is given in Attic, not Ionic. But his description of the figure on the monument is different—hand-clapping instead of finger-snapping. Jacoby therefore postulates that in Arrian Aristobulus' account is contaminated with the vulgate tradition (*FGrH* ii D 512; so Strasburger 29). This is not impossible, but it must be admitted that the contamination, if it exists, is seamless and coherent. I prefer to assume one source for the whole episode, and I see no valid reason for Jacoby's dogmatic exclusion of Ptolemy. We cannot assume *a priori* that he eschewed romantic antiquarian excursions of this kind.

4. *ὁ Ἀνακυνδαράξου* Anacyndaraxes is the name of Sardanapalus' father given by the versions of Aristobulus, Arrian, and Photius. The name was known to Aristotle, who saw in it some esoteric pun (Athen. viii 335 F). Like his mythical son, Anacyndaraxes cannot be identified with any individual king in Assyrian history (Weissbach, *RE* iA. 2469). *σὺ δέ, ὦ ξένε . . . ἄξια* This is the older part of the epigram, known to and derided by Aristotle (Cic. *Tusc.* v 35, 101; *de Fin.* ii 32, 106). The many later versions seem to derive from the verse translation by Choerilus of Iasus:

ταῦτ' ἔχω, ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἀφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος
τέρπν' ἔπαθον. τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια κείνα λέλειπται

(Strabo xiv 5. 9).

This couplet was quickly expanded, and Chrysippus was able to quote an epitaph of seven lines (Athen. viii 336 A). Diod. ii 23. 3 has a somewhat different version (cf. Polyb. viii 10. 3; Dio Chrys. 4. 135; Clem. Alex. *strom.* ii 20, 18).

καὶ τὸ παῖς . . . ὀνόματι The version in Photius is quite explicit; ἔσθιε, πίνε, ὄχευε (*FGrH* 124 F 34).

5. 5-9. *Expedition to Rough Cilicia*

cf. Curt. iii 7. 2-4.

5. ἐς Σόλους Soli, some 20 km west of Anchiale (9 km from the modern town of Mersin) was a Rhodian foundation first settled about 700 B.C. (Beloch i² 1. 262; Ruge, *RE* iiiA. 935 ff.; Magie, *RRAM* ii 1148). By the time of the younger Cyrus the settlement had become a major centre of population (Xen. *Anab.* i 2. 24) and during the fourth century it was a minting centre for the satrapal coinage of Pharnabazus, Tiribazus, and Mazaeus (Head, *HN*² 728). For the city's later history and its change of name under Pompey see Ruge, loc. cit.

καὶ φρουράν . . . εἶχον Curt. iii 7. 2 agrees on the facts but implies that the fine was a pretext for extortion. This is the most arbitrary treatment Alexander is known to have accorded any Greek city, and it shows that a grant of democracy (5. 8) could be very different from freedom in any sense. The fine of 200 talents was immense and it was ruthlessly exacted, this time of troubles becoming proverbial in Soli (Heberdey and Wilhelm, *Denkschr. Akad. Wien* xlv (1896), Abh. vi, 42 f., no. 101). Alexander took hostages and barely a month later all but 50 talents had been paid (cf. ii 12. 2). Then the Persian baggage train was in Alexander's hands and he could afford to be generous (cf. ii 11. 10).

6. τοὺς τὰ ὄρη κατέχοντας Κίλικας 'Rough Cilicia' (*Τραχειώτης*) extended from Coracesium (Alanya) to Soli, a distance of some 240 km (Strabo xiv 5. 3 (669)). In a campaign of seven days Alexander cannot have progressed very far into the Taurus range, and it remained for the first satrap of Cilicia, Balacrus (Berve no. 200), to penetrate the mountains and attack the tribesmen of Isaura and Laranda on the Lycaonian border (cf. Diod. xviii 22. 1; Strabo xii 6. 2-3 (569)). Balacrus, however, was killed, and the Taurus remained unpacified; even the ruthless campaign of Perdiccas in 322 left Isaura unsubjected (Diod. xviii 22. 3). It has been suggested that Alexander's object was to open up a second route through the Taurus via the Calycadnus valley (Schachermeyr² 203; Freya Stark, *Alexander's Path* 16). The time factor, however, tells strongly against this. Alexander, even allowing for his relatively light and flexible infantry force, could not have gone much further than the modern Silifke (some 55 km from Soli), if, as Arrian implies, there was regular military activity. Perhaps the expedition was no more than a show of force, designed to deter the hillmen from raids on the fertile Cilician plain.

7. καὶ ἐνταῦθα . . . ἐφύλασσε The siege of Halicarnassus had been broken off towards winter 334/3, when the Persian defenders, Memnon and Orontobates, had withdrawn to two of the city's citadels (i 23. 3;

Diod. 27. 5). Memnon had died in the summer of 333 (ii 1. 2 n.) and Orontobates was left to continue the defence. Curt. iii 7. 4 says that the final battle was fought at Halicarnassus itself.

Πτολεμαῖον καὶ Ἀσανδρον Ptolemy (Berve no. 674) was the commander of the military forces in Caria (i 23. 6). Asander, son of Philotas (Berve no. 165), was satrap of Lydia, appointed shortly after the Granicus (i 17. 7). The two Macedonian commanders apparently launched a joint operation against the Persian land forces in their sphere of interest.

καὶ Μύνδον . . . Τριόπιον Orontobates had apparently made good use of his naval power and took possession of various strongpoints on the Carian coast, which were relatively inaccessible by land (cf. ii 2. 3 n.). For possible Persian activity at Telmissus in Lycia see i 24. 4 n.

Myndus: on the west coast of the Halicarnassian peninsula. For its successful resistance to Alexander in 334 see i 20. 5 n.

Caunus: situated on the south Carian coast towards the outlet of the river Calbis (immediately below Lake Köyceğiz); cf. Strabo xiv 2. 2 (651). The site is near Dalyan, to the west of the river (G. E. Bean, *JHS* lxxiii (1953) 10 ff.).

Thera and Callipolis: both names occur in the ancient geographers as settlements of southern Caria (Ptol. v 2. 20; Steph. Byz. s.v.). The site of Callipolis has long been a subject of debate. Robert, *Études Anatoliennes* 491–500, argued trenchantly that it was identical with the modern port of Gelibolu, on the south side of the Ceramic Gulf, which certainly preserves the old name Callipolis. G. E. Bean and J. M. Cook, *ABSA* lii (1957) 81–5, revert to the old location near Duran Çiftlik, which is some 9 km inland on the route between Lake Köyceğiz and the Ceramic Gulf. They suggest as an alternative the site of Cetibeli (p. 83) which is close to the port of Gelibolu and could have been an earlier settlement (cf. also Robert, *BE* 1973. 421).

Thera later belonged to the Chrysaoric League (*IG* xii 5. 977), but it seems otherwise unknown. Two tombstones, both bearing the ethnic *Θηραῖος* have been found at Yerkesik, which has been identified as the ancient Thera. It is again an inland site, some 15 km from the sea and not in a particularly strong position. See further P. M. Fraser and G. E. Bean, *The Rhodian Peraea and its Islands* (Oxford 1954) 46 f.

Cos: the island of Cos had been in Persian hands during the siege (Diod. 27. 5) and was to remain an important base throughout the Aegean War (cf. ii 13. 4, iii 2. 6).

Triopium: a cape in the close vicinity of Cnidus (Hdt. iv 38, vii 153; Thuc. viii 35. 2, 60. 3). Ps-Scylax 99 places it immediately before Cnidus in his description of Caria from the north to the south. As Arrian implies, there was a city of Triopium (Diod. v 61; Steph. Byz. s.v.), which was independent of Cnidus. It may well be identical with the site at Kumyer in Palamut Bay, towards the south-east extremity

of the Cnidian peninsula (Bean and Cook, *ABSA* xlvii (1952) 208–10 with plate 37; lii (1956) 86). It lay almost midway between the old city of Cnidus at Burgaz (near the centre of the peninsula) and the Hellenistic Cnidus at Tekir, the eastern extremity of the peninsula.

According to Curtius (iii 7. 4) all these strongholds fell to the Macedonians immediately after their victory. But Halicarnassus was in Persian hands until after Issus (ii 13. 4 and 6), and Cos was not recaptured until 332 (iii 2. 6 n.).

8. αὐτὸς δὲ . . . ἐς Ταρσόν 'He moved away in the direction of Tarsus.' Alexander moved along the Cilician coast to Mallus, and there can be no question of a return to Tarsus. Strabo makes it quite clear that the main body of the army moved along the coast; 'he led the phalanx from Soli along the coast and through the territory of Mallus' (Strabo xiv 5. 17 (676)). This passage of Strabo is taken from an Alexander historian closely related to Arrian's source.

τοῦ Ἀλη[ν]ίου πεδίου The vulgate reading *Ἀληίου* is to be preferred. This is the form in Strabo (xiv 5. 17 (676)), as well as in Homer (*Il.* vi 201) and Herodotus (vi 95. 1).

τὸν Πύραμον The modern river Ceyhan. Curtius adds that Alexander bridged the river before his arrival at Mallus (iii 7. 5).

9. ἐς Μάγαρσον For the spelling see Lycophron. *Alex.* 444; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Μάγαρσος* (variants in Strabo xiv 5. 16; Pliny *NH* v 22, 91).

Magarsus was the harbour town of Mallus, later renamed Antioch on the Pyramus (cf. S. and R. Werner, *JKF* i (1957) 325–7; L. Robert, *CRAI* 1951. 256–9). Its site is at Karataş where the Pyramus discharged in antiquity. Mallus itself lay some 59 stades upstream, built on elevated ground (*Stad. Mar. Magni* 163; [Scylax] 102); its site may have been near the modern Kızıtahta (*CRAI* 1951. 257).

τῇ Μαγαροσίδι The cult title is attested epigraphically (*CIG* iii 5875b; cf. *IGR* iii 889; *SEG* xii 511 = S. and R. Werner, op. cit.). The origins of the worship of Athene at Magarsus are exceedingly obscure (Krause, *RE* xiv 292).

Ἀμφιλόχῳ . . . ἐνήγισε The Cilician worship of Amphilochus was centred at Mallus, whose oracle was famous in late antiquity (Paus. i 34. 3; Plut. *de Def. Orac.* 45, 434 D; Lucian, *Philopseudes* 38; Dio lxxii 7. 1). There were many variant versions of Amphilochus' mythical activities in Cilicia after the fall of Troy (Strabo xiv 5. 16–17 (675–6)), and in the Hellenistic period most cities of Cilicia Pedias, whether Greek or barbarian, attributed their foundation to the hero (Jones, *CERP*² 192–4).

στασιάζοντας . . . κατέπαυσε Alexander had recently deposed the Persian controlled oligarchy at Soli and in its place set up a democracy, as he seems to have done a few months previously at Amisus (App. *Mithr.* 8. 24). Presumably the mere news of his approach was sufficient at Mallus to trigger off a revolution against the incumbent oligarchy.

τοὺς φόρους . . . ἀνήκεν The terminology is identical to that used in Alcimachus' manifesto to the cities of Aeolis (cf. i 18. 2 with note). Arrian's context here makes it quite certain that remission of tribute was an exceptional gesture. Even at Mallus remission from taxes did not secure immunity from political interference, nor was the city exempt from military contributions (cf. ii 20. 2).


Ἀργείων μὲν Μαλλῶται ἄποικοι This connection with Argos presumably came through Amphilochoi (cf. Strabo xiv 5. 16). The historical circumstances of Mallus' foundation are unknown, and the references in Arrian mark the first emergence of the city in history. Presumably the city was penetrated by the Greeks during the Rhodian burst of colonization in Pamphylia and Cilicia about 700 B.C.

Alexander appealed to the fictional genealogy which derived the Argead house of Macedon from the Heraclids of Argos (Hdt. v 22. 2, vii 137 f.; Thuc. ii 99. 3; cf. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* 4). The genealogy had been exploited for political reasons as early as 417 (Thuc. v 80. 2), and Alexander himself had showered favours upon Ilium because of his mother's descent from Andromache (Strabo xiii 1. 27 (594); cf. i 11. 8 n.). But there were other reasons for his treatment of Mallus. Soli also had genealogical ties with Argos (Polybius xxi 24. 10; Livy xxxvii 56. 7), but they were apparently ignored by Alexander. Possibly there was rivalry between the two cities. Mallus and Tarsus were at loggerheads in the Roman period (Dio Chrys. 34. 11, 14, 43 f.) and probably in Hellenistic times (Robert, *CRAI* 1951. 258 f.); there may have been similar discord between Mallus and Soli. In that case Alexander favoured the city most salient for his forthcoming campaign.

6-11. *The Battle of Issus*

Arrian's account of the battle is the most comprehensive and certainly the clearest extant. Much of it must be derived from Ptolemy, who is cited by name as the authority for one particularly sensational detail (ii 11. 8 = *FGrH* 138 F 6). Arrian here quotes his source to dissociate himself from the statement, which fits neatly into the general context. It is clearly not a supplement, added from Ptolemy as a subsidiary source (cf. Strasburger 29; Kornemann 49 ff.).

The other sources for the battle are Curt. iii 8-11, Diod. 32-6, Plut. *Al.* 19-20, and Justin xi 9. Extra details are given in a papyrus epitome of undeterminable authenticity and authorship (*P. Oxy.* 1798 F 44 = *FGrH* 148; cf. Wilcken, *Berliner Akademieschriften* i 175 ff.; Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D 533 ff.). An exceedingly valuable source is the fragmentary account of the contemporary historian, Callisthenes of Olynthus, which can be pieced together from Polybius (xii 17-22 = *FGrH* 124 F 35). In this passage Callisthenes' description of Issus is subjected to a searching and acrimonious critique, in which is preserved his description of the



battlefield and the manoeuvres of both sides before the battle. It is generally accepted that Beloch was right to dismiss Polybius' detailed criticisms as petty and superficial (iii² 2. 355). However, it is clear also that Callisthenes' description contained encomiastic distortions of fact, in particular gross exaggeration of the Persian numbers. This propagandist trait is evident in the later sources, particularly in Arrian, who repeats almost all Callisthenes' material, fabrications not excluded (cf. P. Pédech, *Polybe xii: Commentaire* (Budé 1961) 104-15; Walbank, *Polybius* ii 364-76).

Summaries of modern literature may be found in Judeich, *AS* iv 354, Pédech 104 and Seibert, *Al. der Große* 98-102. To these lists add J. A. Murison, *Historia* xxi (1972) 399-423. All recent research is based on the detailed topographical studies of A. Janke, who surveyed the whole area of Issus as an Austrian military attaché a decade before the First World War: *Auf Alexanders des Großen Pfaden* 5-74; *Klio* x (1910) 137 ff.

6. 1. $\xi\tau\iota\ \delta\epsilon\ \epsilon\nu\ \text{Μαλλῶ}$ Curtius' parallel account has nothing of the news of Darius' approach. Instead he states that Parmenion met the king at Castabulum, the next camp on the Macedonian route from Mallus, which appears to have been on the coast near the defile of Kara Kapı (Ruge, *RE* x 2336). The two accounts are not irreconcilable, but it is tempting to associate the news of the Persian occupation of Sochi with Parmenion's arrival at Castabulum (the doubts of Miltner, *JÖAI* xxviii (1933) 74 n. 22, are unfounded).

Arrian, it should be noted, gives a very abbreviated account of the march from Mallus to Myriandrus (6. 1-2). Alexander left Mallus the morning after the news of Darius' arrival, and the following day crossed the Gates to reach Myriandrus. That would have been a forced march of no mean magnitude, some 56 km a day. In 401 Cyrus' army had taken four days to cover the same distance (*Xen. Anab.* i 4. 4-6), and Judeich posits the same duration for Alexander's march (*AS* iv 360 n. 2). Curtius' account, moreover, makes Alexander move at a far more leisurely pace, stopping first at Castabulum and then at Issus, just as Cyrus' army had done almost seventy years before (*Curt.* iii 7. 8-10). On the other hand, Arrian presents us with a lightning-swift advance by Alexander, which is both contrary to Curtius and far less credible. This could be merely the result of compression (cf. i 5. 5 n.).

There is, however, an alternative explanation. In Arrian the picture is of an Alexander burning to come to grips with Darius (ii 6. 6; so *Plut. Al.* 20. 1-4). Curtius, however, states outright that Alexander intended to fight a defensive battle. Parmenion, he says, advised meeting the enemy in the coastal defiles, which would favour the smaller Macedonian forces; his advice was *accepted* (*Curt.* iii 7. 9-10; cf. iii 8. 10 and 19). This statement by Curtius is the only direct evidence we possess of Alexander's strategy at Issus, and it is perverse to discard or

ignore it, as do virtually all modern scholars (Beloch iii² 2. 363 is an honourable exception). The great dilemma of Issus is why Darius left his chosen ground at Sochi to fight in terrain which all sources regard as unfavourable. To this problem Curtius gives the key. Darius moved into the plain of Issus because the Macedonian army would not advance to meet him, and he was forced to give battle in an area of Alexander's choosing. The element of surprise came when the Persians crossed the Amanus by the Bahçe Pass instead of the Belen, where the Macedonians expected them. But the result was the same. The Persians were lured into a battlefield ill suited to their numbers.

This is in outline the hypothesis of Beloch, which has been sharply criticized by recent scholars (cf. J. Keil, *Mill. d. Vereines klass. Philologen in Wien* i (1924) 17-19, followed by Murison 412-14). The criticisms, however, are not valid, and they are partly based on presuppositions about Alexander's character (e.g. Murison 414, after Keil 19). The main argument of substance against a delay by Alexander in the plain of Issus is that of Keil, who draws attention to Callisthenes' statement that it was only after crossing the Amanus that Darius learned of Alexander's passage through the Gates (Polybius xii 17. 2-3). Callisthenes, he argues, could not have so written if the two armies had faced each other across the Belen Pass for some considerable time. This argument, however, presupposes that Callisthenes could only write the literal truth. In any case, all that Callisthenes says is that the inhabitants of Issus informed Darius that Alexander had moved towards Syria; he does not exclude the possibility that Alexander had spent a considerable time in the plain of Issus before crossing beyond the Pillar of Jonah.

The hypothesis of a delay on the Macedonian side is not refuted. Indeed the fact that Darius' baggage-train reached Damascus is difficult to explain unless there was a considerable period between Darius' arrival at Sochi and the battle proper (cf. ii 11. 9 n.). If we accept that the delay was on the part of Alexander, we have a plausible reason for Darius' movement which is otherwise lacking. The explanation of Arrian, that Darius assumed wrongly that Alexander would fight in Cilicia, has been widely accepted (e.g. Delbrück i³ 192; Wilcken 100-1; Tarn i 24), but it fails to explain Darius' southward turn to Issus; he should logically have gone due west towards Aegae and the Aleian Plain. C. L. Murison has recently modified Judeich's thesis that Darius' move was a planned response to the news of the Macedonian occupation of the Belen Pass. Darius' intention, he argues (419-23), was to split the two parts of the Macedonian army, separating the advance force under Parmenion from the rest of the army in Cilicia. This is an ingenious theory, but, untenable. There is no hint that the Macedonian army was divided into two separated groups at the Belen Pass and in Cilicia. Parmenion had a substantial force of mercenaries and allies when he left Tarsus, but nothing suggests that he left them all at the Belen Pass.

Curtius speaks of a modest garrison at the narrows before Issus and similar guard points throughout the plain (*praesidiis cuncta firmavit*: iii 7. 7). If Darius' intelligence was as accurate as Murison supposes (420), he must have realized that the advance forces were dispersed and that Parmenion himself had returned to join his king in Cilicia (Curt. iii 7. 5-6).

Curtius' statement that the Macedonians *intended* to give battle in the coastal defiles is the only feasible explanation of Darius' move from Sochi. Arrian's story of a forced march from Mallus cannot be reconciled, and it may well be a fabrication to conceal the fact that for the Macedonians Issus was a defensive battle.

ἐν Σόχοις The location of the Persian base is unknown and will probably remain so. In his report of the excavations at Tell Atcharna Sir Leonard Woolley noted no less than 180 mounds in the Amik Plain (*Spadework* (1953), 109), any one of which might be Sochi.

2. ὡς ἐπὶ Δαρείον 'In the direction of Darius'. F. Miltner (*JÖAI* xxviii (1933) 77) lays stress on the wording, which he thinks proves that Darius and his army were 'ein bloß fiktives Ziel', Alexander's main objective being the cities of Phoenicia. This necessitates the translation '*as though* in the direction of Darius'. There is, however, no single instance in Arrian where ὡς ἐπὶ is used to indicate a feint (cf. J. R. Hamilton, *JHS* lxxvi (1956) 26 ff.). If the ὡς has any meaning in these contexts, it is purposive.

πρὸς Μυριάδρω This is the form of the name attested on the coins (variant in Xen. *Anab.* i 4. 6). The exact site is not known. Xenophon places it 5 parasangs south of the Gates, roughly the distance given by the *Stadiasmus Maris Magni* (151-3: 125 stades). The site must therefore be somewhere in the area of modern İskenderun (cf. Honigsmann, *RE* xvi 1090-1).

τοῦτο κατέσχευεν Arrian alone mentions the delaying effect of the storm, and indeed there is no reference elsewhere to bad weather. Admittedly blustery weather is not infrequent in the Hatay during the late autumn,¹ but Darius presumably was not hindered by the storm in his march over the Bahçe Pass, since Arrian gives us to believe that he emerged in Alexander's rear immediately the storm was over (ii 7. 1-2). A local thunderstorm confined to the Myriandrus area is not impossible, but there seem adequate grounds for supposing that we have here an apologetic fabrication (so Beloch iii² 2. 263). The Persian flanking march to Issus covered at least 130 km and would have taken considerable time, much longer than the time implied by Arrian's story

¹ There are meteorological tables, admittedly incomplete, in Vol. 1, Appendix D, of *Turkey* (*Geographical Handbooks Series* BR. 507). İskenderun averages 8 days in November with precipitation exceeding 1.16 mm, while at Adana, the only place in the area to supply the relevant records, late October seems the time of year most susceptible to thunderstorms.

of the Macedonian forced march to Myriandrus. Some delay was necessary, on the one hand, to allow Darius time to cross the Amanus, and, on the other hand, Alexander had to be represented taking the offensive. The expedient of the storm may have been invoked for that reason.

3. Ἀμύντας ὁ Ἀντιόχου cf. i 17. 9, 25. 3; Berve no. 58. Plut. *Al.* 20. 1–4 describes Amyntas' advice in similar terms. Curt. iii 8. 1–12, however, reports a totally different debate, put in the mouth of a different mercenary commander, Thymondas, son of Mentor (cf. Curt. iii 3. 1; Arr. ii 2. 1). The subject of this debate in Curtius is whether or not to divide the Persian forces, a theme which appears in neither Arrian nor Plutarch. On the other hand, both Curtius (iii 2. 10–19) and Diodorus (30) describe an earlier debate in Babylon, in which the Athenian *condottiere*, Charidemus, advocated a division of forces, and by his unseasonable frankness caused his own execution. That debate on long-range strategy comes far better in Babylon, and Curtius' later airing of the subject in the mouth of Thymondas is anachronistic. Darius' reply, however, soon strikes a different note. He begins with a rejection of any proposal to divide the Persian forces, but goes on to say that battle is not to be deferred indefinitely because of shortage of provisions; Alexander is deliberately avoiding battle and must be hunted down in his hiding-place (Curt. iii 8. 8–12). These are exactly Darius' considerations as reported by Arrian, and they have nothing to do with Thymondas' original proposal. It looks as though Curtius is fusing together two different traditions.

4. καὶ αὐτὸς τε . . . ὑπήχθη 'He himself was drawn not unwillingly to the plan which was most pleasant to his imagination.'

Darius is here represented as vain and susceptible to flattery, a motif particularly prominent in Arrian (compare Curtius' more sober statement; *haec magnificentius iactata quam verius* (iii 8. 11)). Indeed Arrian tends to denigrate the whole of Darius' behaviour at Issus. His sensible defensive measures are derided (cf. ii 10. 1 n.), and he is made to take to his heels at the very opening of the battle (ii 4). In this motif of flattery, however, there seems more than simple denigration of Darius. The very idea that Alexander might fight a defensive battle is dismissed as the vain imaginings of Darius and his courtiers.

6. καὶ τὴν καὶ δαιμόνιον For Arrian the supernatural intervenes decisively in Alexander's favour, neutralizing the Persian advantage of numbers (cf. Plut. *Al.* 20. 7). Similar terminology occurs elsewhere (i 26. 2 n., iii 3. 4). At Issus heaven gives Alexander an easy victory against all probability, providing proof of its especial favour.

7. ἐχρην γὰρ ἤδη For the fatalism compare vii 16. 7. The sequence of empires seems to have been almost a cliché in Arrian's day (App. *Praef.* 9. 34; Dexippus, *FGRH* 100 F 12).

7. 1. τὰς πύλας τὰς Ἀμανικὰς Cf. Callisthenes *ap.* Polybius xii 17. 2; Curtius iii 8. 13. The Persian army crossed the Amanus range to the north, following either the course of the modern railway through the Bahçe Pass or the Hasanbeyli Pass immediately to the south, which carries the modern road. In either case the plain of Issus is reached by the pass of Toprakkale, which is usually identified with the Amanic Gates of Arrian and Curtius (Janke 37–44; Pédech 106; Walbank 365 f.; Murison 408). Strabo knows of two other areas termed Ἀμανίδες πύλαι; one was the Belen Pass (xvi 2. 8 (751)) and the other an anchorage on the gulf of Issus, just south of the pass of Kara Kapı (xiv 5. 18 (676)).

ὡς ἐπὶ Ἰσσοῦν Issus was of considerable importance as early as 400 B.C., when Xenophon describes it as the border city of Cilicia (*Anab.* i 4. 1; cf. 2. 24). The city produced the Cilician satrapal issues of the fourth century (Head, *HN*² 722), but it makes no appearance in history until 333. After the battle its name was (temporarily?) changed to Nicopolis (Steph. Byz. s.v. Ἰσσοῦς; Schol. Dionys. Perieget. 118). As yet it has proved impossible to locate the site accurately. It must, however, have been somewhere in the vicinity of the modern Dört Yol (Janke 49; Ruge, *RE* ix 2247).

κατόπιν Ἀλεξάνδρου λαθόν This is conclusive proof that the Bahçe Pass was unguarded by Alexander (cf. 5. 1 with note).

τὸν Πίναρρον The most detailed description of the battlefield is given by Polybius, who criticizes the account of Callisthenes (Polyb. xii 17. 4). According to Callisthenes the plain where the battle was fought was 14 stades wide from sea to foothills, and at right angles to both flowed the river Pinarus with precipitous and difficult banks the whole length of its course. Elsewhere he stated that Alexander was 100 stades away from Darius when he learned of his presence (Polyb. xii 19. 4). Modern research has built on these scanty data to reach strikingly varied conclusions. The earliest identification of the Pinarus was with the Payas, a watercourse crossing the plain roughly 20 km north of İskenderun (cf. Delbrück i³ 185). The Payas, moreover, has abrupt banks and the plain is narrow, some 4 km wide, corresponding very roughly to Callisthenes' 14 stades. In the early years of this century the Payas hypothesis was strongly attacked by Janke on the basis of detailed topographical studies (2–74; *Klio* x (1910) 137 ff.). His two most formidable objections were firstly that at the Payas there is no room for a 40-stade approach march by Alexander, as described by Callisthenes (Polyb. xii 20. 1); 40 stades south of the Payas Alexander would still have been in the coastal defiles of the Cilician Gates. Secondly Janke stated categorically that no point on the Payas allowed a cavalry charge such as that described by Arrian (ii 10. 3). Accordingly he suggested an alternative site, the Deli Çay, a stream some 11 km north of the Payas, and the suggestion was immediately accepted (cf. Judeich,

AS iv 368 ff.; Beloch iii² 2. 335; Fuller 154. The criticisms of W. Dittberner, *Issos* (1908) 105 ff. were quickly and convincingly met by Janke himself—*Klio* 137 ff.). The Deli Çay, however, does not correspond to Callisthenes' description. Its banks are so level and smooth that by no stretch of the imagination can they be called ἀποτόμους and δυσβάτους. The problem is further complicated by the fact that the coastal streams of the Issus plain have altered their courses since antiquity (as Janke admits; *Klio* 140).

It is improbable that certainty will ever be reached, but one point should be made. Janke was attracted to the Deli Çay because it is the most considerable watercourse in the area, and the sources always call the Pinarus a ποταμός (*Klio* 176). This is far from a conclusive argument; not a single source says that the Pinarus was the largest stream in the plain of Issus. Other streams can therefore be taken into account, in particular the Kuru Çay. This lies 3 km north of the Payas, and the banks apparently are steep enough to give some justification to Callisthenes' description and at the same time permit a cavalry charge. Such at any rate was the suggestion of Kromayer (*HZ* cxii (1914) 353), and the same hypothesis was independently put forward by a modern traveller (Freya Stark, *Alexander's Path* 6).

7. 3–9. Alexander's speech before Issus Opinions vary about the authenticity of the speech. Tarn dismisses it as 'part of a school exercise' (ii 286), but his arguments are inadequate. In particular he fails to note the transition at 7. 8, where Arrian adds a λεγόμενον; the previous paragraphs are in *oratio obliqua*, and are clearly derived from his main source, most probably Ptolemy (cf. Kornemann 124). Marsden (*The Campaign of Gaugamela* 1–6) argues that the first part of the speech up to λέγεται is an accurate summary of what Alexander actually said.

Curtius (iii 10. 3–10) and Justin (xi 9. 3–4) both report a *varia oratio* to the various sections of the army; both versions obviously derive ultimately from the same original. Unlike Arrian the vulgate sources make Alexander address the units of his army in turn, but there is enough material common to the two traditions for one to posit a common core, possibly derived from what was said in Alexander's various pre-battle harangues. But certainty is impossible.

συγκαλέσας . . . ἡγεμόνας A similar address to troop commanders was given before the inception of the siege of Tyre (ii 17. 1). Compare too the meeting at Mallus (?) when news broke of the Persian arrival at Sochi (ii 6. 1). Ptolemy must have been present at such meetings, and most probably Arrian's exposition is based on a first-hand report. Cf. also iii 9. 3–5.

4. Μακεδόνας τε . . . ἤξειν (cf. Curt. iii 10. 6 and 9). This passage irritated Tarn: 'it makes Alexander call the Persians cowards, the last thing he would have done' (ii 286). As Marsden 2 points out there is a

world of difference between what Alexander may have thought personally and what he would have said to his army on the eve of battle. In any case Alexander merely represents the Persians as inferior in physique and morale, which is not implausible in an hortatory address. Moreover, Alexander here does nothing more than repeat sentiments which had been voiced throughout the past century, most vocally by Isocrates. There are passages in the *Panegyric* (e.g. 4. 150 f.) which read almost word for word the same as Arrian. This double debilitation of the Persians by their luxury and by their despotic form of government was a cliché of academic thought (cf. R. Schlaifer, *HSCP* xlvii (1936) 95 f.), and nothing would be more natural than for Alexander to have exploited it to encourage his troops.

There is a striking later parallel to this passage of Arrian in Polybius' discussion of the primary and secondary causes of war (iii 6. 9-14). Here Polybius takes as his model the Macedonian invasion of Asia. Remembering the adventures of the 10,000 and Agesilaus, Philip contrasted the ἀνανδρία and ῥαθυμία of the Persians with the εὐεξία of his own men, and reckoned up the accruing prizes of war. This is exactly Arrian's division between the superiority of the Macedonians and the prizes of victory. The sentiments had become firmly embedded in Greek popular philosophy since Isocrates.

ἄσσοι τε Ἕλληνες Curtius (iii 10. 8) and Justin (xi 9. 4) mention a speech to the Greek allies in which Alexander stressed the official motive for war, avenging the Persian sacrileges of 480. There is nothing of this in Arrian, who is pursuing his first theme of the superiority of all branches of Alexander's army. The reasons given for the superior morale of the Greeks on the Macedonian side are somewhat disingenuous. The Greek contribution to the army had been decided after Chaeronea, when Philip was in a position of overwhelming strength (Diod. xvi 89. 2-3; Justin ix 5. 4-6). In such circumstances ἐκόντας ἀμυνομένους is to a high degree euphemistic. Moreover the contrast between Alexander's volunteers and Darius' mercenaries overlooks the considerable number of mercenary troops in the Macedonian army, 5,000 at the Hellespont as against 7,000 troops of the Hellenic League (Diod. 17. 1).

καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτω πολλῷ It is impossible to test the truth of this statement. G. T. Griffith, *Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* 294-300, gives what scanty evidence exists for rates of pay in the fourth century. The only thing definite is that in 401 Cyrus paid his mercenaries 1 Daric or 25 Attic drachmae per month; this was later raised to 1½ Darics, and provisions were supplied over and above the basic wage (Xen. *Anab.* i 3. 21). What is clear is that the Persians were notoriously irregular paymasters. For the period of Alexander the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* supplies information about the tricks used by Memnon of Rhodes to cke out his funds (ii 2. 29 1351^b 1 ff.).

5. βαρβάρων τε αἶ cf. Curt. iii 10. 9–10; Just. xi 9. 4. Arrian alone makes the explicit contrast between European and Asiatic barbarians. The vulgate sources merely contrast the strength of the Thracian and Illyrian tribesmen with the effeminate weakness of the Persians. This environmental division between the barbarians of European and Asiatic stock is solidly Aristotelian. It occurs several times in the *Politics* (vii 1327^b23 ff., iii 1285^a20 ff.), and derives ultimately from the science of fifth-century Ionia. The Hippocratic treatise, *περὶ ἀέρων ὑδάτων τόπων*, attributes differences of racial characteristics to the effects of local climatic conditions (xii–xxiv; cf. xii 10). This environmental theory had become common currency in the fourth century (cf. Plato, *Rep.* iv 435 E), and there is nothing remarkable in Alexander invoking it before Issus. Compare Andreotti, *Historia* v (1956) 264; Badian, *Historia* vii (1958) 440.

6. οὐ γὰρ τοῦς σατράπης...μισθοφόρους Curtius' version of the king's address to the Macedonians emphasizes the victory at the Granicus and the earlier victories in Greece, culminating in the sack of Thebes (iii 10. 7; cf. Justin xi 9. 5). Once more the point of Arrian's speech is different; the goal of Issus is much greater than that of the Granicus, for the result of victory will be the crushing of the whole Persian levy. This last item aroused Tarn, who claims that the entire Persian levy was *not* present (ii 286). Tarn's conclusion here rests on the one hand on his mistaken interpretation of the Cardaces in Arrian (ii 8. 6 with note) and on the other on mistranslations of Curtius (cf. Burn, *Greece and Rome* xii (1965) 149 n. 1). It is the consensus of the sources that the Persian army was present in force at Issus (Arr. ii 6. 6; 7. 2; Curt. iii 8. 2, 9; Diod. 31. 1; cf. Marsden 2–3).

8. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶντος For Arrian's use of Xenophon in the Alexander history see the Introduction p. 8. The example of the 10,000 was a commonplace of ancient literature (Isocr. 4. 145 ff., 5. 90 f.; Polybius iii 6. 10). It was a natural subject either for Alexander or a forger.

καὶ τούτων...αὐτοσχεδιασθέντων The reference is to Xen. *Anab.* iii 3. 6–20. Arrian's text implies that both the Cretans and Rhodians were used as slingers in the emergency alone. On the contrary, the Cretans had been used as the regular unit of slingers from the outset of the expedition (Xen. *Anab.* i 2. 9).

8. 1–2 ὁ δὲ τότε...ὁδόν Arrian describes Alexander's approach to battle in three stages: (i) an advance force is sent forward to secure the coastal defiles while the main army has supper; (ii) the main army sets out in the evening and reaches the defiles at midnight; (iii) after a rest period the army prepares for the approach march.

Curt. iii 8. 22–4 has extra detail: (i) Alexander orders his troops to move at the third watch; (ii) in the interim he sacrifices to the tutelary

gods of the area (this is corroborated by the papyrus epitome—*P. Oxy.* 1798. F 44 col. ii = *FGrH* 148; cf. Wilcken, *SB Berlin* 1923. 155); (iii) the army begins on schedule and reaches the narrows at dawn. Alexander prepares for battle.

2. ἐπὶ τῶν πετρῶν i.e. on the summit of the Pillar of Jonah, which shuts off the coastal defiles to the south (cf. ii 5. 1). The path over the outcrop rises to about 100 m.

καὶ ἕως . . . παράγων The fullest description of these movements comes from Callisthenes (Polybius xii 19. 5–6). Alexander initially placed his infantry at the head of the column, followed by the cavalry and baggage train. When the plain began to open he deployed his phalanx 32 deep, later contracting the depth to 16 and finally to 8. Curt. iii 9. 12 also describes the gradual expansion from a depth of 32 ranks. This is an eye-witness description and Polybius' criticisms cannot stand. Callisthenes' description applies only to the Macedonian phalangites who were no more than 12,000 strong (Diod. 17. 3), and these numbers can easily be accommodated, even in Callisthenes' exaggeratedly narrow frontage of 14 stades.

The movements involved rest on the interpretation of Arrian's phrase: ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην τάξιν παράγων. As at ii 27. 6, τάξις has the same meaning as λόχος or στίχος in the writers of the Hellenistic *Tactica*, namely a single file of infantry. It seems that the standard file of the Macedonian phalanx comprised sixteen men (vii 23. 3; cf. Asclepiodotus 2. 1; Aelian, *Tact.* 4; Arr. *Tact.* 5.5). At Issus the Macedonian phalanx advanced at first two files deep, gradually reducing its depth to a half-file. The final front line would consist of the file leaders and their second-rank men, who were especially well-trained and paid accordingly (cf. vii 23. 3). As Arrian indicates, the process of expansion was continuous. Files would be interjected as the plain widened and spaces appeared at the front, and the phalanx would automatically contract in depth (cf. Asclepiodotus 10. 17–20; Arr. *Tact.* 25; Aelian 29). The succession of imperfects in Arrian (ἦγεν . . . ἀνέπτυσεν . . . συνέτασεν) well describes the gradual extension of the phalanx on the march. For a similar description of battle manoeuvres see i 6. 2–3.

3. ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν According to Callisthenes Alexander deployed his forces in line of battle when he was 40 stades from the enemy (Polybius xii 20. 1). The vulgate tradition (Curt. iii 8. 24; Diod. 33. 1) locates Darius' camp a mere 30 stades from the defiles.

συνέτασεν ἤδη κτλ. The list of phalanx commanders is reproduced by Curt. iii 9. 7, except that he ignores Arrian's peculiar grouping of battalions from each extremity to the centre. The battle order is the same as at the Granicus (i 14. 2–3), except that the Tymphaean battalion is commanded by Ptolemy, son of Seleucus (Berve no. 670). Ptolemy probably took over the command when he returned with reinforcements from Macedonia in spring 333 (cf. i 29. 4).

5. τῶν μὲν ἰππέων... δισμυρίους Darius' advance formation is described somewhat confusedly by Curt. iii 8. 28, who mentions 20,000 cavalry sent ahead with a unit of archers to disrupt the Macedonian advance. Arrian implies that the entire contingent of cavalry was sent across the river. That constituted a very unwieldy force which would surely have confused Darius' carefully arranged dispositions (cf. ii 8. 10) as it fell back.

The totals for Darius' army go back to Callisthenes, who gave 30,000 as the cavalry total on the Persian left (Polybius xii 18. 1-8). Curt. iii 9. 1 corroborates the figure of 20,000 for the light infantry and adds that the cavalry were commanded by Nabarzanes, the Persian chiliarch.

6. τοὺς μισθοφόρους The number of mercenaries again derives from Callisthenes (Polybius xii 18. 2), confirmed by Curt. iii 9. 2.

τῶν Καρδάκ[κ]ων Strabo, in a passage which may be interpolated (xv 3. 18 (734)), claims that the Cardaces were an élite group of young Persians, who corresponded to the Greek ephebes; their name was derived from the Iranian *karda*, meaning 'manly'. This led Tarn to one of his more absurd hypotheses (ii 180-2) that the Persian army at Issus was under strength and forced to supplement the infantry with 'a body of youths under 20'. But Strabo's Cardaces were trained in field sports, almost exclusively on horseback. Their training would have been wasted in the infantry. In fact Cardaces are attested in another Persian army of the fourth century. When Autophradates moved against Datames during the 360s B.C., his forces included 100,000 infantry *quos Cardacas appellant* (Nepos *Dat.* 8. 2). Tarn, ii 180 n. 2, dismisses the evidence as a misunderstanding, since the Cardaces are called a 'tribe' (*genus*). All Nepos seems to imply is that the Cardaces were of the same species as the preceding cavalry, i.e. native Persians, as opposed to the following list of national contingents from Asia Minor. It seems probable that the term denoted a specialized group of infantry, either the native Persian levy or an élite group of barbarian mercenaries, as the lexicographers imply (Photius and Hesychius s.v. *Κάρδακες*· οἱ στρατευσάμενοι βάρβαροι ὑπὸ Περσῶν. Cf. also Eustathius, *Comm. ad Il.* ii 869: 368. 38 ff., where the derivation is ascribed to the historian (?) Theopompus). This does not rule out the evidence of Strabo (or his interpolator). If the interpretation of the word, 'manly warriors', is correct, it could have been applied to two bodies, the cadre of young nobles and a group of Iranian infantry. The term recurs in 217 B.C., when Antiochus III deployed a body of 1,000 Cardaces (Polybius v 79. 11, 82. 11); they were later settled in a military colony in Lycia (M. Segre, *Clara Rhodos* ix (1938) 194; Walbank, *Polybius* i 609). These certainly were Iranian mercenary infantry, and there should be no doubt that the Cardaces at Issus were also a select infantry body (so Schachermeyr² 207).

7. ἐπέταξε δὲ καὶ τῷ ὄρει For the ambiguity of Arrian's use of ἐπιτάττειν see i 14. 1 n. The sense here is clearly, 'he placed alongside' (for the other sense see ii 9. 3). These 20,000 troops were deployed next to the Cardaces along the foothills of the Amanus, and the contour of their position took them far in advance of their line, so as to pose a threat to Alexander's flank. This move is described by Curtius (iii 8. 27, 9. 10); and there is a hint of it in Polybius' critique of Callisthenes (xii 21. 5-6).

ἔπειτα . . . ἐποίησεν Alexander was forced to counter this move with his Agrianians (ii 9. 2; cf. Polybius xii 21. 6). The formation (ἐς ἐπικαμπήν or ἐπικάμπιον) entailed drawing the wing of the phalanx backwards or forwards to describe a right-angle bend (cf. Arr. *Tact.* 26. 7). Xenophon says that the formation resembled the letter *gamma* (*Cyrop.* vii 1. 6; cf. Griffith, *JHS* lxvii (1947) 77 n. 3). At Issus Darius' forces were thrown forwards at right angles to their front line, while the Agrianian defenders were thrown backwards at the same angle.

8. κατὰ ἔθνη . . . οὐκ ὠφέλιμον The Persian national contingents were marshalled behind the main striking force of Greek and Persian infantry (cf. Curt. iii 9. 3). These forces must have extended to a great depth. Even though the numbers are exaggerated (see below), it is agreed that Darius was fighting with all available forces (cf. Diod. 30. 3-4; Curt. iii 2. 1-16). Curtius claims that all the plain was covered by the Persian army (iii 9. 6; cf. 3. 28).

ἐλέγετο γὰρ . . . εἶναι Arrian shows a certain caution, reporting the Persian numbers as hearsay. The qualification may have existed in his source, but, more probably, Arrian is dissociating himself from a suspiciously high figure. The total is both the highest and most frequently attested (Plut. *Al.* 18. 6; *FGH* 148 F 44, col. ii). Other figures are 400,000 foot and 100,000 horse (Diod. 31. 2; Justin xi 9. 1; Orosius iii 16. 6 gives 300,000 foot); and 250,000 foot and 62,000 horse (Curt. iii 2. 4-9). All figures seem exaggerated, although Darius' army was probably far larger than Alexander's.

9. τοὺς τε ἑταίρους . . . καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας The text is impossible. As is proved by countless passages of Arrian (e.g. i 14. 1), the so-called *hetairoi* were the Macedonian cavalry. Attempts to replace *Μακεδόνας* with the name of some other unit (e.g. Roos's *Παίονας*; see Brunt's note ad loc.) are unconvincing. Arrian's description is logical; first the phalanx, next the heavy cavalry flanking units, and finally in c. 9 the secondary groups of light infantry and cavalry. There are few heavy cavalry units available for substitution. More probably we are dealing with a reader's gloss, absorbed into the text during its transmission (for a good parallel see i 14. 2 n.). Schmieder was right to delete *καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας*.

11. αὐτὸς δέ . . . ἐπεῖχεν Darius' exact position is impossible to determine from Arrian alone. Curt. iii 9. 4 says that he was on the left,

flanked by his native infantry. But both Arrian and Callisthenes (Polybius xii 18. 9) place him in the centre of the line (for a similar variation at Gaugamela compare Arr. iii 11. 5 against Diod. 59. 2; Curt. iv 14. 8). Modern analyses therefore place Darius and his bodyguard in the centre of the mercenary phalanx. Such a formation would have weakened the effectiveness of the Greek hoplites, and Pédech 104 (following Delbrück i³ 195) places Darius *behind* the mercenary phalanx. What is more, Callisthenes described Darius moving the entire body of mercenaries from flank to centre (Polybius xii 18. 9), presumably to make room for the cavalry guard. If the body was moved in its entirety, he was hardly at its centre. I prefer Curtius' explicit location. Flanked by his own troops he could be regarded as roughly central, especially if one considers the advance troops in the foothills. (Arrian speaks of the centre of the *entire* line.)

Ξενοφῶν ὁ τοῦ Γρύλλου Cf. Xen. *Anab.* i 8. 21 f.

9. 1. τοῦ μὴ καταφανεῖς It is not stated precisely how the transfer of cavalry was to be achieved without the enemy noticing. Presumably the Thessalians were not yet at the front of the line. The plain was only just wide enough for Alexander as yet to insert his cavalry in a mass alongside the phalanx (ii 8. 9), and the depth of cavalry must have been considerable. The Thessalians would have been towards the rear, so that they could be invisibly moved to the left wing and then gradually deployed in Parmenion's front line as the plain opened out.

2. προέταξε κτλ. Arrian is viewing the battle line as a column, seen from the centre in both directions (cf. i 14. 1 n.). As the plain became wider it was possible to insert the archers to the right of the infantry phalanx and the light cavalry to the right of the *hetairoi*.

Πρωτόμαχος (Berve no. 667) Nothing is known about Protomachus. He had presumably succeeded Hegelochus when the latter was commissioned with the rebuilding of the Aegean fleet in spring 333 (ii 2. 3 n.). After Issus he disappears from history, and at Gaugamela the Scouts are in other hands (iii 12. 3).

3. πᾶσιν ἐπετάχθησαν The mercenaries formed a second reserve line, comparable to the reserve phalanx at Gaugamela (iii 12. 1 n.). Only the mercenaries are mentioned in this context; there is no information about the troops provided by the Corinthian League. These troops were certainly available (ii 5. 1), and it is unlikely that all 7,000 were left guarding the passes and baggage. It may be true that they were of dubious loyalty, conscripted against their will from the cities of the Corinthian League (U. Köhler, *SB Berlin* 1898. 128–34; Berve i 142–3), but they were apparently used in reserve at Gaugamela and there is no reason why the same should not have applied at Issus. Arrian, it should be noted, does not give an exhaustive list of Alexander's dispositions. The Odrysian cavalry and Balacrus' javelin men are not mentioned,

although they presumably participated at Issus as they did at Gaugamela (iii 12. 4). There is no reason why the Hellenic troops should not have been drawn up behind the front line together with the mercenaries.

οὔτε πυκνή κτλ. The Macedonian right terminated with the Scouts and Paeonians, who may have been drawn up in thinner formation than the rest of the line; the two *ilai* of Companion cavalry will have added depth without revealing their numbers immediately to the enemy. That disposed of the problem of the depth of the line. There was another consideration, however. The Persian infantry, whose line continued up into the mountains (ii 8. 7), extended far beyond the Macedonian right wing. According to Callisthenes, the Macedonians had kept their line clear of the mountains during the approach march, so as to avoid the skirmishers on the foothills (Polybius xii 21. 5). This meant that there was a substantial Persian overlap at the Pinarus itself. Alexander therefore deployed troops from three areas, the archers from the right of the phalanx (ii 9. 2), Agrianians from the lateral guard, and mercenaries from the reserve line, so extending his line into the mountains.

Ἀνθεμουσίαν Cf. Hesychius s.v. Ἀνθεμουσία: τάγμα τι παρὰ Μακεδόσιν ἐξ Ἀνθεμοῦντος, πολέως Μακεδονίας. Anthemus was the name of a city, a district, and a river. It seems most plausibly located in the valley of the Vasilikotikos river on the shores of the Thermaic Gulf immediately south of Thessalonica (cf. Hammond, *Macedonia* i 190–1). Like the *ile* of Apollonia (i 12. 7, etc) the Anthemusian *ile* was recruited from the Chalcidic peninsula, and its members, like those of the *ilai* of Apollonia and Amphipolis, had probably received their estates from Philip II.

τὴν Λευγαίαν καλουμένην The name is mysterious. As it stands, it cannot be associated with any known place name in Macedonia. The most favoured emendations (cf. Beloch iii² 2. 326; Berve i 105 n. 3) are *Ληταία* (Lete in Mygdonia: *SIG³* 700. 2; Ptol. iii 13. 36) and *Ἀὐγαία* (in Chalcidice: Ptol. iii 13. 37; cf. Curt. v 2. 5). J. N. Kallérís, *Les anciens Macédoniens* i (1954) 233 f., has suggested *Λεβαία*, the supposed ethnic of *Λεβαίη* in Upper Macedonia. But all other *ilai* are known to have been recruited from important areas of Macedonia, and it is strange to have a squadron named after an obscure village. Droysen's *Ἀἰγαία* (*ile* of Aegae) evades that difficulty, but the form is exceedingly dubious.

Arrian qualifies his expression: 'the so-called Leugaean *ile*'. There is no other such qualification in his references to regional *ilai*; and it is at least possible that the epithet is not a regional adjective but a native Macedonian title for the squadron. The *ile* may have been one of the older cavalry units, recruited from the Macedonian heartland, whereas the squadrons with regional epithets seem to have been creations of Philip's reign.

4. ὑπὲρ τὸ τῶν Περσῶν κέρας (Plut. *Al.* 20. 8). The Persian line was not continuous, as is implied at ii 8. 7. There was apparently a substantial gap between the force drawn up against Alexander's flank and the rest of the Persian left. Alexander's extended right wing now cut between the Persian left and its advance force. The Macedonian troops added on the right were not numerous—a portion of the Agrianians and mercenaries, together with the archers of the flank guard; yet this moderate force changed the whole picture on the Macedonian right. The Persians no longer overlapped; they were themselves outflanked. It seems impossible that the Persian infantry on the left wing can have numbered anything like the 20,000 Arrian states were there. The Persian advance guard also cannot have been large in number or of high calibre, if they were repelled without difficulty by the Agrianians acting virtually unaided and attacking uphill.

10. 1. πολλαχῇ μὲν ἀποκρήμνους This description of the banks of the Pinarus is repeated at ii 10. 5. It stems ultimately from Callisthenes, who described the river banks as precipitous and inaccessible throughout the entire intersection of the plain (Polybius xii 17. 5). Arrian stresses the defensive aspect, and adds that the more accessible areas of the bank were strengthened by a palisade. This last detail does not recur elsewhere, and it may not have been mentioned by Callisthenes. At least Polybius does not refer to the palisade in his criticisms of the impossibility of the Macedonian manoeuvres under the conditions described by Callisthenes (Polybius xii 18. 11, 22. 4). The existence of the palisade in fact exacerbates the difficulties of the battle narrative. If any part of the stream allowed a full-scale cavalry charge, that was precisely where one would expect additional fortification. Arrian, however, says nothing of any obstacles and represents Alexander's charge as an effortless success. Indeed the palisade nowhere reappears in the battle description; it is not even mentioned as one of the difficulties encountered by the phalanx in forcing the passage. The palisade may be an elaboration by Ptolemy himself to increase still further the obstacles faced by the Macedonian army.

Even without the palisade, the description of the river banks creates difficulties. As both Arrian and Ptolemy knew, a cavalry charge down steep river banks was, if not an impossibility, at least a dangerous and difficult move (compare the description at iv 5. 7–9). Yet no source suggests that Alexander was in any way impeded during the actual river crossing. If he did make the kind of charge described by Arrian and Plutarch, the river banks must have been relatively level and unencumbered by defensive works (cf. Janke, *Klio* x (1910) 155–62). καὶ ταύτῃ . . . δεδουλωμένος The phrase τῇ γνώμῃ δεδουλωμένος is a favourite of Arrian (cf. v 19. 1, vi 16. 2, iii 11. 2) and is a borrowing from Thucydides (Thuc. iv 34. 1, vii 71. 3).

This is a remarkable statement, attributing sound defensive strategy to cowardice on Darius' part. Darius is presented as the polar opposite of Alexander, who is portrayed as consistently aggressive throughout the Issus campaign (ii 6. 1, 6. 6, 7. 3). The same motif is apparent in Arrian's description of the Granicus (i 13. 6 ff.); in both cases Alexander charges without hesitation an enemy solidly entrenched in a strong defensive position. But Darius is not only non-heroic; he is represented as a coward both in strategy and in action (cf. ii 11. 4, iii 14. 3, iii 22. 4). This trait was certainly present in Callisthenes' work, for he represented Darius first assigning himself opposite Alexander but then changing his mind (Polybius xii 22. 2), but the picture was endorsed by Ptolemy and accepted uncritically by Arrian.

3. *ὁ δὲ ἦγεν κτλ.* The metaphor of the battle line surging like a wave to the attack is clearly modelled on Xenophon's famous description of the charge at Cunaxa (*Anab.* i 8. 18). There is no need for Krüger's emendation <ἐκ>κυμήναν, which makes the terminology exactly parallel with Xenophon's. Plutarch also uses the metaphor and his language is identical to Arrian's (*Pomp.* 69. 6: ἀλλὰ κυμαῖνον ἀπειρίᾳ... ἔδεισε μὴ διασπασθῆ).

πρῶτοι δὲ The Persians had initiated a similar cavalry charge against the Macedonian left, and they may in fact have begun the engagement. It is the first item in Curtius' account of the battle, placed explicitly at the moment when the two armies came within range (Curt. iii 11. 1). Callisthenes also seems to have placed the Persian charge at the opening of the battle (Polybius xii 18. 11).

4. *τρέπονται... ἐπιτεταγμένοι* Arrian's narrative of this decisive charge is remarkably laconic. The troops Alexander attacked are stated to be those of the extreme left, verging on the mountains (cf. ii 8. 7). In other words, the charge was delivered as far to the left of the Persian line as Alexander could manage. Plutarch confirms that the Macedonians were able to outflank their opponents and so put them to flight (*Al.* 20. 8). The unfortunate troops of the Persian left faced a frontal attack by the Macedonian cavalry and were enveloped on the flank by the Agrianians and mercenaries at the extremity of Alexander's line. Like their comrades of the advance guard they collapsed immediately, and Alexander was able to swing his cavalry left into the flank of the Persian centre (cf. ii 11. 1).

6. *τὴν δόξαν τῆς φάλαγγος* The Macedonian phalanx was in fact *not* unconquered. In 353 the Phocians under Onomarchus had inflicted two severe defeats on Philip's armies, which certainly included Macedonian phalanx troops (Diod. xvi 35. 2; Polyaeus ii 38. 2 *συνέτριβον τὴν Μακεδονικὴν φάλαγγα*). Macedonian prestige, however, was restored by the battle of the Crocus Field in the following year, and in 349 Demosthenes thought it necessary to question the reputation of the *πεζέταιροι* (Dem. 2. 23).

7. ἐς εἴκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν This figure is eloquent testimony of the intensity of the fighting. Elsewhere Arrian's casualty figures are far more modest, 100 for the entire battle of Gaugamela (iii 15. 6), 115 at the Granicus (i 16. 4), and 21 at the storming of the walls of Tyre (ii 24. 4). Here there are 120 admitted casualties in a single sector of the battlefield, proportionally the greatest losses reported by Arrian.

11. 1. ἐν τούτῳ . . . ξένους The description is hard to follow. Arrian moves from the extreme right, where Alexander first turned the Persian line, to the mercenaries in the centre. He speaks as though, having thrust the Persians from the river, Alexander's right had nothing to do but attack the flank of the mercenaries. There was, however, a considerable gap between the troops of the Persian left, where Alexander attacked (ii 10. 4 n.), and the mercenaries of the centre. In between came the Cardaces and Darius' own bodyguard (ii 8. 6, 11 n.). Arrian says nothing about this very considerable body of troops. Delbrück (i³ 195) ingeniously supposed that the hypaspists followed Alexander through the breach he had made, while the Cardaces facing them took to flight, leaving the flanks of the mercenaries exposed. Later writers have generally followed suit (c.g. Tarn i 27; Schachermeyr² 208). Arrian, however, omits the Cardaces altogether. He mentions only the Macedonian right and their adversaries, taking up his narrative from ii 10. 4. The Persians on the extreme left turned in flight; seeing them in flight the Macedonians forced them back from the river and wheeled back into the exposed Persian flanks. There is no hint that any troops were involved other than those who charged with Alexander, and those troops affected the Persians of the wing. The Cardaces presumably still remained to be dealt with. Arrian's failure to mention the Cardaces is relevant to another omission, that of the fighting around Darius. Arrian portrays Darius taking to his heels at the very outset of the battle, and there is logically no place for a heroic struggle against Alexander (cf. ii 11. 4 n.). There are two possibilities. Either Arrian is right about the immediate flight of Darius, in which case we must assume that the entire Persian line left of centre collapsed at a stroke, or the tradition of Darius' flight is incorrect and the whole story of the resistance of the Persian guard has been suppressed by Arrian's source. The two traditions are formally inconsistent and should not be conflated (as attempted by Tarn i 27).

2. ἰππεῖς δὲ κτλ. This cavalry struggle on the left had been a protracted one. According to Callisthenes the Persian charge had come at the very beginning of the battle (Polybius xii 18. 11–12; cf. Curt. iii 11. 1). Curtius also implies that the Persian cavalry had crossed the Pinarus. The Thessalians were able to fall back, regroup, and charge, a manoeuvre which would have been impossible with the river at their backs (Curt. iii 11. 14).

οὐδὲ πρόσθεν ἐνέκλιναν According to Curtius, the Thessalians won their own salvation. They had been mauled and an *ile* trampled down. Accordingly they fell back, resumed their attack on the Persians, and turned the tide with great slaughter (Curt. iii 11. 13–15). This is a circumstantial story, and there is no *a priori* reason to reject it.

3. βαρέως ὀπλισμένους Curtius confirms that both horses and riders were covered with plate armour (*serie lamnarum*) and therefore at a disadvantage in rapid manœuvres (iii 11. 15). The most celebrated heavy cavalry of the Persian army were the Saca horsemen, who distinguished themselves at Gaugamela (cf. iii 13. 4 n.). The cavalry of the north-east frontier, however, was not present at Issus (Curt. iii 2. 9; cf. Arr. iii 8. 3), and the mailed cataphracts of the Persian right must have been of different nationality. Some may well have been Parthian. Hyrcanian horsemen took part at Issus (Curt. iii 2. 6, 9. 5), and it would be strange if the Parthians had not sent a contingent, for Parthia and Hyrcania formed a single satrapy (Berve i 264–5).

4. τὸ πρῶτον . . . πρῶτοις As at Gaugamela (cf. iii 14. 3; 22. 4 nn.) Darius is represented as the first to take flight. This picture, however, is unique to Arrian. The vulgate sources talk of a hotly contested fight about Darius himself and add that he only fled when his horses began to panic and capture was imminent (Diod. 34. 2–7; Curt. iii 11. 7–12; cf. Justin xi 9. 9). This description was celebrated, and the scene (or its counterpart at Gaugamela) is depicted on the famous Alexander Mosaic from the House of the Faun at Pompeii (A. Rumpf, *Ath. Mitt.* lxxvii (1962) 229–41; Seibert, *Al. der Große* 55–8). If Arrian's account is accepted, the entire vulgate tradition must be dismissed as fiction. In that case the picture must derive from court historiography (so Brunt, *Arrian* 161 n. 3). Callisthenes had asserted that the two kings initially wished to face each other in battle (Polybius xii 22. 2): and Chares of Mitylene went so far as to assert that Alexander received his thigh wound at the hands of Darius (*FGH* 125 F 6; cf. W. B. Kaiser, *JDAI* lxxvii (1962) 235 f.). It seems unlikely, however, that either story inspired the vulgate tradition. In the first place, although Callisthenes was eager enough to stress the heroic qualities of Alexander, he was hardly likely to have depicted similar heroism in Darius, especially at a time when Alexander was proclaiming his rival's unworthiness to rule over Asia (cf. ii 12. 5, 14. 6–9). Darius' cowardice was a more congenial theme, and Callisthenes hinted at it when he claimed that Darius regretted his intention to face Alexander (cf. Pédech 115). Nor can the vulgate tradition derive from Chares, otherwise it is inconceivable that Cleitarchus omitted its central feature—the combat of the kings.

The vulgate tradition is partially reflected by Arrian in parenthetical remarks. The thigh wound allegedly received in the onslaught on Darius (Diod. 34. 5; Curt. iii 11. 10; cf. Plut. *Al.* 20. 9; *de Al. f.* ii 9,

341 c), is mentioned by Arrian only after the battle (ii 12. 1). Similarly the Persian nobles who fell defending Darius before his flight are mentioned in the casualty list after the battle (11. 8 n.). Their deaths must be historical, and it is hard to see why they remained to die after their king had fled (cf. Diod. 34. 7). It is hard to avoid the impression that Arrian's sources deliberately placed Darius' flight at the beginning of the battle, making him the architect of the Persian rout. The cowardly Darius is a figment of propaganda, and those scholars are surely right who have rejected it for the vulgate (e.g. Berve ii 121, no. 244; Schachermeyr² 209 f.).

5. ἐπὶ τοῦ ἅρματος The sources vary whether or not Darius left the battlefield in his chariot. Plutarch apparently agrees with Arrian that he drove as far as possible before changing to horseback (Plut. *Al.* 20. 10). Curtius claims that he took to horse on the battlefield itself (Curt. iii 11. 11; so Aelian, *NA* vi 48). Diodorus (34. 7) mentions that Darius changed chariots immediately before his flight, but he says nothing about the horse at any stage, and his narrative is not inconsistent with Curtius.

τὸν κἀνδυν The *candys* was a long-sleeved over-tunic, in the king's case of a sea-purple colour (Pollux vi 48). It was a standard part of the royal regalia, familiar from the reliefs at Persepolis (cf. E. Schmidt, *Persepolis* i 163), and it was one aspect of the Persian court dress that Alexander did not adopt (Plut. *Al.* 45. 2; Diod. 77. 5). Curtius regards its abandonment as shameful (iii 11. 11), but Persian nobles seem to have shed the *candys* for hot and heavy work (Xen. *Anab.* i 5. 8).

6. ἀνὰ κράτος ἐδίωκεν According to Diodorus (37. 2) Alexander covered more than 200 stades in the pursuit, and arrived back in the captured camp about midnight. Darius apparently had 4 or 5 stades' start in the chase (Plut. *Al.* 20. 10). It is surprising that the margin was so small, if Darius had indeed fled at the first Macedonian charge.

8. τῶν δὲ Περσῶν Three of the names, Atizyes, Rheomithres, and Sauaces (for variant spellings see Roos's apparatus), recur in the vulgate tradition (Diod. 34. 5; Curt. iii 11. 10). Arsames and Bubaces are unique to Arrian. The latter is otherwise unknown; Arsames was mentioned earlier as satrap of Cilicia (ii 4. 5). Atizyes is not mentioned in Arrian's extensive list of commanders at the Granicus (i 12. 8), but as satrap of Greater Phrygia (i 25. 3 n.) he ought to have participated in the battle. Diodorus lists him among the casualties both at the Granicus and at Issus (Diod. 21. 3, 34. 5).

τὸ δὲ ἄλλο πλῆθος The other sources agree on the total of 100,000 but say that the 10,000 cavalry losses were additional, not included in the main total (Diod. 36. 6; Curt. iii 11. 27; Justin xi 9. 10 gives the same total but comprising 61,000 infantry dead and 40,000 captured). The only exception to the canon is the fragmentary Oxyrhynchus epitome, which lists over 50,000 Persian infantry casualties, 3,000 cavalry, and

an unspecified number of mercenaries (*FGrH* 148 F 44, col. iv). Even this may not be eccentric; if we allow a hypothetical 10,000 mercenary casualties, the figure corresponds roughly with Justin's 61,000 infantry dead.

Arrian mentions no over-all figure for the Macedonian dead; the 120 phalanx casualties are only touched upon in passing (ii 10. 7). Here the canonical figure seems to have been 150 cavalry (Diodorus, Curtius, Justin) and perhaps 300 infantry (so Diodorus; Curtius gives 32 (emended by Hedicke to 302), and Justin 130). The Oxyrhynchus epitome gives 1,000 infantry casualties and 200 cavalry, figures which are uniquely high, but which may arise from wild scaling up (and in the case of the infantry the addition of the wounded, which Curtius estimates at 504). Both Persian and Macedonian losses are propaganda figures.

Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Λάγου (*FGrH* 138 F 6) Ptolemy's status in the entourage of Alexander is not defined. He was presumably one of the senior *hetairoi* of the *ile basilike*, and he seems to have been involved with the king in his pursuit of Darius after Gaugamela as well as on this occasion (cf. iii 15. 2).

The description of the Persian dead seems an embellishment upon Callisthenes. Callisthenes had mentioned reports (λέγουσι) that the majority of Persians perished in the ravines (ἐκρήγματα) created by the rain-swelled torrents from the mountains (Polybius xii 20. 4). Ptolemy added that in one of these the pursuers were able to cross upon a bridge of corpses. This remark has been greeted with scepticism (e.g. Welles, *Diodorus* 215 n. 3; Lane Fox 174); rightly so, for Alexander was in the van of the pursuit and the Persian dead had not perished at their hands. No matter how crowded and confused the Persian flight (cf. ii 11. 3), it is highly unlikely that such a multitude were trampled down as to form a bridge over a ravine. It looks as though Ptolemy has added a touch of romantic fiction in his own right.

9. ἡ μήτηρ κτλ. The list of captives is standard (Plut. *Al.* 21. 1; Diod. 36. 2; Curt. iii 11. 24 f.; Justin xi 9. 12; *FGrH* 151 F 1 (3)). Of these only the last source, the *Fragmentum Sabbaiticum*, supplies names for Darius' children; the daughters, of marriageable age, were Stateira and Drypetis, and the son, an infant six years old was named Ochus (so, in passing, Curt. iv 11. 6). The names of Darius' wife and mother only occur in the later narrative; the mother is named Sisygambis in the vulgate (Curt. iii 3. 22; Diod. 37. 3; cf. Berve no. 711), while Plutarch alone names the wife Stateira (*Al.* 30. 5-8; cf. Berve no. 721).

καὶ ἀδελφὴ That Darius married his sister is generally agreed (Plut. *Al.* 30. 3; Justin xi 9. 12; Gellius, *NA* vii 8. 3). Such inbreeding was not uncommon in the Achaemenid house; Darius' great-grandfather, Darius II, had married his sister Parysatis, and the marriage produced five surviving children (Ctesias, *FGrH* 688 F 15 (47, 51)). There seems,

however, no evidence for the much-repeated statement that Sisygambis was sister of her husband Arsanes (e.g. Berve ii 356; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 78; Schoch, *RE* iii A. 371); the original hypothesis by O. Neuhaus, *Rh. Mus.* lvii (1902) 610–23, rests on a very flimsy basis. In particular Curt. x 5. 23 mentions her eighty brothers and father who were murdered by Artaxerxes III (cf. also Val. Max. ix 2, *ext.* 7). There is no reference to a husband in the context, and the presumption must be that he was not her brother. The pair were probably first cousins, the offspring of different sons of Artaxerxes II (for Darius' genealogy see Diod. 5. 5).

τῶν ὁμότιμων Curtius (iii 11. 25, 3. 22) speaks of an entourage of noblewomen, whom Diod. 36. 4 terms wives of satraps. Only Arrian uses the technical term ὁμότιμοι for the Persian nobility; it recurs at vii 29. 4 in the context of the Persian aristocrats drafted into the *agema* (cf. vii 6. 4–5). The word occurs repeatedly in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (i 5. 5, ii 1. 9, etc.) and Arrian may have borrowed the word. But the ὁμότιμοι were also a class of the Ptolemaic court (for the title see *OGIS* 177. 6; Grenfell and Hunt, *New Class. Frags.* (1897) 23. 1, p. 41; *P. Tebt.* i 254, etc.), and Ptolemy himself may have adopted the nomenclature from the Achaemenid court (cf. Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides* iii 103).

ἐς Δαμασκόν According to the vulgate (Diod. 32. 3; Curt. iii 8. 12) Darius only sent off his baggage train after he had crossed the Euphrates and was close to Sochi. Now Damascus is some 300 km south of Sochi, a very long way to send the baggage, and it has been asked why Darius did not choose a closer site (e.g. Fuller 98; Murison 410 f.). The answer is surely that Damascus was the richest and most capacious city of the area (cf. Strabo xvi 2. 20 (756)), and Darius chose the most comfortable base for his multitudinous camp followers (Athen. xiii 608 A; cf. Curt. iii 3. 24) who totalled some 30,000 in all (Curt. iii 13. 16).

It is important that the baggage train reached Damascus, for the commandant at Damascus was in a position to offer its surrender immediately after the battle (Curt. iii 13. 2–3). This suggests an additional argument that the interval between the news of the arrival at Sochi and the battle of Issus was greater than the six days implied by Arrian (cf. ii 6. 1 n.). Alexander heard of the Persian arrival almost immediately. Once Parmenion had occupied the Belen Pass it was hardly possible for a Persian army to be concealed in the Amik Plain (as suggested by Judeich, *AS* iv 357 and Murison 418); and it is clear that Parmenion had reconnoitred the area of the Gates before Darius' arrival (ii 5. 1 n.). The baggage train had apparently diverged only a few days before he reached Sochi. It then went south along the main road to Homs and Damascus, and the 300 km must have taken at least three weeks for the unwieldy caravan. On this chronology there is a week at the very minimum to be explained away.

10. ὑπὸ Παρμενίωνος Parmenion's mission, and its success, is described in detail by Curtius (iii 12. 23–13. 17; cf. Polyaeus iv 5. 1). It was a daring march, well ahead of the main Macedonian column, and only a small force was at his disposal (Curt. iii 13. 1). The exploit was worth recording in its own right, but Arrian as usual keeps his narrative firmly centred on the king and deals with Parmenion parenthetically (cf. ii 15. 1).

Νικοκράτους . . . Μαιμακτηριῶνος The archon's name is corrupt, as happens regularly in the text of Arrian (cf. i 1. 1; ii 24. 6). Nicocrates is epigraphically attested archon in 333/2 (*IG* ii² 337–9). Maemacterion of that year has been placed between 28 Oct. and 27 Nov. in the Julian calendar (Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens* 429). But 333/2 was an intercalary year (Meritt, *The Athenian Year* 83 f.); and we have no guarantee that the intercalary month did not come at the beginning of the Attic year (cf. W. K. Pritchett, *The Choiseul Marble* (Berkeley 1970) 63). The limits for Maemacterion 333/2 are therefore late October and late December. Beloch iii² 2. 312 observed that the Persian fleet was still at sea and had not retired to its base at Halicarnassus by the time the news of Issus reached the Aegean (ii 13. 5–6). The sailing season, he thought, hardly lasted until the end of November. But the Persians may have intended to winter at Siphnos, and fear of defection at Chios forced them to risk the winter seas. Curtius for his part implies that the battle occurred close to winter (iii 8. 8) and states that snow had already fallen around Damascus (iii 13. 7).

12–13. *The Aftermath of Issus*

12. 1. τετρωμένος τὸν μηρόν Cf. ii 11. 4 n. According to Curt. iii 12. 2 the wound was superficial and did not prevent Alexander attending the victory banquet.

2. Βάλακρον (Berve no. 200) Balacrus is only known in his role of satrap of Cilicia, in which he fell in battle against the people of Isaura and Laranda (Diod. xviii 22. 1; cf. ii 5. 6 n.). The date of his death is unspecified; Diodorus merely places it in Alexander's lifetime but there is no reason to assign it to the end of the reign (as does Berve). His activity may be associated with Antigonos' campaigns in Lycaonia during 332 (Curt. iv 5. 13); Balacrus could have opened a second front up the Calycadnus valley. See further Bosworth, *CQ* xxiv (1974) 58 f.

Μένητα (Berve no. 507). Diod. 64. 5 supplies his domicile, Pella. For his later appointment to Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia see iii 16. 9 n.

Πολυπέρχοντα (Berve no. 654) The form of the name given by the archetype is epigraphically attested (cf. *OGIS* 4. 24 with Dittenberger's note, 5. 39). This is Polyperchon's first appearance in Arrian; and,

although he is said to have been almost the oldest of Alexander's generals (cf. Diod. xviii 48. 4; Justin xii 12. 8), he had to wait until late 333 for his phalanx battalion and he retained the command, like Meleager, without promotion until the end of the reign. Berve, ii 320, argues that his abilities were limited, but the sources for the Successors suggest the reverse (Diod. xviii 48. 4; Duris, *FGrH* 76 F 12). He may have been impeded by his Tymphaean background (Diod. 57. 2; Curt. iv 13. 28; Diod. xx 28. 1), but the sources are too scanty to provide elucidation.

12.3–8. *Alexander and Darius' Womenfolk* This incident was a celebrated *topos* of generosity and self-control in the victor's relations with the vanquished, and it occurs in all sources (Diod. 37. 3–38. 7; Curt. iii 12. 1–26; Plut. *Al.* 21; Justin xi 9. 12–16). Arrian gives two versions, the first which he claims to be the consensus of Ptolemy and Aristobulus and the second an additional *logos* whose authenticity he will not vouch for. The *logos* occurs in the vulgate tradition in the same form and, as in Arrian, it follows the Leonnatus episode. Plutarch confines himself to the Leonnatus episode in which he largely agrees with Arrian; and his source could be Aristobulus (Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 54). But the vulgate tradition, particularly Curtius, agrees so closely that one must conclude that Leonnatus' mission was a standard story, perhaps derived ultimately from Callisthenes.

3. *τινες τῶν... γραψάντων* At 12. 6 Arrian names Ptolemy and Aristobulus as his sources. The introduction is perhaps indefinite because all his sources, including those for the *logos*, mentioned the interview with Leonnatus. At the point of divergence the primary sources are singled out by name. Compare vi 24. 1–2, where Arrian first cites the general tradition of Alexander historians and then specifically singles out the unique version of Nearchus.

5. *πέμψαι... Λεόννατον* So Curt. iii 12. 7, who says that the deserter Mithrines was first given the office; Diod. 37. 3; Plut. *Al.* 21. 2.

Leonnatus (Berve no. 466) here emerges for the first time in the campaign narrative. He had been one of Philip's bodyguards at the time of the assassination (Diod. xvi 94. 4), but acted as one of the military bodyguard only (Berve ii 233 n. 1; for the distinction see i 6. 5 n.). His elevation to the élite group of court *σωματοφύλακες* took place only in winter 332/1; and at Issus he was no more than a Companion (so Arrian, Diodorus, and Curtius). Leonnatus was related to the Argead house (Arr. *Succ.* F 12; Curt. x 7. 8). The connection with Philip's mother, Eurydice, suggests that his antecedents were Illyrian (cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 99; Ellis, *Philip II* 249 n. 98). Whatever his extraction, there is no doubt that Leonnatus was domiciled at Pella (vi 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 3).

τὴν θεραπείαν Alexander's concessions are standard in the tradition,

except that Arrian omits the offer to bury in Persian style any of the fallen the captives wished (Diod. 38. 1; Curt. iii 12. 13 ff.; Plut. *Al.* 21. 4). His actions have been hailed as 'the dawn of a new Cosmopolis, which knew no more vanquished' (Schachermeyr² 211), but it is unlikely that his motives were idealistic. The women of the Achaemenid household had been crucially important, passed down from one ruler to the next. Cambyses' sister/wife, Atossa, became Darius' wife and the mother of Xerxes (cf. Hdt. iii 88. 2-3), and the younger Atossa played a prominent role in the murderous dynastic struggle in the reign of Artaxerxes II (Plut. *Art.* 23, 26). The royal women almost symbolized the monarchy (cf. Curt. iii 13. 12 ff.), and they must have played an important role in Alexander's claims to be rightful lord of Asia. He apparently cultivated Sisygambis as his 'Mother' (Diod. 37. 6; Curt. iii 12. 24 f.), and promised dowries to Darius' daughters (Diod. 38. 1; cf. 67. 1 with Curt. v 2. 18 ff.), so taking on Darius' functions as son and father. The treatment of Darius' wife is more ambiguous. She died in Alexander's entourage, either in childbirth (Plut. *Al.* 30. 1; Justin xi 12. 6) or of travel fatigue (Curt. iv 10. 18 f.; Diod. 54. 7 leaves the causes unspecified). But all sources place her death in spring 331. The usual reaction has been to transfer her death to mid 332 and to assume that she died while bearing Darius' child (Berve no. 721; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 78; Schachermeyr² 227 n. 249). But there is no justification for this total rejection of the sources. The possibilities are: (i) Curtius is right about travel fatigue and the miscarriage is romantic invention, or (ii) the child was not Darius' and Alexander was not as scrupulous as later moralizing implied (Welles, *Diodorus* 275 n. 3).

6. Πτολεμαῖος καὶ Ἀριστόβουλος The relative contributions of the two authors cannot be isolated. Kornemann 22 suggests that the outline is from Ptolemy, and it is known that Ptolemy laid some emphasis on Alexander's relations with the Queen Mother (iii 17. 6 n.). But the shaping of the story is certainly Arrian's own (Strasburger 29), and it is impossible to say which element comes from which author.

ξὺν Ἡφαιστίωνι Hephaestion had figured before only in the apocryphal story of the crowning of Patroclus' tomb (i 12. 1 n.). That was an isolated variant story, but the present incident is a standard feature of the vulgate tradition (12. 3 n. above, to which add *Itin.* 39; Val. Max. iv 7, *ext.* 2). Even if it has no historical basis it proves that Hephaestion was closely intimate with Alexander.

ἀμφιγνοήσασαν Cf. Xen. *Anab.* ii 5. 33 for the sense of the verb: 'to be in doubt and therefore ignorant' (cf. *Hell.* vi 5. 26).

7. ἐκεῖνον εἶναι ... Ἀλέξανδρον This recalls Zeno's definition of a friend as an *alter ego* (Diog. Laert. vii 23 = *SVF* i 324; Welles, *Diodorus* 225 n. 1). But the definition goes back beyond the Stoa to Aristotle (*NE* ix 1166^a 30 ff.), and it was probably a tenet of popular philosophy.

8. οὐθ' ὥς ἀληθῆ κτλ. A reflection of the methodological rule expressed

in the *Praefatio* (cf. iii 2. 1, vii 15. 6). Arrian includes the story for moral reasons, because of the light it sheds on Alexander's pity and loyalty to his friends. The second motif seems Arrian's own; compare his observations on the treatment of Philip the Acarnanian (ii 4. 11). The emphasis on pity recurs in Diodorus (38. 5), and may well have been a regular part of the tradition (cf. i 19. 6, ii 15. 3). Curt. iii 12. 18–21 allows himself a panegyric on Alexander's *continentia* and *clementia*, and it is clear that the incident was a standard subject for rhetorical moralizing.

13. 1. Δαρεῖος . . . πάντας Curt. iv 1. 1–3 also describes Darius' flight to the Euphrates (for a romantic incident see *FGrH* 148 F 44 col. iv, with Pearson, *LHA* 257). He agrees on the figure of 4,000 but suggests that it comprised mercenaries alone. They met Darius at Onchae, which is probably the ancient name of the Amik Plain (cf. Honigmann, *RE* xviii 411).

Θάψακον Thapsacus is usually sited near the modern town of Dibse, where the Euphrates takes a northern turn (the alternative location at Carchemish, suggested by W. J. Farrell, *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 153, is not compelling). In the Achaemenid period it was one of the principal fords across the Euphrates (Xen. *Anab.* i 4. 11, 17 f.; Diod. xiv 21. 5) and a central point in the line of communication between Syria and Babylon (Diod. xiv 81. 4). The very name Thapsacus may mean 'crossing point' (R. Dussaud, *Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale* (Paris 1927) 445; see, however, R. D. Barnett, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 3 n. 8).

2. Ἀμύντας κτλ. The retreat of the mercenaries is given in fuller detail by Diodorus 48. 2–6 and Curtius iv 1. 27–33 (cf. Anaximenes, *FGrH* 72 F 17). The vulgate tradition mentions only Amyntas (for his previous history see i 17. 9 n., i 25. 3, ii 6. 3). Of the other mercenary commanders Thymondas had apparently commanded the entire division at Issus (Curt. iii 8. 1, 9. 2; cf. Arr. ii 2. 1 n.). Aristomedes of Pherae (Berve no. 128) had been in Persian service as early as 341/0, when he served with the satrapal forces during Philip's operations around Byzantium (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 222; cf. Errington, *JHS* xciv (1974) 27, *contra* Ellis, *JHS* xci (1971) 19). In 333 he had achieved the same standing as Thymondas and he commanded the barbarian infantry on the Persian left (Curt. iii 9. 3).

Bianor (Berve no. 214) is no more than a name; it is likely, but not provable, that he was related to the faction in Acarnania which was exiled in the aftermath of Chaeronea (Tod ii no. 178; cf. Diod. 3. 3).

ὥς ὀκτακισχιλίων Diod. 48. 2 and Curt. iv 1. 27 mention only 4,000 mercenaries, who escaped with Amyntas. This may refer to Amyntas' contingent alone. It is known that Aristomedes shared the flight to Cyprus (*FGrH* 72 F 16), and it is possible that the mercenary

commanders parted ways on the island. Amyntas alone went south to Egypt while the others probably went west to Crete (13. 6; cf. Curt iv 1. 38 f.; Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* 199; Badian, *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 25).

Τρίπολιν The modern city of Tripoli in Lebanon. The city was literally composed of three sub-cities founded by Tyre, Sidon, and Aradus. Because of its mixed origins it was the venue for common deliberations involving all Phoenician cities (Diod. xvi 41. 1; Strabo xvi 2. 15 (754); Pliny, *NH* v 78; cf. Honigsmann, *RE* vii A. 203 ff.; Jones, *CERP*² 230 f.).

3. **τὰς ναῦς . . . διακεκομισμένοι ἦσαν** The transfer of mercenaries from Lesbos had probably involved some 200 ships. It is clear from Arrian's description (so Diod. 48. 2) that Amyntas' forces required only a fraction of the vessels available.

πολυπραγμονῶν Amyntas declared himself satrap of Egypt, appointed by Darius, and took action against the Persian garrison forces which refused to admit his claims. He was killed outside Memphis in a sortie launched while his men were dispersed ravaging the land (Diod. 48. 4; Curt. iv 1. 29–33).

4. **περὶ τὴν Χίον** Curtius iv 1. 37 adds that Pharnabazus had extracted money from Miletus before moving to Chios, where he imposed a garrison. Evidently the faction which had surrendered the island to Memnon (cf. ii 1. 1 n.) could no longer be relied on to retain political control (cf. 13. 5—*μή . . . οἱ Χῖοι νεωτερίσωσι*).

Κῶν καὶ Ἀλικαρνασσόν Despite the Macedonian victory earlier in the year (ii 5. 7 n.) Halicarnassus was firmly in Persian hands and continued to be used as a base throughout the winter of 333/2 (cf. 13. 6 *fin.*).

Ἄγις (Berve no. 15; cf. E. Badian, *Hermes* xciv (1967) 170–92) This is the first and last appearance in Arrian of Agis III of Sparta. There are two subsequent parenthetical notes relating to the war of 331/0 (iii 6. 3, 16. 10), but Arrian nowhere gives any account of the outbreak or ending of the war in the Peloponnese. This is all the more curious in that the isolated detail of Agis' voyage to Siphnos, which is omitted even by Curtius, is treated so fully. The selectiveness of the narrative goes back to Arrian's sources and possibly beyond them. Perhaps Callisthenes omitted the war in the Peloponnese. His published narrative hardly went beyond 330 (Jacoby, *RE* x 1699; *FGrH* ii D 420 f.; Pearson, *LHA* 48 f.), by which time the news of Megalopolis may not have reached Alexander. The earlier operations of winter 333/2 would have been reported promptly while Alexander was still in the Levant (cf. ii 20. 2), and Callisthenes presumably gave some account of them.

Agis succeeded to the Eurypontid kingship in 338/7 after the death of his father, Archidamus II, in south Italy (Diod. xvi 62. 4 ff., 88. 3).

This was a time of acute Spartan weakness; Philip was able to annex their border territory but failed to coerce them into joining the Corinthian League (cf. i 1. 2, 7. 4 nn.). The Spartans were now obsessed with recovering their losses (cf. Polybius xviii 14. 6–8), and the Persians would have given every encouragement to a second front in Greece. The Spartans had sent an embassy to Darius in the months before Issus (ii 15. 2 n.), and we cannot infer from Arrian's silence that this was the first (so Badian, op. cit. 174); he gives no hint of the Athenian overtures to Persia, which took place before 333 (Aesch. 3. 239 ff.; Dein. 1. 10, 18; Plut. *Demosth.* 20; cf. Berve ii 136). Intrigue between Sparta and the Persian court had probably been in progress for years.

ἐπὶ μὲν τριήρους The rendezvous was arranged in advance, and the fact that Agis used a single trireme indicates that he expected no opposition (Badian 175).

5. ἀγγελία . . . τῆς μάχης Badian 175–7 rightly stresses the importance of the news of Issus. Not only was the morale of the anti-Macedonian coalition shattered (*ἐκπλαγέντες* is an understatement) but Alexander's presence unopposed in Syria was a fatal blow to the Persian fleet. In a matter of months the entire Phoenician contingent of eighty ships had gone over to the enemy (ii 20. 1; cf. 13. 7) and the Aegean fleet virtually disintegrated.

6. Ἀγησίλαον (Berve no. 11) Agesilaus, like Hippas, is only known from this passage. Nothing further is heard of him and it is likely that he died before the battle of Megalopolis, for Agis was succeeded by yet another brother, Eudamidas I (Plut. *Agis* 3; *Apoph. Lac.* 220 D; Paus. iii 10. 5; cf. Berve no. 309).

Ταίναρον The rocky peninsula at the southern extremity of the Taygetus ridge. It was to develop into the most important depot for mercenaries in mainland Greece (cf. Badian, *JHS* lxxxix (1961) 25–7). **ἐπὶ Κρήτης** Agesilaus' commission 'to settle the situation' in Crete was more extensive than the mere levying of mercenaries (cf. Curt. iv 1. 39; Badian 177). Agis later took military action, forcing the majority of Cretan cities to adopt the Persian cause (Diod. 48. 2; cf. Curt. iv 1. 40). By the early summer of 331 the situation was so serious that Amphoterus was specially commissioned to invade Crete, which was largely occupied by Spartan and Persian forces (Curt. iv 8. 15; cf. Bosworth, *Phoenix* xxix (1975) 31–3). The Spartans were in fact preparing a secure island base in which the remnants of the Persian fleet would be able to hold out indefinitely.

7. Μένωνα τὸν Κερδίσμυα (Berve no. 514) Apart from a hint in *Itinerarium* 38 (clearly derived from Arrian) there is no other reference to Menon's appointment in Syria. Menon, moreover, never reappears in Arrian's narrative; in 331 the satrap of Syria is named Arimmas. Curtius complicates the issue still more. He claims that Parmenion was placed in charge of Coele Syria in 333 (iv 1. 4) and in late 332

delegated his command to Andromachus (iv 5. 9). After the death of Andromachus a certain 'Memnon' was placed in command of Syria (iv 8. 9). Both Arrian and Curtius are detailed and precise, but they agree on no single point. The prolonged discussion of this divergent source material was summarized and virtually terminated by Leuze (*Satrapieneinteilung* 413–25). I reopened the issue in *CQ* xxiv (1974) 46–53 and reached new and different conclusions. These fall under two headings.

(i) The meaning of Coele Syria. In Arrian's work there seems to be a triple division of Syria: Coele Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia (vii 9. 8; cf. iii 11. 4, v 25. 4). The division is consistent; he locates Gaza in Palestine in the course of his narrative (ii 25. 4; cf. *Ind.* 43. 1), and it is clear that for him Coele Syria denoted the northern area of Syria around the mouth of the Orontes and Palestine covered the area south and east of Phoenicia. That was the regular terminology in the second century A.D. (App. *Praef.* 2. 4; Dio liii 12. 7; cf. *CQ* xxiv (1974) 48 f.), and, as he occasionally does (cf. ii 4. 1 n.), Arrian superimposes the contemporary geographical names. In the Hellenistic period, however, Coele Syria denoted the entire coast from Egypt to Phoenicia—almost precisely Arrian's Palestine (for Polybius (xvi 22a. 3) Gaza belongs to Coele Syria, not Palestine), and the use of the term goes back to the period of the Successors. In Diodorus' digest of Hieronymus Coele Syria refers to the southern part of the Levant (cf. xviii 6. 3, 43. 1, xix 80. 1–5, etc.), whereas the northern area around the Orontes mouth was termed Upper Syria (Diod. xix 79. 6, xx 47. 5). Now when Curtius refers to Coele Syria he seems to use the term in its Hellenistic sense. Both Parmenion and Andromachus were active south of Damascus, in the area Arrian terms Palestine, and it is likely that their sphere of competence was different from that of Menon.

(ii) There were two separate tasks in Syria, one civil and one military. Menon's role, according to Arrian, was defensive, to secure and police the area of north Syria acquired by the victory at Issus. But there was also a military task, to secure the interior of southern Syria while Alexander moved down the coast. Parmenion was given the command of this second front (cf. i 24. 3, iii 18. 1), and later delegated the task to Andromachus. There was, then, a civil satrap in the north and a military commander to the south. This situation persisted into 331, when Andromachus died at the hands of the Samaritans, and was succeeded by 'Memnon' (Curt. iv 8. 9–11). Memnon is an extremely rare name, and there is a strong possibility that Curtius' text is corrupt. Andromachus' successor was probably Menon, son of Cerdimmas, transferred from his command in north Syria to continue the war in the south. The northern satrapy was placed in the hands of Arimmas (cf. iii 6. 8 n.), and Syria remained divided until 330 when it was united with Cilicia under the control of Menes (cf. iii 16. 9).

Στράτων ὁ Γηροστράτου (Berve no. 727) Curtius, iv 1. 6 speaks of Straton as king in his own right. A coin exists bearing Straton's monogram (Head, *HN*² 788), and it has been inferred that he succeeded his father and coined in his own right (cf. Berve). But such independence is most unlikely in the latter years of Alexander's reign; it is more probable that the coin was struck during Straton's regency in 334/3. Straton seems to have surrendered the city in his own right, and he had more authority than his counterpart at Tyre, who was only one of a number of envoys from the *koinon* (ii 15. 7). There were strong checks on the power of Phoenician city-kings. At Sidon in 350 100 prominent citizens were selected as royal advisers (Diod. xvi 45. 1, but note the context), and at Tyre noble judges could hold office for prolonged periods during an interregnum (Jos. c. *Ap.* i 157). But Phoenician kings were hardly constitutional monarchs, as Jones, *CERP*² 234 suggests. The Athenians dealt directly with Straton of Sidon as head of state (Tod ii no. 139), and in 333/2 the Aradian regent made the surrender by himself. The son of the Tyrian king was admittedly less powerful, but he may not have reached his maturity and so was more subject to control. In any case it is likely that the powers of the kings varied from city to city and from period to period, depending on the talents and energies of the individual rulers.

Ἀραδίῳν . . . προσοίκων Aradus, the biblical Arvad, was densely crowded on the small island which is still called Arwad (Strabo xvi 2. 13 (753) comments on the number of multi-storey houses).

8. χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ The people of Tyre were to make a similar donation (Curt. iv 2. 2; Justin xi 10. 10), as had the Carians in 334 (Diod. 24. 3). Such gifts had been common in the Near East as a formal acknowledgement of vassal status (e.g. 2 Kings 16. 8), and the Persepolis friezes depict the annual offerings of the subjects of Persia. By the end of Alexander's reign the presentation of gold crowns became a standard act of homage (cf. vii 23. 2), and the custom was inherited by the Successors (Diod. xix 48. 8; *OGIS* 221, 223).

Μάραθον For the site of Marathus (the modern 'Amrīt) see Honigmann, *RE* xiv 1432 ff. It is in fact not directly opposite Aradus but some distance to the south (cf. Strabo xvi 2. 13 (753)). Marathus was the most important city of the Aradian *paralia* and, not surprisingly, there were grievances against the ruling city (Polybius v 68. 7).

Σιγῶνα . . . Μαριάμμην Sigon is otherwise unknown (for a conjectural location see Honigmann, *RE* ii A. 2455 f.). Mariamme apparently lay in the interior (Ptol. v 15. 16; Pliny, *NH* v 82; Steph. Byz. s.v.; *CIL* xii 4899).

ἐνδίδωσιν Both Arrian and Curtius record only the surrender, omitting any measures taken for the future administration of Aradus. Justin xi 10. 7 speaks generally of confirmation or replacement of existing kings throughout Phoenicia. Presumably Gerostratus was

confirmed in power at Aradus, as was Enylus at Byblus (cf. ii 15. 6). Despite the continuation of the local kingships Phoenician autonomy was strictly limited. The area still paid regular tribute (iii 6. 4 n.) and probably came under the supervision of the satrap of Syria. The garrison established in Tyre (Curt. iv 5. 9; cf. ii 24. 6 n.) would have been a check on the local populace. Nothing shows the vassal status of the Phoenician kings more clearly than the immediate cessation of the local coinage. At Aradus the city mint immediately issued Alexander's own currency; the only concession to local feelings was the addition of the city's monogram first in Aramaic and later in Greek. The same happened at Sidon and Byblus, except that Enylus of Byblus retained his personal monogram on the tetradrachms. (cf. Bellinger 50-6).

14. Darius' First Peace Offer

Cf. E. Schwartz, *RE* iv 1884 f.; Kaerst i³ 376 n. 1; Berve ii 122; Beloch iii² i. 619 n. 1; G. Radet, *REA* xxvii (1925) 183-208; Strasburger 29; Kornemann 115-17; Pearson, *Historia* iii (1955) 449 f.; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 76 f.; G. T. Griffith, *PCPS* ns xiv (1968) 33-48; Schachermeyr² 222-7; G. Wirth, *Chiron* i (1971) 145-7. A work of especial influence is the unpublished dissertation by W. B. Kaiser, 'Der Brief Alexanders des Großen an Dareios nach der Schlacht bei Issos' (Mainz 1957).

The sources are complex, disagreeing on both the number and content of Darius' peace initiatives:

- A. Arrian: (i) ii 14 (Marathus: early 332)—Darius requests his family's return and invites Alexander to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance.
 - (ii) ii 25 (Tyre: summer 332)—Darius offers 10,000 talents ransom and offers to cede all territory to the Euphrates.
- A1. *Itinerarium Alexandri* (this source (fourth century A.D.) is a derivative of Arrian, but there are additions):
 - (i) 39-40 (Marathus: 332): the same offer as in Arrian (i), but Darius offers a ransom of 10,000 talents for his family.
 - (ii) 43-4 (Tyre: 332): the same offer as in Arrian (ii), but it is stressed that the ransom figure was repeated (*sponsa iam pridem*).
- A2. Plutarch *Al.* 29. 7-8 (Phoenicia: spring 331): the same offer as in Arrian (ii), phrased in very similar terms.
- B1. Curtius: (i) iv 1. 7-14 (Marathus: 332): Darius offers to ransom his family (total unspecified) and proposes a treaty of friendship and alliance.
 - (ii) iv 5. 1-8 (Tyre: 332): Darius offers his daughter, Stateira, in marriage and to cede the territory between the Hellespont and Halys.

(iii) iv 11. 1-15 (before Gaugamela: summer 331): Darius offers to leave his son as a hostage, ransom his womenfolk for 30,000 talents, and to cede the territory between the Hellespont and Euphrates.

B2. Justin xi 12. 1-10 gives the whole story of Darius' moves in three undated episodes:

(i) Darius writes from Babylon, asking to ransom his family.

(ii) After a time Darius offers his daughter in marriage and a portion of the empire.

(iii) Before Gaugamela he offers the territory to the Halys, another daughter, and 30,000 talents ransom.

B3. Diodorus: (i) 39. 1-2 (Babylon: 332): Darius urges Alexander to release his family for a ransom and accept his territory to the Halys (Alexander suppresses this letter and forges another).

(ii) 54. 1-6 (before Gaugamela): recapitulation of an earlier offer of the Halys frontier and a ransom (the figure given is corrupt). Darius now offers 30,000 talents, all territory west of the Euphrates, and the hand of a princess.

B4. Valerius Maximus vi 4. *ext.* 3 (undated): this mentions the offer of a daughter and the Halys frontier as well as (apparently) the 10,000 talents ransom, but associates the offer with the intervention of Parmenion, which elsewhere occurs in connection with the Euphrates frontier.

Arrian and the derivative *Itinerarium* are unique in dating the offer of the Euphrates frontier to the time of the siege of Tyre. The proposals are very extravagant for a time when Alexander was stationary, held in check by a long and obstinate siege. Plutarch's dating to the second stay in Phoenicia is far more likely. How the anecdote became misplaced is a matter for conjecture, but it is possible that we have an error of cross-reference. Ptolemy may have mentioned only an unsuccessful peace-offer at the siege of Tyre (Curtius and Justin (ii)) and left its content unspecified. If he then turned to Aristobulus for elucidation, he may have found the proposal of the Euphrates frontier dated to the second visit to Tyre and erroneously concluded that it was the proposal mentioned by Ptolemy (for this type of error see *CQ* xxvi (1976) 125 ff.).

The other alternative, suggested by Griffith, is to conflate Arrian (i) with Curtius/Justin (ii). Darius' original proposal at Marathus was the surrender of the Halys frontier; this proposal Alexander suppressed and substituted for it the letter summarized at ii 14. Griffith argues (37 n. 2) that the common source of Justin and of Curtius (ii)-(iii) combined the two traditions and so had three episodes to be fitted into sequence (cf. Kaerst, *loc. cit.*; Schachermeyr² 223 n. 245). This is certainly ingenious, but the argument raises more difficulties than it solves.

Darius is very quick to make territorial concessions by treaty, an unprecedented step for an Achaemenid monarch (Wirth 147). Even the Marathus letter as given by Curtius and Arrian involved loss of prestige and formal admission of defeat. The letter admittedly does not take a conciliatory tone (Griffith 41 ff.), but it must have taken time for a King of Kings to adjust to the reality and admit publicly that he had an equal if not a superior. It would not be surprising if it took six further months to make the colossal departure of ceding territory. Nor is the letter impudent in tone. Griffith 40 f. makes much of the omission of any ransom offer. But it occurs in Curtius' version and the *Itinerarium*, clearly following Arrian, also mentions a 10,000 talent ransom. There may well be a lacuna in the extant text of Arrian (cf. 14. 3 n.). It is hard to see how on Arrian's account an original letter could have been suppressed. Darius' envoys were commissioned to deliver the proposals both by letter and by word of mouth (cf. Schachermeyr² 223), and they would surely have exposed any chicanery. It is easiest to accept Tradition B's picture of a gradually expanding series of concessions, with the necessary corollary of a misdating by Arrian. The Marathus letter is the first stage, Darius' initial sounding of the victor's intentions. 2. ἐδήλου δὲ ἡ ἐπιστολή Darius' letter begins with self-justification, placing the onus of the war squarely on the Macedonian side. Schachermeyr² 222 sees in this a mark of oriental royal style, constant since the Hittites. But debates on the responsibility for war are common in Greek literature also (cf. Thuc. ii 71 f., vii 18. 2 ff.), and the theme would have occurred to any Greek forger.

φιλία καὶ συμμαχία No other source so much as hints at a formal alliance between Philip and Artaxerxes III. Arrian gives no hint of a date, and objections can be levelled against any dating.

(i) Summer 343 (Beloch iii² 1. 538; Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* 139 n. 1; Wüst, *Philipp II* 89–91). The treaty is brought into the context of the Persian invasion of Egypt in 343/2. Rebuffed by Athens, Artaxerxes turned to Philip to secure his rear. But it is hard to see what Philip would have gained by such an arrangement. While he was representing himself as the champion of the Hellenes the counter-propaganda would have been embarrassing. Any public treaty should also have been reflected in the Demosthenic corpus, which is particularly rich at this period (cf. Dem. 4. 48 for the disquiet in the 350s caused by the mere rumour of such a rapprochement). If it took place in 343, the treaty was a dead secret (cf. Griffith 46 n. 4).

(ii) 351/0 (Schaefer ii² 33; Cawkwell, *CQ* xiii (1963) 127–9). The treaty is assigned to the context of the earlier abortive invasion of Egypt, at a time when there were rumours of diplomatic overtures (Dem. 4. 48). But a treaty of alliance at this period is difficult to reconcile with Philip's harbouring of the rebel Artabazus (Diod. xvi 53. 3; cf. Curt. v 9. 1, vi 5. 2). From the Persian side also the alliance on

equal terms was an impossibility. The King of Kings had no equals and therefore did not conclude formal alliances (cf. Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 157; Diod. xvi 44. 1, which mention only friendship with Athens). For a succinct summary of the case see F. Martin, *M.Helv.* i (1944) 13. Treaties could be made between royal satraps and external powers, as occurred in the Peloponnesian War (cf. Bengtson, *Staatsverträge* no. 202). At almost any time Philip could have concluded an agreement with the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, recognizing the king's territory in return for free rein in eastern Thrace. Such a treaty might be represented from the Greek side as a treaty between monarchs, but hardly by Darius himself (cf. Griffith 46 f.; Ellis, *Philip II* 278 n. 94).

Ἄρσῆς The youngest son of Artaxerxes III Ochus, who was placed on the throne after his father's murder by the chiliarch, the redoubtable eunuch Bagoas (Diod. 5. 3; Trogus, *Prol.* x; cf. iii 19. 4 n.). The king lists give Arsēs two regnal years (338–6; the Oxyrhynchus Chronicle, *FGrH* 255 (4) and (5) erroneously dates his reign 341/0–338/7). The invasion of Asia by Parmenion and Attalus (spring 336) took place in his lifetime, but he was dead by the end of the year, also murdered by Bagoas (Diod. 5. 4; Justin x 3. 4; cf. 14. 5 below).

ἀδικίας πρῶτος . . . ἦρξεν The expression is strongly Herodotean (cf. Hdt. i 2, 5. 3, 130, iv 1. 1, vi 119. 1). Darius is referring to the expeditionary force of Attalus and Parmenion (Diod. xvi 91. 2), which he claims was unprovoked aggression. That invites the counter-charge of Persian involvement in the siege of Perinthus (14. 5). Griffith 43 observes that Darius omits an earlier provocation, Philip's dealings with Hermias of Atarneus in the years before 342. That is a major argument for forgery: Darius is made to ignore an unanswerable accusation. But these intrigues with Hermias are dubious in the extreme, although modern scholars have constructed elaborate fantasies (cf. A.-H. Chroust, *Review of Politics* xxxiv (1972) 373–8). At most there was intrigue, hardly a formal *casus belli*.

14. 3 βασιλεὺς παρὰ βασιλέως This does not imply formal equality. In his negotiations with Persia Evagoras of Salamis had achieved recognition of his regal status, to obey Susa 'as king to king' (Diod. xv 9. 2). Evagoras was recognized as superior to a satrap, a mere slave of the king (Diod. xv 8. 3; cf. Meiggs/Lewis no. 12), but the title of 'king' did not detract from his vassal status.

ἀλδοντας καὶ φιλιαν I suspect a lacuna here. The transition is fairly abrupt, and the parallel passage of Curtius is far more extensive, mentioning a proposed ransom. That in itself is inadequate; any omission in Arrian could be attributed to his own work of abbreviation. But *Itinerarium* 39 follows the tenor of Darius' letter in Arrian and refers explicitly to a ransom: *quarum pretium facere auri talenta x milia*. A reference to a ransom may have fallen out of the text. The manuscripts of Arrian are very susceptible to lacunae, and in most codices the two

lines from διαβῆναι to καταβῆναι (14. 2-3) are omitted. The full text was only restored by Gronovius in 1704.

4. Θέρσιππον (Berve no. 368) Thersippus is also mentioned by Curtius iv 1. 14 He may be the official of Philip Arrhidaeus who is commemorated in the decree of the Island League (*OGIS* 4; cf. Droysen ii² 2. 376).

εἰς τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα Arrian implies that Macedonia was part of Greece, which is the reverse of Isocrates' view of the Macedonians as a barbarian people ruled by a Hellenic king (cf. 5. 19, 108, etc.). H. U. Instinsky, *HZ* clxiv (1952) 560, accordingly argued that ἄλλην is pleonastic and does not subsume the previous concept ('into Macedonia and the rest of the land, namely Greece'). But it is hard to find a direct parallel for the usage in Arrian, and the phrase, *Μακεδονία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς*, recurs too frequently for ἄλλη to be interpreted as pleonastic (cf. Polybius vii 9. 3-7; *SIG*³ 680; Schachermeyr² 667-71). What is more, the inclusion of Macedon in Hellas had a definite point. Alexander's ancestors, Amyntas and Alexander I, were vassals of Persia and joined Xerxes' forces (Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* 4). Representing Macedonia as part of the larger Hellas meant that the pretext of revenge was applicable to the Macedonians (Schachermeyr² 223 f., 671).

τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόν Cf. i 1. 2 n.

5. Περινθίοις For Philip's attack on Perinthus in 340 see Wüst, *Philipp II*. 123-30; Ellis, *Philip II* 174 ff. The Persian intervention took place after the siege began; the king, alarmed by Philip's presence in the Propontis, instructed his satraps to help Perinthus (Diod. xvi, 75. 2; Paus. i 29. 10; cf. Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 222).

εἰς Θράκην This intervention is not attested elsewhere. If historical, it presumably occurred in 340, while Antipater and Parmenion were campaigning against the Tetrachoritae of the Haemus (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 217 f.; Polyaeus iv 4. 1). The Tetrachoritae, it should be noted, were apparently still independent in 335 (cf. i 1. 5 n.).

Ὀχός Alexander, unlike Darius, does not use the regnal name Artaxerxes, which Ochus assumed at his accession. This perhaps implicitly denies the legitimacy of his reign (Droysen i² 1. 269 n. 1; Kaiser 40 f.).

οὓς ὑμεῖς συνετάξατε Curt. iv 1. 12 makes the same allegation, and Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Alexander* 40 f., argues that Darius intrigued directly with the sons of Aeropus before or after the murder. But there is no further evidence besides Alexander's allegation, and, whether true or false, it would have been a natural theme for the Marathus correspondence (cf. Badian, *Phoenix* xvii (1963) 248).

ἀποκτείναντός σου All other sources claim that Bagoas first murdered Arses and his children and then placed Darius on the throne (Diod. 5. 4-5; Ox. Chron. *FGrH* 255 (5); Plut. *De Al. f.* ii 340B; Strabo xv 3. 24 (736)).

οὐδὲ κατὰ . . . νόμον Alexander is probably hinting at rumours that Darius was not of royal blood (Strabo xv 3. 24; Curt. vi. 3. 12). In fact Darius was grandson of Ostanes, brother of Artaxerxes II and younger son of Darius II (Diod 5. 5; Plut. *Artax.* 1; *FGrH* 255 (5)), and after the massive bloodlettings at the accessions of Ochus and Arses he may have been the senior surviving member of the Achaemenid house (see, however, iii 19. 4 n.).

6. οὐδεμιᾶς δεχομένης κτλ. Cf. ii 13. 4 for Persian subsidies to Agis. It is incorrect that the Spartans alone accepted Persian gold. Darius had sent 300 talents to Athens which the *demos* renounced but which Demosthenes is said to have diverted (Aesch. 3. 239; Dein. 1. 10; Plut. *Demosth.* 20). Such venality by individual politicians is presumably the point of the next phrase, τοὺς ἐμοὺς φίλους διαφθειράντων. It would also be surprising if the Thebans had not received Persian funds in 335 (cf. Diod. 9. 5; Justin xi 2. 7). But Alexander's propaganda is consistent. He stresses the general concord of the Hellenes in the war against Persia and stigmatizes the perfidy of the Spartans in holding aloof (cf. i 16. 7, ii 15. 5).

τὴν εἰρήνην . . . κατεσκεύασα The expression, κατασκευάζειν εἰρήνην, is curious. It recurs in the *diagramma* of Philip Arrhidaeus and Polyperchon (Diod. xviii 56. 3) and is used to describe the peace initiatives of Antiochus I Soter (*OGIS* 219. 14). The phrase seems to have been characteristic of the chancellery style of the early Hellenistic period (Wilcken, *SB Munich* 1917 (x). 32 n. 1); but its recurrence in Arrian hardly guarantees Alexander's authorship. It merely suggests that the form of the letter goes back to the time of Alexander and that the author was familiar with the diplomatic language of the period.

7. ὅσοι . . . παρ' ἐμὲ κατέφυγον The identity of these nobles is problematic. We hear only of Mithrines (cf. i 17. 3 n.), who had surrendered the citadel of Sardes and subsequently remained in the Macedonian entourage (Curt. iii 12. 6).

οὐκ ἄκοντες To rule over willing subjects was the mark of a king, not a tyrant (Arist. *Pol.* iii 1285^a 27 f.; Xen. *Mem.* iv 6. 12). It was almost a cliché that the subjects of the king were unwilling (Isocr. 4. 166; cf. Xen. *Hell.* iv 1. 35 f.). Alexander is again implying that he, not Darius, is the legitimate king (Kaiser 49).

9. ὡς πρὸς βασιλεία Alexander now assumes the kingship of Asia, and his ambitions are now the conquest of *all* Persian territory, which is the gift of the gods (cf. Diod. xvi 91. 4). Alexander was to proclaim that lordship achieved after Gaugamela (Plut. *Al.* 34. 1; *FGrH* 532 F 1. C38), but the claims were explicit as early as 332.

There seems nothing in Alexander's letter which could not have been written contemporaneously. The distortions all have some polemical value, and the over-all effect is an impressive case for the Macedonian invasion. On the other hand, Darius' letter is both weak

in argument and does not contain the type of argument the Great King might have used. Griffith seems correct that Darius' case is carefully presented to allow Alexander the most effective riposte. The original source for the exchange may well be Callisthenes, who could easily have transformed Darius' ransom offer and plea for peace into a grand debate, starring Alexander as champion of the Greeks and rightful king of Asia. The whole correspondence reads much better as contemporary propaganda than as an authentic extract from the archives.

15. 1–5. *The Envoys at Damascus*

15. 1 Κωφῆνι τῷ Ἀριαβάζου (Berve no. 459) Cophen presumably returned to Darius after the safe arrival of his charges in Damascus (the city commandant of Curt. iii 13. 2 is a different individual). He was to remain with Darius until the very end, surrendering in Hyrcania with his father (iii 23. 7). Alexander used his diplomatic talents in Sogdiana (Curt. vii 11. 5, 22 f.) and in 324 he drafted him into the cavalry *agema* (vii 6. 4). He hardly colluded with Parmenion in surrendering Damascus (so Niese i 78 n. 2; Willrich, *Hermes* xxiv (1899) 245); his status at Darius' court was not impaired and there can be no question of treason.

2. τοὺς δὲ πρέσβεις Cf. Curt. iii 13. 15. Arrian and Curtius differ markedly. Arrian lists (i) Euthycles of Sparta; (ii) Thessaliscus and Dionysodorus of Thebes; (iii) Iphicrates of Athens. Curtius has no record of Theban ambassadors, naming only representatives from Athens and Sparta: (i) Aristogeiton, Dropides, and Iphicrates from Athens; (ii) Pausippus, Onomastorides, Monimus (so Berve, *RE* xvi 126: the manuscripts read *Omaios*), and Callicratidas from Sparta. The difficulty is compounded by two parallel notes by the same authors dealing with the envoys captured in Hyrcania after Darius' death. Arr. iii 24. 4 lists (i) Callicratidas, Pausippus, Monimus, and Onomas from Sparta and (ii) Dropides from Athens. All these names apparently occur in Curtius' list of envoys captured in 333/2. Curt. vi 5. 6–9 mentions unnamed envoys from Sinope and Sparta, who were detained in Hyrcania and adds that an Athenian, Democrates, committed suicide rather than be captured.

Schaefer (iii² 119 n. 1, 189 n. 2), followed in greater detail by R. Sealey, *Essays in Greek Politics* 194 f., hypothesized that Curtius gave only a partial list of ambassadors present with Darius in 333 and Arrian mentioned only those captured. The Athenian Dropides and all the Spartans except Euthycles escaped from Damascus and remained with Darius for two years. This is most implausible. It is hard to see why the envoys who escaped stayed at the court of a defeated king instead of returning to their home cities. Most scholars (e.g. Berve no. 291, etc.;

Kornemann 117) opt for Arrian's version, but their grounds are the supposed derivation of Arrian's material from the royal archives. It is also difficult to explain away Curtius' narrative as a conflation of the two sets of embassies, for he omits Euthycles in 333/2 while including Iphicrates among the Athenian embassy. If a conflation it is very capricious.

Arrian's story of the capture of Dropides in 330 raises problems. It is difficult to account for an Athenian embassy to Persia at this period. Cawkwell, *CQ* xix (1969) 171 n. 6, suggests that it was sent during the waverings of policy at Athens during winter 331/0. But Persia at this late stage was obviously a broken reed and there was no point in sending an embassy (in violation of the decrees of the League of Corinth) unless Athens was in open revolt. On the other hand, Curtius says nothing about an Athenian embassy in 330; Democrates, who committed suicide, was probably a mercenary commander (*pace* Berve no. 261). What is more, his list of three ambassadors captured in 333/2 is inherently more probable than Arrian's single name, Iphicrates. An embassy of three was regular Athenian practice, but an embassy of one would be unique and unparalleled (cf. D. J. Mosley, *Envoys and Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* 55 ff.). It is probable that Arrian's source mentioned only the most notable of the Athenian ambassadors captured in 333/2 and when describing the events of 330 erroneously substituted the name of Dropides for that of Democrates.

The Spartan ambassadors are a more complex problem. In this case it is probably Curtius who is defective. The more numerous and illustrious embassy, sent to Persia during the desperate time of Agis' War, was substituted for the earlier embassy of Euthycles.

ἥσαν δέ κτλ. All the ambassadors had impressive pedigrees. Thessaliscus must have belonged to the family of Ismenias of Thebes, who was executed on Spartan instigation (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 30 ff; cf. *Hell. Ox.* xvii 1-2, xxiii. 1). The father of Thessaliscus will have been the younger Ismenias, colleague of Pelopidas in the embassy sent to Susa in 367 (Plut. *Artax.* 22; cf. *Pelop.* 27. 1, 29 fin.).

If Dropides and Aristogeiton did, as Curtius says, accompany Iphicrates, they had equally impressive backgrounds, linked with the family of the tyrannicides. Cf. Sealey, *Essays in Greek Politics* 194 ff.; J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* 472-4.

4. τοῦ ἡλικιωτέρου τοῦ Ἰφικράτους The elder Iphicrates had given signal service to the Argead house in 368, when he expelled the pretender Pausanias in the aftermath of the murder of Alexander II and preserved the throne for the Queen Mother Eurydice. Cf. Aesch. 2. 28 f.; Nepos, *Iph.* 3. 2; F. Geyer, *Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II* (HZ Beih. xix: 1930) 132 f. According to Aeschines he had even been adopted at some juncture by Amyntas. The younger Iphicrates must have been counted among the Argead *xenoi* (cf. i 9. 9 n.).

15. 6-7. *From Marathus to Tyre*

Cf. Curt. iv 1. 25 f.

6. αὐτῶν Σιδωνίων ἐπικαλεσαμένων For the destruction of Sidon by Artaxerxes III on the eve of the reconquest of Egypt (344) see Diod. xvi 45. 4-5; Beloch iii² 1. 535; Cawksell, *CQ* xiii (1963) 136-8. Curtius adds that the incumbent king, Straton II, was a friend of Darius and therefore unpopular; Alexander deposed him on public request and, according to the vulgate tradition, he delegated the choice of a successor to Hephaestion (Curt. iv 1. 16-26; Diod. 47. 1; Justin xi 10. 7-9; cf. Berve no. 1). The autonomous coinage of Sidon now ceased. Cf. Head, *HN*² 795 f.; P. Naster, *Proceedings of the International Numismatic Convention* (Jerusalem 1967) 19-21.

7. θῦσαι τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ So Curt. iv 2. 2-3; Diod. 45. 2; Justin xi 10. 10; *Ilin.* 42. Curtius adds that Alexander justified the request by citing his Argead pedigree and claiming that the sacrifice had been prescribed by an oracle (cf. Philip's behaviour in 339; Justin ix 2. 11). Alexander was indeed inspired by the example of Heracles (iii 3. 1-2, iv 28. 4, etc.) and sacrificed regularly to his divine ancestors, Zeus and Heracles (i 4. 5, 11. 7; Curt. iii 12. 27), but there was more to the demand than mere *pietas*. The admission of the army would set the seal on Tyre's vassal status. Curt. iv 2. 10 adds that Alexander arrived at the time of the festival of Heracles/Melqart which took place in the month Peritios (February); cf. Menander of Ephesus, *FGrH* 783 F 1. The date is consistent with the known chronology of the siege of Tyre (cf. ii 24. 6n.), and Curtius' facts should be accepted. Alexander's demand must have looked like an attempt to control or interfere with the celebration of the national festival. Nothing could show more clearly Alexander's claims to be King of Kings and Tyre's position as a vassal.

16. 1-6. *Excursus on Heracles/Melqart*

16. 1 ἱερὸν Ἡρακλέους παλαιότατον Lucian, *De dea Syria* 3, has a note on the temple in the specific context of the non-Argive origins of the Tyrian Heracles; the passage reads like a précis of Arrian.

The antiquity of the temple was proverbial; according to Herodotus (ii 44) it went back 2,300 years, and improvements are ascribed to the reign of Hiram I, c.950 BC (Menander, *FGrH* 783 F 1). The great block of emerald which was its most striking feature is described by Theophrastus (*de lap.* 25; cf. Hdt. ii 44. 2), who probably gained his information from members of Alexander's army. Hdt. ii 44. 3 mentions another temple of Heracles in Tyre, which is presumably identical with the temple in Old Tyre mentioned by Curt. iv 2. 4 and Justin xi 10. 11.

οὐ τοῦ Ἀργαίου Ἡρακλέους The worship of Melqart, the city god of Tyre, is frequently assimilated to that of the Greek Heracles (cf. Hdt. ii 44. 4; Paus. v 25. 12 (Thasos); Paus. vii 5. 5; Strabo xiii 1. 64 (613) (Erythrae); *CIG* 2271. 13 ff.; *Inscr. Delos* v 2308 (Delos). The worship of Melqart was later absorbed into the Graeco-Roman cult of Melicertes (Roscher ii 2. 2633 ff.).

πολλαῖς γὰρ γενεαῖς Hdt. ii 44. 4 is more specific, saying that the shrine to Tyrian Heracles at Thasos was founded five generations before the birth of Heracles, son of Amphitryon. Arrian, or his source, gives a more detailed exposition beginning with the migration of Cadmus. Heracles is then synchronized with Oedipus at the fifth generation. The detail about the birth of Dionysus intrudes irrelevantly, interrupting the family tree of the Argive Heracles. Perhaps Arrian's source was using the cult of Heracles in Tyre to give a genealogy of the ancestors of the Argead house.

3. ἀλλὰ λέγει Ἡρόδοτος Only the statement that Heracles belonged to the Egyptian pantheon is taken from Herodotus (ii 43. 4), and like the other citations of this author (iii 30. 8, v 6. 5, vii 13. 1-6) it comes from Arrian himself.

δ' Ἰακχος ὁ μυστικός 'The mystic Iacchus hymn'. The god Iacchus is variously alleged to be the son of Demeter or Persephone and Zeus or Dionysus himself (cf. Roscher ii. 1. 1 ff.). Arrian's genealogy, from Zeus and Persephone, seems orthodox (*Etym. Magn.* 406. 47). Iacchus was the male component of the Eleusinian triad, and the mystic procession to Eleusis on 20 Boedromion centred around him (cf. Pollux i 35). The hymn to Iacchus was a prominent feature of the procession, sung during the passage through the *agora* (Hesychius s.v. *Διαγόρας*; cf. Roscher ii 1. 7), and that was a part of the ceremonies well known to Arrian (cf. iii 16. 8n.).

4. ὡς τὸν γε ἐν Ταρτησσῷ Arrian is referring to the temple of Heracles/Melqart, which was founded in the Phoenician colony of Gades and located to the east of the island city, facing the mainland (Strabo iii 5. 3 (169)). The temple was celebrated throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and its ritual is described by Silius Italicus (*Pun.* iii 17-31; for earlier descriptions see the accounts of Polybius and Poseidonius, in Strabo iii 5. 7-9).

Arrian is here doubly incorrect. Tartessus was not the name of Gades but of the native kingdom at the mouth of the Guadalquivir, exploited by the Phoenicians since c. 1100 BC and penetrated by Greek commerce until 500 BC, when the Carthaginians intervened to close off southern Spain (A. Schulten, *Tartessus*² (Hamburg 1950) 44 ff.; Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* 343 f.). Gades was a city foundation established by the Phoenicians inside Tartessus (Vell. i 2. 3; Justin xlv 5.2). In the Roman period Tartessus was a distant memory, and it was assumed, wrongly, that Tartessus was an earlier name for Gades (Sall. *Hist.* ii 5; Cic. *Calo*

Maior 49; Avien(i)us 85, 267–9). If Arrian is the author of the digression, it must be an instance of perverse archaizing on his part. That is difficult, for Herodotus, who was very much in Arrian's mind, located the episode of Geryones squarely in Gades (Hdt. iv 8; cf. i 163, iv 152.2), and Arrian elsewhere refers to the city in passing by its usual Greek name *Γάδειρα* (iii 30. 9, vii 1. 2). The terminology must then be taken from Arrian's source, probably Aristobulus.

There is an important consequence. The new verse inscription from Córdoba (see p. 2 above) makes it almost certain that Arrian was proconsul of Baetica around 125. It is striking that he does not mention any knowledge of the temple of Gades, which he must have seen during his term of office, and continues to use the obsolete and misleading name of Tartessus.

5. Ἑκαταῖος ὁ λογοποιός (*FGrH* I F 26) The terminology recurs at v 6. 5 (so iii 30. 8, referring to Herodotus) and is derived from Herodotus himself (ii 143). See K. von Fritz, *Die Griechische Geschichtsschreibung* (Berlin 1967) i 2. 342.

Ἡμεῖς τῆς ἕξω τῆς μεγάλης θαλάσσης Arrian's usage is elsewhere consistent. He refers to the Mediterranean as 'our sea' (vii 1. 2) or 'the inner sea' (v 6. 7, vi 1. 3). The circumambient Ocean is described alternately as 'the outer sea' (v 5. 1, vi 18. 5, 28. 5) or 'the great sea' (v 5. 1, 4). Grundmann's supplement (221 n. 1) restores consistency: 'an island of the outer—that is, the great—sea' (for an exact parallel see v 6. 2). The uncorrected text (retained in Brunt's translation) reads: 'beyond the great sea'. If it is retained, we must assume either that Arrian uniquely termed the Mediterranean 'the great sea' or thought of Erytheia on the far side of the Ocean.

Hesiod, *Theog.* 287 ff., seems the first to have located Geryones in Erytheia by the Ocean. Stesichorus (F 7 Page) located the island off the coast from Tartessus and he was followed by Hdt. iv. 8. Hecataeus, like Eratosthenes later, supposed that the geographical horizon of the early Greeks only gradually expanded and adopted the myths to the framework he evolved (Pearson, *The Ionian Historians* 70 f., 104). [Scylax] 26 also placed the Geryones myth in Cestrine on the Epirote coast (cf. Thuc. i 46. 4; Hammond, *Epirus* 512 f.).

6. οἶδα δὲ ἐγὼ Arrian interposes a rare comment from his own experience, amassed during his period in Nicopolis with Epictetus. Compare *Ind.* 41. 2–3 for a description of the strait between Leucas and the mainland.

The cattle of Epirus were celebrated throughout antiquity: Theopompus, *FGrH* I 15 F 284; Arist. *HA* iii 552^b16–25; Lycus, *FGrH* 570 F 1; [Scymnus] 153–5.

οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ εἰκότος For the idiom see i 9. 6. The argument from probability is Arrian's own: Eurystheus would have heard of the cattle of Epirus but hardly those of remote Spain. He is buttressing an

argument he approves of with a more general argument from probability (cf. v 14. 4–6).

It is usually argued that the entire digression, 16. 1–6, is Arrian's own work (Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D 512; Kornemann 117; Brunt, *Arrian* 181 n. 4). Radet, *Alexandre le Grand* 98, suggests that there was an analogous digression in Arrian's sources, and he may be right. The reference to Tartessus hardly comes from Arrian himself and the somewhat elliptical nature of the argument indicates that he is excerpting others' material with the occasional parenthetical comment.

7. μήτε τινά . . . δέχεσθαι The main issue according to Arrian was Tyrian desire to maintain their neutrality and Curtius agrees that they aimed to keep the island city inviolate (iv 2. 6). Diod. 40. 3 claims that the Tyrians deliberately sacrificed themselves to give Darius time for his preparations. This has been believed (cf. Marsden 7 f.; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 62), but the detail is unique to Diodorus and most unlikely. After Artaxerxes' campaign of 344 it is improbable that Tyre would have imperilled its existence for the sake of Persian long-range strategy. γνωσόμενοι The future participle 'intending to judge this the safest course' is patent nonsense. Lobeck's emendation, γενησόμενον, neatly restores the appropriate sense: 'this course of action was the most plausible for their propaganda for the present and would prove safest for them with regard to the issue of the war, which was still uncertain.'

8. πρὸς ὀργήν Alexander's anger is otherwise attested (Curt. iv 2. 5; Justin xi 10. 11), and it is hardly, as Tarn ii 100 implies, a figment of Peripatetic calumny.

17. *Alexander's Speech before the Siege of Tyre*

The question of authenticity is difficult. Curt. iv 2. 17f. mentions a speech at this juncture, to overcome the soldiers' reluctance to begin the siege, but none of his themes recurs in Arrian's speech. Tarn ii 286f. suggested that the speech came from an original manifesto, on the grounds that the statements about sea power are correct. But Kornemann 118 claims that the theme of thalassocracy looms altogether too large and there are suspicious reminiscences of Parmenion's advice before Miletus (cf. i 18. 6–9). This seems justified. Indeed the speech has little relevance to its context. The question of Tyre is strangely subsidiary; Alexander stresses the impending expedition to Babylon (17. 2 and 4) and begins and ends with the crucial nature of the occupation of Egypt. These considerations come best in the discussion of strategy immediately after Issus, when the debate will have been over the necessity to pursue Darius immediately or to first secure the Levantine coast (Schachermeyr² 212 virtually paraphrases Arrian's speech). I suspect that Arrian found in his sources a speech in favour of

conquering the Levant and turned it into a set piece before Tyre by the addition of such phrases as *ἐξαιρεθείσης δὲ Τύρου*.

17. 2. *ἐπικρατήσαντες αὐτοῖς* Alexander is contemplating the Persians operating from bases in Cyprus and Egypt and transferring the war to Greece. This prospect had worried him in 334/3 (cf. ii 1. 1 n.; Diod. 31. 3 f.), and he would have been well aware of the possibilities for mischief behind his back. But if Tyre alone was at issue the point is irrelevant. The city could have been left in check, an isolated unit on a coast under Macedonian control. The consideration is crucial to the earlier problem, whether or not to leave the Levantine coast unpacified.

ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέως . . . πολεμοῦντων The idiom is Thucydidean (cf. Thuc. i 34. 3; iii 43. 2). At Marathus Alexander had described Sparta as openly hostile (ii 15. 5), which is not the same as outright war. Agis did not declare himself against Macedon for some time, and the trip to Siphnos was probably the first decisive move (ii 13. 4; cf. Badian, *Hermes* xcv (1967) 175 ff.). The offensive in Crete (cf. ii 13. 6 n.) did involve clashes with Macedonian forces (Curt. iv 1. 40), but Alexander cannot have heard so soon. He took preventive action only in spring 331 (cf. iii 6. 3 n.).

18–24. *The Siege of Tyre*

18. 1. *καὶ τὴν καὶ θεῖον* Cf. i 18.6, 25. 6, ii 6. 6. The dream of Heracles recurs in Curt. iv 2. 17 in a speech by Alexander and in Plutarch (*Al.* 24. 5), who reports it as the first of a series of manifestations of Heracles. The connection of Aristander with this dream is unique to Arrian. In Curt. iv 2. 14 he gives a similarly optimistic interpretation to a very different portent (so Diod. 41. 7), while Plut. 25. 1 ff. gives a totally different context for his prophecies. The dream seems common to all sources, and there is no point in attempting to isolate Aristobulus as its source (so Schwartz, *RE* ii 913; Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD. 512; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 62). It seems to be a piece of contemporary propaganda (Alexander's ancestor yielding up the city) and any source including Ptolemy might have mentioned it.

2. *νῆσος . . . ἦν* Cf. [Scylax] 104; Diod. 41. 3; Curt. iv 2. 7–8; Strabo xvi 2. 23 (756 f.); Pliny, *NH* v 76; *RE* vii A. 1877–9. The width of the strait between the island city and mainland Tyre is estimated at 4 stades (Curtius) or 700 paces (Pliny). What was the island (modern Şūr) is now connected to the mainland by a broad isthmus, the basis of which is formed by Alexander's mole (cf. Schachermeyr² 264, pl. 13). The isthmus had formed by the early Empire (Strabo and Pliny, *loc. cit.*).

3. *χῶμα ἔγνω χωνύναί* According to the vulgate (Diod. 40. 5; Curt.

iv 2. 16ff.) the mole was 200 feet broad. The method of attack was probably modelled on the famous siege mole used by Dionysius I in his capture of Motya in 397 (Diod. xiv 48. 3, 51, 1 f.). The labour involved was colossal but ineffectual; the walls were too high and the Tyrian fire-power too concentrated on the one sector (cf. ii 21. 3-4). Ultimately the city fell to naval attack. It is significant that in 315 Antigonos was faced by a similar siege of Tyre, again without naval support. He ignored Alexander's siege mole and devoted himself to building a fleet, so that the city was starved into capitulation (Diod. xix 58, 61. 5). In sharp contrast Alexander did not begin to amass a fleet until the successful Tyrian counter-attack on the mole (ii 19. 6).

ἔστι . . . τὸ χωρίον The idiom seems modelled on Thuc. i 26. 5.

λίθων . . . ὕλης Alexander demolished Old Tyre to supply masonry for the mole (Diod. 40. 5; Curt. iv 2. 18).

ἐς τὸ ἐπιμένειν Curtius harps on the instability of the mole, observing that the prevailing winds and waves gradually eroded the superstructure (iv 2. 8, 3. 6-7 = Diod. 42. 5). The latter passage emphasizes the damage inflicted by a storm, not a trace of which is found in Arrian, who mentions only Tyrian harassment.

4. ἕκαστα ἐξηγουμένου Polyaeus iv 3. 3 states that Alexander took a basket and inaugurated the work on the mole.

5. ταῖς τριήρεσι Extra detail in Curt. iv 2. 19-23 and Diod. 41. 1.

6. πύργους ἐπ' ἄκρου Compare Curtius' description (iv 2. 23), taken from the same source as Arrian. The device of protecting the building work with siege engines had originated at the siege of Motya (Diod. xiv 49. 3), and it is remarkable that Alexander resorted to it only after suffering numerous casualties. Both Arrian and Curtius make it plain that the towers were designed primarily to repel counter-assaults by the Tyrians; they were not the assault towers later described by Diod. 42. 7 (as assumed by Fuller 210, following Tarn). Alexander was concerned to get the mole far enough advanced and stable enough to provide a platform for the heaviest engines. The measures to defend the labourers will have needed less massive preparations. Alexander later used a supplementary screen of ships (Diod. 42. 5).

προκαλύμματα . . . τοξεύματα The passage is very closely modelled on Thuc. ii 75. 5. The similarity of phrasing in Curtius suggests that the shaping goes back to the common source.

19. *The Tyrian Fireship*

19.1. ναὺν ἱππαγωγόν In fourth-century Athens horse transports were superannuated triremes with the lower banks of oars stripped away (Morrison and Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* 248 f.). The Tyrian vessel was far larger than this; Curt. iv 3. 2 speaks of a vessel of exceptional size.

2. *κεραίαν διπλήν* 'A double yard'. Greek yards could be as long as the main mast (Casson, *Ships and Seamanship* 232), and it is most improbable that each of the two foremasts had a double yard attached (as implied by Brunt, *Arrian* 191). Presumably two yards of normal length were passed over the foremasts and lashed together at their meeting-point above the centre of the vessel. All yards may have been composite originally (cf. Morrison and Williams 294), but by Alexander's time it was the exception rather than the rule.

3. *ἐξάψαντες . . . εἰλκον* 'fastening the ship with ropes, they towed it from the rear by means of triremes'. *ἐξάψαντες* seems to be used absolutely. Arrian elsewhere uses the verb with a direct accusative (cf. ii 21. 7) and there seems no parallel for its omission. The verb has been connected with *τῇν ναὺν*, 'fastening the ship to the triremes' (so Facius *navem triremibus alligatam*; Abicht), but the verb is then used with the dative instead of the genitive, which is equally extraordinary. *κατ' οὐράν* is Krüger's conjecture, based on a gloss in B; the rest of the transmission reads *κατ' οὐρόν vel sim*. This is surely correct. Given the prevailing wind from Tyre to the mole, the towing triremes would need to stay astern of the fireship, and only if they were astern could they hope to drive it on to the head of the mole.

6. *τοὺς μηχανοποιούς* Apart from ii 21. 1 this is the only reference in Arrian to Alexander's famous team of siege-engineers and none of their names appears in the extant histories. But the capture of Tyre was largely due to their inventive acumen; a list of famous engineers describes the Thessalian Diades (Berve no. 267) as 'the man who took Tyre with Alexander' (*Laterculi Alexandrini*, ed. Diels, *Abh. Berl. Akad.* 1904, col. 8). Diades, like his colleague Charias (Berve no. 821), had been a pupil of Polyeidus, Philip's engineer at Perinthus and Byzantium (Vitruv. x 13. 3), and he must have been responsible for the massive stone-throwing catapults used against the walls of Tyre (Diod. 42. 7; cf. Arr. ii 21. 7; E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* 102 f.). See also Berve nos. 656, 789.

20. 1–5. *Interlude at Sidon*

Curt. iv 3. 11–12 mentions the arrival of the Cypriot fleet and of Cleander's mercenaries and gives an abbreviated account of the engagement before Tyre (= Arr. 20. 6 ff.). But the expedition into the Antilibanus is transposed to an earlier stage in the siege, before the fireship incident and subsequent storm damage to the mole (iv 2. 24–3. 7). The effect is to exculpate Alexander from any responsibility for the disasters; cf. W. Rutz, *Hermes* xciii (1965) 376 f.

20. 1. *ἐν τούτῳ* This was in early spring. The news of Issus, fought in November 333, will have reached the Aegean fleet after the end of the sailing season (cf. ii 11. 10 n.); and the Phoenician and Cypriot

contingents were in no position to defect until early April (cf. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship* 270–2). When the Phoenician fleet reached home the siege of Tyre had been under way for at least two months, and during that period Alexander was without any effective naval force.

Γηρόστρατος . . . Ἐνυλος Compare ii 13. 7–8 with notes. Arrian says nothing about the king of Tyre who served in the Aegean with his city's contingent (ii 15. 7). When the city was stormed he was among the notables found in the temple of Melqart (ii 24. 5). He must have returned with his fellow kings and reached Tyre before the naval blockade began.

νῆες ὀγδοήκοντα Arrian's sum total for the vessels at Sidon is 224, which agrees with Plutarch's statement (*Al.* 24. 5) that Alexander had 200 triremes at the siege. Curt. iv 3. 11 says that there were 190 ships in the surprise attack on Tyre, which may be correct. Alexander need not have used every available ship.

2. ἐκ'Ρόδου This is the first appearance of the Rhodians in Arrian or indeed the Alexander historians. The vulgate (Curt. iv 5. 9; Justin xi 11.) places the formal surrender of the island after the siege of Tyre, slightly later than Arrian. The Rhodians had hardly been inactive during the Aegean War, as is claimed by Tarn ii 215. In 340 they had been hostile to Philip and sent help to Byzantium (Diod. xvi 77. 2; Front. i 4. 13A). According to Frontinus Philip then made conciliatory moves, but there is no evidence that Rhodes joined the Corinthian League either in 337 or later (Ehrenberg, *Al. & the Greeks* 18). While Memnon, himself a Rhodian, was operating in the south Aegean it is unlikely that the island could or would have stayed neutral. Neighbouring Cos had been a base for the Persian fleet since 334 (ii 5. 7, 13. 6; cf. Diod. 27. 5), and Rhodes must also have collaborated. At least the Persian garrison at Mitylene was commanded by a Rhodian (cf. ii 1. 5 n.). When the Persian fleet dissolved in early 332 it was obvious that the Aegean War was over, and the Rhodians sent a delegation of submission with a splendid peace offering (Plut. *Al.* 32. 11). Only the residual Persian garrison prevented Cos doing likewise (iii 2. 6).

Alexander responded by imposing a garrison. There were complaints in the following spring and Curt. iv 8. 12 implies that it was removed. But his terminology is vague, and the Rhodian representations may not have been successful. A Macedonian garrison was expelled from Rhodes in 323 (Diod. xviii 8. 1) and may have been *in situ* since 332. The fact that Harpalus' treasurer took refuge in the island (Paus. ii 33. 4) does not disprove the garrison's existence (*pace* Tarn). Rhodes was the nearest large island to Crete, where Harpalus died, and the garrison in the city was at the far side of the island from the natural landing point (Fraser, *PdP* vii (1952) 200 n. 3; cf. H. Hauben, *Historia* xxvi (1977) 307–11).

It is a more vexed question whether constitutional change took place. Tarn ii 215 stated dogmatically that Rhodes retained her oligarchy into the Hellenistic period. But the epigraphical evidence is unequivocal that the Rhodian constitution was a democracy. G. Pugliese-Caratelli, *PdP* iv (1949) 154-71, argued that the democratic institutions were the work of Alexander, but the epigraphical texts on which the argument was based were redated by P. M. Fraser, *PdP* vii (1952) 192-206. In particular he seems to have shown (195 f) that the institution of the *mastroi*, the secondary probouleutic body of the three former Rhodian cities, goes back to the early days of the fourth century, before the Carian-imposed oligarchy of the 360s. While Rhodes remained under Persian control the oligarchy is likely to have remained. In that case Alexander presumably restored the democracy. Rhodes was certainly democratic in the Hellenistic period (*SIG*³ 581. 14 = *Staatsverträge* iii no. 551), and the democracy existed shortly after Alexander's death. The *demos* in 315 voted to build ships for Antigonos (Diod. xix 58. 5), and an Argive inscription (c.300) praises the assistance given by the *demos* in a Hellenic War, probably the Lamian War (Moretti no. 40). All the indications are that on Rhodes as on Chios Alexander set up a commission to re-establish democracy (cf. Tod ii no. 192. 5-6).

Relations between Alexander and Rhodes were not cordial. The dedication to the temple of Athene at Lindos (*FGrH* 532 F 1, C 38) is of a piece with the dedications to Athene at Athens and Ilium; Alexander's respect for Athene was quite compatible with suspicions of the local populace. Nor can one build upon the Rhodian interpolations in the Alexander Romance (Merkelbach, *Die Quellen des gr. Alexanderromans* 145 ff.) or the Hellenistic tradition that Alexander deposited his will there (Diod. xx 81. 3; cf. Fraser 202 ff.; Hauben 311 ff.). On the contrary, the persistence of a garrison until the end of the reign suggests that Rhodian loyalties were very questionable.

ἡ τε περίπολος This Rhodian vessel is not mentioned elsewhere. It is usually assumed to have been a state trireme like the Athenian Salaminia and Paralus. Compare Diod. xix 77. 3 for a similar Rhodian squadron of ten ships (Tlepolemus' mythical Rhodian fleet comprised nine ships: *Iliad* ii 654).

3. οἱ τῆς Κύπρου βασιλεῖς During this period Cyprus was divided into nine kingdoms (Diod. xvi 42. 3 f.); Amathus was probably autochthonous (Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 103. 3; [Scylax] 103; Jones, *CERP*² 364), Lapethus and Citium were Phoenician and the rest Greek (cf. Berve i 286 f.; Sir G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus* i (Cambridge 1940) 146 ff.). Arrian mentions the presence of three kings at Tyre: Pnytagoras of Salamis (ii 20. 6, 22. 2), Androcles of Amathus, and Pasicrates of Curium (ii 22. 2).

ὅπ' ἀνάγκης . . . κατὰ γνώμην Not all the kings will have been reluctant to serve in 334/3. There was consistent rivalry between Salamis and

Citium, the chief Greek and Phoenician cities; and the Phoenician element seems to have had Persian backing (Jones, *CERP*² 366). Alexander indeed seems to have taken reprisals of some sort against Pumiathon, the king of Citium, which he unsuccessfully tried to divert by means of a spectacular present (Plut. *Al.* 32. 10). When Pnytagoras of Salamis left Tyre Alexander gave him at his own request part of Pumiathon's territories (Duris, *FGrH* 76 F 4), almost certainly the inland city of Tamasus, which Pumiathon had acquired by his 21st regnal year and lost again by his 37th (326/5); cf. *CIS* i 10-11 (Oberhummer, *RE* xi 538; Hill, op. cit. i 150).

4. ἐπ' Ἀραβίας στέλλεται This expedition is narrated by Curt. iv 2. 24 at a slightly earlier point in the siege, and Plutarch gives a particularly romantic episode in it, which he excerpted from Chares (Plut. *Al.* 24. 10-12 = *FGrH* 125 F 7; cf. also Polyaeus iv 3. 4). It took place some months after the siege began but early enough in the year for the nights in the Antilibanus to be unpleasantly cold (Plut. *Al.* 24. 11), perhaps in late April. Arrian gives no motive for the expedition, but Curtius states that a group of Macedonians were waylaid. The action probably took place in the Massyas valley (now the Bekaa) which separates the Libanus and Antilibanus ranges and which was still plagued by Ituraean and Arab brigands in Roman times (Strabo xvi 2. 18 (755); cf. *ILS* 2683). The Bekaa is still the most fertile area of Lebanon and it must have provided much of the timber for Alexander's siege-works (cf. Curt. iv 2. 18). Theophrastus describes the flora of the region (*HP* ix 7. 1; Pliny, *NH* xii 104), his information perhaps deriving from this campaign.

5. Κλέανδρον τὸν Πολεμοκράτους cf. Curt. iv 3. 11. He had been dispatched to Greece probably in spring 333 (cf. i 24. 2 with note), and had therefore been away nearly a year. All manuscripts and the Byzantine *excerpta* read Ἀλέξανδρον for Κλέανδρον.

20. 6-10. *The Naval Assault against Tyre*

Cf. Curt. iv 3. 11-12 (very abbreviated).

6. ἐπιβιβάσας . . . ἡ ναυμαχία γίγνεται The *locus classicus* for the contrast here made is Thucydides' description of the battle of Sybota (i 49. 1-3), where both sides packed their decks with hoplites and archers, in what Thucydides calls the old-fashioned way, resembling a *πεζομαχία*; 'it was not easy to break away because of the number and the press of the ships, and the hopes of victory lay chiefly in the hoplites on the decks, who took their stand and fought while the ships were at rest. There were no *διέκπλοι*'.

For the tactic of *διέκπλους*—breaking the enemies' line in column,

then wheeling to take the ships individually in the flank, see Hdt. vi 12. 1 and Gomme's note on Thuc. ii 83. 5.

It is clear that by Alexander's day the old-fashioned grappling and boarding tactics had returned and become the standard method of fighting (cf. i 18. 8 n.).

πλὴν Πινυταγόρου (Berve no. 642). Pnytagoras was the king of Salamis, the principal Greek city of Cyprus. In 351, or thereabouts, he had expelled his relative, Evagoras II, from the throne and helped engineer a general revolt against Persia. Thanks to dissension among the leaders of the Persian punitive force he was able to maintain his throne after submitting to Persian sovereignty (Diod. xvi 42. 7, 46. 1-3). Pnytagoras was dismissed with honour by Alexander (cf. ii 20. 3 n.), but seems to have died within a year. His son Nicocreon (Berve no. 568) is attested king in 331 (Plut. *Al* 29. 2 f.).

οὗτος δὲ καὶ Κράτερος So Curt. iv 3. 11. This is no formal contradiction of Curtius' previous assertion that Craterus was left in command with Perdiccas at Tyre when Alexander left for the Antilibanus. It seems that in the meantime Parmenion had returned from the hinterland (cf. Polyaeus iv 3.4) and taken over the command at Tyre. Craterus may have moved up to join the fleet in Sidon.

7. πρότερον μὲν ναυμαχεῖν According to Diodorus (42. 1-5) the Tyrians had actually launched an assault on the mole, when Alexander appeared with his fleet and tried to cut off their retreat and capture the Tyrian harbour. This is a very circumstantial story, and the core of it reappears in Polyaeus (iv 3. 4). The only factor common to the traditions of Diodorus and Arrian is the sinking of the three Tyrian triremes (cf. 20. 9 n.). But this incident seems placed much later by Diodorus than Arrian, at a stage when the assault fleet had been in operation for some time, protecting the work on the siege mole (Diod. 42. 5-7). Either there is a gap in Arrian's narrative or the vulgate tradition has fabricated additional details to make the combat more evenly balanced (cf. Brunt, *CQ* xii (1962) 148).

One thing is obvious. There is not enough detail in Arrian to fill in the eight months of the siege, and there must have been more activity than he mentions. In particular the mole mysteriously disappears from the stage; the Tyrian fireship brings construction work to a temporary halt while the construction is still in progress and the mole some distance from the city walls. The next we hear is that the Macedonians are in a position to attack the wall (ii 21. 3). Diodorus gives subsidiary detail that the construction work was pushed forward under a thick screen of ships (42. 5), convincing detail which is totally omitted by Arrian. Now it might be that Ptolemy included only the most striking and salient detail, but it is perhaps more probable that only incidents are selected which show the Macedonians victorious against natural difficulties and surprise attacks, and ignored the very considerable setbacks incurred

during the siege. Cf. Bosworth, in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 16 ff.

πολλῷ τῷ ῥοθίῳ (cf. vi 3. 3) 'with a great dash of oars', 'with a great spurt'. Cf. Polyæn. iv 7. 6 with Morrison and Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* 203, 311; Casson, *Ships and Seamanship* 279 n. 37.

βύζην Cf. i 19. 3 with note.

9. τὸν πρὸς Σιδῶνος This was, and is, the principal harbour of Tyre, though silting has reduced its dimensions (cf. *RE* viiA. 1879).

ἀντιπρώροις The sense of ἀντίπρῳρος here must be 'with prows opposed to the enemy'. Alexander was faced with a mass of warships crammed together side by side in parallel lines, all with their rams pointing seawards.

τρεῖς δέ . . . Φοίνικες The Phoenicians involved were, of course, the Phoenicians of Alexander's fleet; Diod. 43. 3 and Curt. iv 3. 12 confirm the sinking of the three Tyrian triremes. Neither mentions an additional screen of ships blocking the harbour mouth and Strabo xvi 2. 23 (757) claims that the Sidonian harbour was a closed harbour. That may not have been the case in Alexander's day (cf. ii 24. 1); but the mouth was narrow enough to be covered by a screen of sails (cf. 21. 8) and hardly wide enough to accommodate a large number of triremes in line. If Arrian is correct, we must assume that the blocking vessels were moored in several lines, the three triremes which were sunk forming the outer line.

10. τὸν πρὸς Αἴγυπτον ἀνέχοντα This harbour is described in ii 24. 1 as closed by booms; and indeed a mole has been discovered, now submerged to the south of the island. It is about 75 m. long and 8 broad with a central entrance well fortified. This seems to confirm Arrian's description. The harbour was artificial. But Strabo describes the Egyptian harbour explicitly as ἀνεμμένον (open). It is supposed that by his day the old artificial harbour had silted up, and instead the sandy beach south of Alexander's mole was used (cf. Acts 21. 5-6; *RE* viiA. 1880).

21. 1-7. *The Assault Proper Begins*

21. 1. οὐ ταχυνευτοῦσαι Alexander selected ships which were waterlogged or unserviceable for use as catapult carriers (for the use of ταχυνευτοῦσα meaning 'in first-rate shape' or 'ready for action', see Casson, *Ships and Seamanship* 92-3). Arrian uses the imprecise word μηχαναί to describe the weaponry; Diod. 45. 2 claims that stone-throwing catapults were used against the walls (for the first time apparently; at Halicarnassus stone throwers had been used, but only as an anti-personnel weapon—cf. E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* 101, 103), and it is clear from ii 21. 7 that catapults capable of launching stones were mounted on the ships.

Diodorus adds (43. 3) that Alexander used triremes lashed together to support his siege engines, a detail corroborated by Curt. iv 3. 14 ff., who says that pairs of quadriremes were lashed together at the prows to form a delta shape. The interval was boarded over and used as a platform for troops. Both types of vessel, the catapult and the personnel carrier, are mentioned by Arr. ii 23. 3, and they were clearly intended to operate in conjunction, the one giving covering fire and the other storming the wall. The troop carriers were equipped with a type of scaling ladder which Arrian calls γέφυρα and Diodorus ἐπιβάθρα (45. 5–6, 46. 2); the two expressions were synonymous as is proved by Arrian's description of the siege of Massaga (iv 26. 6, 27. 1). This device looks like an anticipation of the famous *sambycae* which were later used by Marcellus against Syracuse and by Mithridates against Rhodes. These were large scaling ladders, carried between two vessels lashed together and raised by a pulley system on the mastheads (Polyb. viii 4. 2 ff.; Andreas of Panormus, *FGrH* 571 F 1; Appian, *Mithr.* 26. 103, 27. 105; cf. J. C. Landels, *JHS* lxxxvi (1966) 69–77). Alexander's ἐπιβάθραι seem to have been raised from a specially constructed wooden turret (Diod. 45. 2; cf. Athen. Mech. 10. 10, 15. 5) not from masthead pulleys. The principle, however, seems to have been the same—ship-borne ladders raised mechanically to the height appropriate for storming the walls.

3. βέλει τε . . . καὶ πυρφόροις οἰστοῖς Diodorus describes additional anti-catapult weapons devised by the Tyrian engineers—revolving wheels acting as a buffer (Diod. 43. 1–2). Tarn ii 120–1 dismisses these details together with the complementary inventions at 43. 8 and 45. 3 as taken from a Hellenistic textbook on siege warfare. This is quite arbitrary—and the fact that two of the details are repeated in Curtius (iv 3. 24–5—barbed grappling irons and shields piled with red-hot sand) is conclusive that they are taken from a common historical source, not—as Tarn believes—that Curtius suddenly took to copying Diodorus.

4. εἰς πεντήκοντα καὶ ἑκατὸν μάλιστα πόδας This is surely a blatant exaggeration (though accepted without question by Kornemann 119 and Fuller 210). Had the walls been of the height Arrian states, it would have been quite superfluous to build wooden towers on the battlements to gain additional height. If Alexander's siege towers had surpassed the height of the walls they would have far outstripped even Demetrius' gigantic *helepolis*, which we are explicitly told was the greatest siege-machine hitherto constructed—this monster was of nine storeys, and its sloping sides each 100 cubits long (Diod. xx 91. 3–4). So even this most colossal of all siege engines hardly reached the same height as the walls of Tyre according to Arrian. Neither Diodorus nor Curtius has a figure so sensational, merely mentioning that the Tyrians built a second wall in threatened areas, 10 cubits thick and 5 cubits

behind the existing wall (Diod. 43. 3; Curt. iv 3. 13). This was a sound and common defensive move (cf. i 21. 4 with note), but surely superfluous if the walls were of Arrian's dimensions.

5. ναῦς καταφράξαντες Athenian triremes were equipped with elaborate παραρρύματα to provide cover for the whole deck and rowing areas (cf. Xen. *Hell.* i 6. 19; *IG* ii² 1609. 48–50, etc; Casson, *Ships and Seamanship* 249 f.). The Tyrians will similarly have protected their decks and gunwales with hide coverings to withstand the rain of missiles from above.

6. ὕφαλοι κολυμβηταί Similar acts of daring are recorded of Scyllias of Scione (Paus. x 19. 1–2; Apollonides *Anth. Pal.* ix 296) and of the defenders of Byzantium in AD 194 (Dio lxxv 12. 2). See further F. J. Frost, *Greece and Rome* xv (1968) 180–5.

ἀλῦσσειν ἀντὶ σχοίνων Contemporary Athenian triremes were issued with two sets of σχοίνια τριηρητικά—of six and eight fingers' breadth respectively (cf. Casson 265 n. 3). It is clear that anchor-chains were unknown and had to be improvised under emergency conditions. Caesar was later to remark on the curiosity of the Veneti of the Breton coast using anchor chains instead of cables (*BG* iii 13. 3).

7. ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος ἀνέσπων Either (i) 'they drew up the stones out of the sea, operating from the mole' (so apparently Gronovius and the Loeb translation) or (ii) 'they drew the stones from the mound out of the sea': so Vulcanius 'saxa itaque in struem accumulata' and, most recently, E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery* 103.

(i) is virtually ruled out by the fact that working parties operating on Alexander's mole would only be able to clear the obstructions in their immediate vicinity; ii 21. 5, moreover, says explicitly that the haulage was done by ships.

Interpretation (ii) still presents difficulties; the expression ἀπὸ τοῦ χώματος is elliptical and misleading; there was no hint earlier that the stones were in any way piled up into a mole. It is also difficult to see how the operation took place. The vessels would need to be anchored well away from the obstructions to avoid running aground, and the anchors would have needed to be both numerous and extraordinarily strong to provide sufficient purchase to winch out the submerged stones. Arrian adds that the salvaged stones were loaded on to the siege engines and shot out into deep water. Now the maximum recorded weight of a catapult shot is 3 talents (Moschion *ap.* Athenaeus v 208 c), and the catapults involved were specially designed by Archimedes, certainly much larger than Alexander's artillery. If Arrian's description is correct, the stones of Tyre's outer defences were surprisingly small.

21. 8–22. 5. *The Final Tyrian Naval Sortie*

Curt. iv 4. 6–9.

8. ἀμφὶ μέσον ἡμέρας This stratagem of making a lightning attack during the enemy's lunch-break was as old as the art of fighting in Greece (Thuc. vii 39 f.; Xen. *Hell.* ii 1. 24 ff.; cf. Hdt. vi 78). Fuller observes with some justice that Alexander seems to have taken no steps to protect his fleet against such a well-worn stratagem (214).

9. πεντήρεις . . . καὶ τετρήρεις Quinqueremes and quadriremes seem to have evolved in the West during the first years of the fourth century BC. Dionysius I had built 'fours' and 'fives' in 397 for the siege of Motya, and the 'fives' are explicitly described as the first ever built (Diod. xiv 41. 3; 42. 2, 44. 7). The Carthaginians had invented the 'four' some years previously (Pliny, *NH* vii 207 = Arist. *F* 600; Clem. Alex. *Strom* i 45. 10). From Carthage the innovation had travelled to the Phoenician motherland, and by the 340s Sidon is attested with a fleet of 'fives' (Diod. xvi 44. 6), and the 'five' had become the regular flagship in both the Cypriot and Phoenician fleets (cf. ii 22. 2–3). In the Greek mainland the larger vessels were slower to infiltrate. The Athenian navy lists mention that in 330 the Athenian fleet had a mere 18 'fours' to 392 triremes (*IG* ii² 1627. 266–78). By 324 the numbers had increased to 50 'fours'. These vessels seem to have been of roughly the same dimensions as the trireme with reduced numbers of oars, but with two men at each oar—the 'four' had two banks of oars and the 'five' three, the two upper tiers each accommodating two oarsmen (cf. Morrison and Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* 290–1; Casson, *Ships and Seamanship* 101 ff.). This introduction of a second man to the oar meant that relatively unskilled rowers could be drafted into the fleets to give extra muscle-power for the propulsion of heavier vessels.

τὰ μὲν πρῶτα κτλ. 'At first they put out in single file, rowing gently and sliding their oars without the commands of the *keleustai*.'

The commentary to this passage is supplied by Xenophon (*Hell.* v 1. 8). Here the Spartan admiral Gorgopas is trailing an Athenian squadron in conditions of maximum secrecy: λίθων τε ψόφῳ τῶν κελευστῶν ἀντὶ φωνῆς χρωμένων καὶ παραγωγῇ τῶν κωπῶν. Παραγωγή is obviously a technical term for an especially quiet mode of rowing, something like the modern feathering. Arrian's terminology—τὰς κώπας παραφέροντες—must mean something similar. The Tyrian crews dispensed with the regular timing for their strokes given by the *keleustai* and used an especially quiet rowing technique. Both would have required extreme skill (cf. Thuc. ii 84. 3), and the need for exceptional oarsmen would have limited severely the size of the fleet for the sally. The crucial factor was silence, and once again this prevented the use of anything but a small squadron. A trireme made a considerable noise

when it was rowed into action (cf. Arist. *HA* vii 533^b6) and the noise made by a large fleet could not possibly have been muffled (compare the description of the Indus fleet at vi 3. 3).

22. 1. Ἀλέξανδρον κτλ. Alexander is as usual given the spotlight (cf. i 21. 5 n.). His alacrity and brilliance is contrasted by implication with the unpreparedness of the Cypriot kings. Curt. iv 4. 6 is more circumspect, but mentions Alexander's personal participation (*et rex quoque aderat*).

2. τὴν Ἀνδροκλέους . . . καὶ τὴν Πασικράτους (Berve nos. 73, 609). Androcles is attested dynast of Amathus in 321 (Arr. *Succ. F.* 24. 6); he must have been confirmed in the kingship by Alexander. The domicile of Pasicrates is more difficult. All traditions read τοῦ Θουριέως, which is meaningless in a Cypriot context. G. H. Dörner's emendation, *Κουριέως*, has been universally accepted and is now confirmed by a recent epigraphical find. Dr. D. M. Lewis has kindly brought to my attention a catalogue, probably of *theorodokoi*, from Nemea (S. G. Miller, *Hesperia* xlviii [1979] 78f., a partial report only; much more is legible on the photograph, Plate 22). Under the heading of Curium this document lists two sons of Aristocrates, Pasicrates and Themistagoras. Immediately above is Nicocreon, son of Pnytagoras of Salamis (cf. ii 20. 6 note) and immediately below comes the other known Pasicrates, king of Soli from at latest 331 (Plut. *Al.* 29. 3; Arr. *Ind.* 18. 8; *Succ. F.* 24. 6). Pasicrates of Curium is therefore attested as a contemporary Cypriot dynast, but nothing is known about his régime.

22. 6–7. Concerted Assault on Tyre

6. There are similar details in Curtius/Diodorus, but disposed at somewhat earlier points in the narrative. Diodorus in particular is extremely full: 43. 3–5 mentions the shaking and collapse of the walls, and then 43. 6–44. 5 portrays a similar concerted land/sea attack, with graphic details of Tyrian defence measures. The Macedonian assault leads up to a climax, with the Macedonians storming the walls from ἐπιβάθραι but repelled (44. 1–7), so that Alexander thinks seriously of abandoning the siege. Curt. iv 3. 13–18 mentions the combined land/sea attack with additional danger to the troop carriers when a squall blew up (NB νηνεμίαν φυλάξας Arr. ii 23. 1); after an interlude he describes the Tyrian defence measures much as Diodorus does (iv 3. 24–6), and he also portrays Alexander considering whether or not to lift the siege.

Tarn (ii 120–1) rejects the passage in Diodorus from 43. 6 onwards, claiming that at this point there intrudes a second account, representing the siege as a land action with details copied from a Hellenistic siege

manual. What Curtius has in common is copied from Diodorus. This is a bizarre hypothesis and based on misconceptions:

(i) Tarn seems to think that the mole never reached the island of Tyre. It is clear from Arr. ii 22. 6 that siege engines were brought along the mole to attack the wall. So the 'good' tradition agrees that the mole reached the island.

(ii) The wooden tower with its ἐπιβάθρα (43. 7, 46. 2) is said to be only applicable to an attack on land. It is clear that towers could be transported on ships, and the attack on Tyre via ἐπιβάθραι and towers is virtually guaranteed by iv 26. 6 and 27. 1.

(iii) Curt. iv 3. 24-5 describes the beams fitted with cutting edges mentioned by Diod. 44. 4 and claims that they were for use against ships.

Diodorus, as elsewhere, is working from a single source, selectively adapted by Curtius too, a source which represents the assault on the walls as more protracted and more disadvantageous to the Macedonians than Arrian's account.

7. ἐνταῦθα πρῶτον κατεσείσθη Diod. 43. 4 claims that the wall was thrown down for the length of a *plethron*. Arrian claims that a large expanse was shaken and a part of it broke off and fell to the ground. This need not imply that the wall was breached from top to bottom. Once the parapets had gone with their defenders (cf. Diod. 45. 2), the ἐπιβάθραι could be brought to bear on the walls without facing the gauntlet of red-hot sand, and the assault party could gain a foothold on the walls themselves (cf. ii 23. 5-6, where the walls are captured in the final assault).

23-4. *The Fall of Tyre*

23. 1. τρίτη δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἡμέρας Curtius (iv 4. 10) also refers to a two-day rest period, but places it after the naval battle outside the Sidonian harbour, which in his narrative follows the first attack on the walls.

2. οἱ ὑπασπισταί . . . Ἀδμητος (Berve no. 24) Presumably Admetus was chiliarch of the hypaspists, possibly, as Tarn suggests (ii 151), commander of the royal *agema* (cf. iii 11. 9). Certainly there will have been no room (even in one of Alexander's huge quadrireme-catamarans) for the entire corps of the hypaspists.

οἱ πεζέταιροι καλούμενοι The manuscripts, both A and the Byzantine excerpts, read οἱ ἀσθέτεροι καλούμενοι, and the term ἀσθέτεροι (or ἀσθέταιροι) recurs in five later passages (iv 23. 1, v 22. 6, vi 6. 1, vi 21. 3, vii 11. 3). In the last of these passages the terms πεζέταιροι and ἀσθέτεροι occur side by side in a list of units of the Macedonian infantry. Blancardus in 1668 substituted the more familiar term πεζέταιροι in all passages; and Schmieder subsequently disposed of vii 11. 3 by deleting the crucial phrase, καὶ ἀσθέτεροι ἄλλοι, as a marginal gloss.

The 'emendations' have been accepted in all modern editions except the Loeb by P. A. Brunt. I have argued at length (*CQ* xxiii (1973) 245–53; cf. Lane Fox 512) that the manuscript reading should be retained and that the *asthetairoi* are a hitherto unrecognized unit of the Macedonian infantry. More recently N. G. L. Hammond (*CQ* xxviii (1978) 128–35) has drawn attention to a cavalry unit in Antigonos' army, which appears to have been named *asthippoi* (Diod. xix 29. 2: ἀσθίππους R, ἀνθίππους F). Whether this body was, as Hammond thinks, recruited from Upper Macedonia must remain in doubt; but the name is clearly analogous to *asthetairoi*.

Two subsequent passages (iv 23. 1 and vi 21. 3) show that the *asthetairoi* comprised half the phalanx battalions (Bosworth, op. cit. 247 f.), and the battalions seem to have included those of Coenus, Polyperchon, and possibly Alcetas (Bosworth 249 n. 8), in other words, the battalions from Upper Macedonia (cf. Diod. 57. 2; Curt. iv 13. 28). There seems a strong *prima facie* case that the term denotes specifically the Upper Macedonian infantry. The significance of the term is a matter for philological speculation. The final component of the word must be -εταῖροι ('companions'); the variant -ετέροι is a simple corruption which recurs constantly in the transmission of the parallel term πεζέταῖροι (*Elym. Magn.* 658. 41; Hesychius and 'Suda' s.v.), but the prefix ασθ- remains mysterious. The derivation from ἄστυ ('city companions') is impossible, for Upper Macedonia was notoriously deficient in cities (see, however, Hammond, *CQ* xxviii (1978) 130 ff.). I have suggested very tentatively that it is derived from the word ἄσιστα|ἄσσιστα ('closest in kin') and that an original form ἄσισθέταῖροι was contracted by haplology into the form found in Arrian's manuscripts. The title, 'closely related companions', might well have been selected by Philip after his annexation of the upper kingdoms (c.356) in order to describe the newly recruited battalions; they were Macedonians (Thuc. ii 99. 2) but not Macedonians of the plain.

G. T. Griffith has contested this interpretation in a note as yet unpublished¹ but summarized by R. D. Milns in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 99 f. He adopts the derivation of the prefix from the Thessalian contraction ἀστο-|ἀριστο- (cf. Bosworth 251 n. 3) and interprets the word as an honorific title, 'best companions'. Arr. ii 23. 2 seems to show that the title was confined to Coenus' battalion in 332 but later extended to other battalions who distinguished themselves in battle. That two or three of these battalions were from Upper Macedonia is seen as fortuitous. This view seems untenable. The Thessalian contraction ἀστο- seems not to have been used in Macedonia; the preserved proper names all have the full form ἀριστο- (Berve nos. 133, 136–9). Secondly Griffith puts too much emphasis on the wording

¹ See now N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* ii (Oxford 1979) 709–13.

of ii 23. 2. Admittedly the technical term *asthetairoi* occurs in a nominative appositional phrase not in the form of a partitive genitive, as at vi 6. 1, but it is not necessarily used in an exclusive sense. No one would infer from i 28. 4 (οἱ ἀκοντισταὶ οἱ Θρᾷκες) that the Thracians were Alexander's only javelin men or from i 14. 1 that the *hetairoi* were the only cavalry.

3. πάνταχόθεν . . . ἀμφιβόλους Exactly the same terminology is used at iv 29. 4, and the whole phrase is modelled on Thuc. iv 36. 3.

4. ἀνέβαινον ἐπὶ τὸ τεῖχος This passage is decisive that the object of the final assault was to gain control of the top of the wall, not pour through a breach from top to bottom by means of 'drawbridges'.

δ τε γὰρ Ἀδμητος Arrian gives two reasons why the hypaspists attacked with vigour; Admetus showed his valour at that juncture, and Alexander himself was present as a spectator.

Diod. 45. 6 has a variant; Admetus' bravery is placed in the unsuccessful assault, which he and Curtius claim moved Alexander seriously to consider lifting the siege. Furthermore Admetus is killed by an axe-stroke, not a spear-thrust, as in Arrian. There are two alternatives. Either Diodorus has misplaced Admetus' death, or Arrian has fused together two actions in one. The latter is the more likely. There seems no reason for Diodorus' source to have invented extra vivid detail, while Arrian does seem deliberately to minimize the difficulties of the final assault and the magnitude of Tyrian resistance. So two assaults seem described by Arrian together, one where Admetus led and fell, and one where Alexander led and was victorious.

καὶ θεατῆς τῶν ἄλλων Cf. iv 29. 7. The parallel appears in an assured Ptolemaic context, and is a pointer that the account of the final assault in Arrian is taken from Ptolemy (so Kornemann 120).

5. ἐπειδὴ πρῶτον . . . Μακεδόνες 'as soon as the Macedonians had found an access to the walls which was firm and not altogether cut away'. πρόσβασις is used in Arrian exclusively in the sense of an approach to an elevation (cf. i 28. 5, iv 29. 5, vi 24. 5); cf. Hdt. iii 111. 2; Thuc. vi 96. 1, vii 45. Presumably the Macedonian bombardment had not only stripped the wall of defenders but loosened the masonry, making large strips dangerous for the attackers even to gain a foothold.

24. 2. τὸ Ἀγηνόριον This supposed Shrine of Agenor is nowhere else attested, and it may be *interpretatio Graeca*, giving an established and familiar Greek name for an important Semitic sanctuary. Curt. iv 4. 19 mentions Agenor as the founder of Tyre, and he had been solidly associated with Tyre in Greek mythology, figuring as the father of Europa, Cadmus, Cilix, and Phoenix. The tradition had begun as early as Hesiod (F 138-9 OCT; cf. Hdt. iv 147. 4; vii 91).

3. λαβόντες τινὰς αὐτῶν This episode recurs in none of the sources, except conceivably Curt. iv 2. 15. There it is stated that before the siege

began Alexander sent a delegation to Tyre, 'quos . . . contra ius gentium occisos praecipitaverunt in altum'. Abicht conflated the two accounts and suggested that the delegation was sent from Sidon and ambushed *en route*. Alexander, however, is stated to have sent his embassy *after* arriving at Tyre; and, if such a flagrant breach of international etiquette had taken place, it is very improbable that Ptolemy and Aristobulus failed to mention it at this juncture, when it would have explained the Macedonians' anger so nicely. The incident in Arrian must have come at the very beginning of the siege, when the Tyrians still had command of the sea, and it was certainly used as an apology for the gruesome slaughter which ended the siege. At a later stage the incident may have been turned into the more heinous crime of murder of ambassadors.

4. ὥς ὀκτακισχίλους The casualty figures vary. Curt. iv 4. 16 claims that 6,000 Tyrians were killed in the final assault; Diod. 46. 4 gives 7,000. But numbers are very easily corrupted in manuscript, and the text of Diodorus is peculiarly open to error in this matter. It is worth noting that both Diodorus and Curtius mention 2,000 men of fighting age who were crucified by Alexander. This, taken with Curtius' lower figure, makes up the discrepancy between Arrian's total and the vulgate.

The Macedonian figure of 400 casualties *throughout* the siege must be a propaganda distortion. It is inconceivable that such fierce and protracted fighting could have taken so small a toll. The first figure listing the fallen hypaspists may come from an honours list similar to that made after the Granicus (cf. i 16. 4 with note); cf. Diod. 46.6.

5. Καρχηδονίων τινὲς θεῶροι This is the only reference to this delegation in Arrian. It plays a much more prominent role in the vulgate account. Curt. iv 2. 10 notes that they arrived at the very beginning of the siege, *ad celebrandum sacrum anniversarium*, and proffered help from Carthage. Later he notes the arrival of 30 *legati*, regretfully refusing any military assistance (iv 3. 19). It might be that Curtius has twice reported the arrival of the same embassy (Diod. 41. 1, which seems to be an excerpt of the same source as the second passage, places the vote to transplant the non-combatant element of the population to Carthage at a much earlier part of the siege). Diodorus adds that some of the women and children were moved out before the naval blockade was under way (41. 2), which would indicate that the embassy arrived towards the beginning of the siege. Curtius also notes that Alexander spared the envoys—though declaring war against Carthage. This last statement has no corroboration in any of the ancient sources, and Curtius might be thinking vaguely of Alexander's last plans (cf. x 1. 17). But, on the other hand, Curtius' story of a declaration of war might be taken as corroboration of the historicity of the programme of the *hypomnemata*. Certainly it would do much to explain the alacrity of the Carthaginian embassy to Babylon after Alexander's return from India

(Arr. vii 15. 4; Diod. xvii 113. 2; Justin xii 13. 1-2); we are not told what reception it received from Alexander. On the 'ancient custom' see Diod. xx 14. 2: 'in former times they used to dispatch to the god a tithe of all that fell within their revenues.' The tithe apparently was discontinued long before 310 B.C. as a regular institution, but was revived in time of crisis (so Justin xviii 7. 7).

ἐς τρισμυρίους Diodorus says that only 13,000 were enslaved (46. 4), but the majority had been smuggled away (to Sidon?); Curt. iv 4. 16 claims that 15,000 escaped through the good offices of the Sidonians. If it is legitimate to combine these figures, the sum total of 28,000 corresponds nicely to Arrian's figure.

There is also a tradition that 2,000 Tyrian fighting men who survived the siege were crucified along the coast (Diod. 46. 4; Curt. iv 4. 17; cf. Justin xviii 3. 18). Tarn ii 67, 82, rejects the story out of hand, as had Niese before him (i 81 n. 1). Schachermeyr² (218 with n. 240) is rightly reluctant to dismiss the tradition because of Arrian's silence.

6. τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἔθυσσε Cf. Diod. 46. 6. Alexander fulfilled his original intentions (cf. ii 15. 7) with an impressive religious and athletic festival (cf. i 18. 2, ii 5. 8). It was on this occasion that Antigonus, son of Callas, won his double victory in the *stadion* and the race in armour—the first of the *hetairoi* to achieve such a distinction (*Arch. Deltion* xxvi 1 (1971) 120-7; Moretti no. 113). Alexander repeated the sacrifice and the gymnastic competition when he returned to Tyre in spring 331 (iii 6. 1; cf. Plut. *Al.* 29. 1; Curt. iv 8. 16).

τὴν ἱερὰν This sacred vessel is not mentioned elsewhere, but there is a parallel attested in Carthage (Polybius xxxi 12. 11 f.).

οὐκ ἄξιον μνήμης τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τὸ ἐπίγραμμα is otiose and pleonastic, and should surely be excised as a marginal gloss. Presumably the epigram was the work of one of Alexander's court poets, about whose talents the ancients were consistently derogatory (see the testimonia listed by Jacoby, *FGH* 153 F 10-15 with Tarn ii 57 f.). The comment is presumably Arrian's own, justifying the omission of a poem quoted in his source.

μηνὸς Ἑκατομβαιῶνος Arrian dates the fall of Tyre precisely to July/August 332. Both Diodorus and Curtius claim that the siege ended in its seventh month (Diod. 46. 5; Curt. iv 4. 19; Plut. *Al.* 24. 5). In all probability it began in the Macedonian month Peirittios (February, cf. ii 15. 7 n.), and an inclusive calculation of seven months takes us to August. If the prophecy of Aristander (Plut. *Al.* 25. 1 ff.) is historical, Tyre fell on the thirtieth of a Macedonian month, probably Loos. This takes us somewhere around 10 August 332.

The name of the archon is given as Ἀνικίτου, but the correct form must be Νικίτου (*FGH* 239 B5, 255 (7); Dion. Hal. *Dein.* 9 (310. 6 R)); corruption of archons' names is a recurrent feature of Arrian's manuscripts (cf. i 1. 1, ii 11. 10).

Tyre was not destroyed. Like Gaza (cf. ii 27. 7), it was repopulated from the perioecic peoples and placed under a Macedonian garrison (Curt. iv 5. 9), which remained until at least 321 (Diod. xviii 37. 4; cf. xix 61. 5, 86. 1). The population of the city was still Semitic; in 310 the Carthaginians felt sufficiently close to continue their offerings to Melqart (Diod. xx 14. 1–3). There is some debate whether the kingship continued (Diod. 47. 1 ff. and Justin xviii 3. 19 patently refer to Sidon). Jones, *CERP*² 448 n. 12, mentions the fact of a post-Alexandrian regal coinage (*BMC Phoenicia* cxxix–xxxix); but Head, *HN*² 799 f., supposes that the coinage was issued by dynasts appointed by the Seleucids. Given the absence of any positive evidence it is best to assume that Alexander ended the native line of kings.

25. 1–3. *Darius' Proposal of a Euphrates Frontier*

Sources: *Ilin.* 43–4 (derived from Arrian); Plut. *Al.* 29. 7–8 (same, or cognate, source); Diod. 54. 1–5 (cf. 39. 1–2); Curt. iv 11. 1–22 (cf. iv 5. 1–8); Justin xi 12. 3–15; Val. Max. vi 4, *ext.* 3.

For the chronology of this proposal see the discussion at ii 14. 1. It seems that Arrian has misdated an offer actually made by Darius in 331, shortly before Gaugamela. Curtius places a different series of proposals at the time of the siege of Tyre, conceding a frontier at the Halys, and Plutarch, who presents terms identical to Arrian's and couched in almost identical phraseology, places them during the *second* visit to Tyre in early summer, 331 (not a digression, but taken from a historical narrative). To dismiss the vulgate tradition, internally consistent and a logical progression of offers, involves intricate hypotheses of invention for dramatic effect. To dismiss Arrian's version we need only suppose some confusion in the sources. Possibly Arrian found a note in Ptolemy about offers from Darius at Tyre, cross-referred to Aristobulus for details, and found them in the wrong stay in Tyre (i.e. Ptolemy and Aristobulus referred to different embassies).

25. 1. ἔτι δέ . . . ξυνεχομένου Cf. ii 14. 1 ἔτι δέ ἐν Μαράθῳ . . . ὄντως. In both cases the formula seems to show a transition between Ptolemy and Aristobulus (cf. Schwartz, *RE* ii 913).

μύρια μὲν τάλαντα Curt. iv 11. 12 and 6, Justin xi 12. 10, and, apparently, Diod. 54. 2 give 30,000 talents. This seems a genuine divergence in the tradition rather than corruption of figures.

καὶ τῆς γυναικὸς Arrian's version (so *Itinerarium*) presupposes that Stateira was still alive when Darius made his final overtures. It is inconsistent with the story in Curt. iv 10. 18–19 and Justin xi 12. 6.

ἐπὶ θάλασσαν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν This phrase is found only in Arrian, and is an addition to Plutarch. Curtius reads *inter Hellespontem et Euphraten* (iv 11. 5). Ἑλληνικὴ θάλασσα of course, denotes the Aegean (so Hdt. v

54. 2; Thuc. i 4. 1). I cannot see any significance in the terminology used and the order of progression from the Euphrates to the Aegean (Kornemann 122; Schachermeyr² 228 n. 250 suppose that this phraseology reflects the actual wording of Darius' proposals).

τὴν Δαρείου παῖδα Curt. iv 5. 1 claims that the hand of Stateira the younger was offered during the siege of Tyre (cf. Justin xi 12. 3); the offer was apparently repeated before Gaugamela (Curt. iv 11. 5; Diod. 54. 2).

2. ἐν τῷ συλλόγῳ Cf. Plut. *Al.* 29. 8; Diod. 54. 2; Curt. iv 11. 1. On the nature of this council see i 25. 4 n.

Παρμενίωνα μὲν λέγουσιν This does not mark a switch from main to subsidiary sources. The parallel passage in Plutarch reflects Arrian's phraseology both before and after Parmenion's intervention, and Plutarch's source is certainly unitary. The λέγουσι is used by Arrian to dissociate himself from the detail he transcribes from Aristobulus.

This is the most famous of the exchanges between Alexander and Parmenion (on which see in general i 13. 4-5 n.), and is reproduced by virtually every source for the history of Alexander (so Berve ii 302 no. 606). There seems no doubt that a disagreement over Darius' proposals did occur and that Alexander did make something like his celebrated riposte, and very probably it served for Callisthenes to insert more debates on similar lines, designed to show Parmenion as a reluctant campaigner, envious of Alexander's glory (cf. *FGrH* 124 F 37).

25. 4-27. 7. *The Siege of Gaza*

Cf. *Itin.* 45-7 (epitome of Arrian); Curt. iv 6. 7-30; Plut. *Al.* 24. 4-5; Diod 48. 7; Jos. *AJ* xi 320; 325; Polyb. xvi 22a. 5-6; Zonaras iv 10.

4. τῆς Παλαιστίνης For Arrian's use of this geographical term, see ii 13. 7 n. Polybius xvi 22a. 5 confirms that the rest of the region had capitulated without opposition.

σὺνοδχος ... τις ... Βάτις (Berve no. 209) The precise name and function of the Persian commander at Gaza is in dispute. Curt. iv 6. 7 reads *Belis*, more or less Arrian's form, but Josephus, *AJ* xi 320 has a strange form, the manuscript readings oscillating around *Babemesis* (for attempts to reconcile the two forms, see R. Marcus in the Loeb Josephus vi 468 note c, and Tarn ii 265-6). More important, only Arrian and the derivative *Itinerarium* mention that 'Batis' was a eunuch; Curtius describes him neutrally as city commander, and stresses his loyalty to Darius, while Josephus explicitly terms him *φρούραρχος*, garrison commander (Dion. Hal. *De comp. verb.* 18 calls him *ἡγεμών*, and the fragment of Hegesias he cites gives his name as *Βαῖτις*, but the text is in doubt). Either 'Batis' was the Persian garrison commander (*pace* Tarn, Arrian's *κρατῶν τῆς πόλεως* does not necessarily imply that he was

'tyrant' of Gaza), or he was a local dynast, previously under Persian sovereignty. In either case he could have been a eunuch; Hermias of Atarneus had been a eunuch and still ruled in the Troad, while in 343 the celebrated Bagoas commanded one of the three army divisions in the invasion of Egypt (Diod. xvi 47. 4; cf. 50. 8).

For the gruesome story of the capture and execution of 'Batis' after the siege, see Curt. iv 6. 26-9 and Hegesias, *FGH* 142 F 5. The tradition is accepted by Grote, xi 469; Radet, *Alexandre le Grand* 104-5; Schachermeyr² 220 n. 242, and rejected by Tarn ii 267-70; Pearson, *LHA* 247 f.

"Αραβας Arab mercenaries are not elsewhere attested, but at the battle of Raphia Antiochus III was able to recruit 10,000 Arab warriors from the Gaza area (Polyb. v 79. 8, 82. 12).

26. 1 ἡ Γάζα For the history of the city, see Bezinger, *RE* vii 880-6, and for a description of the modern settlement the Admiralty Geographic Handbook Series: *Palestine and Transjordan* BR 514 (1943) 315-17.

ἐπὶ χώματος ὑψηλοῦ The modern city is grouped around a low hill of 18-30 m. in height and about 3 km in circumference. Arrian's description seems exaggerated, but necessarily so to justify the absurd proportions he gives for the siege mound (ii 27. 3). No other source ever gives the impression that Gaza was at all elevated.

2. διὰ ὕψους τοῦ χώματος In Arrian the main problem is represented as the difficulty of getting siege-engines to the level of the walls. Curtius lays the stress elsewhere, and says that Alexander devoted his attentions primarily to undermining the walls (iv 6. 8-9); mining operations are only mentioned in passing by Arrian at ii 27. 4. Curtius adds that Alexander tried to bring siege-engines to bear on the walls as a diversionary tactic, and says, totally credibly, that the assault failed because the wheels of the engines became bogged in the loose sand. There is nothing of this in Arrian, who makes the difficulty the sheer height of the city's elevation, which is false. The whole picture being constructed is one of impregnable fortifications, overcome against all expectation by the Macedonian army and Alexander's siege-engineers.

3. ἐδόκει . . . χωννόναι This notice is apparently repeated at ii 27. 3; after his illness Alexander *again* gives orders to construct a siege mound around the city although the mound had previously been taken up to the level of the walls. One is inclined to think that there were two stages of construction, the first concentrating on the southern part of the city ἵνα ἐπιμαχώτερα ἐφαίνετο, and the second completing the circumvallation. But there are difficulties: (i) Curtius says nothing about a siege mound in the early stages of the siege. Everything is done by mining, and before the omen a direct assault by the army was anticipated (iv 6. 10); the siege mound is only begun *after* Alexander's wound (iv 6. 21-3 = Arr. ii 27. 3-4). (ii) The siege only lasted two months (Diod. 48. 7;

Jos. *AF* xi 325); there is hardly time, even with a gigantic impressed labour force, for first a mound up to the wall level, second a protracted recovery by Alexander (*ἐθεραπεύετο χαλεπῶς*), and third the expansion of the mound all round the city to the gargantuan dimensions of ii 27. 3.

It seems best to suppose that the two references to the mound are a genuine doublet, caused by Arrian's amalgamation of accounts by Ptolemy and Aristobulus (so Wirth, *RE* xxiii 2472; Brunt, *Arrian* 206 n. 1). Of these ii 27. 3-7 is roughly the same story as Curtius, but ii 26. 2-3 places the construction of the mound too early, and includes encomiastically exaggerated details about the elevation of Gaza. The break presumably comes at ii 27. 3 (the mound is presupposed in the account of Batis' counter-attack).

27. 1 *πρὸς ταῖς μηχαναῖς* Arrian implies that the assault proceeded, but that Alexander held back from the fighting. Curt. iv 6. 13 claims that he gave the signal for retreat and that the sally from Gaza took place as the Macedonians gave ground.

2. *βάλλεται . . . διαμπάξ* So Curt. iv 6. 17 who adds that the catapult missile was an arrow; Plut. *Al.* 25. 8. There is a tradition that this wound was preceded by an assassination attempt by a pretended Arab deserter; Curt. iv 6. 15-16; Hegesias, *FGH* 142 F 5. Curt. iv 6. 24 mentions that Alexander was also hit by a stone in the final assault.

3. *καὶ χῶμα . . . ἐκέλευσεν* For this doublet see ii 26. 3 n. Curt. iv 6. 22 confirms that a mound was constructed at this juncture, but he gives no dimensions and says only that siege-towers were placed on top, enabling the attackers to overtop even the wooden superstructure of the walls of Gaza. He says nothing about rams, and one would have thought that any mobile siege-engines would have come to grief on the mound in the same way as on the level sand (cf. iv 6. 9; cf. Fuller 218).

Arrian's figures of 250 feet high and two stades wide are totally incredible. The height of the *modern* hill of Gaza is no more than a hundred feet, and 250 feet is an absurd exaggeration (Krüger indeed suggested *πεντήκοντα καὶ πέντε* (έ corrupted to έ), but that leaves the equally ridiculous breadth of 2 stades). The description is exaggerated in every way, and one can hardly assume anything more than a low defensive breastwork around the city with a full-size siege ramp on the south of the perimeter (so Fuller 217).

6. *Νεοπτόλεμος* (Berve no. 548) This Neoptolemus was almost certainly of the royal house of Epirus (Beloch iv² 2. 145). The Molossian dynasty was alleged to have been founded by Neoptolemus, son of Achilles and great-grandson of Aeacus. (Pindar, *Nem.* vii 38-40; Eur. *Androm.* 1243 ff.). The memory of both Neoptolemus and Aeacus was cherished in Epirus; there were two kings named Neoptolemus, and one of Alexander's contemporaries, the son of Arrhybas and father of

Pyrrhus, was named Acacides (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 1). Even after the dissolution of the Epirote monarchy its survivors proudly called themselves Acacids, as is attested by an epitaph found in Macedonia (Edson, *Hesperia* xviii (1949) 84 ff. = *SEG* xii 340).

Some time before 349 Philip had ejected King Arrhybas from the Molossian throne in favour of his brother-in-law, Alexander (Tod ii no. 173; Errington, *GRBS* xvi (1975) 41-50). Presumably Neoptolemus belonged to the other branch of the family, descended from Neoptolemus I and Alexander the Molossian. He was therefore related to Alexander himself, who on occasion stressed his own Acacid lineage (cf. iv 11. 6). By the end of the reign Neoptolemus had a command in the hypaspists (Plut. *Eum.* 1—ἀρχυπασπιστής) and it is a reasonable assumption that he served in the corps in 332 (so Berve).

7. ἀπέθανον πάντες Curt. iv 6. 30 says that 10,000 fighting men fell in battle. Their stand to the last well deserves Polybius' impressive tribute, that the men of Gaza were the bravest of Coele Syria (Polyb. xvi 22a, 1-7).

τὴν πόλιν δὲ ξυνοικίσας Strabo xvi 2. 30 (759) claims that the city remained deserted after being destroyed by Alexander, but he is clearly mistaken. By 315 Gaza was strong enough to resist the overtures of Antigonus and had to be taken by storm (Diod. xix 59. 2; cf. 80. 5).

BOOK III

1. 1-4 *The March on Egypt*

Cf. Curt. iv 7. 1-5; Diod. 49. 1; *Itin.* 48 (based on Arrian). The major modern work is V. Ehrenberg, *Alexander und Ägypten* (Beih. zum alten Orient vii: Leipzig 1926) = *Polis und Imperium* 399-448. See also K. Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Alexander* 69-80.

1. 1. ἐβδόμη ἡμέρα . . . Πηλοῦσιον So Curt. iv 7. 2. The road between Gaza and Pelusium was notoriously waterless and bedevilled by quicksands around Lake Serbonis (Diod. i 30. 4 ff., xvi 46. 5; Strabo xvii 1. 21 (803)). In early A.D. 70 Titus reached Gaza on his fifth day's march from Pelusium (Jos. *BJ* iv 661 f.); and Ptolemy IV in 217 B.C. reached Raphia, a day's march from Gaza, on the fifth day out (Polyb. v 80. 1-3). Alexander took longer than either to cover the inhospitable terrain, and he must have had his entire army with its impedimenta.

Pelusium and the Pelusiatic mouth of the Nile had been Egypt's first and principal line of defence since pharaonic times (H. Kees, *RE* xix 408 ff.). In the fourth century an elaborate system of fortifications had frustrated successive Persian invasions (cf. Diod. xv 42. 2-4; Strabo xvi 2. 33 (760) mentions a Palisade of Chabrias, probably erected in 383-80). During the invasion of 343 the fortress was only surrendered through treachery (Diod. xvi 49. 2-4); and in the Ptolemaic period it was continuously and successfully occupied (Diod. xviii 34. 2, xx 76. 4, etc.). No resistance to Alexander is recorded, and the garrison probably had prior orders to welcome his fleet.

καταλαμβάνει . . . ὁρμούσας This is decisive evidence of prior agreement. In 306 B.C. the Pelusiatic fortifications prevented Antigonos' fleet making a landing in Egypt (Diod. xx 76. 4), while in 219 the news that Ptolemy IV was strengthening Pelusium was sufficient in itself to frustrate a projected naval invasion by Antiochus (Polyb. v 62. 4-5).

2. Μαζάκης (Berve no. 485) The previous satrap of Egypt, Sauaces, had died at Issus (ii 11. 8; cf. Diod. 48. 3; Curt. iv 1. 28). Mazaces was probably his lieutenant, the military governor of Memphis (Curt. iv 1. 32); his *de facto* control was probably confirmed by Darius in the course of 332.

τῆς Ἀραβίας At v 25.4 Arrian speaks more conservatively of the conquest of *parts* of Arabia, and in the narrative he mentions only the brief campaign against the Arabs of the Antilibanus (ii 20. 4 n.). Hence Sintenis' pleonastic and superfluous conjecture *παράλας*. But Parmenion had campaigned in the hinterland before the siege of Tyre and his

operations were continued by Andromachus (Curt. iv 5. 9; cf. *CQ* xxiv (1974) 46 ff.).

3. ἐφ' Ἡλίουπόλεως The Egyptian Ōn. Heliopolis is at the confluence of the Pelusiac arm of the delta with the Nile proper, its site now absorbed in the north-eastern suburbs of Cairo. In antiquity it was chiefly celebrated for its temple of Rē, which survived until Strabo's time (xvii 1. 27-9 (805 f.) cf. Peiper, *RE* viii 49 f.).

4. καὶ τῷ Ἄπιδι Exactly the same ceremonies had been performed in honour of Asclepius (ii 5. 8) and Heracles/Melqart (ii 24. 6). There are two curiosities. The Apis bull was not a deity in itself, but the bodily receptacle of the city god Ptah. What is more, this is Alexander's first sacrifice to a native deity in native guise (Melqart was explicitly equated with the Greek Heracles: cf. ii 15. 7 n.). The first point is not significant. From the time of Herodotus the Greeks had acknowledged Apis as a god and identified him with Epaphus (Hdt. ii 153, iii 27-9; 64. 3), and it was natural for Alexander to treat Apis as a god in his own right. No doubt Alexander remembered the stories of Cambyses slaying the Apis bull. These were Egyptian calumnies (cf. F. K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrh.* 57-9), but no Greek author after Herodotus queried their veracity. More recently in 343 Artaxerxes III Ochus is said to have killed the Apis bull. This statement has been doubted (Kienitz 108), on the grounds that an Apis bull is attested dying in January/February 336. If his predecessor had been killed in late 343, he would have died at the very early age of six (known Apis bulls of the 26th dynasty and Ptolemaic period almost invariably reached ages of 16-26). But accidents and diseases can happen; the Apis bull who died in 518 was only seven years old (Louvre: Serapeum no. 357). The tradition of Ochus' outrage is early, deriving from the *Persica* of Deinon of Colophon (*FGH* 690 F 21; cf. Aelian, *VH* iv 8, vi 8; *NA* x 28; 'Suda' s.v. Ἀπῖς), and, if invention, it is close to the event. But, whether or not the tradition is historical, there was no doubt that conspicuous honours to Apis would further endear Alexander to the indigenous population and point the contrast with the Persians in the strongest possible way.

τεχνίται . . . δοκιμώτατοι Further details about the artists present with Alexander are given in Plutarch's description of the festivities at Tyre in 331 (Plut. *Al.* 29. 3-6 with Hamilton's commentary). The fullest details come from Chares' extensive description of the mass wedding at Susa (*FGH* 125 F 4). Alexander's repeated athletic and dramatic festivals (cf. Berve i 93-6) must have drained Greece of her leading professionals; over 3,000 performers flocked to Ecbatana in 324/3 (vii 14. 10; Plut. *Al.* 72. 1). This caused resentment; the tragic actor Athenodorus was fined for failing to appear at the Great Dionysia at Athens (Plut. 29. 5).

ἐκ δὲ Μέμφιος κατέπλει According to Arrian Alexander went directly

downstream to the Canopic mouth of the Delta. Curt. iv 7. 5 implies the opposite, that Alexander went upstream *ad interiora Aegypti* and confirmed the native administration there; a few sentences later he has the detail in Arrian about the journey downstream to Lake Mareotis (iv 7. 9). Curtius could be retailing a genuine episode omitted by Arrian (Ehrenberg, *Polis und Imperium* 413, summarily dismisses the whole story); but, if so, the journey upstream cannot have been prolonged; Alexander was on a tight schedule in Egypt. It is possible, but not likely, that Curtius is referring elliptically to the expedition which Alexander supposedly sent to explore the sources of the Nile (Arist. F 246 Rose; cf. Partsch, *Abh. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss.* xxvii (1909) 583 ff.; Wilcken 130; *contra* Jacoby, *RE* x 1689; Schachermeyr² 235 n. 256; Pearson, *LHA* 31).

1. 5-2. 2 *The Foundation of Alexandria*

Cf. Plut. *Al.* 26. 3-10; Strabo xvii 1. 6 (792); Diod. 52; Curt. iv 8. 1-6; Justin xi 11. 13; *Itin.* 48 f. (largely based on Arrian). Ps.-Call. i 31 ff. provides additional but possibly apocryphal details.

The sources conflict fundamentally. Arrian and Plutarch place the foundation immediately before the visit to Siwah, while the vulgate sources date it to the return. Until recently Arrian's dating was regarded as incontrovertible. But C. B. Welles, *Historia* xi (1962) 271-98, attempted a reconstruction on the basis of the Alexander Romance and argued for the veracity of the vulgate story. His arguments have been accepted by E. N. Borza, *Historia* xvi (1967) 369 and Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 67 (but see *Al.* 176 n. 13); but they have been vigorously contested by P. M. Fraser, *Opuscula Atheniensia* vii (1967) 23 ff.; esp. n. 27; *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972) i 3-7, ii 2-3, n. 6. The problem is hard to evaluate, but there are clear weaknesses in Welles's line of argument. It suffers from his insistence that Arrian's narrative is virtually a direct excerpt from Ptolemy, which presupposes a degree of ignorance of Alexander's movements quite unacceptable in a contemporary. Alexander probably *did* return direct from Siwah to the coast, but Arrian's insistence that Ptolemy said the contrary rests on a misunderstanding (cf. 4. 5 n.). In that case he passed the site of Alexandria on both stages of the journey and might have founded the city either on his way out or on his return.

I have recently suggested a solution to the source conflict (*CQ* xxvi (1976) 137 f.). Curtis' account to some extent follows Arrian. He agrees on the inspection of Lake Mareotis on the outer journey from Memphis (iv 7. 9), and claims that on his return Alexander built the city on the mainland although he had decided (*statuerat*) on the island of Pharos. The use of the pluperfect suggests that Alexander decided on the foundation on the way out to Ammon and implemented it on his

return. In that case Arrian and Plutarch have for convenience grouped the whole story together at the time of the original decision to found the city. That is a procedure by no means unique in Arrian; he anticipates the return of the statutes of the tyrannicides (cf. iii 16. 8 n.) and deliberately advances his account of the débâcle of Callisthenes in order to associate it more closely with Cleitus' murder (iv 10–14; cf. iv 22. 2). There is only one explicit chronological link in the foundation stories, that is Plutarch (*Al.* 26. 11); Alexander ordered his agents to proceed with the work and started for the Ammonium. But this is a transition phrase, linking two distinct episodes, and it is well known that Plutarch's transitional phrases can be misleading in their chronological implications (cf. *Al.* 32. 8 with *CQ* 1976. 138 n. 112; *Al.* 14. 1—a leap back from 335 to 336). The crucial factor is Alexander's route back from Siwah. Provided that he returned along the coast (4. 4–5 nn.) there is no radical conflict of evidence; Alexander visited the site on both his outward and return journeys.

5. ἐς Κάνωβον The city was at the head of the western, Canopic, arm of the Delta, 120 stades from Alexandria (Strabo xvii 1. 17 (801); Amm. Marc. xxii 16. 12). It was well known to the early Greeks (Aesch. *PV* 846; Hecataeus, *FGH* 1 F 308), but its later fame rested on the Ptolemaic temple of Sarapis and its function as a pleasure centre for Alexandria (cf. Kees, *RE* x 1869 f.).

τὴν λίμνην τὴν Μαρίαν The modern Buheirat Maryût. The form in Arrian is the usual Greek spelling ([Scylax] 107; Thuc. i 104. 1; Strabo xvii 1. 7); Latin sources use the more familiar Marcotis.

Alexandria was founded on the isthmus between sea and lake, 7 to 8 stades wide (Strabo xvii 1. 8). The original site of the city was the old harbour station of Rhacotis, situated roughly in the area which later became the Eunostus harbour (Strabo xvii 1. 6; cf. Wilcken 119).

ἔδοξεν . . . κάλλιστος κρίσαι The favourable situation of Alexandria is a *topos*. Strabo devotes an entire chapter to the city's *εὐκαιρία* (xvii 1. 7 (793) cf. Diod. 52. 3).

Alexander's motives for the foundation may have been partly economic (P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford 1972) i 134, with the literature cited at ii 237 f., n. 18; Schachermeyr² 241). The establishment of Alexandria brought a secure harbour to the inhospitable coast of Egypt and replaced Naucratis as the focal point of Greek commercial activity. Other motives may have been stronger. Alexandria occupied a natural defensive position (Diod. 52. 3), and the area of Marcotis had been established as a fortress zone by Psammeticus I, c. 650 (Hdt. ii 30. 2). But in 332/1 there was no citadel in the west to compare with Pelusium in the east and Alexander could well have intended the military factor to be paramount, as it certainly was in his eastern foundations. Ehrenberg, *Polis und Imperium* 414 ff., saw Alexandria as the intended capital of the 'First Kingdom' (cf. Schachermeyr²

256 ff.), but there is no hint in the sources of so grandiose an original design.

πῶθος . . . τοῦ ἔργου Simply 'enthusiasm for the task took hold of him' (so Kraft 92). There is no warrant for Ehrenberg's suggestion (*Al. and the Greeks* 56 n. 1) that Ptolemy tampered with the text for his own purposes, to associate Alexandria as closely as possible with Alexander and his expressed desires.

αὐτὸς . . . ἔθηκεν So Diod. 52. 2 f.; Curt. iv 8. 6. The actual surveying of the site was the work of Deinocrates of Rhodes (Berve no. 249): Val. Max. i 4 *ext.* 1; Pliny, *NH* v 62, vii 125; Vitruv. ii *Praef.* 4; Amm. Marc. xxii 16. 7.

Ἰσιδος δὲ Αἰγυπτίας The cult of Isis was well known in Greece. Herodotus had equated her with Demeter and noted a cult at Cyrene (iv 186. 2). The Athenians some time before 333 had allowed Egyptian merchants the privilege of acquiring land for a temple to Isis (Tod ii no. 189), and the same may have occurred at Eretria (*IG* xii Suppl. p. 185 no. 562; cf. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* ii 410, n. 555). Alexander's temple was a tribute to the native religion of Egypt, as was his sacrifice to Apis. Wilcken 119 suggests that it was a foundation for the original Egyptian inhabitants of Rhacotis (so Berve, *Klio* xxxi (1938) 141 n. 1).

The site of the temple is not known. Fraser doubts strongly that it was located on Rhacotis Hill, where Tacitus mentions a pre-Ptolemaic temple of Isis and Sarapis (Tac. *Hist.* iv 84; cf. *Ptolemaic Alexandria* i 267 f.).

2. 1 τοιόσδε λόγος The story ought to be taken from Arrian's subsidiary sources (cf. *Praef.* 3, ii 12.8). It is repeated by virtually all sources, but there are divergences in detail:

(i) Arrian; Strabo xvii 1. 6 (792): the omen consists solely of the use of barley-meal for the outlines of the site.

(ii) Plut. *Al.* 26. 8-10; Val. Max. i 4. *ext.* 1; *Itin.* 49 (so Ps.-Call. i 32. 7; Steph. Byz. s.v. *Ἀλεξάνδρεια*): the use of barley-meal is peripheral; the crux of the story is an influx of birds who devoured the marking material. The *Itinerarium*, which otherwise follows Arrian's report of the Egyptian campaign, adds the detail of the birds to the simple story of barley-meal and makes it the basis of a different prophecy, enunciated by Alexander.

(iii) Curt. iv 8. 6: the marking out with *polenta* is not a substitute but genuine Macedonian custom. The omen again is the devouring by birds.

If Curtius is correct, and he made a point of signalling Macedonian traditions (Tarn ii 106 f.; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 68), the marking out with barley-meal is the historical core of the story. This unorthodox use of material was rationalized in the version of Arrian and Strabo. Perhaps earlier Cleitarchus (if he is Curtius' source) added the influx of birds as

a medium for prophecies of Alexandria's future wealth. Later still the two versions were combined.

τῶν δὴ τεικτόνων . . . περιτειχισμοῦ 'One of the masons hit on the solution; and collecting all the barley-meal the soldiers had in their kit he cast it on the ground where the king indicated. So the circuit of the fortifications was described.'

The deponent ἐπιφράζομαι is used in prose only by Herodotus and Arrian ('Suda' s.v. ἐπιφρασθεῖς explicitly cites *Ind.* 27. 8). Here the verb is used absolutely as at *Ind.* 34. 9.

ἐποίησεν The verb is otiose. Krüger's ἐπενόει is very attractive: 'the fortifications which he had in mind for the city'. Cf. iv 4. 1: τὴν πόλιν ἣν ἐπενόει..

2. τοῦτο δὲ ἐπιλεξαμένους Again a Herodotean expression not found elsewhere in prose: cf. *Hdt.* i 78. 1, ii 120. 1, etc.

2. 3-7. *Hegelochus' Report of the End of the Aegean War*

Cf. ii 1-2 with notes.

Curt. iv 5. 14-22 narrates the same events in greater detail and with minor divergences. His narrative is dated to autumn 332 and placed in a review of successes by Alexander's satraps in Asia Minor.

3. Τενεδίους τε For Tenedos' submission to the Persian fleet see ii 2. 2-3 with notes.

βίβη τῶν κατεχόντων Curtius is far more helpful. The Chians first appealed to the Macedonian fleet and there was factional struggle. Pharnabazus intervened and placed the city under the titular headship of Apollonides and others of the pro-Persian faction. Hegelochus then invested the city and stormed it when a dispute broke out between Apollonides and the garrison commanders. Arrian obscures the fact of the earlier factional struggle; but there were clearly oligarchic exiles, for Alexander's settlement edict distinguishes between the medizers who left the city before the siege and those who were captured later (*Tod* ii no. 192. 11 ff.). The chronology of the recovery of Chios is therefore relatively secure:

(i) In summer 333 discontent and factions grew in Chios until Pharnabazus imposed a small garrison (ii 13. 4; Curt. iv 1. 37).

(ii) After Issus (Nov. 333) Pharnabazus returned to Chios fearing defection (ii 13. 5). That defection had already occurred and the oligarchic leaders were in exile. He arrived in time to frustrate the surrender to Macedon (winter 333/2) and held out with the support of the new junta until spring 332.

Αὐτοφραδάτης τε Curtius mentions only Pharnabazus; Autophradates had been left in Siphnos and later withdrew to Halicarnassus (ii 13. 6). Arrian is here somewhat garbled. He says nothing of the reversal of

policy within Chios and there is no hint of a siege. He makes Hegelochus sail straight in, invited by the *demos*.

4. **Ἀριστόνικον Μηθυμναῖον** (Berve no. 131) Cf. Curt. iv 5. 19–21 and, for the previous history of Methymna, ii 1. 1 n. Curt. iv 8. 11 mentions another tyrant, Chrysolaus/Stesilaus (?), who was surrendered to popular justice with Aristonicus.

ξὺν ἡμιολίαις ληστρικαῖς So Curt. v 5. 19. Pharnabazus also had pirate auxiliaries in Chios (Curt. iv 5. 18). In the year 340 there had been a resurgence of piracy in the eastern Aegean and Lesbos was involved (cf. Tod ii no. 170). The Persians seem to have encouraged and supported the phenomenon, as certainly did the Ionian oligarchies (see further ii 1. 2 n.).

5. **Ἀπολλωνίδην τὸν Χῖον κτλ.** Curtius mentions only Apollonides and Athenagoras as leaders of the final junta, but there is no reason to doubt any of the names in either tradition. After their exile (2. 6) their families may have remained on Chios. A decree datable to 276 B.C. mentions Apollonides son of Angeliscus and Oeneus son of Phesinus (*SIG*³ 402. 2 and 40). But Phesinus was not a rare name at Chios (cf. *CIG* 2242; *BCH* xx (1896) 633) and Apollonides may have been equally commonplace (cf. *BCH* xx 627).

6. **Χάρητα** Chares had only recently taken over Mitylene which he held with 2,000 Persians (Curt. iv 5. 22). He had probably intervened at Methymna in 333 (Polyaenus v 44. 3; see above ii 1. 1 n.), and had been won over by Memnon to the Persian cause. In 332 he was probably a private citizen operating as a mercenary commander, like Iphicrates and Chabrias in the past. After the surrender he negotiated safe conduct to the Athenian holdings on Imbros (Curt. iv 5. 22), and subsequently appears only once before his death in 324/3, as Leosthenes' predecessor in command of the mercenary force at Taenarum ([Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 848 E; cf. Badian, *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 26, nn. 69–70.

Mitylene only surrendered to the Persians under extreme pressure (ii 1. 2–5), and Chares had a hostile population to control. In 331 Alexander rewarded the city by reimbursing its war expenses and adding substantially to its territory (Curt. iv 8. 13).

7. **Φαρνάβαζος δὲ ἀπέδρα** Pharnabazus now disappears from the history of Alexander's reign. He re-emerges as a commander of Eumenes' mercenary cavalry in 321 (Plut. *Eum.* 7. 1). No doubt he shared in the amnesty offered to his father and brothers (cf. iii 23. 7 n.; Berve no. 766).

τοὺς τυράννους μὲν The tyrants of Methymna were surrendered to the justice of their fellow citizens, who tortured and executed them (Curt. iv 8. 11). Curtius places their fate at the time of Alexander's march through Samaria (early summer 331). Perhaps Arrian has concentrated all Alexander's decisions about Hegelochus' captives; they need not have been made simultaneously.

The Eresus dossier (Tod ii no. 191) gives explicit evidence about the procedures followed. Alexander sent a dispatch commanding (*προσέταξε*) the Eresians to put Agonippus and Eurysilaus on trial and determine their sentence (vv. 129-31); their condemnation was presupposed. A popular court was convened and two secret ballots taken—the first on the death sentence and the second on the mode of execution. Not surprisingly Agonippus was condemned to death by 883 votes to 7 (vv. 15-32). Both tyrants were executed and their families exiled, as were those of the former junta (vv. 132 ff.). As at Chios a democracy was installed in both Eresus and Antissa ([Dem.] 17. 7).

τοὺς δὲ ἀμφὶ Ἀπολλωνίδην The exile of the Chian oligarchs presents a problem. Alexander's edict to Chios (Tod ii no. 192) is explicit about the fate of the medizers. Those who left the city before the siege (above, 2. 3 n.) are to be outlawed, while those captured in Chios are to be tried by the *synedrion* of the Corinthian League. However, Apollonides and his associates who were captured in Chios (Curt. iv 5. 17, perversely denied by Lenschau, *Klio* xxxiii (1940) 207) are dealt with by Alexander himself, in apparent contravention of his own orders. There are various possibilities:

(i) Alexander's orders did not reach Hegelochus. That is most unlikely. The edict seems to have been issued before the surrender of Chios (cf. Ehrenberg, *Al. & the Greeks* 23), and one provision at least was carried out. The garrison, financed by the Chians (vv. 17-19), was actually imposed and removed in 331 at the Chians' own request (Curt. iv 8. 12).

(ii) Alexander countermanded his own orders. Wilcken 120 suggests that in the year between the edict and its execution Alexander had grown more independent in his dealings with the Corinthian League (so Dobesch, *Grazer Beitr.* iii (1975) 92/3 n. 43). According to Ehrenberg 28 f. the edict was issued to encourage surrender and conveniently ignored after the surrender. A. J. Heisserer, *Historia* xxii (1973) 203 f., argues for two sets of exiles. The medizers mentioned on the stone were tried in the *synedrion*, but in 334. Apollonides and his junta were a later clique of rebels. But the redating of the edict to 334 is wholly conjectural and rests on some false premises (cf. ii 1. 1 n.).

(iii) The instructions of the edict were carried out in 332. Nothing in Arrian or Curtius suggests that the prisoners were brought directly to Alexander; and in the interval between the fall of Chios (spring 332) and Hegelochus' arrival in Egypt there was ample time for the Chian oligarchs to be sent up to Corinth and remitted from there to Alexander. The case may have been like that of the Spartans in 330, which was submitted by Antipater to the League *synedrion* and after discussion referred unresolved to Alexander (Diod. 73. 5-6; Curt. vi 1. 19-20; Aesch. 3. 133; cf. Dobesch, art. cit. 101 ff.).

ἐς Ἐλεφαντίνην The old Egyptian Iēbew ('Elephant city'), at the south of the island in the Nile opposite Aswan (Strabo xvii 1. 48 (817); Mela i 51). Just below the first cataract, it was the terminus for navigation up the Nile (Jos. *B^J* iv 611), and from Saitan to Roman times it was regarded as the southern boundary of Egypt (cf. Hdt. ii 17. 2; Tac. *Ann.* ii 61). The Chian oligarchs could not have been sent further, but Alexander did not have them executed or surrendered to popular justice.

3-4. *The Visit to the Ammonium at Siwah*

Cf. *Ilin.* 49 f.; Diod. 49-51; Curt. iv 7. 5-32; Plut. *Al.* 26. 11-28. 1; Justin xi 11.

The earliest account of the visit is that of Callisthenes, which Strabo summarizes as a characteristic example of factual reporting blended with flattery (Strabo xvii 1. 43 = *FGrH* 124 F 14a). All subsequent accounts draw upon this original, and Arrian's sources followed Callisthenes in the question of motivation and the portents *en route*. But Arrian gives less detail than any source about the actual consultation of the oracle, and in particular the greeting of Alexander as son of Zeus is totally omitted. Apart from the motivation, Arrian's account is a catalogue of marvels and natural curiosities.

For modern bibliography see Seibert, *Al. der Grosse* 116-25, to which add Brunt, *Arrian* 467-80; Bosworth in *Greece and the E. Mediterranean* 41-75.

3. 1. πῶθος λαμβάνει αὐτόν Curt. iv 7. 8 has a similar formula: *ingens cupido animum stimulabat*. Alexander's desire to visit Siwah is surely historical fact which any historical source might have emphasized (H. Montgomery, *Gedanke und Tat* 208 ff.; Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Al.* 92-4). παρ' Ἀμμῶνα For the early history and first connections between Ammon and the Greek world see C. J. Classen, *Historia* viii (1959) 349-55. The cult of the Egyptian Amon-Re, revitalized and with oracular trappings added, was imported from Nubia; and in the early eighth century B.C. subsidiary shrines were sent out from Thebes and established in the oases of El Khargeh and Siwah. By the fifth century the people of Cyrene had adopted Ammon as their city god and identified him with the Zeus of the Greek pantheon. From the late fifth century the oracle of Ammon was visited with increasing frequency by visitors from mainland Greece and cults were widely instituted (for Athens see A. M. Woodward, *ABSA* lvii (1962) 5-13). It was generally recognized that Ammon was the Libyan manifestation of the universal deity Zeus. See, in general, A. Fakhry, *Siwa Oasis. Its History and Antiquities* (Cairo 1944), esp. 21-33.

Περσέα καὶ Ἡρακλέα It seems likely that the details in Arrian were first supplied by Callisthenes (cf. *FGrH* 124 F 28-9, 32-3 with Pearson,

LHA 41–5). There is no hint in any other source that Perseus or Heracles visited the Ammonium (the late myths found in (e.g.) Serv. *ad. Aen.* iv 196; Hyginus, *Astron.* i 20 are derived from the Alexander tradition). The stories of Busiris, Antaeus and the Gorgon were favourite themes of tragedy, regularly set in Egypt (cf. *IG* v. 2. 118, v. 10; for the connection of Perseus with Egypt see A. B. Lloyd, *JHS* lxxxix (1969) 81); and the oracle of Ammon, which in the fourth century ranked as the equal of Dodona, might easily have been drawn into the context. At least there was a cult of Heracles at the Ammonium by the third century B.C. (G. Petzl, *ZPE* ix (1972) 68–71). It is possible that the association predated Alexander's visit and did in fact provide a motive for it (Schachermeyr² 243 n. 269).

2. *φιλοτιμία* Callisthenes had already mentioned Alexander's emulation of his ancestors and used similar terminology: *φιλοδοξῆσαι μάλιστα*. This spirit of emulation is a recurrent feature of the tradition and certainly historical (cf. Brunt, *Arrian* 464–6), but Arrian represents it as subsidiary to the legendary *ἀτρέκεια* of the oracle.

ἀπὸ γένους τε ὄντι τοῦ ἀμφοῖν For Alexander's Heraclid lineage see ii 5. 9 n. Official genealogies placed Perseus three generations before Heracles; the Argive dedication at Delphi, erected in 369, represents Perseus as Heracles' great-grandfather and names Zeus as the father of both (*SIG*³ 161; cf. Paus. x 10. 5). Although Perseus was recognized as an ancestor of the Macedonian kings of the Hellenistic period (Chr. Boehringer, *Zur Chronologie mittelhellenenistischer Münzserien* 118–21), he is not attested in that role before 331. It may be that Alexander first proclaimed Perseus as his ancestor because of the etymological myths which represented Perseus as founder of the Persian nation (Hdt. vi 54, vii 61. 3, 150; Hellanicus, *FGH* 4 F 59–60). To stress his descent from Perseus buttressed Alexander's claims to be the legitimate king of Persia (ii 14. 5 ff.; cf. Lane Fox 201).

καὶ τὴ καὶ αὐτὸς . . . ἐς Δία A most controversial passage, which Wilcken attempted to foist upon Cleitarchus and dismiss as an accretion to the 'reliable' tradition (*SB Berlin* 1928. 588–90; cf. *Greece and the E. Mediterranean* 69 ff.). But Arrian presents the passage as a continuous whole and there is no hint that he has switched from a principal to a subsidiary source. There is no basis for supposing source contamination. This passage has been much discussed since Wilcken (cf. Strasburger 29–33; Tarn ii 353 f.; A. Gitti, *Alessandro Magno all'oasi di Siwah* (Bari 1951) 64–80; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 69 f.; Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Al.* 53–60); there has been little agreement, but the problems are delimited.

(i) The introductory *καὶ* presents a new consideration (*pace* Kraft 57 f.). Two reasons for the visit are given, explicitly marked off by the . . . *τε . . . καὶ* construction. The first is the fact that Alexander was of the same stock as Perseus and Heracles. Arrian now gives a second reason for the emulation, that he was directly descended from Zeus Ammon.

(ii) *γένεσις* must mean 'birth', not a vaguer expression like 'origins'. The parallels in Arrian are quite unambiguous (iv 8. 2, 10. 2, vii 27. 3). Alexander 'referred part of his birth to Ammon, just as the myths referred that of Perseus and Heracles to Zeus'.

(iii) Arrian uses a partitive genitive (*τι ... τῆς γενέσεως*), which seems to contrast with the second limb of the sentence in which the birth of Heracles and Perseus is attributed solely to Zeus. But the archetype A reads *καθάπερ οἱ μῦθοι τῆς Ἡρακλέους ...*; *τὴν* is a conjectural emendation by Krüger. If we retain the manuscript reading (and there seems no linguistic objection), there is an exact parallel between Alexander and his heroic forebears. As Tarn observed (ii 353) the partitive phrase ('some part of his birth') can only refer to dual paternity. Alexander had two fathers, Zeus Ammon and Philip, just as Heracles acknowledged both Zeus and Amphitryon as his fathers (Eur. *HF* 1258 ff.; cf. iv 8.2). Perseus does not quite fit the pattern, since he had no parents other than Zeus and Danae; but Arrian's use of mythology is not pedantically accurate (he can refer to both Dioscuri as sons of Zeus: iv 8. 2).

(iv) The passage implies that Alexander thought himself the son of Zeus Ammon even before the visit to Siwah and his salutation by the officiating priest. Other evidence corroborates this, primarily the oracle from the Milesian shrine at Branchidae 'about his sonship from Zeus' (*περὶ τῆς ἐκ Διὸς γενέσεως*: Callisthenes F 14a). To reach Memphis by spring 331 the oracle must have been delivered in late 332. Even before the visit Alexander had made it known that he considered himself son of Zeus.

ὥς καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ... ἐγνώκεναι Arrian repeats Alexander's desire for accurate knowledge about his affairs. He does not suggest that the purpose of the journey was to gain confirmation of his divine origins, although that may be included in the blanket term *τὰ αὐτοῦ* (Brunt, *Arrian* 473; *contra* Kraft 56 f.). Indeed Arrian uses language of studied vagueness. Unlike the other sources he gives no indication what precise questions were posed to the oracle, and later he only reveals in passing that Ammon had approved Alexander's sacrificial ceremonial (vi 19. 4). It is clear from Callisthenes' contemporary narrative that Alexander consulted the oracle in privacy within the sanctum (Wilcken, *SB Berlin* 1928, 586 f.; 1930. 165 ff.), and the tradition that he kept the responses secret is probably correct (see the letter cited by Plut. *Al.* 27. 8). See, however, Schachermeyr² 252 n. 285, 672-75.

Arrian's ironical addition ('or at least to say that he had such knowledge') is added evidence that the questions to the oracle found in the vulgate are apocryphal (Diod. 51. 2 ff.; Curt. iv 7. 27 f.; Justin xi 11. 9-11; Plut. *Al.* 27. 5-8; Frag. Sabb. *FGH* 151 F 1. 10). If specific questions were widely known, the irony would be pointless; the consultation was public not private knowledge. The so-called cynicism

of expression (Wilcken, *SB Berlin* 1928, 588; Strasburger 30 f., etc.) is hardly striking. Either Ptolemy or Aristobulus might have been sceptical about the unrevealed oracular responses. What Arrian is *not* doing is querying the king's claim to be son of Zeus (as, on his own authority, he does at vii 27. 3, 29. 3). It is the general claim to oracular knowledge which is placed in doubt. Curtius uses a similar expression (iv 7. 8: *aut credebatur esse aut credi volebat*), but it is associated explicitly with the claims to divine paternity.

3. Παραιτονίου The modern Mersah Matrûh, in antiquity one of the few safe harbours on the Egyptian coast (cf. Diod. i 31. 2). Aristobulus, like Callisthenes F 14a, makes Paraetionium the starting-point for the journey to Siwah. According to Strabo xvii 1. 14 (799), the route to the oasis left the coast at Apis, a village 100 stades from Paraetionium. Strabo also gives the distance from Alexandria as 1,300 stades as against Aristobulus' 1,600. The road distance is about 290 km.

4. ὕδωρ δὲ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κτλ. Arrian's account follows closely the general lines laid down by Callisthenes. Strabo's résumé mentions the relief brought by rain, and Plutarch's account of the inland journey, based on Callisthenes (cf. *Al.* 27. 4), states that the abundant rainfall removed any danger of thirst. The second obstacle, the prevailing south winds, also occurred in Callisthenes. It is clear that his story of the journey became canonical, and Ptolemy and Aristobulus retailed the salient details. There are variations in the vulgate; the rains are placed at a providential and dramatic juncture, when the water supplies had failed, four days out from Paraetionium (Diod. 49. 3-4; Curt. iv 7. 10-14).

These details are not apocryphal. On the coast of eastern Libya there is a variable winter rainfall and heavy deluges are attested. In winter and autumn there is apparently a high percentage of southerlies, while the qiblî, or hot southerly sirocco, is a frequent curse in spring (cf. O. Bates, *The Eastern Libyans* (1914) 19-20). The natural phenomena are historical, but it is another question whether they caused Alexander any difficulty. Strabo describes the route as a mere five days' journey and mentions no dangers (xvii 1. 14 (799)).

5. Πτολεμαῖος κτλ. (*FGrH* 138 F 8, 139 F 15). Ptolemy's version is unique. Callisthenes (F 14; Strabo and Plutarch) had portrayed two crows acting as guides to Siwah, and although the story was condemned as gross flattery (Timaeus, *FGrH* 566 F 155; Strabo) it appears in virtually every version. The vulgate writers locate the crows' intervention near Siwah and make the story less dramatic (Diod. 49. 5; Curt. iv 7. 15). Crows are frequent in the Libyan desert, and, if a pair had appeared close to Siwah, they may have been taken as a sign of divine guidance (Lane Fox 206, citing Bayle St. John's journey of 1847). Ptolemy's snakes seem a deliberate variant of Callisthenes' story (cf. Jacoby, *ad loc.*; Pearson, *LHA* 207). As the cult animals of Ammon (*Anth. Pal.* ix 24. 1; Hesych. s.v. "Ἀμμων) they were more appropriate

guides, and they may have been intended to recall the rumours of Olympias' impregnation (Ehrenberg, *Polis and Imperium* 425). For whatever reason, Ptolemy has transformed an exaggeration into a deliberate falsehood (cf. ii 11. 8 n.).

φωνὴν ἰέντας For the use of *φωνή* to describe animal noises see i 25. 7 (swallow); v 10.2 (elephant). Ptolemy's snakes did not necessarily use human speech (so Hamilton, *Plut. Al* 71).

καὶ ὀπίσω αὖθις This is apparently at variance with iii 4. 5, where Ptolemy stated that Alexander took another route direct to Memphis. E. N. Borza, *Historia* xvi (1967) 369, argued that Ptolemy did not know of a return journey via Paraetionium. Strasburger 33 had already seen the difficulty and suggested translating *ὀπίσω* as 'afterwards' rather than 'back again', but in its context the expression would be perversely misleading. But is there a formal contradiction? The snakes led the way to Siwah and back again (to Egypt); there is no necessary implication that the same route was taken.

4. 1. ἐς τεσσαράκοντα μάλιστα Diod. 50. 1 gives 50 stades for both the length and breadth of the oasis. The cultivated area now measures some 10 km long and 7 km wide. In antiquity it is thought to have been larger (Bates, *The Eastern Libyans* 10).

2. πηγὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀνίσχει The so-called spring of the sun. It was described by Herodotus (iv 181. 3-4), and it was one of the most striking sights of Siwah. There are very similar details in Curt. iv 7. 22 and Diod. 50. 4-5 (more precise location). See also Pliny, *NH* ii 228; Lucretius vi 848; Ovid, *Mel.* xv 309 ff.; A. Fakhry, *Siwa Oasis* 85, identifies it as the spring of 'Ain el Hamman and observes that its temperature is in fact a constant 29 °C. But gases are constantly discharged into the waters, which apparently give the impression of boiling when viewed by moonlight.

3. ἕλες αὐτόματοι Hdt. iv 181. 2 had mentioned salt deposits in the Sahara, at Siwah and elsewhere. Pliny later devoted an excursus to the salt mines of Siwah and Cyrene (*NH* xxxi 78 f.). No Alexander source other than Arrian mentions the salt; and Strasburger 33 argued for Ptolemaic authorship, for Ptolemy must have received presents from the Ammonium. True enough, but the presents of salt had been described somewhat earlier in the *Persica* of Deinon of Colophon (*FGrH* 690 F 23a). The *Persica* must have been at least contemporary with Callisthenes, and in any case the Siwah gifts were well enough known for any historian of Alexander to have described them.

4. καθαρὸς ὥσπερ κρύσταλλος Pliny, *NH* xxxi 79, claims that Ammoniac salt was alum-like in colour and opaque; the most prized variety split into flakes and became transparent. The distinction between sea salt and mined salt seems to have been observed in Ptolemaic documents (cf. Wilcken, *Gr. Ostraka* 341).

5. καὶ ἀκούσας . . . ὥς ἔλεγεν Arrian's account says nothing of any specific questions to the oracle (cf. iii 3. 2 n.) and agrees with Callisthenes' statement that the king consulted the oracle in privacy (F 14a). There is no possibility of eliciting the content of the original questions, despite the speculative suggestions of Wilcken, *SB. Berlin* 1928. 592-4, 603 and Tarn ii 354.

Berve, *Gnomon* v (1929) 374 f., pressed the imperfect ('Alexander kept on saying') and argued that the oracles were never secret. But, as Wilcken observed (*SB. Berlin* 1930. 167), the imperfect need not be iterative (cf. i 18. 6, iii 10. 1, iv 8. 8).

ὥς δὲ Πτολεμαῖος . . . ἄλλην εὐθεῖαν (*FGrH* 138 F 9; 139 F 15). An obstinate clash of authority. Other sources represent Alexander returning by the coast and founding Alexandria *en route* (Curt. iv 8. 1 (explicit); Diod. 51. 4-52. 1). Welles, *Historia* xi (1962) 278 f., has argued against the unhesitating acceptance of Ptolemy, claiming that the interior route across the Qattara depression was much less attractive than the coast road. Fraser, *Opuscula Atheniensia* vii (1967) 30 n. 27, observes that there are and were routes other than that across the Qattara. That is true. There was a well-beaten inland route from Tripoli via Wagīlah to Siwah; from Siwah the road branched east through Bahariāh to the Nile and was much used during the winter to escape the rains and cold of the coast road (Bates, *The Eastern Libyans* 14).

The source conflict cannot be resolved from external evidence. The coastal and inland routes are almost equiprobable. But, if Alexander had taken the inland route, one would expect fresh accounts of miracles, above all a comparison with Cambyses who had allegedly lost an army on the same route (Hdt. iii 25. 3-7). Plutarch in fact mentions Cambyses' failure on the outward journey (*Al.* 26. 11-12), and, had Alexander successfully traversed the same route, his source Callisthenes (?) would have noted the parallel. What matters is the divergence among contemporaries on a basic item of fact. I have argued (*CQ* xxvi (1976) 136-8) that any error should be ascribed to Arrian. His report of Ptolemy is very brief and stands alone. It may be that he misinterpreted his sources. If Aristobulus had a detailed statement that Alexander returned via Paraetonium to Egypt while Ptolemy said baldly that Alexander returned to Memphis, it would have been possible for him to draw a mistaken inference from Ptolemy's brevity and assume that two routes were at issue.

5. 1. πρεσβεῖαί τε πολλάι These embassies presumably included those from Miletus and Erythrae which conveyed oracles to Memphis (Callisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F 14a).

παρὰ μὲν Ἀντιπάρου The small numbers are surprising, but they supply no evidence that Agis' war had broken out (cf. ii 13. 4 n.). What is explicit is that the 500 cavalry were sent out from Thrace and not by

Antipater. In other words, Memnon, the military governor of Thrace, had not yet revolted (Diod. 62. 5; cf. Badian, *Hermes* xcv (1967) 179 f.), and it was his revolt which precipitated full-scale war in the Peloponnese. As yet the sources speak only of *νεωτερίσματα* in Greece (cf. iii 6. 3; Callisthenes F 14a). Arrian does not talk of *war* against the Spartans until winter 331/0 (iii 16. 10).

Μενοίτας (Berve no. 510). Emendation (to *Μενίδας*) is unnecessary (cf. Hamilton, *CQ* v (1955) 217). There is no problem in the appearance of an otherwise unattested Menoetas; whether he is identical with the Menoetas of Diod. xix 47. 1 must remain an open question.

2. **τῷ Διὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ** Probably a sacrifice in honour of Amon-Re, whom the Greeks regarded as the Egyptian manifestation of Zeus and the progenitor of Ammon of Siwah (Ehrenberg, *Polis und Imperium* 431 f.; but cf. Wilcken, *SB Berlin* 1928. 596). Zeus Basileus, like the later Zeus Hysistos, seems to have been an all-purpose name for the respective heads of the local pantheons (cf. ii 3. 4 n., with my observations in *Greece and the E. Mediterranean* 54 f.).

5. 2-7. *The Organization of Egypt*

Cf. Curt. iv 8. 4-5, with Ehrenberg, *Polis und Imperium* 433-44; Bengtson, *Strategie* iii 4-13.

δύο μὲν νομάρχας These officials are different from the humbler nomarchs mentioned at 5. 4. Ehrenberg 438 suggests that Doloaspis and Petisis were originally the nomarchs of Memphis and Thebes and that Alexander elevated them to become the titular heads of Upper and Lower Egypt. What functions they possessed is questionable. Military and fiscal tasks were reserved for Greeks and Macedonians, and there seems little left but the judiciary. Maybe they were intended to settle civil and criminal suits involving native Egyptians, where interference by Macedonians would be a complex and tiresome business. But these Egyptian officials had no real power, as is shown by the fact that when Petisis resigned his charge, Doloaspis was simply placed over the whole of Egypt (cf. Badian, *Greece and Rome* xii (1965) 172). Curtius does not even mention the Egyptians, and the appointments seem primarily a public-relations exercise.

3. **φρουράρχους** The garrisons were an inheritance from the Persian occupation (for Pelusium see iii 1. 1 n.); Alexander merely placed them under his own men. Both commanders, like the commanders of the holding forces, are Macedonians.

τῶν ξένων δέ These are not mercenaries from Alexander's army, who would have comprised the holding force led by Peucestas and Balacrus (5. 5). Schachermeyr (238 n. 263; cf. Tarn i 44) must be right in claiming that these mercenaries were the military settlers of the Persian period, the counterparts of the *κάτοικοι* who were later settled in the individual nomes of Ptolemaic Egypt (Rostovtzeff, *SEHWW* i 248 ff.).

It is quite possible that Lycidas himself was an Egyptian resident who had served in the invasion of 343 and was retained in the standing military establishment.

γραμματεῖα In the Ptolemaic period secretaries are attested in the armies and fleets of Egypt and overseas possessions (*OGIS* 102. 11 f., 154–5; cf. Wilcken, *UPZ* i 161, no. 14. 43). The position is rare in Alexander's army. Curt. vii 1. 15 mentions a certain Antiphanes who was *scriba equitum* and acted as quartermaster (cf. vii 1. 34), while Nearchus' fleet had a secretary, an otherwise unknown Evagoras of Corinth (*Ind.* 18. 9). These men are relatively undistinguished but Eugnostus is said to belong to the Companions. If Lycidas had served under the Persians, Alexander may have wished to put a reliable man alongside him—and Lycidas' Aetolian origins may have made him slightly suspect (cf. i 7. 4, 10. 2 with notes). In any case, if these military settlers were distributed around the nomes, as the Ptolemaic *κάτοικοι* were in 312 (Diod. xix 85. 4; cf. Bengston, *Strategie* iii 18 f.), their maintenance and co-ordination would have been a major problem, amply justifying the use of a separate administrative officer.

ἐπισκόπους δὲ αὐτῶν This is usually taken 'inspectors of the mercenaries'; Ehrenberg 437; Berve i 146, 206, etc.; Pearson, *LHA* 61 f.; Brunt, *Arrian* 235. There are, however, objections which seem decisive. The *ξένοι* seem implausibly overstaffed, with four separate officers. Secondly Curt. iv 8. 4 places Aeschylus on the same footing as Peucestas, the military commander, and he seems to regard him as the administrative head of Egypt. Thirdly, there is a parallel in the appointment of Neiloxenus as *ἐπίσκοπος* in Parapamisadae: *τῶν δὲ ἐταίρων Νειλόξενον . . . ἐπίσκοπον ἀπολιπών* (iii 28. 4). Neiloxenus is not 'inspector of the Companions'; as so often the genitive is partitive ('N., one of the Companions'). Now in iii 5. 3 *τῶν ἐταίρων* has twice been used in the partitive sense, in different positions in the respective clauses, and Arrian is clearly reluctant to use the expression a third time. *αὐτῶν* is therefore substituted. Aeschylus and Ehippus were *ἐπίσκοποι* from the ranks of the Companions (cf. *CQ* xxiv (1974) 55 n. 2). In that case it seems that they acted as supervisors for the two Egyptians who had the *titular* standing, much as Tlepolemus and Neiloxenus served alongside native satraps in eastern Iran (iii 22. 1, 28. 4).

Ἐφιππον τὸν Χαλκιδεῶς Chalcideus is an impeccable patronymic (cf. Thuc. viii 6. 5, 8. 2, etc.). Geier's emendation to *Χαλκιδέα* presupposes that this Ehippus is identical with the Ehippus of Olynthus who composed the notorious pamphlet on the deaths of Hephaestion and Alexander (*FGrH* 126 F 1–2; cf. Berve no. 331). There is no reason either for emendation or identification (so Badian, *Studies* 253).

4. Λιβύης . . . Ἀραβίας Cf. Curt. iv 8. 5. Only Arrian mentions Cleomenes' control of Arabia.

In Ptolemaic times there were specific nomes of Libya and Arabia (*P. Rev. Laws* col. 61. 1–12) which seem to have comprised the territory to the east and west of the Delta (Strabo xvii 1. 30 (806)). Apollonius' command seems both military and administrative, like the *Λιβυάρχια* mentioned by Polybius in 203/2 (xv 25. 12; cf. Bengtson, *Strategie* iii 157). Cleomenes likewise governed the territory of Arabia which extended towards Sinai, but he also administered the entire fiscal system of Egypt. The combination of fiscal and administrative duties seems paralleled in the arabarch of Ptolemaic Egypt (see the excellent discussion by Dittenberger in *OGIS* ii pp. 256–8), but there is no parallel for the enormous scope of his financial authority. Nothing is known of his previous history, except that he came from Naucratis, but it is very likely that he had been important in the Persian administration (Berve ii 210, no. 431).

Cleomenes later became the most important man in the province, and he is termed satrap (Paus. i 6. 3; [Arist.] *Oec.* ii 2. 33, 1352^a16). The date at which he achieved the title is unclear; it may have been after the death of Hephaestion (vii 23. 6; cf. J. Vogt, *Chiron* i (1971) 153–7; J. Seibert, *Chiron* ii (1972) 99–102). For the later career of Cleomenes see Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* 39–51.

τοὺς μὲν νομάρχας ἔαν ἄρχειν Cf. Curt. iv 7. 5. There was a canonical list of forty-two nomes, current from Pharaonic times to the Roman occupation. The nomarch was the regional administrative head (Diod. i 73. 1) and during the Persian occupation nomarchs led rebellions ([Arist.] *Oec.* ii 2. 32: 1352^a10; cf. L. Cracco Ruggini, *Athenaeum* xlv (1967) 67 n. 132). The nomarchs had supervised taxation at a local level (Hdt. ii 177. 2) and Alexander naturally preserved their age-old functions. In the Ptolemaic period their power was eroded by the appointment of a Greek *strategos*, first as military commander but later usurping the nomarch's civil functions (cf. Wilcken, *Grundzüge* i 8–12; Jones, *CERP*² 295–7, 469–71). For Cleomenes' dealings with the nomarchs see [Arist.] *Oec.* ii 2. 33, 1352^a16. It is clear that they were independent in the levying of taxes and contributed the total to Cleomenes.

5. στρατηγός . . . Θηραμένους Curt. iv 8. 4 mentions only Peucestas and gives a figure of 4,000 for the holding force; this may be the army of Upper Egypt only. He adds that the fleet comprised thirty triremes. ἀντὶ Ἀρρύβα (Berve no. 156) The manuscripts repeat Balacrus' name, but Arrian's note about Arrhybas' death guarantees the emendation. This is our sole reference to Arrhybas, but the name points strongly to Epirus and the Molossian royal house (Tod. ii no. 173; *IG* iv² 1. 122.63). In that case, Arrhybas was akin to the Aeacid Neoptolemus (ii 27. 6 n.) and presumably a relative of Olympias (Plut. *Al.* 2. 2; Justin vii 6. 11).

For Leonnatus' earlier history see ii 12. 5 n. His patronymic varies

wildly in Arrian's works (cf. vi 28. 4; *Ind.* 18. 3; *Succ.* F 1a. 2). The usually accepted form is Anteas (at vi 28. 4), but the corruption here and elsewhere is hard to explain.

7. *Ῥωμαῖοί μοι δοκοῦσι* For the imperial administration of Egypt and the exclusively equestrian appointments see Strabo xvii 1. 12 (797); Tac. *Ann.* ii 59. 3; *Hist.* i 11. 1; Dio li 17. 1-3. Arrian's terminology, *ὑπαρχος Αἰγύπτου* is strange. The invariable Greek term for the *praefectus Aegypti* is *ἐπαρχος*. An isolated use of *ὑπαρχεία* in the sense of *provincia* occurs in the newly discovered *laudatio funebris* for Agrippa, but the very uniqueness of the word has caused serious problems (L. Koenen, *ZPE* v (1970) 235-41; E. W. Gray, *ZPE* vi (1971) 230). Arrian, it seems, has transferred one of his regular words for the satraps of Alexander (cf. i 12. 8 n.; *CQ* xxiv (1974) 55-7) to describe the Roman governors of Egypt.

6. *Alexander in Syria: Spring 331*

6. 1. *ἅμα τῷ ἡρι ὑποφαίνονται* Cf. iv 18. 4 with i 1. 4, 11. 3. The expression indicates the very beginning of spring, almost 'at the daybreak of spring' (cf. Xen. *Hell.* v 3. 1, iii 4. 16).

ἀφίκετο ἐς Τύρον Arrian has no details of the march between Egypt and Tyre; but Curt. iv 8. 9-10 knows of a punitive expedition against the Samaritans (cf. F. M. Cross, in *New Directions in Biblical Archaeology* (ed. D. N. Freedman and J. C. Greenfield: New York 1969) 41-63), and he places the Greek embassies before the arrival in Tyre.

2. *ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν* For this embassy see Curt. iv 8. 12. No other Athenian named Achilles is attested in this period (cf. Berve no. 192; *PA* 2796), but Diophantus may be identical with the politician, the son of Phrasicleides (*IG* ii² 1623. 210-12; cf. *PA* 4435; J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* 166 f.). Arrian mentions explicitly only the request for the release of their prisoners; Curtius adds that they congratulated Alexander on his 'victory', which can only be Issus. This ties in with the notice that the Corinthian League voted an embassy of fifteen in the summer of 332 to present a golden crown (Diod. 48. 6; Curt. iv 5. 11 f.; cf. Dobesch, *Grazer Beitr.* iii (1975) 95). The Athenians no doubt felt it prudent to send an additional embassy in the hope of extracting private concessions. There seems no doubt that the two gold crowns for Alexander, which are listed in the treasury accounts for the period 334-1, were conveyed by this embassy (*IG* ii² 1496. 52 ff.; cf. Schaefer iii² 185 n. 2).

ἑυνεπρέσβευον ... καὶ οἱ Πάραλοι The *Paralus* was one of the two Athenian state triremes used for ceremonial purposes and the dispatch of urgent messages of state (Plut. *Praec. r. p. ger.* 15; 811 D; cf. F. Miltner, *RE* xviii 1209-11). Their crews were traditionally hand-picked and ultra-democratic (Thuc. viii 73. 5; Ar. *Frogs* 1071 ff.) and

in 331 they were ready to make their own representations to Alexander (cf. Aesch. 3. 162).

3. τὰ δὲ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ... κατήκουον I have discussed this problematic passage in *Phoenix* xxix (1975) 27-43. The difficulties of interpretation centre on the identification of the disturbances in the Peloponnese. Most scholars have argued that Arrian means the actual outbreak of the campaign of Megalopolis: E. Badian, *Hermes* xcv (1967) 181; E. N. Borza, *C. Phil.* lxvi (1971) 230; G. Wirth, *Historia* xx (1971) 627; R. A. Lock, *Antichthon* vi (1972) 15 f. There is a minority view that the events referred to are to be found in the confused period before the outbreak of war: G. L. Cawkwell, *CQ* xix (1969) 172; Bosworth, loc. cit. Two points are crucial:

(i) Arrian's terminology is hard to reconcile with outright war in the Peloponnese. He emphasizes loyalty to the *Persian* war, which is a most peculiar expression if Alexander knew of the crisis after the defeat of Corrhagus. Then it was the war against Sparta that was crucial (cf. iii 16. 10); the Persian war was a side-issue. The expression suits a context before war broke out. Arrian's source was probably thinking of the difficulties experienced by Alexander's officers recruiting in the Peloponnese (cf. Bosworth 29 f.).

(ii) Curt. iv 8. 15 claims that Amphoterus was sent to Crete, which was occupied by Persian and Spartan forces, and to deal more generally with piracy. The two accounts are usually combined: Amphoterus was already in Crete in 331 and was recalled to deal with the outbreak of war (so Berve no. 68, followed by Badian, Wirth, and now Brunt, *Arrian* 482). This presupposes that Curtius is either anachronistic or has missed the main point of Amphoterus' commission—and also that Amphoterus was not physically present when he received his orders, which both sources imply (cf. Bosworth 30 f.). But, if the commission predated the outbreak of war, the contradiction is less stark. Crete was indeed a problem in 331, the final theatre of the Aegean War (cf. ii 13. 6 n.), and the events of 332 had shown that piracy was endemic and dangerous (cf. ii 1. 2, iii 2. 4 nn.).

There remains the problem why Arrian does not mention Crete, allegedly Amphoterus' primary objective. I have drawn attention to evidence that the Peloponnese could be conceived as including Crete (*Phoenix* 34 f.). Arrian's source may have used the term in its more extended sense, including both Crete and the Peloponnese proper. Alternatively Arrian may merely have retailed one of a series of instructions which his source gave more fully (he gives only one of the petitions of the Athenian embassy, although he is aware of more).

4. ἐν Φοινίκῃ ... Βερροιαῖον This is the sole reference to Coeranus (Berve no. 441), but there is no reason to doubt Arrian's statement that he became fiscal superintendent of Phoenicia. It is erroneous to infer that he had responsibility for the whole Levant (a mistaken comparison

with the role of Menes: iii 16. 9) and over-pedantic to claim that his function was to transport the taxes already collected (cf. Leuze, *Satrapieneinteilung* 441); ἐπὶ τῶν φόρων τῇ ξυλλογῇ is patently a variation upon the more usual phrase ἐκλέγειν τοὺς φόρους (cf. iii 5. 4, 16. 4). The functions of the financial directors seem to have been more complex than Leuze supposed; they comprised both the partition of taxes among the communities of the satrapy and supervising the mechanism of collection. In the case of Phoenicia such an official was essential. No satrap had been imposed in 332 (cf. ii 13. 8 n.). Alexander needed some functionary in the area to supervise the reception of tribute and to distribute the burden impartially.

Φιλόξεον ... ἐκλέγειν The passage involves two complex sets of problems: (i) the scope of Philoxenus' appointment in 331 and (ii) the relationship between this Philoxenus and the Philoxenus attested operating on the western coast of Asia Minor in 324. Cf. U. Wilcken, *Hermes* xxxvi (1900) 191 f.; Berve ii 389-91; *RE* xx 189 f.; Leuze, *Satrapieneinteilung* 425-8; Bengtson, *Philologus* xcii (1937) 126-55; *Strategie* i 34 ff.; Badian, in *Anc. Soc. & Inst.* 54-61; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 56 f.

(i) During the Hellenistic period the expression τὰ ἐπὶ τὰδε τοῦ Ταύρου denoted the regions of Asia Minor north-west of the Taurus range (*OGIS* 219. 13 (Ilium c.270); P. Hermann, *Anadolu* ix (1965) 29 ff. (Antiochus III and Teos); see further H. H. Schmitt, *Antiochos der Grosse* 159 f.). This superficially gives the impression that Philoxenus controlled the fiscal system of all Asia Minor. But the scope of the appointment would have been vast and it overlapped functions delegated to Nicias in Lydia and to individual satraps (cf. i 17. 1 and 7). Leuze 442 f. therefore suggested that Philoxenus' job was simply the conveyance of taxes already collected. But such a function is incompatible with Arrian's term ἐκλέγειν which must mean 'to collect'. The most popular approach has been to link Philoxenus' post with the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Bengtson, *Philologus* 137 f., suggested that he was a special commissioner who also collected taxes. More attractive is Badian's suggestion that Philoxenus' function was originally to collect *syntaxeis* from the Greek cities, newly incorporated in the Corinthian League. After the remission of *syntaxeis* in 330 he was elevated into a *hegemon*, the counterpart of Antipater. This seems to me unlikely:

(a) Arrian's terminology suggests the collection of regular tribute, like Coeranus' task in Phoenicia.

(b) There is no evidence that members of the Corinthian League were forced to pay *syntaxeis*. The parallel with the Athenian Confederacy (Badian 51-2 with n. 60) cannot compensate for the lack of evidence and the omission of financial contributions from the bitter list of complaints of [Demosthenes] 17.

(c) In the Seleucid period *syntaxeis* were irregular contributions

extracted over and above the regular tribute. The Teian decree for Antiochus III is quite explicit: 'he granted the city to remain sacred, inviolate and immune from tribute and promised to discharge us from the rest of the *syntaxeis* which we paid to king Attalus' (i 8-9). This decree gives ample evidence that tribute and *syntaxeis* could be imposed concurrently upon the same community. There is other evidence of extraordinary contributions being levied in time of war (*OGIS* 4. 10 ff. (321 B.C.); Welles, *RC* 1. 44 f.), and these contributions are labelled *syntaxeis* (Welles, *RC* 15. 26; cf. Magie, *RRAM* ii 829 n. 14; Herrmann, *Anadolu* ix (1965) 104). Now it is known that Alexander extracted contributions for his war effort. That is attested explicitly for Aspendus (i 26. 3 n.), and it must have occurred elsewhere. The *syntaxis* from which Alexander exempted Priene (cf. Tod ii no. 185) falls into the same category, a once-for-all contribution quite different from tribute.

Philoxenus' post in 331 simply involved the collection of taxes in Asia Minor, and we must look for the most likely segment of the sub-continent. Now the richest portion of Asia Minor apart from Lydia was Caria. And Caria held a peculiar position, subject to a native queen and a Macedonian military commander, Ptolemy (Berve no. 674). Ptolemy is last attested in 333, and the following year Miletus was captured by an otherwise unknown Balacrus (Curt. iv 5. 13; Berve no. 203), perhaps Ptolemy's second-in-command and successor. In 331 Caria was finally quiet and a major garrison no longer required. Troops could be withdrawn as they were from Lydia (see below 6. 7 n.), and a fiscal superintendent imposed in place of the military commander. Caria was certainly classed as part of Cistauric Asia (Polybius xxi 24. 7; Livy xxxvii 55. 4-7), but Arrian uses the wider geographical term. Possibly Philoxenus' competence extended outside Caria, to the areas of Lycia and Phrygia which were more easily accessible from Caria than from the respective satrapal centres.

(ii) Philoxenus' further career is not mentioned by Arrian, but, if he was appointed to Caria, he is certainly identical to the satrap who brought troops to Babylon in 323 (vii 23. 1, 24. 1; cf. [Arist.] *Oec.* ii 2. 31, 135¹36). After Ada died, at some time unknown (i 23. 8 n.), the administration would have been taken over by the senior Macedonian of the area. Philoxenus' *de facto* satrapal authority may have been confirmed officially, like Cleomenes' usurped position in Egypt (cf. iii 5. 4 n.), after Alexander's return from India.

It is more problematic how he is related to the Philoxenus who is variously termed $\delta\tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\ \theta\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\eta\ \sigma\tau\tau\alpha\tau\eta\gamma\acute{o}\varsigma$ (Plut. *Al.* 22. 1; *de vit. pud.* 5: 531 A), $\delta\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma\ \pi\alpha\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma\ \acute{\upsilon}\pi\alpha\rho\chi\acute{o}\varsigma$ (Plut. *de Al. f.* i 12: 333 A) and *Ἰωνίας ὑπαρχος* (Polyaenus vi 49). Nothing can be built upon Plutarch's terminology. He can use *στρατηγός* as a synonym of satrap (*Al.* 68. 4) and *ὑπαρχος* is a notoriously ambiguous word. As for the geographical context, expressions such as $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\ \theta\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\eta$ or $\acute{\eta}\ \pi\alpha\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\alpha$ may denote

limited tracts of coastline such as Ionia (Xen. *Hell.* iv 8. 17) or Aeolis (Diod. xvi 52. 2 ff.), but they can refer to the entire coast between Caria and Cilicia (Arr. iii 22. 4, i 24. 3; cf. ii 1. 1). Plutarch could have described a satrap of Caria as *strategos* or hyparch of the coastal districts. Polyaeus is more difficult. He says that Philoxenus intervened at Ephesus and sent three revolutionaries to prison in Sardes. But a satrap of Caria may have so acted. Ephesus was close to the Carian border, formed by the river Maeander (Xen. *Hell.* iii 2. 14, 19; Diod. xiv 36. 2), and Alexander's satraps were not rigidly confined to their provinces. The satrap of Lydia took part in the action at Halicarnassus (ii 5. 7), just as Pharnabazus co-operated with Tissaphernes in the campaign of 397 (Xen. *Hell.* iii 2. 13–20; Diod. xiv 39. 4–6). Philoxenus may have intervened at Ephesus as satrap of Caria; and Sardes, where the revolutionaries were interned, seems to have been a central prison for Asia Minor (Plut. *Phoc.* 18. 6; Aelian, *VH* i 25). There remains Polyaeus' statement that Philoxenus was hyparch of Ionia. That may be one of his many errors, a mistaken inference that the hyparch who intervened at Ephesus was the hyparch of Ionia.

All these references are consistent with a single Philoxenus operating in Caria; there were hardly two men of the same name in adjacent territories (Bengtson 144; Badian 69 n. 104 is unconvincing). Two other men named Philoxenus are recorded, the official sent to Susa in 331 (iii 16. 6) and the man elevated to the satrapy of Cilicia in 321. The latter had served as phalanx under-officer in Alexander's reign (Arr. *Succ.* F 24. 12) and was an upstart, not the previous satrap of Caria (so Wilcken, *Hermes* xxxvi (1900) 191, establishing a dogma; cf. Berve no. 794). Otherwise all references allude to a single man, appointed fiscal superintendent of Caria in 331 and promoted to the satrapy after Ada's death. In 323 he was summoned to Babylon and replaced by Asander. Nothing is subsequently heard of him.

5. Ἄρπαλος γὰρ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ἔφυγε The background to Harpalus' exile in 337 is given by Plut. *Al.* 10, who explicitly links his disgrace with the marriage intrigues with Pixodarus of Caria (cf. i 23. 8 n.). Names and details are common to both Arrian and Plutarch; Arrian's narrative, however, concentrates exclusively on Harpalus and keeps the background to a minimum. There could be a common source, perhaps Aristobulus (Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 498; Strasburger 34).

οὐ πιστὸς ἦν There is no need for emendation; the crisis of 337 was such that loyalty to Alexander was construed as an offence. Arrian underlines the point two lines later, when he gives Philip's general suspicions of Alexander as the reason for the exiles. Kraft, *Der 'rationale' Alexander* 26 f., argues that Arrian *contradicts* Plutarch, separating the exiles from the Pixodarus affair. That is wrong. Arrian stresses the causal not the temporal relationship.

Εὐρυδίκην All other sources name her Cleopatra (Satyrus *ap.*

Athenaeus xiii 557 D; Plut. *Al.* 9. 6; Paus. viii 7. 7; Justin ix 7. 2, 12). The name Eurydice was probably the royal name. Compare Adeia, daughter of Amyntas and Gynna, who changed her name to Eurydice after her marriage to Philip Arrhidaeus (Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 23; cf. Berve no. 23). Her maternal grandmother, Audata, is also named Eurydice by Arrian (*Succ.* F 1. 22; cf. Athenaeus xiii 557 C), and it seems that Eurydice was the established name for a Macedonian queen. Cleopatra was the pre-marital name (*contra* Berve no. 434; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 24).

Cleopatra/Eurydice was the sister of Hippostratus and niece of the great Attalus (Athenaeus xiii 557 D-E). Her marriage to Philip provoked a dynastic crisis which imperilled Alexander's succession: cf. Badian, *Phoenix* xvii (1963) 244 ff.; Hamilton, *Greece and Rome* xii (1965) 120-2; Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 101 ff. For less cataclysmic interpretations of the crisis see Kraft 16 ff.; J. R. Fears, *Athenaeum* liii (1975) 125 ff.; Ellis, *Philip II* 211 ff.

6. Πτολεμαῖον . . . σωματοφύλακα This is anticipatory. Ptolemy was not elevated to the Bodyguard until autumn 330 (cf. iii 27. 5).

ἀχρεῖον ἦν It is not known what Harpalus' deformity was. The suggestion that he was lame is based on the contemporary nickname Παλλίδης which appeared in the satyr-play *Agon* (Athenaeus xiii 595 F); it is wholly speculative and, it seems, linguistically inadmissible (Stähelin, *RE* vii 2397; Berve ii 76 n. 3).

Ἐριγύδιον . . . Λαομέδοντα (Berve nos. 302, 464) The two brothers came originally from Mitylene (Diod. xviii 3. 1; Arr. *Succ.* F 1b. 2), but in the list of trierarchs for the Indus fleet their domicile is given as Amphipolis (*Ind.* 18. 4). Larichus must have been one of the earlier immigrants, tempted into the new Macedonian territories after 356 and established among the Companions. It is interesting that his sons were so influential in 337. Erigyus did not obtain his command of the allied cavalry until 333 (cf. i 14. 3 n.). If he was, like Ptolemy, a coeval of Alexander he may have been considered too young for an independent command at the beginning of the campaign. As for Laomedon, this is the sole reference to him in Alexander's reign, apart from his trierarchy at the Indus. He must have continued in high favour, for he re-emerges in the Babylon settlement as satrap of Syria (Berve no. 464; cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxvi (1976) 63 f.). His son is probably the Larichus honoured in a decree of Priene as a friend of Seleucus and Antiochus I (*OGIS* 215; cf. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*² 88 f.).

διγλωσσος . . . γράμματα I see no reason for emendation (e.g. Sintenis' γραμματέα with its attendant repunctuation) or for deleting ἐς . . . γράμματα as suggested by Roos and Brunt. It is possible that Laomedon's bilingual capacities extended only to documents not to actual speech. Peucestas is explicitly attested to have been the only Macedonian to speak Persian (cf. vi 30. 3, vii 6. 3). On the other hand, literary

accomplishment in Asiatic languages was not unknown in Alexander's secretariat (Diod. xix 23. 1-4; Polyaeus iv 8. 3), and there may have been more Macedonians able to read documents than to speak the language. The true bilingual seems to have been a rare phenomenon: cf. Galen viii p. 585 (Kühn).

Νέαρχον . . . τὸ ὄρος The reference is retrospective. Arrian had not noted Nearchus' original appointment to Lycia/Pamphylia, which he seems to have held between 333 and 330, when he conveyed reinforcements to Zariaspa (iv 7. 2; cf. i 24. 4 n.). Like the sons of Larichus, Nearchus was domiciled in Amphipolis, although he was born in Crete (Arr. *Ind.* 18. 10; cf. Tod ii no. 182). No doubt his father, Androtimus, had joined the court in the early years of Philip's reign, while his son was still an infant (Berve no. 544; Pearson, *LHA* 113-15).

7. ὀλίγον δὲ πρόσθεν κτλ. The 'first flight' of Harpalus is controversial. Badian, *Historia* ix (1960) 245 f., suggests that he withdrew out of pique, having been replaced by Coeranus and Philoxenus. But this is speculation. Arrian nowhere suggests that Harpalus was relieved of his post as treasurer *before* he fled. It is more probable that his successors were appointed after Harpalus' desertion. Nor can one make inferences from the fact that Philoxenus demanded Harpalus' extradition in 324; it does not (*pace* Badian 246) prove that the two were enemies, still less that enmity existed as early as 333. There is a more prosaic explanation. Before Issus Alexander was not the favourite contender. The native Syrians expected a Persian victory (Diod. 32. 4; Jos. *AJ* xi 315 f.), and in Greece it was expected and hoped that Alexander would be annihilated (Aesch. 3. 164). The king himself, according to one tradition, was in desperate anxiety (Curt. iii 8. 20; cf. *FGH* 148 F 44, col. ii). Little wonder, then, if the weaker spirits were tempted to desert, especially when Alexander fell seriously ill in Cilicia (cf. ii 4. 7 ff. with notes). See now W. Heckel, *G. Phil.* lxxii (1977) 133-5.

Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Ἡπειρώτην (Berve no. 38) The brother of Olympias, placed on the Molossian throne by his brother-in-law, Philip II, some time before 349 (cf. Errington, *GRBS* xvi (1975) 48 f.). In early 334, simultaneously with Alexander's crossing of the Hellespont, he had launched a major expedition into south Italy to assist the Tarentines against Lucanian pressure: Arist. F 614 (Rose); Gellius xvii 21. 33; Justin xii 2. 1-15; Livy viii 24. 1-17; Strabo vi 1. 5 (256); vi 3. 4 (280). Alexander was murdered, probably in the winter of 331/0 (for the date see Aesch. 3. 242), but in the interim he had enjoyed considerable success against the Bruttians and Lucanians (cf. Livy viii 24. 4; Justin xii 2. 12). In late 333 he seemed to offer more prospects of enrichment without hazard than his famous nephew..

ἐν τῇ Μεγαρίδι Nothing is known of the history of Megara in Alexander's reign, but the city must have been insignificant and vulnerable to the garrison on the Acrocorinth (compare the events of

243: Polybius ii 43. 4–5). Harpalus' choice of refuge indicates that he had few fears of reprisals from Alexander.

Μένανδρον (Berve no. 501) Menander held Lydia from 331 to 323 (cf. vii 23. 1; *SIG*³ 302), replacing Asander as satrap. Badian, *TAPA* xci (1960) 329, interprets Asander's recall as an early move against Parmenion. But there is no valid reason to assume that Asander was Parmenion's brother (cf. i 17. 7 n.).

8. Κλέαρχος At iii 12. 2 the commander of the ἀρχαῖοι ξένοι at Gaugamela is said to have been Κλέανδρος. It seems unlikely that the command of the unit changed in so short a time (as is assumed by Berve no. 425, but see ii 204 n. 1), and the text of one of the passages is probably corrupt (cf. Roos's apparatus). Which should be emended is uncertain, but probability inclines towards reading Κλέανδρος in both passages. Cleander, the lieutenant of Parmenion in Media, was a mercenary commander (iii 19. 7 n.), and it is most likely that it was he who led the ἀρχαῖοι ξένοι at Gaugamela.

ἀντὶ δὲ Ἀρίμμα (Berve no. 114) This Arimmas is otherwise unknown, but that does not justify Droysen's emendation, ἀντὶ δὲ <Μένωνος τοῦ> Κερδίμμα (cf. ii 13. 7 n.). The appearance of an unknown Arimmas in northern Syria can be explained by the troubled circumstances of 331. After the death of Andromachus at the hands of the Samaritans Menon, son of Cerdimmas, was probably transferred from the north to the south (Curt. iv 8. 9–11; cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxiv (1974) 51–3). Arimmas was a new appointment, and when Alexander marched from Tyre to Thapsacus he clearly disliked what he saw of his performance.

βλακεῦσαι This is the universally accepted emendation of A's reading, βασιλεῦσαι. Schneider suggested it in his commentary to Xen. *Anab.* ii 3. 11 (cf. v 8. 15), presumably because it goes better in the context: 'he seemed to have been slack in the preparations'. Arrian, however, uses βλακεύειν elsewhere (at vi 9. 3) and there is no hint of corruption. What is more, βασιλεῦσαι does have adequate sense: 'he was thought to have acted the king in his preparations' (*regiam maiestatem usurpasse*—Vulcanius). It is a slightly extended use of the verb, but it makes sense in the context.

7–12. *The Prelude to Gaugamela*

7. 1. Ἑκατομβαιῶνος ... Ἀριστοφάνους i.e. 10 July–9 August. The eclipse of the moon following the Tigris crossing took place on 20 September (cf. 7. 6 n.), almost exactly forty days after the end of Hecatombaeon. The most plausible estimate of the distance traversed by Alexander is c. 495–530 km (Marsden 20 ff.), and the marching rate was therefore at most 13 km *per diem*. This seems excessively slow, for the sources state that Alexander was in a hurry (7. 5 below; Curt. iv 9. 13) and the plains of Mesopotamia were not an area in which to linger

(Schachermeyr² 266—an eye witness description). Arrian may be a month too early (as at iii 15. 7), perhaps giving too precise a date for a reference in his source to midsummer. The transit of Mesopotamia probably took thirty days at most.

καὶ γὰρ καὶ Μαζαῖος κτλ. (cf. Berve no. 484; Stähelin, *RE* xv 1–2; Six, *NC* 1884. 97 ff.). During the reigns of Artaxerxes III, Arsēs, and Darius, Mazaeus had been successively satrap of Cilicia (Diod. xvi 42. 1), satrap of a united Syria and Cilicia (Head, *HN*² 731 ff.), and satrap of Syria. Coins found in Phoenicia bear the regnal years 16–21 of Artaxerxes and 1–4 of Darius (Head, *HN*² 796; cf. Leuze, *Satrapieneinteilung* 392–6). His tenure of Syria therefore fell between 345/4 and 333. His tenure of Cilicia is more problematic; all that is certain is that in 334 Arsames was satrap of Cilicia and Mazaeus of Syria (cf. i 12. 8 n.). There is no hint why the two satrapies had been united or how long the union lasted.

Curt. iv 9. 12 also mentions the commission to defend the Euphrates; but both he (iv 9. 7 f., 14 f.) and Diodorus (55. 1 f.) also mention another order of Darius, to prevent the Macedonians crossing the *Tigris*. If both statements are accepted, the only explanation is that Mazaeus was first sent to ascertain Alexander's route from the Euphrates, and later, after the news of Alexander's northward turn, he was ordered to prevent the Tigris crossing (cf. Marsden 15 ff.). But there are serious problems. Marsden makes Darius move north from Babylon only *after* the news of Alexander's crossing. In other words, the Persian army moved faster than the Macedonians; and the choice of Gaugamela was a poor substitute for a holding position on the Tigris. Neither is probable. Diod. 53. 1 implies that Darius' preparations were complete before Alexander's arrival in Syria; and it seems that the battle site was chosen and prepared well in advance (Diod. 53. 4; cf. Arr. iii 8. 7).

ἱππέας μὲν ἔχων The μὲν is left isolated; and it is certain that there is a lacuna in the text, referring to the infantry component of Mazaeus' force. The missing number is irretrievable. Curt. iv 9. 12 gives a figure of 6,000 for Mazaeus' command, but he states that it comprised cavalry alone (cf. iv 9. 7).

3. τὴν ἐτέραν ἰόντι κτλ. Alexander may have been influenced by Xenophon's description of the arid reaches of the Euphrates south of Thapsacus (*Anab.* i 5. 4–7). It is also possible, though nowhere attested, that Mazaeus had denuded the area to the south of everything eatable, as had happened in 401 (Xen. i 6. 1; cf. Marsden 12). Alexander's choice of route may have been the best of evils, but it was not inviting. Northern Mesopotamia is a barren undulating plain with limited water-supply, confined to a few water courses and occasional wells. Alexander would have had to exploit to the full the occasional oases like Urfa (Edessa) and Viranşehir (Tela): cf. *Turkey* (Geogr. Handbooks

Series: BR 507) i 171 ff. Nor is the heat much less oppressive than along the Euphrates. The August maxima average 40 °C and the mean temperature is as high as 27°.

4. ἐπὶ τοῦ Τίγριτος Darius was at Gaugamela, some 35 km as the crow flies, from the Tigris. Perhaps Darius' original intention was to reach the river (so Marsden 15, but see above 7. 1 n.), but alternatively the Persian scouts may have been lying. Arrian's ἐπὶ may even be used loosely, 'near the Tigris' (cf. Xen. *Anab.* ii 5. 18), implying that Darius intended to remain at Gaugamela and guard the Tigris bank with cavalry patrols (so Diod. 55. 1-2; Curt. iv 9. 7, 12).

5. δι' ὁξύτητα τοῦ ῥοῦ Fuller details are given by Diod. 55. 3-6 and Curt. iv 9. 15-22.

6. καὶ τῆς σελήνης . . . ἐγένετο Cf. Curt. iv 10. 1-7; Plut. *Al.* 31. 8; Pliny, *NH* ii 180 (the eclipse described by Cicero, *De Div.* i 121, seems different from the lunar eclipse before Gaugamela: cf. Pease's commentary ad loc.). This eclipse reached its maximum near Arbela at 9.12 p.m. on 20 September 331. Plut. loc. cit., claims that it took place about the start of the Eleusinian mysteries in the month of Boedromion, adding that the eleventh night after the eclipse was the night before battle. In the *Camillus* (19. 5) he gives a precise date for Gaugamela: 26 Boedromion. According to his calculations the eclipse took place on 15 Boedromion, which was the date of the gathering of the initiates, the beginning of the Mysteries (Hesych. s.v. ἀγυρμός). The dating is internally consistent and affords a precise synchronism for the Athenian year 331: 15 Boedromion = 20 September (cf. Dinsmoor, *The Archons of Athens* 359, 429; Hamilton's note (*Plut. Al.* 81) is inadequate). The date for the battle proper is 1 October 331.

τῇ τε σελήνῃ . . . τῇ γῇ The same triad of deities occurs in the treaty of 215 between Hannibal and Philip V (Polybius vii 9. 2), and the parallel of Alexander's sacrifice suggests that they were regularly worshipped in Macedonia (*contra* Walbank *Polybius* ii 46).

ἔδοκεῖ Ἀριστάνδρῳ . . . Ἀλεξάνδρῳ (cf. iii 15. 7) Full details of mantic interpretations of lunar eclipses are given by Plut. *Nicias* 23, who cites Philochorus, himself a *mantis*. Most light is shed by Curtius (iv 10. 6), who reports the interpretation of Egyptian seers that an eclipse of the moon portended disaster for the Persians; for the Greeks the fatal portent was a solar eclipse (cf. Hdt. vii 37. 3).

7. διὰ τῆς Ἀσσυρίας This is Assyria proper, the territory called Adiabene in the Hellenistic and Roman period (cf. Pliny, *NH* vi 41; Strabo xvi 1. 19 (745)). The equation is explicit in Dio's account of Trajan's campaigns, which is certainly derived from Arrian's *Parthica* (Dio lxviii 26. 4). Arrian is deliberately archaizing (cf. Hdt. i 102. 2, 106, ii 150. 2).

Γορδυνῶν The manuscripts have σογδιανῶν but the reading is guaranteed by the parallel passage of Curtius (iv 10. 8-10) which seems

to be taken from the same source as Arrian. See also Plut. *Al.* 31. 10, and for the name Strabo xi 12. 4 (522).

τετάρτη . . . διαβάσεως This must mean 'on the fourth day from the crossing-place' (compare the use of *πόρος* at i 4. 3, iii 1. 4). Arrian's chronological details about the prelude to Gaugamela continue as follows:

(i) iii 9. 1: after receiving news of the position of the Persian army Alexander rested his army for four days.

(ii) 9. 2: Alexander marched overnight to a position 30 stades from Darius.

(iii) 9. 5: reconnaissance of the battlefield. This apparently took place the day after the approach march and continued into the night before the battle, Plutarch's eleventh from the eclipse.

Arrian's narrative takes up nine full days, so that the night before battle would be the tenth after the eclipse. Marsden 75 therefore suggests emending Plutarch's text to ἐν δὲ δεκάτῃ . . . νυκτί, so dating Gaugamela to 30 September. Beloch (iii² 2. 316, followed by Brunt, *Arrian* 491 f.), more plausibly suggested that the march from the Tigris was delayed one day by the sacrifices after the eclipse. Curtius, however, states that the march began immediately after the eclipse (iv 10. 8) and even if exaggerated his account is not compatible with a delay of twenty-four hours. It seems more likely that a day has fallen out of Arrian's account of the march from the rest camp to the final battle position. There are suspicious elements in Arrian and the parallel narrative of Curtius presupposes an extra night (cf. 9. 1 n.).

8. 3-7. *Persian Preparations for Battle*

The description of the Persian contingents at Gaugamela seems modelled on Herodotus' celebrated description of the national components of Xerxes' army (*Hdt.* vii 61 ff.). Each contingent, as in Herodotus, is listed with its commander, and the digression on the ethnography of the Sacae has its exact counterpart in Herodotus (cf. iii² 8. 3 n.). This dramatic presentation of the Persian forces is no doubt Arrian's own work. The contingents correspond exactly to the Persian line of battle, described at iii 11. 3-8 and allegedly based on Aristobulus' version of the captured Persian dispositions. Probably this list included the commanders of the national contingents, as did the list of the vulgate sources (cf. Curt. iv 12. 6-13), and Arrian extrapolated their names for a preliminary muster of the army on Herodotean lines.

8. 3. Βῆσσος ὁ τῆς Βακτρῶν χώρας σατράπης (Berve no. 212) This is the first appearance of this formidable individual. Curt. iv 6. 2-4 states that he was already under suspicion of aiming at the royal powers, surely a *post eventum* rationalization.

Σάκαι The general description of the nomads who lived in the steppes to the east of the Caspian (cf. Herrmann, *RE* iA. 1770–1806). Arrian and Curtius are later more specific, and we hear that the Saca contingent included Dahae and Massagetae (iii 11. 3; Curt. iv 12. 6). These tribes lived on the south side of the Iaxartes, the Dahae immediately contiguous to the Caspian (Strabo xi 8. 2 (511)), and the Massagetae along the Oxus to the west of the Bactrians (Eratosthenes *ap.* Strabo xi 8. 8 (513) cf. iv 16. 4–5). Arrian says explicitly that these peoples were independent of the Bactrian satrapy, and fought as allies not subjects of Persia. The situation was different from that in the fifth century, when the Sacae *were* subjects of the Great King (cf. Hdt. iii 93. 3). In Xerxes' time they had been subordinated to the Bactrian satrapy under the king's brothers, Hystaspes and Masistes (Hdt. vii 64. 2, ix 113. 2).

Σκυθικὸν τοῦτο τὸ γένος This was almost a truism, stressed by most writers on the Sacae, beginning with Herodotus and Choerilus of Samos at the end of the fifth century (Hdt. vii 64. 2; Choerilus *ap.* Strabo vii 3. 9 (303)) and transmitted to later writers (Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 158; Pliny, *NH* vi 50; Mela iii 59). Although the observation is so common, it seems that the gloss in Arrian is borrowed directly from his immediate model, Herodotus' army list. Elsewhere Arrian very seldom uses the term **Σάκαι**. Apart from the problematic reference at iii 11. 4 the word only recurs in the Opis speech (vii 10. 5). In other passages he calls them **Σκύθαι** (iii 13. 3–4, 27. 4, iv 1. 1–3, 3. 6, 4. 1 ff.). Presumably Ptolemy himself referred to the Saca peoples simply as Scyths, accepting without question the *communis opinio* about their ethnic derivation. The reference to Sacae in Arrian's army list is his own addition, derived from his reading of Herodotus.

ἱπποτοξόται Cf. iv 4. 4–8.

4. Παρθαίους . . . Φραταφέρνης ἤγεν According to Curtius iv 12. 9 the contingent of Caspian peoples was led by the satrap of Tapuria, Phradates (named Autophradates by Arrian; cf. Berve no. 189). Arrian gives no hint that Autophradates was present at Gaugamela. Curtius may therefore be wrong, but alternatively, as Berve suggests, Autophradates may have been a subordinate of Phrataphernes. The satraps held adjacent territories, and their cavalry forces were naturally amalgamated for convenience of command, as had been the case at Issus (cf. Curt. iii 2. 6–7).

Παρθαίους Arrian's invariable term for the Parthians (the examples of **Πάρθοι** in the *Parthica* (F 1, 20, 30, 103) are all in second-hand quotations from other authors). This seems to have been the Hellenistic nomenclature: at least it is the invariable usage in Polybius, Strabo, and Appian. Writers using Roman sources, like Plutarch and Cassius Dio, tend to use **Πάρθοι** (see too the Greek translation of *Res Gestae* 33–4). The two terms seem synonymous, and there is no attempt to

differentiate the Parthians before and after the Arsacid invasion. Curtius is the only exception, clearly distinguishing the *Parthyaei* of Darius' army from the *Parthi* who held the territory in his own day (Curt. iv 12. 11).

Τοπαίρους The form recurs at iii 11. 4 in the second review of Darius' army. Elsewhere Arrian uses the form *Τάπουροι* (iii 23. 1-7, 24. 3, iv 18. 2, vii 23. 1), which is the more regular—attested, for instance, in Strabo and Curtius. This divergence probably goes back to Arrian's sources; *Τόπειροι* must be the form found in Aristobulus' army list (cf. iii 11. 3), whereas Ptolemy presumably used the more familiar *Τάπουροι*. The satrapy of Tapuria was adjacent to Parthia/Hyrcania. According to Eratosthenes it lay on the southern side of the Elburz between Hyrcania and Areia (Strabo xi 8. 8 (514), xi 9. 1, 13. 3 (523)).

Καδοῦσιοι τε καὶ Ἀλβανοὶ καὶ Σακεσῖναι The peoples of the south-west Caspian. The Cadusii occupied the stretches directly to the north of Ecbatana (cf. iii 19. 7), adjoining the Anariacae and Mardi (Eratosthenes *ap.* Strabo xi 8. 8 (514)). The Albani were further to the north, in the Araxes plain between the Iberians to the west and the Caspian (Strabo xi 4. 1-2, xi 14. 4), while Sacasine was immediately contiguous, bordering on Albania and the Cyrus river (Strab. xi 14. 4). The Sacasinae were allegedly Saca invaders, who occupied the best land in Armenia and gave their name to it (Strabo xi 8. 4).

5. **τοὺς δὲ προσοίκους . . . Ὁ(ρ)ξίνης ἐκδόσμων.** Something is seriously astray here. Three commanders seem a very large allowance for the peoples of the Persian Gulf. Worse, these same three commanders are mentioned in Curtius' army list, but with very different functions. The Persians with their Mardian and 'Sogdian' auxiliaries were led by Ariobarzanes and Orontobates. These two commanded separate army corps, whereas the command of the entire Persian contingent fell to Orsines, a lineal descendent of Cyrus the Great (Curt. iv 12. 7-8). The peoples of the Persian Gulf are grouped with the Indians in an entirely different position (iv 12. 9). Curtius must be right. In the first place, Ariobarzanes is explicitly attested as satrap of Persis in late 331 (iii 18. 2), and an Orxines was later executed for having usurped the satrapy of Persis during Alexander's absence (vi 29. 2; Curt. x 1. 22 ff.). Both men are closely associated with Persis and *a fortiori* one would expect the satrap to conduct the native Persian levy.

How then is Arrian's error to be explained? Berve ii 294 n. 592 suggests very tentatively that the 'dwellers by the Persian Gulf' may have included the Persians proper, which is hardly credible and is refuted by Curtius, who explicitly separates the Persian nationals from the *Rubri maris accolae*. It is much better to suppose a lacuna in the text. In the second list there are contingents not mentioned at iii 8. 3-6, most strikingly the Persians and their Mardian auxiliaries (cf. iii 11. 5), the very troops Curtius says were commanded by Orontobates and

Ariobarzanes. Diodorus too confirms that the Mardians, together with the Cossaei, occupied the Persian centre along with the Persian *μηλοφόροι* (59. 3). I therefore assume that after *ἐρυθρᾷ θαλάσῃ* there is a lacuna of indeterminate length, in which the commander of the peoples of the Persian Gulf was mentioned (probably Astaspes, the satrap of Carmania); and the national levy of Persia, together with their Mardian and Cossaeian allies, was also listed.

Βουπάρης This man is nowhere else attested, and he has been listed as satrap of Babylonia (Lehmann-Haupt, *RE* iiA. 115 and 142; Berve no. 222). Not necessarily. Some of the contingents have non-satrapal commanders, notably the Susians, who were led not by their satrap Abulites but by his son Oxathres (cf. Berve no. 585). It is interesting that the army of the Babylonian satrapy was divided at Gaugamela, the Mesopotamian contingent falling under Mazaeus' command. Leuze suggested persuasively that the satrap of Babylonia was either aged or infirm, and that his army was divided between a deputy, Bupares, and the satrap of Syria, who would otherwise have had to be content with the forces he evacuated before Alexander's conquest of the Levant (*Satrapieneinteilung* 410-12).

ἀνάσπαστοι Κῆρες The 'transplanted Carians' are not mentioned elsewhere, but they were presumably the inhabitants of the Carian villages which were located on the east bank of the Tigris opposite Sittacene (Diod. 110. 3 f., xix. 12. 1). When and how they were transplanted is impossible to guess.

Ἀρμενίων δὲ Ὀρόντης Orontes was the son or grandson of the famous Orontes who was satrap of Armenia in 401 B.C., married a daughter of Artaxerxes II, and led the insurgent forces during the great revolt of 362 (cf. M. J. Osborne, *ABSA* lxvi (1971) 310-21; *Historia* xxii (1973) 520 n. 29). Mithraustes is not mentioned elsewhere, and Berve no. 523 may be right in suggesting that he was a subordinate in charge of the infantry.

Ἀριάκης Καππαδοκῶν Palmerius' emendation *Ἀριαράθης* is usually rejected (cf. Berve no. 111), but on weak grounds. The Cappadocian princeling, it is argued, aimed for independence and resisted all domination until he was finally crushed by Perdiccas in 322 (cf. ii 4. 2 n.). He would hardly have troubled to send a contingent to Darius. The *Ariaces* who commanded at Gaugamela is therefore said to have been an otherwise unknown satrap, appointed to succeed Mithrobuzanes in Cappadocia (cf. i 16. 3 n.). That may be true, but one cannot rule out Ariarathes' having sent help to Gaugamela. In 331 it was the Macedonians who menaced his independence. If they destroyed the Great King, he was likely to be swallowed up. What is more *Ἀριάκης* and *Ἀριαράθης* look suspiciously similar—the first is said to be a 'hypokoristikos' of Ariarathes (Berve no. 111). It is quite possible that the man called Ariarathes by Hieronymus of Cardia appeared as

Ariaces in Aristobulus' army list (compare the unique form *Τόπειροι* for *Τάπουροι*).

6. *Σόρους* . . . *ἦγεν* The passage implies that Mesopotamia fell under the command of Mazaeus, Darius' satrap of Syria (cf. iii 7. 1 n.). That seems impossible. The Imperial Aramaic name for the Syrian satrapy was 'Abar nahārā', the land *beyond* the river (Ezra 6. 6; cf. 5. 6). There is no evidence that Mesopotamia ever formed part of any satrapy but Babylonia; and it was only in the latter years of Alexander's reign that the territory was detached to form a separate satrapy (cf. Leuze, *Satrapieneinteilung* 460–2). Mazaeus' command over the Mesopotamian contingent was probably a temporary expedient like that of Bupares (cf. 8. 5 n.).

Arrian describes Syria as tripartite, comprising Coele Syria, Palestine, and 'Syria between the rivers', and the division recurs at v 25. 4 and vii 9. 8. This is problematic. Arrian tends to refer to the whole area between the Amanus and southern Babylonia as Assyria and its inhabitants as Assyrians (cf. ii 6. 1–2 with iii 7. 7 n.). This is sheer archaism, imitation of Herodotus who uses Assyria as his standard term for the land between the rivers (Hdt. i 185. 2; 192 f., iii 92. 1). Arrian, however, also describes the peoples on both sides of the river as Syrians. That can perhaps be explained by the Greek habit of describing all Aramaic speakers as Syrians, from the Mediterranean inland (Poseidonius, *FGH* 87 F 105; cf. Hdt. vii 63; Strabo xvi 1. 2 (737)).

The geographical term 'Syria between the rivers' (v 25. 4, vii 9. 8) remains a problem. Although Herodotus acknowledges that the Syrians were widespread, he explicitly confines the territory Syria to the coastal strip of the Levant (Hdt. iii 91). Xenophon seems to refer to the east bank of the Euphrates south of Thapsacus as part of Syria (*Anab.* i 4. 19–5. 1); but Cyrus' army never penetrated inland from the river, and we cannot infer that in Xenophon's day the Syrian satrapy extended east to the Tigris. The only parallel to Arrian's expression is in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, *de mir. ausc.* 149 (ἐν τῇ Μεσοποταμίᾳ τῆς Συρίας). Nowhere else is it hinted that Mesopotamia formed part of Syria. There are two possibilities:

(i) The usage is Hellenistic and taken from Aristobulus (so, by implication, Th. Nöldeke, *Hermes* v (1871) 459 f.; F. A. Lepper, *Trajan's Parthian Wars* 142). There is no mention of Palestine at iii 8. 6, and Coele Syria *could* be used in its Hellenistic sense to denote the entire Levant coast (cf. ii 13. 7 n.). But the division recurs twice in speeches which must be largely free composition, and at vii 9. 8 'Syria between the rivers' appears alongside the contemporary geographical names, Coele Syria and Palestine.

(ii) The usage comes from Arrian's own day. At least it recurs in fragments of near-contemporary history in the *Parthica* which explicitly locate various Mesopotamian cities in Syria (F 7 Hatra; F 10 Naarda;

F 47 Edessa). 'Syria Mesopotamia' may have been a coinage of Trajan's time; it could have been part of the propaganda of conquest to describe the territory as a subdivision of Syria.

ἐλέγετο κτλ. Arrian's total is the highest and, as in his description of Issus (ii 8. 8), he presents it as hearsay only. Diod. 53. 3 gives 800,000 infantry and 200,000 cavalry and Plutarch (*Al.* 31. 1) speaks vaguely of a million. Justin xi 12. 5 merely repeats his figure for Issus. The lowest total is provided by Curt. iv 12. 13: 200,000 infantry and 45,000 cavalry. Arrian's figure for the cavalry is in rough agreement with that of Curtius; and Curt. iv 12. 6 gives individual numbers for the cavalry contingents of the Persian left: they amount to 16,000, a figure certainly compatible with the sum total. Marsden 32-7 carried out intricate calculations, based on the hypothetical length of the Persian line, and concluded that the total cavalry number was 34,000 (see, however, Brunt, *Arrian* 511). A more conservative approach is to accept Curtius' totals, or at least the cavalry figure, as derived ultimately from the captured Persian dispositions (Schachermeyr² 269; cf. Hammond, *JHS* lxxxvi (1966) 253). But any estimate depends on too many acts of faith to hold conviction, in particular reliance on the transmitted numbers in a text as corrupt as that of Curtius (cf. Judeich, *AS* iv 373). All that one can say with confidence is that the Persian infantry, whatever their actual numbers, was militarily insignificant except for the central core of mercenaries and *μηλοφόροι*. The strength of the army lay in cavalry and only cavalry on the Persian side are recorded participating in the fighting. They must have far outnumbered the 7,000 Macedonian cavalry; otherwise the entire description at iii 13. 1-2 is pure fantasy. ἄρματα . . . διακόσια The same number is recorded at Cunaxa (Xen. *Anab.* i 7. 11).

7. ἐν Γαυγαμήλοις . . . Βουμήλω See the more detailed discussion at vi 11. 4-6, refuting the majority of historians who placed the battle 'near Arbela'. He refers to the accounts of Ptolemy and Aristobulus which sited the battle at Gaugamela and adds that estimates of the distance from Arbela varied between 600 and 500 stades. There is, however, no hint in his battle description of any discrepancy in the sources. He merely gives the version of his principal source, presumably Ptolemy.

The location of Gaugamela seems assured. Since the nineteenth century it had been recognized that the mound Tell Gomel preserves the ancient name Gaugamela, but the mound itself proved surprisingly elusive. Reports placed it both north and south of the Jabal Maqlub, the highest (1,040 m) of the hills which intersect the plain beyond the Great Zab. Schachermeyr, however, established from two independent reports of the area that Tell Gomel lies to the north of the Jabal Maqlub, in the plain of Nauqûr. The river Bumelus should be identified with the Gomil, the western arm of the river Khazir, itself a tributary of the Great Zab (the Lycus of antiquity). See Schachermeyr² 270 n.

311, supporting Streck, *RE* vii 861 ff. and Judeich, *ASiv* 374 against Sir Aurel Stein, *Geogr. Journ.* c (1942) 255 ff.


The estimate of 600 stades from Gaugamela to Arbela seems a slight exaggeration; modern estimates vary between 80 and 95 km (cf. Judeich, loc. cit.).

9. 1. τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα ἀπολείπειν According to Arrian Alexander left without his baggage-train, intending to come to grips with the Persian army at dawn. But the baggage reappears in the battle description (iii 12. 5, 14. 5); it was situated close to the battlefield, within easy access for infantry, and there is no possibility that the fortified camp at the rear is at issue. If Arrian's credit is to be maintained, one must assume that some of the baggage was moved up to the front during the day of inactivity before the battle (Brunt, *Arrian* 249 n. 1). But there are other discrepancies. No other source mentions a night march, and, if Curt. iv 10. 15 is correct that the main camp was pitched when Darius was believed to be 150 stades away, the plan shows alarming rashness (cf. Marsden 40). Even if the figure is estimated on the basis of a short Macedonian stade (cf. Strasburger, *Hermes* lxxx (1952) 468 f.), the night march over unknown country seems suspiciously long. Indeed the story of the night march peters out strangely; and Arrian proceeds to talk as though it were day (οὐ μὴν που καθεώρων ἀλλήλους).

These two problems fall into the wider context of the siting of Alexander's base camp, which is the major *crux* in the interpretation of the battle. Arrian mentions only two camps, the fortified base camp and the temporary halting place 30 stades from the Persian line (9. 3). Curtius mentions *three* camps: the four-day rest camp (iv 10. 15), an overnight camp below a hill occupied by Mazaecus (iv 12. 17 ff.), and a fortified camp established the following day on the hill vacated by Mazaecus, i.e. the Jabal Maqlub (iv 12. 19, 24). There is some common ground but more disagreement. The final camp is agreed to have been sited on the hills overlooking Gaugamela, but for Arrian it was a makeshift affair whereas for Curtius it was the main fortified camp where baggage and prisoners were deposited (iv 13. 35; cf. 12. 2-3). The camp plays a different role in the accounts of the battle proper. For Curtius the camp is the object of a large-scale planned attack by Mazaecus (iv 15. 5 ff.) while in Arrian the attack is a small accidental break-through (cf. iii 14. 5-6 with notes). There seems little point in attempting a reconstruction, for two traditions are at issue.

2 τὰ στρατόπεδα Not 'the camps' (so Marsden 40), but, as so often in Arrian, the armies themselves (cf. iii 13. 1).

γῆλοφοι γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ The hills also figure in Curtius' narrative (iv 12. 18 f.), and they are certainly part of the Jabal Maqlub range (cf. iii 8. 7 n.). Neither version is compatible with it still being night.



4. ἡ σκόλοπες . . . ἀφανεῖς. There is a tradition that Darius implanted spiked mines in the terrain surrounding the area where it was anticipated Alexander would make his charge. The news was allegedly conveyed by a Greek deserter named Bion (Berve no. 217), and the presence of the mines is given as the reason for Alexander's oblique assault march (Curt. iv 13. 36-7, 15. 1; Polyaeus iv 3. 17). But Arrian gives a totally different reason for the oblique approach—to draw the engagement away from Darius' prepared ground (iii 13. 2), and there is no further reference in any source to the minefield.

9. 5-8. *The Pre-battle Speech*

Arrian mentions only an exhortation to the *consilium* of senior officers, which was to be passed on to the troops, like the addresses before Issus and Tyre. Diodorus mentions an address to the officers on the morning of the battle (56. 4). There was another tradition, originating with Callisthenes, which represented Alexander riding among his troops and addressing selected units, particularly the Thessalians and allied cavalry (Plut. *Al.* 33. 1 = *FGrH* 124 F 36; cf. Curt. iv 13. 38 ff.; Justin xi 13. 6 ff.). The two traditions are of course reconcilable; Alexander could have addressed both a council of officers on the eve of battle and individual contingents during the preliminaries. What cannot be established is the extent to which Arrian used his primary sources for the context of Alexander's speech (Strasburger 34: Arrian's own composition; Kornemann 58: pure Ptolemy). It is striking, however, that in the speech and in the observations on the night attack (iii 10) Arrian models his style very faithfully on Thucydides. There is regular use of Thucydidean abstract nouns, some of them (ἐξόρμησις; συγχώρησις) Arrian's own coinage, a profusion of neuter articles with adjectives and participles, and prominent use of prepositional compounds. Faced with an eve of battle speech, Arrian clearly imitated the style of the most famous speech writer among ancient historians. The style and phrasing is his own (and a very successful imitation it is too), and the content may be equally Arrian's own invention.

8. ἔν τε τῷ καθ' αὐτόν . . . 'They were to remember that on each individual's actions depended the whole issue; dereliction of duty brought common peril and conscientious performance common success'. An intricate and chiasmic sentence, with typically Thucydidean use of abstract nouns and compound participial expressions.

10. *Parmenion and the Night Attack*

Cf. Plut. 31. 10 ff.; Curt. iv 13. 3-10; *Itin.* 58.

The incident is presented explicitly as a *legomenon*, and presumably does not derive from Ptolemy (so Strasburger 35). It seems, however,

to have been a popular anecdote, as is proved by its repetition, with variants, by Curtius and Plutarch, and may derive ultimately from Callisthenes' derogatory portrait of Parmenion. Certainly Parmenion is at the centre of all three accounts, although in Plutarch he is the spokesman for a group of elderly *ἑταῖροι*, while in Curtius the exchange takes place in a formal council-of-war, and Parmenion's proposal wins general acceptance. In Arrian, however, Parmenion acts more on his own initiative, and there is no hint that he represented any other opinion than his own.

It is difficult to establish whether there is any core of truth in the story. Some have believed it (e.g. Berve ii 303; Wilcken 135; Fuller 164), but it seems *prima facie* very implausible that an experienced general would have advocated a night attack. The story is probably worked up from the authentic (?) detail that the Persians feared a night attack; it is certainly designed to show Parmenion unconfident of the outcome—in sharp contrast to Alexander.

2. αἰσχροὺν . . . νίκην. So Plut. 31. 12, and, less trenchantly, Curt. iv 13. 8–9. The riposte is characteristic of the heroic portrait of the younger Alexander, represented on every occasion as engaging the enemy frontally and under the most adverse circumstances. Failure was shameful (ii 26. 3), but the use of underhand stratagems to achieve victory was even more so. Contrast, however, the crossing of the Hydaspes, which *was* made under cover of night. There Arrian says baldly, κλέψαι οὖν ἐπενόει τὴν διάβασιν (v 10. 3). It was 326 and there was no Callisthenes to give the engagement a heroic overlay.

καὶ τὸ μεγαλήγορον . . . ἐφαίνετο. In the other sources there is some apology for Alexander's apparent rudeness. According to Plutarch some thought the remark childish, but others defended it because of the proper confidence it expressed, while Curtius softens the exchange, claiming that Alexander wished to spare Parmenion's feelings. Pearson (*LHA* 47, quoted by Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 82) suggests that this might be the occasion on which Callisthenes accused Parmenion of resenting Alexander's ἐξουσία καὶ ὄγκος (Plut. 33. 10 = *FGrH* 124 F 37). Callisthenes, he thinks, cannot have allowed Alexander to be accused of 'arrogance', ὄγκος, without repudiating the accusation. And Arrian does explicitly defend Alexander from being ὑπέρογκος.

But ὄγκος in Plutarch need not mean 'arrogance' or be necessarily pejorative (cf. Plut. *Fab.* 4): 'majesty' is an equally acceptable translation. There need have been no implicit accusation of arrogance or any need to defend it. Callisthenes was certainly, as Jacoby says (*RE* x 1678), accusing Parmenion of near treason, 'grudging the extent and majesty of Al.'s power', and criticizing his general attitude at Gaugamela. It could have occurred in any context.

11. 1. οὕτως ὅπως. . . ἐτάξαντο. Curt. iv 13. 11 observes that Darius

kept his horse bridled and in position and the greater part of his army under arms. The sensitivity of Persian armies to a night attack appears to have been well known. Xenophon notes that in 401 the enemy forces never encamped less than 60 stades from the Greek army (*Anab.* iii 4. 34-5). At Gaugamela it was totally impracticable for Darius to retire to a safe distance, and so he followed what must have been standard practice, keeping his army in preparedness throughout the night.

11. 3-12. 5. *Persian and Macedonian Battle Dispositions*

3. ἐάλω γάρ ... Ἀριστοβούλος (*FGrH* 139 F 17) Arrian emphasizes that Aristobulus mentioned a captured Persian order of battle, and he makes the explicit statement to guarantee the detailed description which follows, presumably also taken from Aristobulus (Strasburger 35). This information is usually taken as authentic (cf. Pearson, *LHA* 162; Marsden 44 n. 1; Schachermeyr² 269), and certainly there is some reason to think so. This is the only one of the great battles where the Persian disposition is described in detail in terms of national contingents (compare the description of Darius' army at Issus: ii 8. 5-8; Curt. iii 9. 1-5). There is every likelihood that any documents relating to the battle were captured, if not on the field, at least at Arbela (cf. iii 15. 5); and a captured order of battle would have been available to Callisthenes at any rate. Eccentric features also occur (cf. 8. 4-5 nn.), which could easily have stemmed from Greek transliteration of an Aramaic original.

E. Schwartz, however, thought that Aristobulus' 'ordre de bataille' was an invention, to justify the comprehensiveness of his report (*RE* ii 913). This is wholly *a priori*, but there may be some grounds for scepticism. It is striking that the Persian battle order is not standard in our sources. Curtius, iv 12. 6-13, gives a somewhat different description. The outlines are similar, but there are omissions and supplements (the Cossaei, 'Gortuae'; and Phrygians, for instance, are unique to Curtius). But there are also variations in placings. Curtius, for instance, places the Susian cavalry much further to the left than Arrian, and the Cadusii are placed on the right instead of at the left centre (Curt. iv 12. 12; cf. Arr. 11. 3). Some of these divergences can be attributed to Curtius' notorious carelessness in reproducing lists (note the egregious errors in the description of the Macedonian phalanx: iv 13. 28-9), but by no means all. It may be that the original Persian document was much fuller than the list in either Arrian or Curtius, and that there have been errors of transmission in both cases. Alternatively, though less likely, Aristobulus alone may have used the captured order of battle.

Δάαι (cf. 8. 3 n.) According to Curtius the Dahae, 1,000 strong, occupied the extreme left, along with 1,000 Bactrians. This must be the flank guard of Sacae and Bactrians mentioned by Arrian at iii 11. 6.

Curtius places the Massagetae alongside the main Bactrian contingent (iv 12. 6), which is circumstantial information and no doubt correct. The Dahae may have provided forces both for the flank guard and the main contingent. They were the most populous of the Saca peoples (Strabo xi 8. 2 (511)), and may well have provided a very sizable contingent for Gaugamela.

καὶ Σούσιοι ἐπὶ Πέρσαις Curt. iv 12. 6 gives fuller details about the Persian left. A flank guard of two (thousand strong) contingents of Bactrians and Dahae were followed by 4,000 Susians and Arachosians. Next came the main mass of Bessus' cavalry, 8,000 Bactrians and 2,000 Massagetae. The national contingent of Persians then *followed*. The details are precise and complement Arrian, except for the placing of the Susians and Arachosians to the left of Bessus.

Καδούσιοι This is again problematic. Diodorus says explicitly that the Persian army was arrayed *κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἐθνῶν περιοχάς*. Now the Cadusii were part of the contingent from the south-west Caspian, and fell logically towards the right centre with the Albani and Sacasinæ. Curtius indeed placed them firmly on the right (iv 12. 12). What is more, the detachment allegedly sent by Mazaeus, commander of the Persian right, to plunder the Macedonian camp, comprised Cadusians and Scythians (Diod. 59. 5; Curt. iv 15. 12; *Itinerarium* 62; cf. Plut. *Al.* 32. 5).

It should be noted that the list in Arrian is elaborate and stylized. He moves from left to centre, then switches to the right, and only then describes the centre. The flank guards are listed in an appendix. This is clearly a deliberate plan, varying the presentation of the extensive lists of names in his sources. But such artifices required concentration, if contingents were not to be wrongly placed, and Arrian was not infallible (cf. i 14. 1-3 nn.). It would have been relatively easy for him to have transposed the Cadusians from the inner left to the inner right.

4. Παρθυαῖοι καὶ Σάκαι In the preliminary review of the national contingents the Saca peoples were listed with the Bactrians alone (iii 8. 3 n.). It is not impossible, however, that there were Saca auxiliaries attached to the Parthian cavalry. The Saca nomads extended from the Caspian in a great arc through the desert country, and their territory stretched as far as the borders of Areia (Strabo xi 8. 2 (511)); cf. Tac. *Ann.* xi 10. 2). They could easily have supplied forces for the Parthian satrap. Certainly there were Saca on the Persian right. Mazaeus sent both 'Scyths' and Cadusians in the raid on the Macedonian camp. These Scyths may have been the Sacasinæ (cf. iii 8. 4 n.), but they could equally well have included the Sacae in the Parthian contingent.

5. οἱ τε συγγενεῖς According to Diodorus (59. 2) the Royal kinsmen comprised an élite cavalry squadron 1,000 strong (Curt. iii 3. 14 claims that the *cognati regis* numbered 15,000, perhaps a mistake for the entire Persian national cavalry at Issus). The kinsmen were of the highest

nobility (cf. Diod. 20. 2), and they alone had the right to kiss the king (cf. Xen. *Cyrop.* i 4. 27; Arr. vii II. 1, 6).

οἱ μηλοφόροι The *melophoroi* were the Palace guard, 1,000 strong, selected from the permanent infantry corps, the 10,000 Immortals; the name was derived from the golden apples which served as butt spikes for their spears (Heracleides of Cumae, *FGrH* 689 F 1; cf. Diod. 59. 3). Their commander, the chiliarch, was second only to the king in the court hierarchy (cf. Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 32 ff.; Bosworth, *CQ* xxi (1971) 131 f.). Like other Persian institutions the guard and chiliarchy were adopted by Alexander, but the guard was evenly divided between 500 Persian *melophoroi* and 500 Macedonian *argyraspides* (Phylarchus, *FGrH* 81 F 41; cf. Arr. vii 29. 4).

οἱ Μάρδοι τοξόται (cf. Weissbach, *RE* xiv 1649 f.) Diodorus also places the Mardi in the immediate vicinity of the *melophoroi* (59. 3) and he adds the Cossaei (so Curt. iv 12. 10). These Mardian archers are associated with the Persian contingent in the vulgate, and they are to be identified with the Persian Mardi, not the Mardi of the Caspian coast (cf. iii 24. 1 nn.). Herodotus had named them among the four Persian nomadic tribes (Hdt. i 125. 4; cf. Aesch. *Pers.* 993), and they were located in the Zagros, in Persis proper (Strabo xi 13. 6). Alexander was to make contact with them during his spring campaign of 330 (Curt. v 6. 17–19, wrongly discounted by Tarn ii 104).

εἰς βάθος ἐπιτεταγμένοι 'were drawn up behind in depth'. Compare the native levies at Issus, who were massed behind the phalanx of mercenaries and Persian infantry (ii 8. 8). The Mesopotamian infantry were second-rate troops, described by Curtius as *nomina verius quam auxilia* (iv 12. 9), and it was pointless to use them in the front line.

6. οἱ τε Σκύθαι . . . These are the 1,000 Dahae whom Curtius places at the extreme left of the Persian line, followed by the 100 scythed chariots mentioned by Arrian (Curt. iv 12. 6). Arrian, however, makes the whole contingent an advance guard. It is logically possible that Arrian's *προεταχάτο* denotes the extreme contingent of the front line (cf. i 14. 1 n., iii 11. 8); but, if the Persian left had comprised the numbers Curtius gives and extended in a single line, it would have far overlapped the Macedonian line. However, we are explicitly told that the Agrianians and archers placed in front of Alexander and the Companion Cavalry faced the scythed chariots (iii 12. 3), which Curtius places near the extreme Persian left. The Scythian and Bactrian advance contingent must then have been placed *in front of* Darius' line. This was the part of his army which would face the Macedonian cavalry and Alexander himself, and it was logical to make it as strong and deep as possible.

11. 8–12. 5. *The Macedonian Dispositions*

This is the longest and most detailed description of the Macedonian army to be found in Arrian, and it is rightly taken as one of the principal bases for modern reconstructions. Parallel lists are given by Diod. 57. 1–5 and Curt. iv 13. 26–32, both of them clearly taken independently from a single source (*pace* Tarn ii 116–20). These accounts complement Arrian, and add valuable details about the territorial origins of the phalanx battalions and the allied cavalry. There is only one serious divergence, about the identity of the temporary commander of Amyntas' battalion (11. 9 n.), and even there Arrian betrays acquaintance with the vulgate version.

8. ἡ Ἰλη ἡ βασιλική So Diod. 57. 1; Curt. iv 13. 26 names the squadron the *agema*. This has caused trouble. Arrian says nothing about a cavalry *agema* until the march on India (iv 24. 1); until the attack on the Persian Gates he refers only to the *ile basilike* (cf. ii 5. 9, iii 1. 4, 8. 1, 18. 5). The intrusion of the earlier terminology has been thought to be an error by Curtius (cf. Berve i 109 n. 2); but he uses the term *agema* later in a context where Arrian talks of the *ile basilike* (v 4. 21 = Arr. iii 18. 5). Cleitarchus, at any rate, seems to have believed that a cavalry *agema* existed before 327. He is probably anachronistic, for it seems most likely that there was a change of nomenclature at the time of the institution of cavalry hipparchies (cf. iii 29. 7 n.). There are similar anachronisms in the Alexander tradition. Arrian/Aristobulus speaks of a hipparchy as early as 334/3 (cf. i 24. 3 n.), and the vulgate tradition of Gaugamela mentions both hipparchies and *argyraspides* (Diod. 57. 1–2; Curt. iv 13. 27).

τῶν βασιλικῶν ἰλῶν The phrase occurs in suspicious proximity to ἡ Ἰλη ἡ βασιλική and it is possible that βασιλικῶν is a scribal gloss (so Roos and Brunt).

Ἡγέλοχος This Hegelochus is usually identified as the commander of *prodromoi* in 334 and admiral of the Aegean fleet (i 13. 1; cf. Berve no. 341). That is a possibility only.

9. Ἀμύντου τοῦ Φιλίππου Amyntas was the son of Andromenes (i 8. 2, 14. 2, iii 16. 10, 27. 1), and Arrian is clearly in error here about his patronymic. The problem, however, is more complex than a mere slip on Arrian's part. Curtius and Diodorus say nothing about Simmias deputizing for his brother at Gaugamela. In his place—at exactly the same point in the list—they claim that Philippus son of Balacrus held the command (Diod. 57. 3; Curt. iv 13. 28; Berve no. 778). This cannot be coincidental. Arrian makes an error with the patronymic and substitutes the name which appears in precisely that point in the vulgate list. It can only be the case that Arrian had before him a variant list (by Aristobulus!), which in this case he rejected but he had

the variant so much on his mind that it slipped into his account willy-nilly (Bosworth, *CQ* xxvi (1976) 125).

Who commanded Amyntas' *taxis* during his absence it is harder to say. Berve opts without discussion for Simmias (ii 27, 354 (no. 704); 384 (no. 778)), but it should be emphasized that Simmias is the minority tradition. Philippos was the *taxis* commander according to the vulgate sources, and, in all probability, Aristobulus. Only Ptolemy, it seems, mentioned Simmias. Both men are disturbingly obscure. Philippos is never apparently mentioned again (certainly not at iv 24. 10), and Simmias reappears only during the conspiracy of Philotas (cf. iii 27. 1 n.), accused of treason with his brother. But the sons of Andromenes were adherents of Perdiccas and opposed Ptolemy in 321 (Diod. xviii 37. 3; cf. Arr. *Succ.* F 24). It is possible, therefore, that Ptolemy maliciously exaggerated his role. He could have been in a subordinate post under both Amyntas and Philippos and Ptolemy exalted him into battalion commander so that he could lay at his door the breach in the Macedonian line. See further, Bosworth in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 9–16.

ἐξ ὕλλογῆν στρατιᾶς. For commentary, see iii 16. 10 n.

10. οἱ τῶν Φαρσαλίων ἱππεῖς. The Pharsalians had profited most from Philip's intervention in 346 and the humbling of their old rival, Pherae. At all events, after 344 Pharsalians, particularly Cottyphus, Daochus, and Thrasydaeus, virtually monopolize the Thessalian representation in the Amphictyony (cf. Y. Bourquignon, *RE* Suppl. xii 1062–6). It is not surprising to find them contributing the largest unit of the Thessalian contingent, and acting as the counterpart of the *ile basilike* in the Companion cavalry (cf. Berve i 141).

12. 1. ἡ... ἐπὶ μετώπου τάξις 'The formation along the front'. Arrian first gives the front extension and then moves to the rear and flanks. His description precludes any such reconstruction as that of Judeich, *AS* iv 378, which represents the flank guards (see 12. 2) as an extension of the front line. The same, I think, goes for Marsden's theory (45–57), which interprets Alexander's formation as oblique, the flank guards parallel to the Persians and at an oblique angle to the main phalanx. On this reconstruction the flanks are virtually part of the front.

ὡς... ἀμφίστομον. 'To give the phalanx a double front' (cf. v 17. 1; Arr. *Tact.* 29. 1). Curtius uses similar language (iv 13. 32). The composition of this second phalanx is not stated, but, by elimination, it must have included the infantry of the Corinthian League, and any mercenaries not included in the flank guards.

2. εἰς ἐπικαμπὴν δέ For the terminology, see the discussion at ii 8. 7. In this case the angle of the flank turned backwards towards the reserve phalanx. According to Curtius the over-all picture was roughly rectangular, the formation designed to counter encirclement at any

point (iv 13. 31-2). This picture has been widely accepted (cf. Tarn ii 184; G. T. Griffith, *JHS* lxxvii (1947) 77-9; A. R. Burn, *JHS* lxxii (1952) 85 f.; Fuller 167-9). Marsden (48 f.) has argued that the flank guards were parallel to the Persian line, but he is unconvincing. At iii 13. 2 the flank guard are undoubtedly described as τῶν προτεταγμένων τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τάξεως, but the description is consistent with a flank guard facing right, its side exposed to the enemy, while the troops which are described as wheeling (ἐπικάμψαντας) at iii 12. 4 are clearly the Persians not the Macedonian flank guard (so Brunt). Above all, Curtius should not be dismissed as misunderstanding Ptolemy (cf. Tarn ii 184 n. 4). His material comes from Cleitarchus (Diod. 57. 5 = Curt. iv 13. 30) and is independent of Arrian's account.

ἢ ἀναπτύξαι ἢ συγκλείσαι τὴν φάλαγγα. This description presumably refers only to the inner layer of infantry, the Agrianians and mercenaries. If Alexander contracted his line, the infantry would have to wheel anticlockwise to fill in the gap in the front, and if the line expanded they would presumably move further to the rear to create a space for the expanding front-line troops. The cavalry by contrast would have to keep their position in the flank to prevent an encirclement by the enemy.

οἱ Μακεδόνες οἱ τοξόται This is the sole reference in the Alexander sources to specifically Macedonian archers. Curtius, however, claims that the archers grouped with the Agrianians on the right flank were Cretan (iv 13. 31). Berve, ii 95 no. 183, argues that Curtius has substituted the Cretan contingent for the less familiar Macedonian corps, but why he should have made such an error he wisely refrains from guessing. It is equally possible that οἱ Μακεδόνες is an incompetent marginal gloss upon οἱ τοξόται (cf. ii 8. 9 n.), and that Arrian said nothing about the nationality of the archers. Cleitarchus/Curtius may well have been right that it was the Cretan contingent which formed the flank guard with the Agrianians. It is certainly possible that no corps of Macedonian archers existed.

The Brison here said to have been commander of the archers is not mentioned in previous or subsequent history (cf. Berve no. 223). There is no mention either at Gaugamela of the Cretan, Ombrion, said to have been put in charge of the archers at Memphis (iii 5. 6). He may have commanded the frontal contingent of archers screening the ἐταῖροι (12. 3 below), or alternatively he may have died or been deposed during the summer of 331. It is, however, possible that Arrian's text has been corrupted by contraction: i.e. for ὦν Βρίσων read ὦν <Ὀμ>βρίων. οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καλούμενοι ξένοι The title is not given again, and one must assume that this mercenary corps was formed from the survivors of Philip's permanent pool of mercenaries (H. W. Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers* (Oxford 1933) 188). Berve, however (i 144 ff.), considered that there was a sharp difference in Arrian's terminology, ξένοι or ξένοι

μισθοφόροι denoting troops present at the *diabasis*, and μισθοφόροι or "Ἕλληνες μισθοφόροι mercenaries levied in Asia. This theory has not found much favour (cf. Parke, loc. cit.; G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (1935) 29–30), and two arguments seem conclusive against it.

(i) When he refers to Darius' mercenaries Arrian uses ξένοι μισθοφόροι and "Ἕλληνες μισθοφόροι with no apparent distinction (cf. ii 2. 1, 8. 6, 11. 1, 13. 1, iii 11. 7, 16. 2).

(ii) At iii 19. 7 Arrian refers to *all* Alexander's mercenaries *en bloc* as τοὺς ξένους.

3. Ἀρέτης καὶ Ἀρίστων (Berve nos. 109, 138) Ariston was in command of the Paeonians at Issus (ii 9. 2). Curtius confirms his command of the contingent in the prelude to Gaugamela (iv 9. 24). Aretes must therefore have commanded the πρόδρομοι, and Curtius once more confirms (iv 15. 13).

ξυμπάντων δὲ προτεταγμένοι On both sides of the line the flank-guards resembled a wedge, the points of which were the two bodies of mercenary cavalry under Menidas and Andromachus.

4. εἰ . . . ἐπικάμψαντας 'If the enemy should ride around their wing, they were to charge them in the flank after they had wheeled'. ἐπικάμψαντας goes most naturally with the preceding αὐτούς, and that alone fits the sense. If Menidas was at right angles to the Macedonian line he could not have wheeled to counter an encircling move; he was already in a position to charge (cf. Marsden 48). Griffith, *JHS* lxxvii (1947) 77, tries to get round the difficulty by translating 'charge at an angle'. This is too extended a sense for the verb, which always seems to preserve its primary sense, to make a bend (cf. v 11. 1, ii 11. 1, iii 18. 5). In that case the verb can only apply to the enemy. In order to encircle the Macedonian right the Persian cavalry would have needed to wheel round clockwise, so that Menidas could charge them while they were still in column.

οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἱππεῖς This was clearly a small contingent of allied cavalry, the main body having been stationed on the left front under their regular commander Erigyius (cf. 11. 10). Diodorus and Curtius list the contingents in the main body, recruited from the Peloponnese, Achaia, Phthiotis, Malis, Locris, and Phocis (Diod. 57. 3; Curt. iv 13. 29). The flank-guard must, then, have been primarily composed of Boeotian cavalry (cf. ii 7. 8; Tod ii no. 197; *Anth. Pal.* vi 344).

The commander, Coeranus, is not elsewhere attested (Berve no. 442), but there is no need for Roos's emendation, Κάρανος, identifying him with the cavalry commander of the later expedition against Spitamenes (Berve no. 412).

5. ἡ πᾶσα στρατιά The figure here given is generally agreed to come from Ptolemy (Berve i 178; Tarn ii 159; Marsden 24, 27). There is no evidence either for or against. Either Ptolemy or Aristobulus might

have transmitted the figure from Callisthenes' original army list. If the figure is correct—and there is no reason to doubt it—the cavalry forces had drastically increased since the *diabasis*. For 334 the highest figure, that of Anaximenes, was 5,500 (*FGrH* 72 F 29; cf. i 11. 3 n.).

13. 1–14. 3. *The First Period of the Battle*

For detailed discussion see Tarn ii 185–7; G. T. Griffith, *JHS* lxxvii (1947) 80–2; Marsden 51–9; A. I. Devine, *Phoenix* xxix (1975) 378–85. The other sources are Curt. iv 15. 1–22; Diod. 57. 6–60. 4; *Itinerarium* 59–62 (only partly derivative); Plut. *Al.* 32. 5 ff; Justin xi 14. 1–3 adds nothing.

The details given by the sources vary considerably, but a composite picture can be built up. Arrian concentrates entirely on Alexander's right, ignoring the action on the left. This gap is to some extent filled by Diodorus, who has a graphic description of a concerted charge of cavalry and scythed chariots launched by Mazaeus (58. 2–5), followed by a flanking attack on the Macedonian camp (59. 5–8; cf. iii 14. 4–5 n.). Diodorus also mentions the cavalry engagement on the right, but very briefly (59. 8). Curtius' account is detailed, but extremely careless and contaminated. He begins with a description cognate to that of Diodorus (and substantially identical to Plutarch's summary), mentioning the Scythian attack on Alexander's right flank and Mazaeus' flanking move on the Macedonian camp, which led in turn to Parmenion's celebrated appeal for help (mentioned by Plutarch but not by Diodorus). At iv 15. 12 Curtius changes sources and uses an account very similar to Arrian's to describe the cavalry battle on the right. He still has the attack on the camp on his mind, however, and retrojects the engagement between the Bactrians and Macedonian light cavalry to the baggage area, producing a gruesome muddle. Apart from the controversial matter of Parmenion's first appeal the picture is fairly uniform, and the following conjectural reconstruction may be offered.

Left wing	Right wing
(i)	Menidas meets the Scythian out-flanking movement.
(ii) Combined cavalry and chariot attack.	Scythed chariot attack.
(iii) Move on the Macedonian camp by Scythians and Cadusians.	Arete and the Macedonian light cavalry engage fully with the Bactrians.
(iv) Mazaeus launches a full cavalry assault on the Macedonian left.	Alexander takes advantage of the gap in the Persian line and drives at Darius.

13. 1. ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ δεξιόν Diodorus says that Alexander used a λοξή τάξις (57. 6), while Curtius is more explicit: *agmen obliquum incedere iubet* (iv 15. 1). This is quite consistent with Arrian's march to the right. If the Macedonians kept roughly facing the enemy and did not march in column, there would have developed automatically a slanting formation.

ὑπερφαλαγγοῦντες πολὺ . . . If Darius had originally faced Alexander, the overlap must have been extreme. Between Darius and his flank were the Persian national army, the Arachosians and Bactrians (iii 11. 3 nn.), and these faced Alexander's flank guard alone. Alexander's move to the right seems to have reduced this overlap. At least his leading squadrons were soon making contact with the Saca flank guard, near the end of the Persian line (cf. Marsden 52).

2. κελεύει τοὺς προτεταγμένους These were the 2,000 Dahae and Bactrians stationed ahead of the Persian left flank (iii 11. 3 n.). According to Curtius the troops who attacked the Macedonian flank were the Massagetae, stationed on the flank but *behind* the flank-guard (iv 15. 2; cf. iv 12. 6).

3. τοὺς περὶ Ἀρέτην τε, τοὺς Παίονας Aretes commanded the *prodromoi*, not the Paeonians, who were Ariston's command (cf. iii 12. 3 n.). This may be merely an error on Arrian's part (so Berve ii 58 n. 1; Roos, app. crit), but there is no apparent reason for Arrian to have made the slip. It must have pre-existed in his source. But Aretes is mentioned again, at iii 14. 1, where Alexander before his decisive charge sent him against 'the force riding around their left wing with a view to encirclement'. Accordingly it has been assumed that there were three stages to the cavalry battle, the abortive assault by Menidas, the reinforcement by the Paeonians and mercenaries, and Aretes' final attack. But doubts may be evinced.

(i) Curtius follows the general lines of Arrian quite closely, but he only mentions two stages, Menidas' attack and reinforcement by Aretes and the Scouts (iv 15. 12-13).

(ii) Arrian's second reference to Aretes is difficult. As E. Schwartz saw (*RE* ii 913), the language at iii 14. 1 closely resembles the previous description at iii 13. 3. Schwartz suggested dittography, the earlier passage stemming from Aristobulus. A more likely explanation, however, is that iii 14. 1 is resumptive. It is clear that the action on the right was complex and diverse, and Arrian (or his source) has resorted to a *κατὰ γένος* schema. He first gives a complete account of the cavalry engagement on the flank. Then at iii 13. 5 he reverts back to an earlier phase of the battle with the charge of the scythed chariots (see the note below) and continues the story until he reaches once more Aretes' charge, which he has already described fully.

(iii) At iii 14. 2 Alexander is said to have continued to move right after dispatching Aretes. That would surely be impossible if reinforce-

ments had already been sent. The Sacae were commissioned precisely to stop Alexander's rightward movement, and the intense fighting on Alexander's flank would automatically have stopped him proceeding much further. Aretes' mission must have come quite early in the piece.

At iii 13. 3 we should therefore read *τοὺς περὶ Ἀρέτην τε <καὶ> τοὺς Πάϊονας*, and conclude that Alexander only sent *two* cavalry waves against the Bactrians and Sacae.

4. *ἀκριβέστερον εἰς φυλακὴν πεφραγμένοι ἦσαν* Cf. Curt. iv 9. 3. The mailed Saca horsemen had developed in Chorasmian territory to the immediate south of the Aral Sea during the sixth century B.C. The Assyrians had earlier used a type of mailed horseman, but the Saca development seems to have been independent; and the practice of encasing the horse as well as the rider in protective mail originated with them (cf. B. Rubin, *Historia* iv (1955) 264 ff.; J. W. Eadie, *JRS* lvii (1967) 161–3). The new armour and tactics gradually spread, though apparently not extensively in neighbouring Bactria. At first the horsemen specialized either in archery or with the lance, but from Alexander's time onwards the mailed horseman used both lance and bow for close and distant combat (cf. Rubin, loc. cit.). Curtius suggests that the innovation was a last-minute response to the Macedonian challenge. Be that as it may, the mailed horsemen proved themselves effective enough to be incorporated in Alexander's army by 327 (cf. v 12. 2), and subsequently under the title of cataphracts they became a regular unit of the Seleucid armies (Livy xxxv 48. 3; xxxvii 42. 1; Polyb. xxx 25. 9).

ἀλλὰ ... τάξεως Griffith, *JHS* lxvii (1947) 80–1, has plausibly explained the passage, correcting Tarn's assumption that *Μακεδόνες* refers to the Companion cavalry (ii 185 f.). *Μακεδόνες*, as at iii 15. 1 and 14. 4, is merely a generic term for Alexander's troops, non-Macedonians as well as Macedonians, and the *τάξις* here mentioned is the *Persian* formation (this interpretation goes right back to Gronovius). 5. *καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ...* 'Meanwhile the barbarians *had* launched the scythed chariots'. So Curt. iv 15. 14 *'Inter haec currus ... in phalangem inveciti erant'*. For similar resumptive uses of *ἐν τούτῳ* see i 15. 4, ii 20. 1.

It seems that the chariot attack took place in the course of the cavalry engagement. That has never to my knowledge been previously suggested, but it seems unavoidable. In the first place, the whole purpose of the circling move of the Saca cavalry was to prevent Alexander moving outside the area of the chariot charge. It is unlikely that Darius would have delayed his attack very long while Alexander was still moving to the right. Secondly, before the Saca encircling movement even began, Alexander's advance forces were in contact with their advance guard at the end of the line. The Companion cavalry would have had to advance very little further to be right in the line of attack from Bessus' 100 chariots (cf. 11. 6). Lastly, Diodorus states clearly that

the chariot attack on the left took place at the very outset of the battle (58. 2), and, if the assault was a concerted one, there was hardly time for all the complex manœuvres on the right to have elapsed. I assume therefore that Darius first launched his Saca flank guard to block the Macedonian advance and then dispatched his chariots as soon as Alexander himself came within range.

For a similar, if more highly coloured, description of the chariot attack see Curt. iv 15. 14-17.

6. ὑπασπισταὶ οἱ βασιλικοί This is slightly problematic. Tarn ii 149 f. argues that these were members of the hypaspist corps who detached themselves from the battle line and helped the grooms overcome the remaining chariots. That is possible; although the chariots were launched κατ' αὐτὸν Ἀλέξανδρον, the hypaspist corps was next in line to the Companions and would have been affected by the charge. But Arrian speaks as though these hypaspists were stationed behind the line. Tarn might be right that Arrian has merely got them out of the logical order. The other possibility, however, is that these were the small body of Royal shield bearers who carried the king's weapons before him into battle (i 11. 8 n.). At the start of the action they may have retired behind the lines, leaving Alexander with the arms of his choice.

14. 2. ὥσπερ ἔμβολον Alexander made for the gap himself at the head of the ἑλὴ βασιλική (cf. Curt. iv 15. 20-1). The result was that the cavalry, already at an angle after the approach march, drove obliquely into the Persian line. On the right of the king were half the Agrianians and archers, who will have followed the charge, again obliquely. The formation would have appeared like an inverted *nu* (so Schachermeyr² 273) with the Royal Squadron at the apex. That the right arm of the attack comprised Agrianians is supported by the confused narrative of Curtius, which places them alongside Alexander during the decisive assault.

3. ὥς δέ ... ἐφαίνετο Arrian's description is brief and almost formulaic. The description of the cavalry onslaught is almost a verbatim repetition of the fighting at the Grānicus (i 16. 1), while the account of the phalanx onslaught seems modelled on *Iliad* iv 282: πυκινὰὶ κίνυντο φάλαγγες | κυάνεαι, σάκεσιν τε καὶ ἔγχεσι πεφρικυῖαι (cf. *Il.* vii 61-2). That may not be wholly due to Arrian. There was a persistent tradition linking the Macedonian phalanx with Homeric descriptions of group fighting (Diod. xvi 3. 2; Polyb. xviii 29. 6; Curt. iii 2. 13).

πρῶτος ... ἔφηνεν Arrian is here isolated (except for *Itinerarium* 62). According to Plut., *Al.* 33. 8, Darius continued fighting until his Persian nationals fell back in disarray on his own chariot. The vulgate sources go further, describing an epic hand-to-hand combat, in the course of which Darius' driver was killed. Only the misapprehension that Darius

himself had fallen led to the general flight (Diod. 60. 2-4; Curt. iv 15. 24-33; cf. Justin xi 14. 3). For the development of the tradition see F. Pfister, *Rh. Mus.* ci (1958) 97-104; W. B. Kaiser, *JDAI* lxxvii (1962) 235 f.

Mederer 24-30 discussed the variants, but he starts from the mistaken premise that Ptolemy/Arrian derives from unimpeachable archival material—so that all divergences from Arrian are dismissed as fantasy. His view has become canonical, even though moral judgements about Darius' flight have varied (cf. Wilcken 136; Tarn i 50, ii 190 f.; Marsden 58; Schachermeyr² 273). But if, as Arrian claims, Darius fled at the outset of the Macedonian charge, it is hard to explain why such a small minority of the Persian centre followed their king out of battle (iii 16. 1). On purely *a priori* grounds Plutarch's version seems preferable (it is apparently accepted by Berve ii 126 no. 244 and Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 88; *Al.* 83); Darius only fled when the situation was desperate and his mobility hampered by the fugitives.

ἐφοβήθησαν Griffith, *JHS* lxxvii (1947) 85 (followed by Fuller 177), suggests that the narrative is defective and that what caused the Persian retreat was a charge by the Companion cavalry, who had turned back after mopping up the centre. His view has been rightly challenged by Marsden 58 f. In the first place the reconstruction leaves no space for the heated pursuit of Darius, which the sources agree was the main feature of the final stage of the battle. Secondly, Griffith exaggerates the magnitude of the flanking movement to the Persian left, implying that the Persian national contingent participated. At iii 11. 5 they seem placed towards the *centre* (cf. Griffith 84 n. 26). Arrian suggests only two phases in the battle of the flank: Menidas' initial charge and the reinforcement from Aretes and the mercenaries. From iii 13. 4 it seems that these forces were sufficient to contain Bessus' onslaught. Presumably the Persian troops in this sector gave up the struggle after Alexander had rolled up the centre and retired in good order (iii 16. 1). Perhaps, as Griffith suggests, Bessus' heart was not wholly in the defence of his king (cf. iii 8. 3 n).

5. καὶ ταύτη . . . τῶν Μακεδόνων. This passage is far more problematic than is generally supposed (Burn, *JHS* lxxii (1952) 88-90, seems unique in appreciating the difficulties). In the first place one wonders what the reserve phalanx was doing during this break-through. The Persian and Indian cavalry were part of Darius' centre guard, and Simmias must have been somewhere in their vicinity. On almost any plan of the battle they should have been covered by the second line of infantry. Yet, according to Arrian, the reserve phalanx did not learn what was happening until the Macedonian camp was actually under attack. Secondly, the distances involved are suspicious. Alexander's base camp for the battle was 30 stades to the rear (cf. iii 9. 1 and 3 with notes) and by now some distance to the left of centre, exposed by Alexander's

oblique march to the right (so Burn 89). The camp was not in the direct line of flight for the fugitives and it was some 6 km from the actual hostilities. Given that this cavalry body was in flight from a defeat, as Arrian states, it is surprising that they turned aside to plunder the camp and even more so that they were still there when the reserve phalanx made its way back from the battlefield.

Tarn ii 180 ff. insisted that this breakthrough was a charge by the entire Persian Guard, entrusted with the liberation of Darius' family. It is an untenable view but surprisingly prevalent (cf. Griffith 84 f. and, with reserves, Marsden 59). The only evidence for Darius' supposed order is a piece of free rhetorical invention by Curtius (iv 14. 22; cf. Burn 87). Arrian, moreover, speaks only of *some* Indians and Persians and implies a small-scale incident (so Marsden 59 f.), virtually an accident. What is more important is that Arrian's version is unique. The other sources state that the attack on the camp was a deliberate outflanking move by Mazaeus (see above pp. 294, 304). In Arrian's story the camp is an excrescence. If it is omitted, there is a small incident of Persian and Indian fugitives charging through a chance gap in the Macedonian line, only to be foiled by the reserve phalanx. This story could have been elaborated by Ptolemy for propagandist reasons. The attack on the camp was transformed from a deliberate and formidable move to a comparatively insignificant accident. If anyone was to blame it was Simmias, as member of a family bitterly hostile to Ptolemy (cf. 11. 9 n.). Mazaeus' attack disappears to be replaced by an episode politically more satisfactory. Unfortunately it also is self-contradictory.

καὶ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι βάρβαροι Cf. Diod. 59. 6; Curt. iv 15. 9.

6. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιοῦ κέρως. Cf. Diod. 60. 5–6; Curt. iv 16. 1–2. Curtius agrees that Mazaeus had a great preponderance of troops and was encircling the Macedonian left. That was only natural, for Alexander's initial march to the right must have created a large overlap of forces on Mazaeus' wing.

15. 1–7. *End of the Battle*

15. 1. ἀμφιβόλων Either 'wavering', as at ii 23. 3, v 9. 2, 15. 3, or 'pressed on both sides', as at iii 18. 8.

τοῦ μὲν ... ἀπετραπέτο All sources agree that Parmenion sent an appeal for help at this juncture, but there is serious divergence about Alexander's response. Arrian says that Alexander first drew back from his pursuit and rode across to the Persian right in time to elicit that the enemy was already in retreat. He therefore resumed the pursuit until dark. As this stands, there is a severe difficulty. How could a message have reached Alexander if he was already in full cry pressing the pursuit of Darius? Scholars have therefore compromised. Griffith 87–8 argues that Alexander did not immediately pursue Darius but turned

to help his hard-pressed right, where the message could have reached him behind the lines. Marsden by contrast (61-2) makes the message a preconcerted signal between Alexander and Parmenion, delivered while Alexander was in the process of encircling the Persian centre. But both these hypotheses presuppose that Arrian (and all other sources) has missed the crucial feature of Alexander's battle strategy and allow no place for a pursuit, which all sources claim to have taken place.

Other sources have different stories. Plut. 33. 9-11 says that Darius would have escaped had not a messenger announced that Parmenion's forces were in difficulties. Alexander was annoyed by the appeal, but, concealing the truth from his men, gave as his reason the approach of night and sounded the retreat. On the way back news came of the victory of the left. Some of this story is repeated by Curt. iv 16. 3, who claims that Parmenion's message reached the king when he was some distance from the battlefield. Alexander bitterly resented the summons but nevertheless halted his advance. So far we are with Plutarch. Curtius, however, goes further. After a break he mentions that Alexander turned back from the river Lycus because it was late in the day. He adds that the king was concerned because he *believed* that his left wing was in danger (iv 16. 16-19). Curtius here talks as if Alexander had never received a message from Parmenion. That is the story of Diod. 60. 7-8, who says that Parmenion sent a message to Alexander. His horsemen, however, found that Alexander was far away pressing his pursuit and returned unsuccessful.

Diodorus' account is *prima facie* convincing, and Griffith 88 admits that such must have been the case had Alexander been pursuing Darius (so Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 89). Since Arrian's version presents grave difficulties as it stands, it would seem best to accept what Diodorus says, that Parmenion's message never reached Alexander. How then did the variants arise? It is certain that Callisthenes was responsible for portraying Parmenion's behaviour at Gaugamela as inefficient and almost treasonable (Plut. 33. 10 = *FGrH* 124 F 37). One of the traits of his general picture was presumably that Alexander was prevented from capturing Darius because of a premature appeal by Parmenion (compare Tarn i 51 'Parmenion lost his nerve . . .'). That is the version that has penetrated to Plutarch. The source of the vulgate tradition, be he Cleitarchus or not, gave the authentic story of an unsuccessful appeal by Parmenion and pursuit by Alexander to the river Lycus.

But Arrian's account varies in two important respects. Alexander responds to Parmenion immediately, and there is no hint of chagrin on his part. Next, there are two pursuits, the second lasting until nightfall. No other source so much as hints at a renewed pursuit, and Plutarch and Curtius say explicitly that Alexander turned back *for the first time* at the approach of evening. We may be faced here with a second level of propaganda. Callisthenes had used Parmenion's message in his

propaganda to imply that Alexander had been prevented from achieving the full fruits of his victory. In Arrian's version there is no animus against Parmenion. Alexander responds promptly and then resumes his pursuit. If, as seems unavoidable, that is invention, it might have been caused by the controversy after the battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.). There Demetrius pursued his victorious cavalry charge well out of the battlefield, leaving his father, Antigonos, to defeat and death. The whole incident was strikingly similar to Alexander's pursuit of Darius, as it appears in Diodorus and Plutarch, and the continued pursuit might have been used as a criticism of Alexander's generalship at Gaugamela. Either Ptolemy or Aristobulus might have modified the story of the pursuit to protect the king's military reputation, but Aristobulus is the more likely to have been affected by the events at Ipsus (cf. Introduction pp. 23, 27). See now Devine, *Phoenix* xxix (1975) 382 n. 24.

τοῖς τε Παρθαίοις Cf. Curt. iv 16. 20–5. There has been an unfortunate tendency to identify this group of fugitives with the contingent which is said to have broken Simmias' battalion (Tarn ii 187 f.; Griffith 84–6; Burn 89; Schachermeyr² 275). That is impossible. Arrian iii 14. 5 says explicitly that only *some* of the Persian horse broke the line and he mentions no Parthians. Of that small group the majority were eliminated by the reserve phalanx (14. 6). The group which attacked the victorious Companions was much larger, comprising most of the surviving *συγγενεῖς* and the Parthians further to the Persian right. Darius fled before Alexander reached the centre of the line (14. 3 n.); and, when the dust-cloud raised by his entourage (Diod. 60. 4; Curt. iv 15. 33) was seen disappearing, Alexander led his cavalry in pursuit, leaving the phalanx to press home the attack in the centre. Accordingly the Persians made their escape as best they could, some penetrating through the gap created by Simmias to be cut to pieces by the reserve but the majority withdrawing with the adjacent Parthian cavalry, who noticed Darius' flight. These clashed with the Companions. 2. καὶ τιτρώσκεται . . . Arrian implies that Hephaestion, Coenus, and Menidas were all wounded in this last hectic cavalry engagement. Coenus, however, was a phalanx commander fighting in the centre (cf. iii 11. 9) and Menidas had been in action on the extreme right (iii 13. 3). Griffith 86 f. adduced the passage to support his theory that Alexander moved to help his right after the flight of Darius and, when recalled by Parmenion, met the Persian fugitives in the centre. More probably Arrian's source mentioned Hephaestion's wound in the final mêlée and digressed to give a list of the other notable casualties in the battle. Diod. 61. 3 and Curt. iv 16. 32 give precisely the same list, with the addition of Perdikkas, but place it in the general casualty report. The omission of Perdikkas by Arrian is interesting. If his source is Ptolemy, it seems that Perdikkas was deliberately omitted from the list

of honourable casualties—part of Ptolemy's vendetta against the memory of his dead rival (cf. i 8. 1 n.; Errington, *CQ* xix (1969) 237).

3. οἱ Θεσσαλοὶ ἱππεῖς . . . For a fuller description of the fighting on the left, see Diod. 60. 8; Curt. iv 16. 4–7. Both sources agree that the Thessalian cavalry distinguished themselves as they had done at Issus (ii 11. 1–3), but they claim that it was the news of Darius' flight that caused Mazaeus to withdraw. Alexander had nothing to do with the action. Plut. 33. 11 agrees that Alexander received the news of the victory of his left soon after he turned back from the Lycus.

4. τὸν Λύκον Cf. Curt. iv 16. 16. The Lycus, or Great Zab, is nearly 32 km as the crow flies from the field of Gaugamela. Curtius' estimate of 80 stades is excessively short (iv 9. 9).

5. τὰ χρήματα according to the vulgate sources 3,000 or 4,000 talents of silver and an ample wardrobe of barbarian costume was captured at Arbela (Diod. 64. 3; Curt. v 1. 10).

τὸ ἄρμα. So Curt. iv 15. 32–3. Plutarch's story that Darius transferred himself to a newly foaled mare for the escape (33. 8) must therefore be dismissed as a doublet of Issus (cf. Ael. *NA* vi 48, ii 11. 5 n.).

6. ἀπέθανον δέ The sources vary wildly about both Persian and Macedonian losses. Arrian, as usual, gives the lowest figure for the Macedonians. According to Diodorus there were 500 dead and very many (παμπληθεῖς) wounded (61. 3), while Curtius claims there were 330 losses (iv 16. 26). Arrian's 100 dead is obviously ridiculous, since he admits that sixty Companions fell in the final clash alone (15. 2). There must also have been substantial losses in the cavalry battle on the right (13. 3–4: it is admitted that Alexander's men suffered more casualties than the Bactrians), as well as in the sustained fierce fighting on the left. Schmieder therefore emended to πεντακοσίους (φ' corrupted to ρ') to fit Diodorus' figure, but the corruption is improbable and the casualty figure is still too low for the *entire* Macedonian losses. We are clearly dealing with propaganda figures, so remote from reality that no conclusions about the actual losses are possible (compare the equally fatuous figure of 400 dead during the entire siege of Tyre, ii 24. 4).

The Persian losses are wildly exaggerated in the opposite direction. Arrian is again the most extreme. Diodorus gives 90,000 and Curtius a relatively conservative 40,000. In the middle of this fantasy of propaganda there is one touch of reality: Arrian's figure of the 1,000 horses lost during the battle. That one can well believe, given the consistent intensity of the cavalry fighting.

7. μηνὸς Πυανεψιώνος Plutarch (*Al.* 31. 8; *Camillus* 19. 5) dates the battle to the 26 Boedromion, and his dating is internally consistent (cf. iii 7. 6 n.). Arrian, it is certain, has placed the battle in the wrong month, perhaps due to a faulty conversion into the Attic calendar of the Macedonian month Hyperberetaios. From the reign of Alexander Macedonian months appear to have been correlated with the

Babylonian calendar, Hyperberetaios corresponding to the Babylonian Ululu. That was the case until the first century A.D. when the Macedonian calendar was retarded by one month. Hyperberetaios now corresponded to Tashritu, the next Babylonian month (cf. A. E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology* (Munich 1972) 140-4). If Arrian used the equation current in his own day, it would explain the error of precisely one month in the dating of Gaugamela.

16. *Arbela to Susa*

16. 1. εὐθὺς ἐκ τῆς μάχης 'Immediately after the battle', as below at 16. 2, not 'straight from the battlefield', the usual interpretation (cf. Schachermeyr² 275 and the translations of de Sélincourt and Robson/Brunt). It is clear that Darius first fled to Arbela before continuing his escape across the Zagros (Eratosthenes *ap.* Strabo ii 1. 24 (79); Curt. v 1. 3).

παρὰ τὰ ὄρη τὰ Ἀρμενίων The most accessible route crossed the Spilik pass to Ruwandiz and from there reached the region of Lake Urmia by the Gowre Shinke pass (for the alternative routes see H. H. Schmitt, *Antiochos der Große* 56 n. 2).

2. τῶν μισθοφόρων ξένων Curtius (v 8. 3, 12. 4) claims that 4,000 mercenaries were with Darius in the summer of 330. If that is correct we must assume that more were recruited over the winter. It is strongly attested that 1,500 mercenaries surrendered in Hyrcania (iii 23. 9; Diod. 76. 2; Curt. vi 5. 10), at a time when their numbers must have been seriously depleted by desertion.

Neither of the mercenary commanders reappears in Arrian's narrative. In Curtius, however, Patron is the spokesman of the loyal Greeks at the time of Darius' arrest (v 9. 15, 11. 1-12. 4; cf. Berve no. 612).

οὐκ εὐπορος Antiochus III is not recorded to have encountered difficulties when he followed Darius' route to Media in the summer of 220 (Polybius v 55. 6-10; cf. H. H. Schmitt, *Antiochos der Große* 56 n. 2; 148). Had Darius' capture been Alexander's prime objective, the pursuit would have continued across the Zagros. At this stage the capture of Babylonia was clearly more important.

3. τὴν ἐπὶ Βαβυλῶνος Curtius v 1. 16 gives the only details about the route; the army reached Mennis in four days, the source of bitumen for Babylon (possibly near the modern Kirkuk). Strabo xvi 1. 4 (737 f.) describes the road from Arbela to Babylon; his source was Hellenistic (after the foundation of Seleucia and Demetrias) and is not reliable evidence for Alexander's itinerary.

ξυντεταγμένην ὡς ἐς μάχην So Curt. v 1. 19. Curtius' account of the entry into Babylon (v 1. 17-23) supplements Arrian, and the details he transmits are detailed and convincing, probably derived from eye-

witness reports digested by Cleitarchus (Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 63). In particular he reveals that Mazaeus and his children formally surrendered the city while Alexander was still *en route*. It has been argued that Mazaeus' satrapal appointment (16. 4 n.) was the price for the surrender (Wilcken 141; Bellinger 61). That is unlikely.

4. τὰ ἱερά . . . τιμῶσι Βαβυλώνιοι The temple of Belus was the enormous complex of the city god, Bel-Marduk, located to the east of the Euphrates and known as Esagila. It consisted of the vast eight-storeyed step-pyramid, Etemenanki, and the official state temple immediately to its south (E. Koldewey, *The Excavations at Babylon* (London 1914) 204 ff.). The building was described by Hdt. i 181-3 and was known to later writers as the tomb of Belus (Ctesias, *FGH* 688 F 13. 26; Diod. 112. 3; Strabo xvi i. 5 (738)). There are, however, difficulties in Arrian:

(i) It seems certain that Xerxes did not destroy Esagila, as Arrian states (and repeats at vii 17. 2; so Strabo xvi i. 5). We have a detailed description by Herodotus, who visited Babylon long after Xerxes' death (i 181. 2, 183. 3), and in his day the temple was unharmed, except for the loss of the cult statue which Xerxes *had* removed (i 183. 3: οὐκ εἶδον). Whatever dilapidation had occurred in the century between Herodotus' visit and the Macedonian conquest, it was merely referred to Xerxes, who was regarded by the Babylonians as the classic tyrant and destroyer (cf. A. T. Olmstead, *History of the Persian Empire* 236 f.).

(ii) Arrian alone dates the project to Alexander's first stay in Babylon. Diod. 112. 3 says that the idea was suggested by the Chaldaeans a few months before his death, and Strabo confirms (xvi i. 5). It is certainly true that no work was done until the clearing of the mound in April 323 (vii 17. 2; so Strabo). Probably Alexander merely issued a manifesto in October 331 promising the rebuilding as an act of grace to the Babylonians. It was clearly of great symbolic importance. As late as March 269 Antiochus Soter assumed the time-hallowed title of 'caretaker of Esagila and Ezida' and promised yet again the reconstruction of Esagila (J. B. Pritchard (ed.), *Ancient Near Eastern Texts* (Princeton 1955) 317). But, once Alexander had left Babylon, he had other preoccupations and it is unlikely that he even thought again of the project until he returned in spring 323 (*contra* Tarn i 54).

σατράπην δέ . . . Μαζαίων κ.τ.λ. These appointments are recorded also by Diod. 64. 5-6 and Curt. v i. 43-4, and they add that a commandant was appointed to the palace-citadel, Agathon of Pydna (Berve no. 9).

Mazaeus' appointment to the satrapy of Babylonia is important. It is the first-recorded promotion of an Iranian dignitary (see above i 23. 7, ii 4. 2 for Ada and Sabictas), and it is striking that it comes so soon after the decisive battle. The system Alexander adopted was that of the Egyptian appointments. In particular all military functions were

confined to Macedonians, the general Apollodorus (cf. vii 18. 1; Berve no. 101) and the *phrurarch* Agathon. Unlike the Egyptian nomarchs, however, Mazaeus seems to have had control of the civil administration and he was certainly more than a cipher.

While in Babylonia Mazaeus struck coins, the so-called lion-staters, apparently silver tetradrachms of Attic standard (doubted by G. K. Jenkins, *NC* 1960. 340) with the figure of Baaltars on the obverse and on the reverse a lion with the Aramaic superscription of Mazaëus' name (*BMC Arabia* 180; Bellinger 62-6). The series continues after a few issues without Mazaeus' name and was eventually adopted by Seleucus with the addition of his characteristic anchor symbol (cf. Bellinger 64). If the series began in 331 there are two startling anomalies; a satrap's name appears on an independent satrapal coinage (cf. ii 13. 8 n.). Mazaeus may have been uniquely privileged (Wilcken 141; Tarn i 52), but it seems more profitable to challenge the assumption that the named series began in 331 (cf. Badian, *Greece and Rome* xii (1965) 173; Lane Fox 528). The device of Baaltaars is more appropriate on a Syro-Phoenician issue than one from Babylon (Bellinger 63) and the spherical flans from which the coins were struck have their counterparts in Mazaeus' issues from Sidon (Hill, *BMC Arabia* cxlii). Perhaps the first coins of the series were struck in the two years before Gaugamela when Mazaeus was satrap in exile and Darius' senior general (cf. iii 7. 1, 8. 6, etc.), a period when minting must have been intense. After 331 he continued the type without his name in conjunction with Alexander's regal coinage.

5. *ἔς Ἀρμενίαν Μιθρήνην* For Mithrines' capitulation at Sardes see i 17. 3 n. Diod. 64. 6 and Curt. v 1. 44 confirm his appointment as satrap of Armenia. Nothing more is heard of him, and it is usually assumed that he never occupied his satrapy. There is no record of its surrender and it does not figure in the satrapy distributions at Babylon and Triparadeisus. In 317 an Orontes is attested there, and he is usually supposed to be identical with the commander of the Armenians at Gaugamela (iii 8. 5 n.). He may have retired home after the battle, repelled Mithrines' efforts to take control and maintained power throughout Alexander's reign. Cf. Julien 27 f.; Berve i 261 f.; Badian, *Greece and Rome* 175 n. 1; Schachermeyr² 283.

Niese i 94 stated baldly that Armenia was surrendered to Alexander in 331, and he could be right. No source mentions any force of occupation sent with Mithrines, which is extraordinary if Armenia was still independent and hostile. The previous satrap, Orontes, could well have made his submission during the march on Babylon, to be retained with honour in Alexander's entourage. Diodorus (xix 23. 3; cf. Polyaeus iv 8. 3) speaks of a friendship between Peucestas and Orontes which was a factor in the events of 317. Since 324 Peucestas had been satrap of Persis with no opportunity to conclude a friendship with the

ruler of distant Armenia, and the relations between the two must have developed at Alexander's court in the years between 331 and 324. Probably Mithrines did become satrap in 331 and was replaced by Orontes later in the reign. The events are mysterious. We hear only of a force sent by Alexander to occupy gold mines at Caballa (Strabo xi 14. 9 (529); Berve no. 516); the date is unknown and the fate of the expedition obscured by a textual corruption. All that seems certain is that Armenia was out of royal control by 323. It is not mentioned in the Babylon settlement, but in 321 Neoptolemus was operating there with a considerable body of Macedonians (Plut. *Eum.* 4. 1, 5. 1; Diod. xviii 29. 2) and his commission can only have been the recovery of Armenia (cf. Beloch iv² 1. 313; Briant, *Antigone le Borgne* 152 n. 8). Craterus' invasion of Asia Minor ended the operations and Orontes remained independent.

τοῖς Χαλδαίοις The regular Greek nomenclature for the Babylonian priests of Bel (cf. Hdt. i 181–3; Curt. v 1. 22; Diod. 112 f., xix 55. 7 f.; Plut. *Al.* 73.1).

τῷ Βήλῳ . . . ἔθουσεν The sources give no details of this ceremony, but it is probable that Alexander performed some substitute for the solemn New Year rite, in which the king grasped the hands of Bel-Marduk and gained the god's sanction for his rule (cf. Schachermeyr² 282 n. 326; Lane Fox 248). As in Egypt Alexander became king of the native population, and cuneiform documents call him King of Lands after the old custom.

6. ὁ τε παῖς The son of the satrap acted as guide, conducting Alexander to the river Choaspes (Karkheh), where his father Abulites was waiting to welcome the conqueror (Curt. v 2. 8–10). This son of Abulites was probably Oxathres (Berve no. 585), who had commanded the Susian contingent at Gaugamela and was subsequently appointed satrap of Paraetacene (iii 8. 5, 19. 2).

7. ἐν ἡμέραις εἴκοσι A valuable piece of evidence for Alexander's normal marching-rate. The twenty days' march included a lengthy stay in Sittacene (Diod. 65. 2; Curt. v 2. 2), and the direct distance between Babylon and Susa is about 365 km. It seems that we must reckon with a marching rate of c.25 km per day, rest days excluded.

πεντακισμύρια Curtius v 2. 11 agrees with Arrian (50,000 talents of silver bullion). Diod. 66. 1–2 mentions over 40,000 talents in gold and silver bullion and in addition 9,000 talents in gold darics. The figure of 40,000 talents recurs in Plut. *Al.* 36. 1 (*all* coin) and Justin xi 14. 9. Strabo xv 2. 9 (731) mentions that authorities varied whether the total was 40,000 or 50,000 (he states, erroneously it seems (cf. iii 18. 10 n.)), that these totals were given for the *combined* treasures of Susa and Persis). It is Diodorus who gives the most precise information. Curtius clearly worked from the same source, but he conflated the figures for

bullion and coin and gave a round figure for bullion alone. The same mistake probably underlies Arrian's total, but, if we can believe Strabo, the error was inherited from his source. See also Bellinger 68 ff. with n. 148.

8. ὁπίσω πέμπει There is disagreement about the date of the return of Agenor's archaic statue-group. Arrian later implies that Alexander sent it back during his second visit to Susa in 325/4 (vii 19. 2). More seriously, Pausanias i 8. 5 gives the credit for the return to Antiochus I, while Valerius Maximus (ii 10, *ext.* 1) says that it was due to Seleucus. There is no real conflict between the last two sources. We should assume that the restoration took place in the joint reign of Seleucus I and Antiochus (292–281), when Antiochus had control of the territories east of the Euphrates, including Susa (C. Seltman, *JHS* lxxvii (1947) 26 with no. 23).

Apart from Arrian only Pliny (*NH* xxxiv 70) attributes the return to Alexander, but the passage is problematic, occurring incongruously in a review of the works of Praxiteles. The weight of evidence inclines toward the Seleucid period. We must assume therefore that Alexander merely promised the return of the statue-group during a stay in Susa.

καὶ νῦν κείνται See now D. M. Lewis, *CR* xxiv (1974) 186 f. This passage is independently attested in the scholia to Proclus' Commentary to the *Timaeus* found in two manuscripts, the Parisinus Coislinianus 322 (C, end of eleventh century) and the Marcianus gr. 195 (end of fourteenth century). There are variant readings which, as they stem from a tradition independent of the codex Vindobonensis, are interesting and important.

Arrian had clearly been familiar with the area of the *agora* (cf. *Periplus* 9. 1 for a description of the cult statue in the Metroon). He must have visited the city during the period when he sat at the feet of Epictetus and submitted himself for initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries. He speaks as an initiate, and as priest of Demeter and Kore in his native Nicomedia he will naturally have participated in the most famous rites of the goddesses he served.

Arrian's description is apparently precise, suggesting a location in the *agora* to the west of the Panathenaic Way, more specifically between the Temple of Ares and the Odeum, a position roughly facing the Metroon (cf. S. Brunnsåker, *The Tyrant Slayers of Kritios and Nesiotes*² (Stockholm 1971) 125–35). A fragment of one of the statue-bases was unearthed in precisely that position, but its context was late and it has remained isolated. Most probably it was transferred from another site (cf. H. A. Thompson and W. E. Wycherley, *The Athenian Agora* xiv (Princeton 1972) 156–8). There are difficulties also in Arrian's reference to the Metroon; in that position the Odeum would have been a more immediate landmark, familiar to any initiate. There are various indications that the statute-group should be placed further to the north.

Timaeus (*Lex. s.v.* Ὀρχήστρα) places it by the orchestra, which was located by reference to the Temple of Ares and the Royal Stoa (cf. *The Athenian Agora*³ (Athens 1976) 91 f.). Pausanias i 8. 5 also describes the group near the Temple of Ares but locates it by reference to the statue of Pindar, which is otherwise attested near the Royal Stoa, to the north-west of the Temple ([Aesch.] *Ep.* 4. 3; cf. Brunnsäker 131). Finally, it would be reasonable to place the statue-group at the site of the murder it commemorated, that is, by the Leokoreion; and the Leokoreion has recently been identified as a small shrine immediately opposite the Royal Stoa (*Agora*³ 87–89). It would therefore seem most plausible that the Tyrannicides were located north of the Temple of Ares, roughly opposite the Royal Stoa and the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios. In that case Arrian's reference to the Metroon is quite inappropriate; it lay some distance south of the statue-group, obscured from view by the Temple of Ares. If the argument is correct (and there is, as yet, no archaeological corroboration), we can only assume that Arrian's memories of the *agora* were faulty and that, when he wrote this passage, he was not a resident of Athens (cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxii (1972) 172 f.).

ἐν Κεραμεικῷ In the Roman period Cerameicus comprised all the segments of Athens between the Dipylon Gate and the Acropolis (J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias' Description of Greece* ii 55). It certainly included the *agora*; cf. Poseidonius, *FGrH* 87 F 36 (212 E); [Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 843 c, 852 E; see now E. Vanderpool, *Hesperia* xliii (1974) 308–10.

τοῦ Εὐδανέμου The scholia to Proclus read τῶν Εὐδανέμων, which Roos accepted in his *editio minor*. Arrian refers to a single altar, which he claims is a landmark for any Eleusinian initiate. It may have figured in the ceremonies of the fifth day of the Mysteries, when the procession of the initiates progressed along the Sacred Way, starting from the Eleusinion above the south-east corner of the *agora* (*SIG*³ 885. 20 ff.). The site of the altar can only be located by reference to the statue-group. R. Hampe ('Kult der Winde', *SB Heidelberg*, ph.-hist. Kl. 1967 (i). 17–22) identified it with a pit recently excavated west of the Panathenaic Way and opposite the Temple of Ares. But the site was disturbed in the early fifth century and subsequently closed (*The Athenian Agora* xii 119 f.); it had been abandoned 150 years before the time of Alexander, let alone Arrian.

The Eudanemi are extremely obscure. There was a *genos* so named in the fourth century, and their activities were connected with the Mysteries (Dion. Hal. *de Dein.* 11: 315. 1 R). Apart from that our knowledge is limited to Proclus who mentions εὐχαὶ τῶν Εὐδανέμων which were addressed to the Θεοὶ δημιουργοί, the deities which controlled the rains and winds (*Comm. in Timaeum* i 213 (Diehls)). The Eudanemi seem associated with the cult of the winds but their precise activities are beyond speculation.

ἐπὶ τοῦ δαπέδου An obscure phrase. 'On the (Eleusinian) plain'

(Abicht, Chinnock, Robson, de Selincourt) is clearly excluded; Arrian is referring to an altar in the *agora* not at Eleusis. The expression denotes some distinguishing feature of the altar; it is perhaps best translated, 'on its pavement'. The original sense of *δάπεδον* appears to have been 'floor', and that is the second-century prose usage (cf. Athen. xii 537 f). The altar may have been surrounded by a distinctive pavement which marked it off for observers.

9. *φρούραρχον κτλ.* The appointments in Susa are recorded more fully by Curt. v 2. 16–17. He agrees that the military commander was Archelaus (Berve no. 158) and adds that a certain Callicrates was placed in charge of the treasury. There is, however, disagreement over the citadel commandant. According to Curtius his name was not Mazarus but Xenophilus. Now Xenophilus is attested phrurarch and treasurer at Susa in 317/16 B.C. (Diod. xix 17. 3, 18. 1, 48. 6), and it is generally believed that Curtius has antedated his appointment (Berve no. 578; Habicht, *RE* ixA. 1565–6). But the context seems reliable—the other appointments are perfectly acceptable. Arrian's account, however, is more suspicious. Mazarus, he says, was one of the *ἐταῖροι*. The name, as Berve admitted, sounds very Iranian (cf. Hdt. i 156. 2, 157. 2 for Mazares the Mede), and there is a distinct probability that Arrian or his source has confused Alexander's officer with the Persian commandant, who would have formally surrendered like Bagophanes at Babylon (cf. Curt. v 1. 44). See further Bosworth, *CQ* xxvi (1976) 122 f.

ὑπαρχον ... Μένητα Cf. Diod. 64. 5; Curt. v 1. 43. Menes was apparently sent to the coast to replace Balacrus in Cilicia and to take over the two Syrian satrapies (cf. ii 13. 7, iii 6. 8). The whole of the Levantine coast from the Taurus to the borders of Egypt was placed in the hands of a single man. Desperately short of forces, Alexander rationalized the commands in the area and transferred a substantial proportion of the satrapal armies to the east (iv 7. 2, 329/8). For detailed discussion of this interpretation see Bosworth, *CQ* xxiv (1974) 53–64.

10. *ἐνταῦθα καὶ Ἀμύντας* For Amyntas' commission see Curt. iv 6. 30 and Diod 49. 1. He was sent to Macedon with ten ships after the siege of Gaza, an incident omitted by Arrian (cf. iii 11. 9 n.). His arrival is described in greater detail in the vulgate sources (Curt. v 1. 39–42; Diod. 65. 1–2), which gave different dates for the reunion with the main army. Curtius says that they arrived while Alexander was in Babylon, but he has clearly moved the incident forward to provide a rhetorical contrast (cf. v 1. 39). He agrees with Diodorus about the reorganization of Sittacene, and there seems little doubt that the common source placed the arrival during the march from Babylon to Susa, just before crossing the Tigris and entering Sittacene. The information is precise and there is no reason to question it (accepted by

Badian, *Hermes* xciv (1967) 187 n. 4). Arrian's source by contrast seems uninterested in Amyntas' arrival and inserts it at the first convenient pause.

The vulgate sources give figures and provenance for the reinforcements. Macedon provided 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, Thrace 600 cavalry and 3,500 infantry, while 4,000 mercenary infantry and nearly 1,000 cavalry (380 Curtius) had been levied from the Peloponnese. These are formidable numbers and they were levied from areas affected by Agis' War. It is difficult to believe that such large forces could be detached from the home army while hostilities with Sparta were in full swing. They could not (*pace* Wirth, *Historia* xx (1971) 627-30) have been the first herald of Agis' defeat; otherwise Menes' funds for Antipater are impossible to explain. Alexander must have had advance notice before the arrival of Amyntas and news as important as the victory of Megalopolis would have been conveyed as quickly as possible. The only plausible alternative is that Amyntas' forces had been levied before the defeat of Corrhagus, which was the real beginning of Agis' War.

11. τοὺς πεζοὺς . . . 'He added the infantry to the other units (i.e. not the Companion cavalry)'. *τάξις* is here used in its all-purpose sense of a military unit, not in its specialized sense, 'phalanx battalion'. R. D. Milns, *GRBS* vii (1966) 160, argued that it was from these reinforcements that a seventh phalanx battalion was created: 'the emphatic position of the words *ταῖς ἄλλαις* implies that there was a battalion or battalions over and above the ones to which additions were made'. This is unlikely. In the first place *ταῖς ἄλλαις* surely refers back naturally to *τὴν ἵππον τὴν ἑταιρικήν*. Even if we assume an ellipse referring to extra unmentioned battalions, Arrian states explicitly that all forces were arranged by their *ἔθνος*. That surely is inconsistent with the new arrivals, presumably from all over Macedon, being lumped together in a single heterogeneous battalion. There is in fact no evidence of a seventh battalion before Alexander's entry into India (see my observations in *CQ* xxiii (1973) 247 n. 2, 252-3).

λόχους δέο This reorganization of the cavalry *ilai* is hinted at by Curtius, who confirms the appointment of *λοχαγοί* by excellence and not by nationality (v 2. 6; Diod. 65. 2-4 is a string of generalized platitudes). Curtius does not mention the subdivision of the cavalry *ilai*, but he gives a detailed description of a parallel reorganization of the hypaspists. The four chiliarchies were divided into pentacosiararchies, each commanded by an officer selected from the ranks for his bravery (see the discussion at i 22. 4 n.). This seems to be exactly what happened with the Companion Cavalry. The reasons for the reorganization are not stated, but Curtius stresses the lack of regional affiliations in the new commanders. It may be that there were already tensions between Alexander and his high command. If so, it would have been prudent to

interpose an additional link in the chain of command between the regional ilarch and his men.

17. *Alexander and the Uxii*

17. 1. τὸν Πασιτίγριν ποταμόν There is general agreement in the Alexander histories that Susa was in the vicinity of the river Choaspes (Curt. v 2. 9; cf. Strabo xv 3. 4 (728)), the modern Karkheh, which flows just west of the ruins. To the east, however, the sources speak both of the Eulaeus and the Pasitigris, and there is inextricable confusion (cf. vii 7. 1–2 (Eulaeus); *Ind.* 42. 1 and 5 (Pasitigris)). It may be that there was a confluence. At present the Karun splits into two arms below Susa and sends off a tributary, the Ab-i Diz. In Alexander's day the same may have obtained. The Eulaeus and Pasitigris, separate in their upper reaches, may have amalgamated into a single stream, called by either name in the sources (cf. Weissbach, *RE* vi 1061–3).

Οὐξίων The Uxii make their first appearance in the Alexander historians (cf. Treidler, *RE* ixA. 1313–19). Arrian alone distinguishes explicitly between plain and mountain peoples, but the vulgate sources confirm that the Uxii spread into the mountains (Diod. 67. 1–3; Curt. v 3. 1), and Diodorus in particular describes glowingly the fertility of the land of the Uxii of the plain (67. 3). This plain began after the Pasitigris crossing and continued as far as the passes into Persis (Curt. v 3. 3; Strabo xvi 1. 17 (744)). It was the plain Uxii who sent a contingent to Gaugamela under the son of the Susian satrap (iii 8. 5, 11. 5), and the district apparently had a satrap of its own (Curt. v 6. 4). The vulgate sources represent Uxian guides assisting Alexander in turning the Persian passes and presumably knew of the submission of the plainsmen (Diod. 67. 4; Curt. v 3. 5–6).

οἱ δὲ ὄρειοι καλούμενοι There is general agreement that the mountain Uxii occupied the area of the Zagros around the headwaters of the Pasitigris (Diod. 67. 1–2; Curt. v 3. 1; Strabo xv 3. 6 (729); cf. Diod. xix 17. 3). Their territory may have spread north to the upper reaches of the Choaspes (Strabo xv 3. 4 (728)).

καὶ παρὰ τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως Strabo xv 3. 4 (728) confirms that the mountain Uxii received payment from the Persian kings *κατὰ τὴν ἐκ Σούων εἰς Πέρσας εἰσβολήν*. Whether the payment was regular and invariable may be doubted. According to Nearchus (*FGH* 133 F 1g) all four of the independent peoples of the Zagros extracted payments from the kings, but it was the Cossaeans who are specifically mentioned as receiving gifts whenever the court moved from Ecbatana to Babylon.

2. καὶ τοὺτους ἀποπέμπει κτλ. There is a fundamental difference between Arrian and the vulgate sources about the role of the Uxii. Diodorus and Curtius give basically the same version (Diod. 67; Curt.

v 3. 4-15). The satrap of Uxiane, a certain Madates (Berve no. 483), had barred the passes into Persis and occupied a set of fortifications, making a frontal assault impossible. The defenders were confined to a central keep and were only saved from destruction by the advocacy of the Queen Mother, Sisygambis, who was also Madates' mother-in-law. This story conflicts with Arrian's in almost every respect:

(i) It tells of a formal defence by a Persian satrap, not a demand for payment by mountain brigands.

(ii) The details of Alexander's attack are different. According to Arrian the assault was a surprise from the outset. The vulgate account, however, represents the main army under Alexander launching a direct frontal assault upon the pass, while a light-armed column under Tauron circumvented the mountain with the help of Uxian guides.

(iii) Arrian's account mentions no serious fighting. Both Diodorus and Curtius tell of a sustained Macedonian assault which was unsuccessful until Tauron appeared in the rear.

(iv) According to Curtius (v 3. 15) the enemy who surrendered were given their freedom and immunity from tribute. Arrian speaks of the imposition of a huge *phópos*.

In the face of these divergences modern scholars have either accepted Arrian without question or discussion (e.g. Wilcken 143; Schachermeyr² 286; Hamilton, *Al.* 87-8) or dismissed the vulgate version as contaminated by romance (e.g. Strasburger 35; Treidler, *RE* ixA. 1316). All seem agreed that the two versions deal with the same incident, even Lane Fox (254, 528), who most emphasizes the differences of the sources. This seems to me unjustified. Apart from Ptolemy's reference to the intervention of Queen Sisygambis (17. 6 below) there seems no similarity between the two versions. It is, I think, possible to posit two different incidents at different stages of Alexander's march from Susa. The vulgate account seems unquestionably placed at the beginning of the passes leading into Persis. Sir Aurel Stein may well have been right to identify the site of the action as Kotal-i Sangar, a pass 6 km north-east of modern Fahliūm where traces of an ancient defensive wall have been found (Stein, *Old Routes of Western Iran* (London 1940), 39-43). Arrian's account seems located further north. He mentions Susian guides, and the area of Mālamīr has been thought an attractive location. It is near the headwaters of the Karun, the heartland of the mountain Uxii (Droysen i² 1. 352 n. 2; Kaerst, *RE* i 1424 f.). The Uxians in that area were independent and intractable in the period after Alexander's death (Diod. xix 17. 3), and it was probably they who demanded passage money from Alexander.

The vulgate account, moreover, fills an awkward gap in Arrian's narrative. The passes into Persis were a vital strategic point. Now the road towards the Persian Gates makes a fork after entering the passes. After the Kotal-i Sangar, where Stein placed the encounter with the

Uxians, there is a junction, one branch going to the Persian Gates proper and the other passing over to modern Kāzarūn and the Shiraz road (cf. iii 18. 1 n.). It was vital to have a force stationed to block the junction, and the vulgate account of Madates' defence fits excellently into that strategic position.

It is surely far more plausible to suppose two encounters. Arrian's story deals with an incident much farther north, on the modern route from Susa to Behbehān. Alexander had difficulties with the mountaineers at the head of the Kārun and had to undertake a punitive expedition. Later he found Madates in a strong defensive position at the entrance to the Persian passes and was forced to take the position by storm. Arrian has omitted the Madates incident and described only the first campaign. What is more, the omission goes back not merely to his immediate source but to the ultimate authority, for Ptolemy himself has clumsily added the Sisymbis episode, transposing it from the engagement with Madates to the encounter with the Uxii (cf. 17. 6 below). The excision of Madates must have been deliberate, and it is easy to see why it was made. In the vulgate account the forcing of the passes was tedious and perilous. Both in the encounter with Madates and at the Gates themselves there were repeated reverses, even though Alexander directed operations. It was a far cry from the effortless victories that are attributed to the king by his official chroniclers, and the difficulties needed to be minimized. The reverses at the Persian Gates were patently glossed over (cf. iii 18. 3 n.), and it seems that Madates' defence was omitted altogether.

τοὺς σωματοφύλακας This use of *σωματοφύλακες* to denote a part of the Macedonian infantry is rare, but recurs at iv 3. 2 and iv 30. 3. In none of these contexts can there be a reference to the élite group of nobles who formed the entourage of the king himself (cf. i 6. 5 n.), and there seems no doubt that the word refers to the *agema* of the hypaspists, the royal footguard (cf. i 1. 11, ii 8. 3, iii 11. 9, vii 7. 1).

6. Πτολεμαῖος . . . λέγει (*FGrH* 138 F 12) The intervention of the Queen Mother is described by Curt. v 3. 12–15, who claims that her advocacy was on behalf of her son-in-law, Madates. Ptolemy on the contrary alleges that she pleaded for the mountain Uxians and prevented their being transplanted. The charisma of Ptolemy has meant that his account has been accepted without question, and it is usually argued that he corrected consciously the exaggerations of the vulgate (cf. Strasburger 35). But, far from exaggerating, Curtius' account is plausible (grudgingly admitted by Jacoby, *FGrH* iiD. 504. 32; Berve ii 357 no. 711). Madates was a close relative of the Queen Mother, and it was natural for her to plead *pro necessario ac propinquo suo* (Curt. v 3. 14). On the other hand, it is very hard to see why Sisymbis should have taken the part of the mountain Uxii. They had been independent of the Persian throne and were a thorn in the side of

successive Persian rulers. I conclude that Curtius' account is substantially correct, and I can see only two ways to explain Ptolemy's statement.

(i) Ptolemy did in fact tell the story of Madates, but Arrian excerpted the account of Aristobulus and added the anecdote about the Queen Mother from his major source, not realizing that it related to a totally different incident. This is unlikely. Had Arrian been faced with a divergence as radical as this in his principal sources, the version as a whole he would have opted for was Ptolemy's (cf. ii 3. 7 n.).

(ii) The error is Ptolemy's. He followed an extant history for the encounter with the Uxii and added from his own experience the story of Sisygambis' intervention, either not realizing or not caring that it came in a different context.

ὁ φόρος The Uxii with Madates were exempted from tribute (Curt. v 3. 15). There is no contradiction between Alexander imposing a heavy annual tribute upon the mountain Uxii and exempting the men of the plain after Sisygambis' intercession.

How long the mountaineers paid tribute is not known, but it is unlikely that Abulites could control them from Susa. Nearchus implied that the Uxii as well as the Cossaeans were affected by Alexander's punitive campaign of 324/3 (*Ind.* 40. 6 f.; cf. *FGrH* 133 F 1g), and even this was ineffective. The mountain Uxii were still autonomous in 317 (Diod. xix 17. 3).

18. 1-9. *The Struggle for the Persian Gates*

18. 1. κατὰ τὴν ἀμαξιτόν . . . φέρουσιν Curt. v 3. 16 calls this route a *campestre iter*, an exaggeration but justified by comparison with the route through the Persian Gates. This carriage road is usually identified with the road which branches south-east from the plain of Fahliūm, leading to Kazarūn and the highway to Shiraz. Cf. Sir A. Stein, *Old Routes of Western Iran* (London 1940) 18 ff.; J. Hansman, *Iran* x (1972) 101 ff., esp. 117-19.

Typically no information is given about the adventures of Parmenion's column. Yet adventures there must have been. In the Achaemenid period the Persian Gates, leading to the old centre of Anshan, were of secondary importance. The main route used was the more gradual southern road assigned to Parmenion (cf. Hansman 119). It is not credible that, having blockaded the Gates with such care, the Persians left the main road unguarded, so that Parmenion could enter Persis and attack their position at the Gates from the rear.

Polyaenus provides a clue. Instead of Ariobarzanes he claims that Phrasaortes commanded at the Persian Gates (iv 3. 27). It is usually thought that Phrasaortes, whom Alexander later appointed satrap (cf. 18. 11 below), is confused with his predecessor (so Berve no. 813). But it could be the case that Phrasaortes commanded a secondary force,

blocking the main road traversed by Parmenion, and Polyaeus, excerpting in his usual slipshod fashion, combined the two forces.

2. *ἦει σπουδῇ* Diod. 68. 1 and Curt. v 3. 17 say that the Gates were reached on the fifth day after Parmenion's departure, a very leisurely rate for the 30 km involved.

τὰς πύλας τὰς Περσίδας Apart from Arrian only Strabo xv 3. 6 (729) speaks explicitly of the Persian Gates. Other sources refer to the defile as the Susian Gates (Curt. v 3. 17; Diod. 68. 1; Polyaeus iv 3. 27), a perfectly understandable variant (cf. ii 5. 1 n.). The Gates are to be identified as the Tang-i Khās, a narrow defile ascending with an easy gradient to a pass (c. 1,870 m) and leading into the Merv Dasht basin below. Cf. Stein, *Old Routes* 25; Hansman 117 f. The route was of great antiquity and the kings of Ur had referred to the pass as the 'Bolt of Anshan'. By Alexander's time, however, Anshan had declined and the pass was only used on rare occasions when it was vital to reach Persepolis by the most direct route (Hansman 119).

Ἀριοβαρζάνην (Berve no. 115) This Ariobarzanes must be distinguished from the son of Artabazus who surrendered with his father in Hyrcania (iii 23. 7). The equation is almost invariably made (e.g. Kaerst, *RE* ii 883 no. 4; Berve ii 60 f.; Schachermeyr² 287). But Curtius says explicitly that the Ariobarzanes who commanded at the Gates was killed in a skirmish outside Persepolis after the pass was turned (v 4. 33). His story is circumstantial and should not be doubted. It follows that this Ariobarzanes was dead several months before the son of Artabazus made his surrender. The satrap of Persis is distinct, and he may have belonged to the family of the Ariobarzanes who held the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia from 388 and whose defection in 366 precipitated the Great Satrapal Revolt (cf. Beloch iii² 2. 146, 254-7). He was betrayed by his son Mithridates who thereby restored the credit of the family (Xen. *Cyrop.* viii 8. 4). A member of the house could easily have held the satrapy under Darius. The duplication of names is hardly rare in the Persian nobility; another of Artabazus' sons, Arsames, had the same name as the satrap of Cilicia who fell at Issus (cf. ii 11. 8).

τετρακισμουρίους Diod. 68. 1 has the more conservative figure of 25,000 infantry (so Curt. v 3. 17) and 300 cavalry.

Stein located the Persian camp in the plain of 'Alīābād, about a kilometre from the head of the pass. The bulk of the army was concentrated below the crest in open ground, while an advance guard occupied the crest itself. The wall blocked the top of the pass from side to side, and it served as defensive wall and advance fortification. The camp itself had rudimentary defences, a surrounding trench and a series of outlying guardposts (cf. 18. 7).

3. *αὐτοῦ καταστρατοπεδεύσατο* Alexander's camp was established on the large open space at the entrance of the Tang-i Khās, known as Mullah Susan. It was here that Alexander retreated after his initial

attack was beaten off. The vulgate sources place this camp about 30 stades from the pass (Curt. v 3. 23; Polyaeus iv 3. 27; Diod. 68. 4 gives 300 stades), a distance perfectly compatible with the Mullah Susan (cf. Stein, *Old Routes* 25).

ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου . . . βαλλόμενοι The vulgate sources indicate that the Macedonians were unaware of artillery concealed in the hills and so were taken by surprise in the narrowest point of the defile (Diod. 68. 2–3; Curt. v 3. 17–23). The dead were left on the battlefield (Diod. 68. 4; Curt. v 4. 3). All this Arrian summarizes baldly; and he gives no hint of any decline in morale. But when Philip suffered a similar reverse in 353 (Polyaeus ii 38. 2) the sequel was the most serious discontent of his reign (Diod. xvi 35. 2).


4. τῶν δὲ αἰχμαλώτων Other sources claim that the crucial information was conveyed by a bilingual Lycian herdsman (Diod. 68. 5; Curt. v 4. 4–14; Plut. *Al.* 37. 1; Polyaeus iv 3. 27).

ἄλλην ὁδόν This route began with an abrupt climb to the head of the Bolsoru pass (2,250 m) and then branched southwards over broken ground along an outlier of the Paskōhak massif to 'Alīābād where the Persian army was encamped. The vulgate sources give vivid descriptions of the difficulties of the route; snowfalls, terrain intersected by ravines, heavy forest, features all noticed by Stein who passed through the Gates in late November, at the same time of year as Alexander.

5. ἑκατὸν σταδίους The distance is given by Arrian alone, and Stein (*Old Routes of Western Iran* 25) agrees that 12½ miles (20 km) is a fair estimate for Alexander's march. But that is for the total distance. Arrian's 100 stades is intended to cover the distance to the point where Alexander divided his forces, which was on the ridge extending from the Bolsoru Pass (Curt. v 4. 20), and, according to Stein, the distance from Mullah Susan to the pass is no more than 8 km (*Geogr. Journ.* cxii (1938) 315). Arrian's statement is an over-estimate, and he may have erroneously taken the statement of distance for the whole route to refer to the first stage only.

τετραρχίαν . . . ἱπικὴν This is the sole reference to cavalry tetrarchies in the Macedonian army. The tactical writers speak of a subdivision of the phalanx named *τετραρχία*, which ideally comprised four *lochoi* of 16 men (Arr. *Tact.* 10. 1; cf. Aelian 9. 2; Asclep. 2. 8; 'Suda' s.v. *τετραρχία*). Documents of the reign of Philip V confirm that *τετράρχαι* were minor infantry officers (Moretti nos. 110, 114). But these facts shed little light on the composition of cavalry tetrarchies.

Berve i 107, following Droysen i² 1. 358 n. 3, suggested that the tetrarchy was a temporary formation of four *lochoi*. This is an attractive suggestion, but somewhat vitiated by the fact that Arrian refers to the group as a regular unit and implies that there were others. Perhaps Alexander was still experimenting with his cavalry organization. He had recently subdivided his cavalry *ilai* into *lochoi* (iii 16. 11 n.), and he



may have created a horizontal as well as a vertical grouping, associating *lochoi* from four different *ilai* in a common unit. If so, the tetrarchies would have been heterogeneous entities without any over-all regional characteristic. How many tetrarchies there were is impossible to determine. It is possible, however, that two extra *lochoi* were formed from the 500 Macedonian cavalry brought by Amyntas (Diod. 65. 1; Curt. v 1. 40), so that there was scope for four tetrarchies, each comprising four *lochoi*, in addition to the Royal *ile*. These tetrarchies may have been the forerunners of the hipparchies, which are a regular phenomenon after 329 (cf. iii 29. 7 n.).

6. Ἀμύνταν . . . Κοῖνον Curt. v 4. 20 mentions the division of forces, but adds the name of Polyperchon. There is no reason to doubt what he says. Alexander had all the Macedonian phalanx troops at the Gates. He had left behind the battalions of Craterus and Meleager and took that of Perdiccas in his advance guard. Three battalions were left, those of Coenus, Amyntas, and Polyperchon, and these are the commanders named by Curtius in charge of Alexander's second army group.

There has been some debate about the role of Philotas. It has become conventional to identify him as a seventh phalanx commander (e.g. Beloch iii² 2. 328; Berve ii 397 no. 803; Tarn ii 144; R. D. Milns, *GRBS* vii (1966) 160; only von Domaszewski, *SB Heidelberg* 1925/6 11–12, identifies him as the famous Philotas, the commander of the Companions). The evidence, however, rests on the flimsiest basis; in particular there is no evidence to suggest that the Philotas mentioned at iii 29. 7 and iv 24. 10 was a phalanx commander (cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxiii (1973) 252–3). More importantly, the second force at the Persian Gates had a substantial component of cavalry. Alexander had a tetrarchy and the royal *ile* with him and 500 cavalry had been left with Craterus (18. 4). That leaves at least half of the Companion cavalry and the *πρόδρομοι* unaccounted for, and they can only have been with the second column (cf. Curt. v 4. 20, *quia et eques pediti iret mixtus*). In that case Philotas, the cavalry commander, was the natural leader of the force.

καὶ τὸν ποταμὸν . . . γεφυροῦν The river was the Araxes (the modern Pulvar), which Alexander crossed close to Persepolis itself (Strabo xv 3. 6 (729); Curt. v 5. 2–4; Diod. 69. 2). Curtius, however, diverges fundamentally about the bridging and the purpose of Philotas' column. He states that Philotas was deputed not to bridge the Araxes but to follow Alexander to the Gates and launch a secondary attack (v 4. 30). Far from finding the bridge already built, Alexander bridged the river on his advance to Persepolis, demolishing the nearby villages for timber (v 5. 2–4). The two versions are both internally consistent and they are irreconcilable. Kaerst must be wrong to argue that the divergence in Curtius stems from incompetent contamination of Ptolemy's account (i³ 402 n. 1; so Berve ii 397 n. 4).

δρόμῳ τὸ πολὺ ἦγε Arrian throughout stresses the speed of Alexander's march, implying that the whole turning movement took place in a single night. Curtius, however, says explicitly that the march took two nights and a day. From the afternoon until the night of that day he rested his troops before completing the march (v 4. 22 f.).

τὴν μὲν δὴ πρώτην φυλακὴν These outposts cannot be identified, but presumably they were to the rear of the Persian camp on the flanks of the mountain. The other sources confirm that there were three of them and agree that no fugitives gave the alarm (Diod. 68. 7; Polyaeus iv 3. 27; Curt. v 4. 27–8).

8. οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας ἐλθόντες Curtius again disagrees and claims that the Persians put up a memorable fight (v 4. 31–2). Once more Ptolemy and Arrian have portrayed the Macedonian troops gaining an effortless victory.

9. Πτολεμαῖον ἀπολελοίπει This passage presents acute difficulties. Which Ptolemy is involved? J. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* 8–10, has challenged the orthodox view that it was the son of Lagus. The man is introduced without patronymic, which is virtually unique for the son of Lagus as he appears in Arrian. Seibert therefore suggests that we have to do with Ptolemy son of Philippus (Berve no. 671). But this presupposes too much scrupulous accuracy in Arrian (cf. G. Wirth, *Bibliotheca Orientalis* xxx (1973) 408 f.). The reference to Ptolemy is resumptive (Alexander *had* left him behind), and it is possible that the source first included the patronymic to describe the commission and later simply referred to the commander as Ptolemy (cf. iv 24. 10, 25. 2 and v 23. 7, 24. 1–3). The original reference could have been omitted by Arrian.

No other source mentions Ptolemy's rearguard action; in its place Curtius mentions a concerted second assault, launched by Philotas' army group (v 4. 30). Now Arrian (18. 6) claims that Philotas had been sent ahead to prepare a bridge over the Araxes, and he has been universally believed. If he is correct, Alexander's strategy is peculiar. Philotas' force comprised three phalanx battalions (18. 6 n.) and the bulk of the cavalry—at least the equivalent of Alexander's turning force. Arrian's account makes Alexander act as though the turning of the Gates were a foregone conclusion, which he could accomplish with half his forces, a strange assumption after the losses of the previous day. But Curtius is more persuasive. There are two waves of attack. Philotas' group with its large preponderance of cavalry moves by a slightly different route, where the fodder was plentiful, and it launches a second attack after Alexander's surprise advance had diverted the enemy's attention.

C. B. Welles, *Miscellanea Rostagni* 107, suggested on largely *a priori* grounds that Ptolemy exaggerated his role at the Gates. I would go further and suggest that he cast himself for the role played by Philotas.

He may indeed have been left behind with a small force (much less than 3,000) in a position where he could harry fugitives. It was a small incident, too insignificant to attract the vulgate writers (compare the versions of the arrest of Bessus: iii 30. 5 n.). This minor role Ptolemy built up to replace the second assault by Philotas; it was to be his force which inflicted the most slaughter on the defenders. Once the substitution was made, it was necessary to do something with Philotas and the phalanx commanders; hence the order to bridge the Araxes. Three of these men, the three mentioned by Arrian, were dead by the end of the reign and in no position to refute Ptolemy. He could exaggerate his role with relative safety.

18. 10–12. *Alexander in Persis*

10. ἐς Πέρσας 'To Persepolis'. It seems that the original nomenclature of the city was Πέρσαι (Pārsa). That emerges clearly from a fragment of Berossus (*FGrH* 680 F 11), which lists Πέρσαι along with Babylon, Susa, Ecbatana, Bactra, Damascus, and Sardes. The more familiar form Περσέπολις appears to have been a contraction of Πέρσαι πόλις, (which is the most common reading in the manuscripts of Strabo; cf. J. Wackernagel, *Glotta* xiv (1925) 36–44). Arrian's references to Πέρσαι in iii 18 (1 and 6) probably all denote the city. At vii 1. 1, however, he refers to the city by the longer form, Persepolis, which may perhaps represent Aristobulus' usage as against that of Ptolemy (cf. Kornemann 61 n. 76, 157).

ἔφθη ἀφικέσθαι Curt. v 5. 2–3 adds that Alexander was warned of the danger of plunder by Tiridates, the treasurer at Persepolis. This is a detail not unlikely in itself and it coheres with Curtius' previous statement that the garrison of Persepolis excluded the fugitive Ariobarzanes (v 4. 34). It is clear that Persepolis was surrendered from within, and Tiridates was left, temporarily at least, in charge of the vast treasures (Curt. v 5. 11; cf. Berve ii 374–5 no. 754).

Arrian's entire report of Alexander's stay in Persis is extraordinarily brief, and one would never guess from his few notes that it encompassed four months, from January to April/May 330 (Plut. *Al.* 37. 6; cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 98–9; E. N. Borza *CP* lxxvii (1972) 237). More particularly there is no hint at all that Persepolis was plundered at the time of Alexander's entry. The vulgate sources give a vivid description of Alexander submitting the city to his troops to despoil at their pleasure (Diod. 70. 1–6; Curt. v 6. 1–8; Plut. *Al.* 37. 3–5). It is a story that has often been disbelieved (see, most recently, G. Wirth *Historia* xx (1971) 622 f.), but on quite a *priori* grounds.

τὰ ἐν Πασαργάδαις χρήματα Pasargadae was c. 43 km north-east of Persepolis on the upper reaches of the Pulvar (cf. E. Schmidt, *Persepolis*.

i (Chicago 1953) 20 ff.; H. Treidler, *RE Suppl.* ix 777 ff.). It was the city of Cyrus the Great, to whose reign is dated the citadel platform (Takht-i Sulaiman). The citadel itself formed a formidable defensive complex, covering an area over 200 m long and 130 m wide. Cf. D. Stronach, *Iran* i (1963) 19 ff., esp. 27.

Pasargadae, like Persepolis, was surrendered by its citadel commander, Gobares (Curt. v 6. 10; Berve no. 238). Its treasury contained a mere 6,000 talents (Curt. loc. cit.); the vast bulk of Persian wealth was stored as bullion in the great treasury at Persepolis. There is some variation in the totals given for the captured treasure (cf. Bellinger 68 n. 148). Strabo (xv 3. 9 (731)) knows one version claiming that 180,000 talents were ultimately concentrated at Ecbatana (so Diod. 80. 3; Justin xii 1. 3 gives 190,000). The vulgate sources claim that 120,000 came from Persepolis alone (Diod. 71. 1; Curt. v 6. 9). Other sources give smaller figures: Plutarch (*Al.* 37. 4) says that the same amount of coin was found at Persepolis as at Susa (40,000 talents), which may come from the same source as Strabo's confused statement that the totals from Susa *and* Persepolis were given as 40,000 or 50,000 talents (xv 3. 9). The figures are far apart. They may perhaps be reconciled on the supposition that Curtius and Diodorus give the entire treasure found at Persepolis, both coined money and gold bullion in ingot form (cf. Hdt. iii 96. 2), while Plutarch and the Strabo variant give coined money alone (compare the Susa figures: iii 16. 7 n.). The only internally consistent figures come from the vulgate; 50,000 talents from Susa, 120,000 from Persepolis, and 6,000 from Pasargadae do total very nearly 180,000, the figure given for the treasure accumulated in Ecbatana. Whatever the true total, Alexander had acquired one of the greatest hoards in history and acquired it in the space of two months.

11. **Φρασαόρτην** (Berve no. 813) This is the only reference to Phrasaortes as satrap; he had presumably died before 325/4 when Orxines is attested in control of Persis (vi 29. 2; cf. Berve no. 592). Alexander probably left some sort of holding force. Curt. v 6. 11 states that a garrison of 3,000 Macedonians was established at Persepolis before the winter campaign against the Mardi. It may have remained after his departure from Persis (cf. Berve i 263).

τὰ βασίλεια ... ἐνέπρησε. This refers of course to the vast palace complex planned by Darius and largely completed by Xerxes. For a detailed description of the history of its construction see E. Schmidt, *Persepolis* i 39 ff.; F. Krefter, *Persepolis Rekonstruktionen* (Berlin 1971). The palace was burned at the end of Alexander's stay in Persis (Plut. *Al.* 38. 1; Curt. v 6. 19–20), just before he resumed his pursuit of Darius. It was a violent conflagration, which has left its traces everywhere on the site, most strikingly in the Treasury, where many of the column bases were shattered by the heat of the fire and charred patches of

plaster still hang from the blackened walls (Schmidt, *Persepolis* i 178). The burning did not, however, prevent Persepolis' continued existence as capital of Persis; it was there that Peucestas established his court in the period of the Successors (Diod. xix 21. 2, 22. 1, 46. 6).

Παρμενίωνος σῶζειν ξυμβουλευόντος The advice of Parmenion is unique to Arrian. Strabo xv 3. 6 (730) mentions only that Alexander burned the palace as an act of revenge; his reference to the incident is so compressed that it is impossible to say whether his source mentioned Parmenion's intervention (Strasburger 36 argues that Strabo represents Aristobulus and Arrian Ptolemy; that certainly does not follow from Strabo's silence about Parmenion). We cannot even say that Strabo's source omitted the role of Thais. Even the vulgate sources agree that Alexander stressed the revenge motive during the burning (Diod. 72. 2; Curt. v 7. 4; Plut. *Al.* 38. 3-4), and that is all that Strabo says; the burning was an act of revenge.

The conflict is between Arrian and the vulgate sources. These stress the role of the courtesan Thais, Ptolemy's future mistress (Athen. xiii 576 D-E; Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 100). During an uproarious *κῶμος* she suggested the burning of the palace as an act of revenge; the idea took hold, and Alexander laid the first torch to the palace. The main lines of the story certainly go back to Cleitarchus, who represented Thais as the principal agent of the burning (*FGH* 137 F 11; cf. Plut. *Al.* 38; Curt. v 7. 3-11; Diod. 72). In this version the burning is unpremeditated; according to Arrian it was deliberate (cf. Plut. *Al.* 38. 8—οἱ μὲν οὕτω ταῦτα γενέσθαι φασίν, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ γνώμης). Parmenion plays no part in the vulgate version and Thais none in Arrian's.

Faced with this divergence, scholars have either accepted the vulgate version (Berve ii 175; Mederer 69 ff.; Hamilton *Plut. Al.* 99-101; Schachermeyr² 289-91; Lane Fox 260 ff.) or accepted the tradition of the deliberate firing, but for motives other than sheer revenge.

(i) A demonstration to the peoples of Asia that the Persian empire had perished; cf. Th. Nöldeke, *Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte* (Leipzig 1887) 84, 141; Tarn i 54; G. Wirth, *Chiron* i (1971) 149-52.

(ii) A reaffirmation to the Greek world that Alexander was still aware of the problems of his homeland; E. Badian, *Hermes* xcv (1967) 189.

(iii) An attempt to destroy the morale of the Persians by destroying the symbol of their empire; cf. R. Andreotti, *Saeculum* viii (1957) 127 f.; E. N. Borza, *CP* lxvii (1972) 243.

The crux of the problem is whether or not the burning was premeditated. In other respects the two versions can be reconciled. There seems no problem in the burning having been planned in advance but the execution stimulated by the liberating influences of Bacchus and Thais (cf. Badian, loc. cit.; Borza, *CP* lxvii (1972) 234-5). But the question of premeditation was clearly a problem even in

antiquity, as Plutarch shows (*Al.* 38. 8). There are several factors to be taken into account.

(i) Even before the fire the palace had been picked clean. That is perfectly clear from the excavations of the Treasury. The subsidiary Halls 41 and 38 apparently contained *inter alia* the royal tableware, and in their excavation there were found numerous shattered remains of stone or glassware, but not a single vessel of gold or silver (Schmidt, *Persepolis* i 179). It seems certain that the Treasury was cleared of bullion before the fire; but that does not necessarily imply that the burning was planned in advance. Alexander had already decided to remove the Persian treasures to a central repository and begun the requisition of draught animals (Diod. 71. 2; Curt. v 6. 9; Plut. 37. 4). It may well be that the gold and silver had been removed from the Treasury well in advance and accumulated together in a single, easily supervised assembly point.

(ii) There are several hints that Alexander regretted the burning. Arrian himself says that Alexander criticized the act when he returned to Persepolis in 324 (vi 30. 1), and there are indications that he had second thoughts long before. Curtius says that the regrets followed immediately after the burning; Alexander declared it would have been greater punishment for the Persians to see him enthroned in the palace of Xerxes. Plutarch has something similar, and both he and Curtius agree that it was the most common story (*ὅτι δ' οὖν μετενόησε ταχύ. . . ὁμολογείται* Plut. 38. 8; *paenituisse constat* Curt. v 7. 11). This unanimity cannot have been as impressive as they imply, for clearly Alexander's immediate repentance was mentioned by no source used by Arrian. Otherwise Arrian, who disapproves of the burning and admires Alexander's capacity for remorse (cf. vii 29. 2), cannot have failed to mention it. Perhaps the statement goes back originally to Cleitarchus. He could easily have stated that all his informants were unanimous that Alexander immediately regretted the burning. If he and his informants were right, we have important evidence that the burning was unpremeditated, for Alexander is hardly likely to have regretted a formal decision so immediately after its execution (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 101).

οὐδὲ αὐτῷ ἐγνωκότι Plut. 38. 7 says that Alexander's men joined in the conflagration gladly because they considered it indicated that the king intended to return home and not stay in Asia—interesting evidence that there was already pressure from the troops to halt the process of conquest. The same thought appears in Arrian but in a very different form.

12. *ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐμοί* This is Arrian's first unfavourable comment about Alexander (repeated vi 30. 1), and, *pace* Kornemann 61, it must be his own observation, not a direct quotation from Ptolemy. As it stands, it is a fair comment, but it stands in isolation. The comment applies to the

entire pretext of revenge; the invasion of Asia was hardly a fair reprisal for the sack of Athens 150 years before. Arrian, however, writes as though he were not aware of the motive of revenge before its emergence at the burning of the palace.

19. *Persepolis to Media*

19. 1. εἰ δὲ τι . . . Ἀλέξανδρον The basis for modern translations has been Dübner's rendering: *num forte novi aliquid accideret in rebus Alexandri*. This, I think, is too neutral. In the first place, νεωτερίζειν always has a pejorative connotation in Arrian, implying a change for the worse. It may be qualified (ἐς τὸ βαρβαρικώτερον νεωτετέριστο iv 8. 2; νεωτερισθείη . . . ἐς ὕβριν vii 13. 3), or used by itself (i 1. 2, i 25. 5 *fin.*, iii 6. 3). In the latter case the sense seems to be *novas res pelere*, the invariable meaning of the word in Cassius Dio. Arrian's style here seems closely modelled upon Thucydides, who supplies exact parallels for the construction (iv 41. 3 μὴ καὶ . . . τι νεωτερίσθῃ τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν; cf. iv 76. 5), and in Thucydides νεωτερίζειν clearly implies revolution. I should translate the phrase; 'in the hope that some disaffection might break out around Alexander'.

According to Arrian, Darius was hoping for sedition at Alexander's court. He may have had inside information about the debate over the limits of empire and the question of the Euphrates frontier (see ii 25. 1 above), which may well have led to serious tension at court. But, even so, Arrian's language is very strong, implying outright mutiny, and it is difficult to see what can have given Darius reason for hopes so sanguine. There is another possibility, that Arrian's source is preparing the ground for the Philotas affair. Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus claimed that the 'conspiracy' had been reported as early as the Egyptian campaign (iii 26. 1). Both categorically assert Philotas' guilt and gloss over the details of the alleged plot. It would add colour to the picture they present, if Darius could be made to wait in Media in anticipation of conspiracy.

φθειρών πᾶσαν Memnon's advice before the Granicus re-emerges as policy (cf. i 12. 9 n., ii 4. 3 n.). East of the Caspian Gates the policy might have been effective, for the main road was mostly desert with rare sources of water (cf. iii 20. 4, 21. 7). Bessus was to adopt a scorched earth strategy in Bactria (iii 28. 8 n.).

2. τὰς Κασπίας καλουμένης πύλας For the location of the Caspian Gates, see A. F. v. Stahl, *Geogr. Journ.* lxiv (1924) 318-9; H. Treidler, *RE* xxii 322-33; J. F. Standish, 'The Caspian Gates', *Greece and Rome* xvii (1970) 17-24. The descriptions of the ancient sources are not in themselves adequate to locate the exact defiles. In all probability the term 'Caspian Gates' referred to the entire complex of defiles in the district of Khar (ancient Choarene), including both the Sar-i Darreh on the road to Rhagae and the Elburz passes to the north (cf. Standish

24). During the Parthian period the Gates were a vital point of reference: according to Apollodorus of Artemita they were 500 stades from Rhagae and 1,260 from Hecatompylus (*FGrH* 779 F 5), and Isidorus of Charax places them on the road from Rhagae, just before Choarene (*FGrH* 781 F 2. 7-8). This makes it certain that their reference point was the Sar-i Darreh, and those defiles are surely the Caspian Gates crossed by Alexander (so E. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* 195 f.).

Παρ(α)τάκας μέν. According to Strabo (xv 3. 6 (729)) the headwaters of the river Araxes (Pulvar) were in Paraetacene. The district, then, was immediately north of Pasargadae on the main road to Ecbatana, roughly on the same latitude as Sittacene (Strabo xv 3. 12 (732)). To the north it bordered ὄν Media and its territories apparently extended eastwards in the direction of the Caspian Gates (Strabo xvi 1. 17 (744)).

3. **κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν** Arrian tells the dramatic story of the pursuit of Darius entirely from the Macedonian point of view, and confines his report of the adventures in the Persian camp to reports brought by deserters at the various stages of Alexander's march. That is the emphasis we should expect from Ptolemy and Aristobulus, who will have participated in the pursuit and had no direct experience of the crisis in Darius' camp. On the other hand, our only other full source for the pursuit, Curtius, tells the story predominantly from the Persian side (Curt. v 8-12), and very few details are given of the Macedonian pursuit (v 13. 1-8). It is only the final stages of the pursuit that are given in any detail.

Curtius says nothing of any plan by Darius to fight at Ecbatana. His narrative begins with Darius already in flight. He mentions a plan by Darius to stand and fight near the Caspian Gates (v 8. 1 ff.), but it is clear that the plan was never carried into effect, thanks to the treachery of Bessus and Nabarzanes, and it was quite different from the original design to meet Alexander near Ecbatana. There seems no reason to reject Curtius' version as a confused distortion (so Schwartz, *RE* iv 1878). It is not mentioned by Arrian, it is true, but the plan to halt near the Gates was ephemeral, soon shelved, and overshadowed by the arrest of Darius. Arrian's sources, who centred their account on Alexander, could easily overlook the whole affair (cf. Berve ii 127). There were, then, two decisions by Darius to fight, the first based on rational strategic considerations, and the second an act of desperation during the flight itself.

Σκύθας . . . καὶ Καδουσίους These Scyths can only be the Sacasinae of eastern Armenia, who, like the Cadusii, had sent a contingent to Gaugamela (iii 8. 4 n.). They had been associated with the Medians then, and they were Darius' most salient allies while he was at Ecbatana (cf. G. Radet, *Mélanges Glotz* ii (Paris 1932) 766-7).

4. **Βισθάνης** (Berve no. 215) According to the detailed account of Diodorus all the sons of Ochus were murdered by the eunuch Bagoas except the youngest, Arses, who succeeded to the throne (xvii 5. 3-4). It may be that Diodorus is mistaken and the purge was not complete (so Th. Nöldeke, *Aufsätze* 81 n. 1). If so, the error is twofold, for Diodorus says both that Arses was the only son to survive (5. 4) and that Ochus' house came to an end with his death (5. 5). On the other hand, Arrian's account stands alone. Curt. v 13. 1 merely states the arrival of news that Darius had left Ecbatana and does not name the messenger. Bisthanes, moreover, does not recur in any other context, and there is no corroboration of Arrian's filiation. He may have been the son of a royal concubine.

5. **ἐπτακισχίλια** The other sources agree that Darius took 8,000 talents with him from Ecbatana (Diod. 74. 5; Strabo xv 3. 9).

πεζοὺς δέ Both Curtius (v 8. 3) and Diodorus (73. 2) say that the total number of infantry with Darius at Ecbatana was 30,000. This figure may be exaggerated (so Berve ii 127), but Arrian's estimate seems unduly small. Apart from the Greek mercenaries and the surviving **μηλοφόροι** (iii 16. 1) Darius had the satrapy of Media as a recruiting ground, and in the six months after Gaugamela he could have raised a formidable force. In contrast to the infantry total Curtius' cavalry figure of 3,300 coheres very well with Arrian's 3,000.

ἐλθὼν δὲ ἐς Ἑκβάτανα This statement has been universally accepted; but I have recently argued (*CQ* xxvi (1976) 132-6) that Arrian has been misled by his sources and that Alexander did not in fact enter Ecbatana in 330.

(i) The stay in Ecbatana was an unnecessary diversion. Alexander was moving at speed both before and after, in the anticipation of overhauling Darius (cf. 19. 4, 20. 1-2). The administrative arrangements here recorded would have interrupted the pursuit and wasted valuable time. At most Alexander gave orders for the demobilization of the allies which were only executed after the death of Darius. So J. Marquart, *Philologus* Suppl. x (1907) 37 f.

(ii) Curt. v 13. 1-3 has an abbreviated account of Alexander's pursuit which in the main agrees with Arrian. But he states explicitly that Alexander diverged from the road to Media and pursued the fugitive via Tabae (for the location see *CQ* 1976. 134 n. 95). This story is inherently probable. Once Alexander knew that Darius had left Ecbatana it was a waste of time to continue to the capital. His journey lay north-west along the line of the Zagros, whereas Darius was moving almost due east to Rhagae. If Alexander wished to intercept the fugitive he needed to cut across in a direction north of north east, taking a route corresponding to the modern road through Arak/Sultanabad and Qom to Teheran.

(iii) It is only the phrase **ἐλθὼν . . . ἐς Ἑκβάτανα** which is at variance

with this. It is possible that Arrian's source introduced an anticipatory digression. His source mentioned a division of forces after the news of Darius' flight. Parmenion and his phalangites were to escort the bullion train to Ecbatana, while the allied troops went ahead to secure Ecbatana and arrange for its reception. In the context there was the note that the allies were later discharged from the capital. The whole complex of present and future arrangements was placed together in an extended digression, and Arrian wrongly inferred that Alexander himself went to Ecbatana with the allied troops.

δισχίλια The same figure is given by Plutarch (*Al.* 42. 5), referring to the Thessalians alone. The vulgate sources claim that the bonus paid was 1 talent for each cavalryman and 10 minae for each foot soldier (Diod. 74. 4; Curt. vi 2. 17), so that the total exceeded 12,000 talents (Diod. loc. cit.; Curt. vi 2. 10). This is at least consistent with the allied numbers in 334 (Diod. 17. 3-4). The 2,000 talents of Arrian and Plutarch covered only payments made to the allied cavalry.

6. οὐκ ὀλίγοι These troops included a number of Thessalian cavalry, who were later discharged at the Oxus (iii 25. 4, 29. 5). The inducements to re-enrol were great, including a 3-talent donative (Diod. 74. 4).

7. τὰ χρήματα . . . παραδοῦναι This refers to the bullion actually in transit between Persepolis and Ecbatana, which had been left in Paraetacene (19. 3 above). What happened to the rest of the vast hoard from Persepolis is not certain. The vulgate sources indicate that the surplus of the Persepolis treasure was due to be transported to Susa (Diod. 71. 2; cf. Curt. v 6. 9), and some authorities used by Strabo (xv 3. 9) claimed that it actually was conveyed there. Either Alexander changed his mind in mid 330 and rerouted the treasure from Susa to Ecbatana (Borza, *CP* lxvii (1972) 239) or the treasure was in fact divided between the capitals (Lane Fox 530). In the latter case we need to explain the massive figure of 180,000 talents which some sources claim were concentrated in Ecbatana (cf. 18. 10 n.). The total may in fact include the gold and silver foil which overlay the pillars, tiles, beams, and even bricks of the palace at Ecbatana, which the conquerors stripped and melted down for bullion (Polybius x 27. 11 ff.); the small fraction of gold and silver which remained as embellishments in the temple of Anaitis were to realize 4,000 talents for Antiochus III.

“Ἀρπαλον . . . ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων For general discussions of Harpalus' role as treasurer see Berve ii 76 f., no. 143; Schachermeyr² 476. The accepted view is that he administered the finances of the central satrapies of the empire, the foremost of a number of 'Reichsfinanzdirektoren'. But the evidence for his activity is remarkably slender. Arrian merely states that he had been left ἐπὶ τῶν χρημάτων, which, as the context shows, means no more than oversight of the actual bullion train left in Paraetacene. Parmenion was to return and lead the escort to Ecbatana, where the citadel and its treasure were to be entrusted to

Harpalus. Unfortunately the order is linked with Parmenion's commission to drive along the Caspian shore to Hyrcania, which we know was not carried out. Parmenion remained in Media and Diod. 80. 3 says that he was entrusted with the treasury. There is no reference here to Harpalus and no source mentions that he connived in Parmenion's murder. That is remarkable, for, as treasurer and childhood friend of Alexander, he should have played a role (Badian, *JHS* lxxxix (1961) 22, infers that he *did*). It is more probable that Harpalus had left Ecbatana by late 330.

What scanty evidence we have for Harpalus' later activities is connected with Babylon. Diod. 108. 4 says that he was responsible for its treasures and revenues, and it seems that he was in charge of the finances of Mesopotamia, administering and disbursing the tribute collected by men like Asclepiodorus (iii 16. 5). It was at Babylon that Harpalus established his court and conducted exotic botanical experiments (Theophr. *HP* iv 4. 1; cf. Plut. *Al.* 35. 15; *QC* iii 2: 648 c; Pliny, *NH* xvi 144) and at Babylon that his mistress, Pythionice, lived and died (Philemon *ap.* Athenaeus xiii 595 c; Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F 253). The extent of his powers is conjectural. Curt. ix 3. 21 (cf. Diod. 95. 4) mentions his sending 7,000 infantry and 25,000 panoplies to India, which indicates both military and financial competence. If we may generalize from the activities of his successor, Antimenes of Rhodes, he could issue commands to neighbouring satraps, in financial matters at least: [Arist.] *Oec.* ii 2. 34 f.; 1353^a2, 24; cf. A. Andreades, *BCH* liii (1929) 5-10. The sources, however, are too lacunose to permit any reconstruction of the fiscal hierarchy under Alexander (such as in Berve i 314 ff.). It is a measure of our ignorance that there is no direct account in our principal sources of appointments as crucial as Harpalus' in Babylon and his replacement by Antimenes.

ἐς ἑξακισχίλιους A very formidable contingent, the equivalent of half the phalanx numbers at the Hellespont.

Παρμενίωνα . . . Ὑρκανίαν Parmenion's commission was probably conceived as an appendage of the pursuit of Darius. He was to make a detour along the Caspian shore through the territory of the Cadusii, who were known to be the allies of Darius (cf. 19. 3, 8. 4 nn.); the object was both punitive and defensive—to intercept any retreat by the Persians through the Elburz passes to the Caspian. But the expedition was cancelled; and the mercenaries and Thracians earmarked for it remained as the garrison of Media. That is proved by the details of the lieutenants who engineered his murder (iii 26. 3, vi 27. 3):

(i) Cleander (Berve no. 422) had commanded the 'old mercenaries' at Gaugamela (iii 12. 2 n.; cf. 6. 8 n.); these troops will have formed the nucleus of Parmenion's mercenaries.

(ii) Sitalces (Berve no. 712) had commanded the Thracians at Issus and Gaugamela (cf. iii 12. 4). The Thracians are not mentioned in

Alexander's entourage after 330, and they must have remained in Media with Sitalces.

(iii) Menidas (Berve no. 508) had commanded the mercenary cavalry (cf. iii 12. 3, etc.). His forces were brought to Arcia in late 330 by Philippus, son of Menelaus (iii 25. 4). Philippus also brought from Ecbatana the remnants of the Thessalian cavalry and the other body of mercenary cavalry, that of Andromachus (cf. iii 12. 5), which also served in Parmenion's army corps.

(iv) Agathon (Berve no. 8) is only mentioned as general in Media by Curt. x 1. 1. He had, however, commanded the Odrysian cavalry (iii 12. 4), and, since the Odrysians, like the Thracians, are not again attested with Alexander (cf. Berve i 134), it seems most likely that they were left with Parmenion.

8. Κλείτω κτλ. Cleitus' illness and commission are not mentioned elsewhere. Nor does Arrian state when the 6,000 phalangites rejoined the main army. Curtius, however, is explicit; the army which had served under Parmenion arrived shortly after Alexander entered Arachosia (early 329), and he gives their numbers: 6,000 Macedonians with 200 *nobiles* (= *hetairoi*), and 5,000 Greeks with an additional 600 cavalry (Curt. vii 3. 4). These correspond exactly to the Macedonians of Parmenion's force, and the mercenaries no doubt also belonged to his command.

There are two minor difficulties:

(i) Immediately before Alexander entered Arachosia Cleitus was appointed hipparch in place of Philotas (iii 27. 4). This is not contradictory. He may have left his infantry column to report to Alexander in advance of their arrival. Alternatively he could have been elevated *in absentia* to the hipparchy.

(ii) At the borders of Arcia Alexander marched with his whole force together (ὁμοῦ ἤδη ἔχων τὴν πᾶσαν δύναμιν iii 25. 4). This has been taken to imply that the Macedonian troops had arrived from Media (Milns, *GBRS* vii (1966) 165 n. 34; Lane Fox 532). But in the same breath Arrian announces the arrival of the Median advance guard, and he cannot mean that all Alexander's forces were previously united. All Arrian implies is that Alexander had the forces at present with him concentrated in one body, not dispersed in separate army groups, as had happened repeatedly during the recent Elburz campaign (e.g. iii 23. 2, 24. 1).

20-1. *The Pursuit and Death of Darius*

20. 1. τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἱππέας At Gaugamela there were two groups of mercenary cavalry, those led by Menidas (12. 3) and the contingent of Andromachus (12. 5). Both these commanders were detached to Parmenion's army group at Ecbatana (see note to 19. 7), and their units

went with them (25. 4). But Alexander took with him a third group of mercenary cavalry, whose commander, Erigyus, had previously led the allied cavalry of the Corinthian League (iii 6. 6, 11. 10). The safest explanation (cf. Berve i 148-9) is that a third mercenary squadron was created for Erigyus out of *vexillationes* from the other two groups (see now R. D. Milns, *Historia* xxvii (1978) 175 f.).

2. ἐξ Ῥάγας Rhagae survives as the modern Rey, about 12.5 km south-east of Tehran. It was one of the ancient centres of Media, refounded as Europus by Seleucus Nicator, and rose to its highest glory as the capital of the Seljuks between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries A.D. For description and photographs see E. Schmidt, *Flights over Ancient Cities of Iran* (Chicago 1940) 29 with plates 31-3.

ὁδὸν ἡμέρας μιᾶς It is 51 miles (82 km) from Rhagae to the eastern outlet of the Caspian Gates, and Alexander could not cover the distance in a day (cf. Marquart, *Philologus* Suppl. x (1907) 30; R. D. Milns, *Historia* xv (1966) 256). He still had several thousand infantry with full equipment (cf. 21. 3) and in any case had given up hope of overtaking Darius.

3. κατὰ πόδας αἰρήσειν. Arrian does not state exactly what news Alexander received of Darius' progress and where it was delivered. Presumably the deserters from the Persian army brought in an increasing mass of information during the march to Rhagae. Curtius at least confirms that the news brought to him on the borders of Paractacene was that Darius was in headlong flight for Bactria (v 13. 2). It is clear that as yet there was no hint of disaffection in the Persian camp. Alexander had news that Darius was in flight and too far ahead for him to overhaul with a substantial infantry force (κατὰ πόδας).

Ὁξυδάτην (Berve no. 588) Curt. vi 2. 11 confirms that Oxydates had been arrested by Darius and adds that he was under sentence of death. He places his appointment to Media not at Rhagae, but after the death of Darius. For Oxydates' fall from grace in 328/7 see iv 18. 3.

Arrian states that Oxydates' experiences under Darius recommended him to Alexander. This may be his own inference (cf. iv 22. 8, where the formula recurs), but it is very likely that the inference is correct. Alexander in late 330 seems consciously to have placed satrapies in the hands of men of proven disloyalty to Darius. Amminapes became satrap of Parthia/Hyrcania (iii 22. 1 n.) and the regicide Satibarzanes was confirmed in Areia (iii 25. 1-2).

ἐπὶ Παρθυαίους In the Parthian period the satrapy of Parthia extended west as far as the Caspian Gates and Rhagae, areas which had previously belonged to Media (Strabo xi 9. 1 (514)). Arrian gives no hint where the boundary came in Alexander's day, but Curtius says clearly that the Macedonians entered Parthia after the death of Darius (vi 2. 12; cf. v 12. 18). The Achaemenid satrapy, then, began further east than its Parthian counterpart. The change may have come at


Triparadeisus, where the boundaries of Media are explicitly defined: ἔστ' ἐπὶ πύλας τὰς Κασπίους (Arr. *Succ.* F 1. 35).

4. τῇ μὲν πρώτῃ The halting place before the Caspian Gates is usually identified as the village of Awan-i Kif, some 70 km from Rhagae (v. Stahl, *Geogr. Journ.* lxiv (1924) 320; Radet, *Mélanges Glotz* ii 771).

τῇ δευτέρᾳ... οἰκούμενα ἦν Immediately after the Gates was the ancient district of Choarene (Isidorus of Charax, *FGrH* 781 F 1. 8), the modern Khar. It was celebrated as an *amoenissimus situs* (Pliny, *NH* vi 44) and remains a well-watered oasis in a desolate terrain. The cultivated area of Khar extends some 60 km east of the Gates, as far as the village of Padi, where Radet locates the halting point (772-3; previous scholars made Alexander pause at Aradan, somewhat closer to the Gates). But this is surely impossible. A march of 50/60 km, immediately after a forced march to the Gates, was unnecessarily exhausting; Alexander had given up hope of overtaking Darius on foot. What is more, Alexander intended Coenus' foraging party to be absent for several days (cf. 21. 2); and the accumulation of provisions for the forthcoming desert march would have been a lengthy business. Obviously the Macedonians spent more than one day in Khar and would have spent more but for the news of the crisis in the Persian camp.

21. 1 καὶ ἐν τούτῳ... παίδων Both Arrian and Curtius give detailed accounts of the reports by deserters from the Persian camp, but they diverge seriously in matters of fact. Arrian mentions three episodes: first the news of Darius' arrest, next the detailed report of the desertion of the mercenaries and the flight of the conspirators (21. 4-5), and lastly the information of the locals about the shorter route to intercept Darius (21. 7). Curtius begins with Bagistanes' news, which, he claims, was not the actual arrest of Darius, but the imminent danger of arrest (v 13. 3). The next report was made at the actual scene of the arrest by Melon, Darius' erstwhile interpreter (v 13. 6-7). It was two deserters, he adds, who gave the information about the shorter route (13. 9), and finally Brochubelus, a son of Mazaeus, gave the news that the Persian force was only 200 stades ahead and in complete disorder (13. 11). The reports are similar but given at different stages in the pursuit by different people. In particular the role played by Mazaeus' son is totally inconsistent. According to Arrian he was named Antibelus and deserted to Alexander at Khar, while in Curtius' account he is named Brochubelus and appears in the final stage of the pursuit.

Arrian's account seems to me vulnerable. If Bagistanes had brought news of Darius' arrest, he ought also to have brought news of the defection of the Greek mercenaries which Curtius makes clear occurred immediately after (v 12. 14-18). The arrest indeed seems to have come very near the end of the drama, after a period during which the loyalty



of Bessus and Nabarzanes became increasingly suspect (Curt. v 9-11). In Curtius' version it is the initial intrigues which are reported by Bagistanes. News of the arrest comes only when Alexander reaches the scene of the crime. If that is correct, the camp deserted by Bagistanes cannot, as Arrian says (21. 3), be the camp where the arrest took place. Between the preliminary intrigues and the arrest there was at least one day's march (Curt. v 10. 12 ff.); and, according to Curtius, it was the intrigue that Bagistanes reported.

There seems little reason to doubt Curtius' circumstantial story of the desertion of Orsilus and Mithracenes and their report of a shorter route to intercept Bessus. They are said to have arrived when Alexander was about to leave the scene of the arrest, his forces now entirely mounted for the final pursuit (v 13. 8-9). This once more at variance with Arrian's report, which places the cavalry chase on the very last night of the pursuit, when Alexander reached the final camp of Darius' captors (21. 7). Arrian, however, has yet another incongruity. This final camp had been occupied the day before Alexander's arrival. The Persians, he says, now intended to husband their strength and travel by night alone. That meant that they had travelled two nights' journey from this final camp, a distance of 400 stades which Alexander covered in one tremendous push (21. 9). It is scarcely credible that the Persian force, encumbered by its baggage train (cf. Plut. 43. 2) and slowed by desertions, could have travelled at a speed of 200 stades each night. By contrast Curtius makes Alexander's final pursuit rather earlier on the road from the Caspian Gates, and the last stage, covered after the message of Brochubelus, was a mere 200 stades (v 13. 11). Brochubelus presumably arrived at Alexander's last halting place, which could well be the camp mentioned by Arr. 21. 7.

The choice of nomenclature for Mazaeus' son is difficult. Both Arrian and Curtius give perfectly respectable Babylonian names: Antibelus means 'servant of Bel' (Marquart, *Philologus* Suppl. x (1907) 30 N. 1) and Brochubelus means 'blessed by Bel' (Badian, *Greece and Rome* xii (1965) 175 n. 2). It seems impossible that either can be a corruption of the other, and we have a straight choice. It seems to me that Arrian's source, already confused about the time of the desertion, referred to the wrong son of Mazaeus. Instead of Brochubelus, he named the deserter Antibelus. The latter is almost certainly identical to the Artiboles who was later drafted into the *agema* (vii 6. 5; Berve ii 84 n. 154 denies that the equation is valid, but the two names Artiboles/Antibelus seem to be derived from the Babylonian Ardu-bel, and it is highly probable that they are alternative Hellenizations of the same original). If so, he will have been more familiar to the Macedonian court than his brother, Brochubelus, and more likely to have been substituted by a Macedonian author.

Ναβαρζάνης (Berve no. 543) Arrian seems to have misinterpreted

Nabarzanes' functions, for he implies that he was merely commander of the cavalry with Darius. At iii 23. 4, however, he describes him simply as ὁ Δαρείου χιλιάρχης. That is more accurate. The Persian official known to the Greek world as the chiliarch was the virtual head of the Persian court, second only to the king (Nepos, *Conon*. 3. 2; cf. Diod. xviii 48. 5). The title, chiliarch, seems a literal translation from the Persian **hazārapatiš* ('commander of 1,000') (cf. E. Benveniste, *Titres et noms propres en iranien ancien* (Paris 1966) 67-71), and the command of the palace guard was his original function (cf. Diod. xi 69. 1). But the chiliarch was also in charge of court protocol, managing and supervising the royal audiences, and he was clearly the most powerful figure in the king's entourage. Though primarily associated with king and court he could be detached for important missions, both military and diplomatic, as Tithraustes had been under Artaxerxes II (see Schachermeyr, *Alexander in Babylon* 31-3). Nabarzanes was clearly every inch as influential as his predecessors.

2. τῶν πεζῶν . . . ἐπιλεξάμενος 'Selecting the strongest and most agile of the infantry'. *κουφοτάτους* does not imply (as at 21. 8) that the troops were particularly lightly armed, merely that they were physically the fittest. Alexander selected the best troops from all infantry units, including phalanx battalions (cf. iii 23. 3, iv 6. 3, 28. 8 with Tarn ii 153; R. D. Milns in *Alexandre le Grand: image et réalité* 118-24).

3. ἐλθὼν δὲ κτλ. The exact itinerary is controversial. J. Marquart, *Philologus* Suppl. x (1907) 30 ff. (esp. 44 f.), made the pursuit end near Damghan, a result agreeing with the later independent investigations of A. von Stahl, *Geogr. Journ.* lxiv (1924) 322 f. G. Radet, however, followed the older view of Tomaschek and took the pursuit some 80 km further to the north-east, to the vicinity of Shahrūd (*Mélanges Glotz* ii 774 f.; cf. Brunt, *Arrian* 497).

Curt. vi 2. 15 claims that after the pursuit ended Alexander moved ahead to Hecatompylus; Diodorus apparently agrees, although with typical carelessness he makes Hecatompylus the terminus, not the starting-point, of the march to Hyrcania (Diod. 75. 1; cf. Curt. vi 4. 2). The pursuit then ended west of Hecatompylus (*pace* von Stahl, there is no indication that he doubled back to the city). Unfortunately the location of Hecatompylus is a notorious topographical crux. The ancient evidence is perplexingly inconsistent. Both Pliny and Strabo's excerpt of Eratosthenes give detailed figures for the stages of the itinerary from the Caspian Gates to India (Jacoby, *FGrH* 119 F 2, prints the versions in parallel columns). For the distance between the Gates and Hecatompylus Pliny gives 1,064 stades and Strabo 1,960. In both cases the figure coheres with the rest of the distances to India (see the table in *FGrH* ii D. 408), and there is no way of resolving the discrepancy by emendation (as attempted by Marquart 22; Kiessling, *RE* vii 2794; Brunt, *Arrian* 496). The figures of Pliny and

Strabo/Eratosthenes are fundamentally different. A third figure is given by Strabo from the Parthian historian, Apollodorus of Artemita (xi 9. 1 = *FGrH* 779 F 5): 1,260 stades from the Gates to Hecatompylus as opposed to 500 from Rhagae to the Gates. The 500 stade figure is an overestimate; the distance is c.82 km, and it looks as though Apollodorus operated with a short stade of 0.164 km or 1/10 mile (cf. Lehmann-Haupt, *RE* iii A. 1934 ff.; Brunt, *Arrian* 497, is unconvincing that the figure is merely rounded up). In that case his measurements cohere roughly with Pliny (and with Ammianus xxxiii 6. 43, who gives 1,040 stades) and suggest a distance from the Gates of 200 km. At approximately this distance is the village of Qûsheh, east of a scattering of mounds, the Shahr-i Qûmis, which von Stahl had tentatively suggested as the site of Hecatompylus. Excavations recently conducted there have unearthed not only remains of Parthian construction but also Parthian coins of the first century B.C. and an ostrakon with early Parthian script (J. Hansman, *JRAS* 1968. 111-39, esp. 116 ff., 1970. 29-62, 1974. 8-22). No other site in the area has produced remains earlier than the Islamic period (Hansman, *JRAS* 1968. 116), and there is a strong probability that the mounds of Shahr-i Qûmis are the remains of Hecatompylus.

If this is correct, Alexander's pursuit, which ended west of Hecatompylus, covered no more than 200 km. This is considerably less even than von Stahl's conservative estimate, but Curtius provides corroboration. Alexander, he says, travelled 500 stades from Khar to the scene of Darius' arrest (v 13. 6); he then covered slightly less than 500 stades to intercept the fugitive Persians (v 13. 9-11). The entire chase from Choarene to the vicinity of Hecatompylus was close to 1,000 stades and is consistent with the lower estimates of Apollodorus and Pliny.

The camp of Darius is difficult to locate. Curtius refers to it as a village (v 13. 6) and Justin xi 15. 1 names it Thara. One must look for a district with abundant water and fodder, and a possibility at least is the modern village of Lâsjerd, an oasis with abundant drinking-water, roughly equidistant between Khar and Shahr-i Qûmis.

5. κατ' οὐκείῳτῃα Bessus' relationship to Darius is mentioned again at iii 30. 4, a passage securely attributable to Ptolemy. This is hardly surprising. Bactria/Sogdiana was one of the most important satrapies of the empire and it had in the past been held by members of the Achaemenid house (Hdt. ix 113. 2; Diod. xi 69. 2—the son and brother of Xerxes). If Bessus was related by blood to Darius, it explains why he achieved the leadership of the conspirators with such little apparent effort.

6. ἕξ τινα κόμην Curtius mentions both the incidents which Arrian locates here: the report of a short cut through desert country and the reduction of the pursuing force to cavalry alone (Curt. v 13. 8-10). He

places them, however, at a substantially earlier date, just before Alexander left Thara, the place of Darius' arrest.

7. *ἐς πεντακοσίους* Curt. v 13. 8 says that these infantry numbered 300 out of a total of 6,000. He confirms that they carried their heavier infantry equipment and adds that they were called *dimachae*. This last detail is genuine and important. Pollux i 132 says that the *dimachae* were a specific innovation by Alexander, a compromise between infantry and cavalry, able to act in either function (cf. Hesych. s.v.; Diod. v 33. 5). It is possible that the effectiveness of this *ad hoc* arrangement led Alexander to form a permanent unit of *dimachae*.

8. *Νικάνορα καὶ*. Arrian's phrasing here is obscure. All that is certain is that Nicanor and Attalus, as opposed to the other infantry commanders, were left behind on foot, and we can be fairly sure that the select group of infantry who accompanied Alexander from Thara comprised largely Agrianians and hypaspists, the lightest armed and most highly trained units (cf. R. D. Milns, *Historia* xx (1971) 187–8). But Arrian, most perplexingly, speaks of two groups apart from the body of cavalry which was the spearhead of the assault. The men with Nicanor and Attalus are to follow Bessus' route with the bare minimum of equipment, while the rest of the infantry are to follow in due order. Nicanor's lightly laden men are described as *τοὺς ὑπολειφθέντας*, i.e. those left behind by Alexander's cavalry push, and it is hard to see who the rest of the infantry could be except the main body left at Khar with Craterus (21. 2). In that case Arrian's expression is misleading, for he implies that Alexander gave commands to both army groups where he was, and Craterus' group was several hundred stades in the rear with instructions of its own (R. D. Milns, *Historia* xxvii (1978) 377, suggests that the final group comprised the dismounted cavalry).

It is more likely that *τοὺς ὑπολειφθέντας* refers to a part only of the infantry with Alexander. There could have been two groups in the final pursuit, one with the bare minimum of equipment in order to intercept any fugitives (cf. Curt. v 13. 10 f.) and the other with orders to bring up the impedimenta at their own rate. It is quite impossible to say which troops were attached to which group and invalid to use the passage as evidence that the hypaspists were more lightly armed than the regular phalangites (so J. R. Hamilton, *CQ* v (1955) 218 f.).

10. *Σατιβαρζάνης* It is only Arrian who mentions the murderers of Darius; Curtius leaves them anonymous. Satibarzanes is mentioned nowhere else as an accomplice in the murder, and Schmieder suggested reading Nabarzanes here, certainly wrongly, for Satibarzanes is the *lectio difficilior*. There is a problem, however. In the immediate sequel to the murder Satibarzanes was reappointed to the satrapy of Areia (iii 25. 1–2 n.), whereas his accomplices were treated more harshly. Bessus was executed with the utmost barbarity, as apparently was Barsaentes (iii 25. 8). The fate of Nabarzanes is uncertain, but he certainly was not

employed by Alexander. Of all the regicides Satibarzanes was best treated. Arrian may be wrong that Satibarzanes did in fact have a hand in the murder (so apparently Badian, *CQ* viii (1958) 147 n. 1), or alternatively the actual assassination was not in Alexander's eyes an unpardonable crime. It was mitigated by prompt surrender.

πρὶν ὀφθῆναι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ The principal sources are unanimous that Darius was dead before Alexander reached him. There is a romantic story, reported by the vulgate sources (Plut. *Al.* 43. 3-4; Curt. v 13. 23 f.; Justin xi 15. 5-15), that a Macedonian soldier, Polystratus, found Darius on the point of death and carried his parting message to Alexander. Since Darius regularly used an interpreter (Curt. v 13. 7), this seems at the least embellished by later fantasy. According to Diodorus (73. 4), some authorities claimed that Alexander himself found Darius still alive and consoled him in his last moments, and it is this version which is built up by the Alexander Romance (Ps.-Call. ii 20. 5 ff.). The story is again highly implausible, but it was almost certainly Diodorus' source, not Diodorus himself, who referred to the variant; and it may be an early development.

22. 1. ἐν ταῖς βασιλικαῖς θήκαις For a general description of the royal tombs cut into the rocks at Persepolis and Naqš-e Rostam see E. Schmidt, *Persepolis* iii (Chicago 1970) 80 ff.

The sources are unanimous that Darius was given burial in the royal tombs (Diod. 73. 3; Justin xi 15. 16; Pliny, *NH* xxxvi 132). Darius had already begun the construction of a rock tomb on a low spur of the Mountain of Mercy to the south of the palace terrace (cf. Schmidt, *Persepolis* iii 107; pl. 76-9). It remained unfinished, its reliefs still rough outlines, and without a sepulchral compartment. Schmidt conjectures that the body was placed in the crypt of Tomb V, the supposed burial place of Artaxerxes II.

Ἀμμινάπην (Berve no. 55) Curtius agrees that Amminapes (whom he calls Minapes) was appointed satrap of Parthia/Hyrcania, but he places the appointment some time later, after the surrender of Phrataphernes, the satrap under Darius (vi 4. 25; cf. Arr. iii 23. 4). Curtius also says that Amminapes had been an exile at the court of Philip, which is not inconsistent with the high office he is said to have held in Egypt. He may have been in the entourage of Artabazus, and returned to favour after the reconquest of Egypt in 343 (Diod. xvi 52. 3 ff.).

Nothing further is heard of Amminapes, and Berve suggests that he was almost immediately replaced by Phrataphernes, who was apparently restored to his satrapy by 329 (cf. iii 28. 2). Perhaps the change of satraps came after Alexander's return from his push east from Areia. Satibarzanes had revolted and needed to be replaced (iii 25. 7). It was logical to review the appointment in the neighbouring satrapy of

Parthia/Hyrcania at the same time, and Amminapes' efficiency and loyalty may then have been found wanting.

Τληπόλεμος (Berve no. 757) Tlepolemus' position resembles that of Anaxippus in Areia (iii 25. 2) and Neiloxenus in Parapamisadae (iii 28. 4). Arrian implies that, like the ἐπίσκοποι of Egypt (cf. iii 5. 3 n.), he acted in a supervisory capacity, as an independent watchdog for the Iranian satrap (cf. Badian, *Greece and Rome* xiii (1965) 174). Like Anaxippus and Neiloxenus, he was probably in titular command of the satrapal army of Thracians (cf. v 20. 7), but that did not prevent the Iranian satrap being given military commissions in his own right (iii 28. 2, iv 7. 1, 18. 2). Tlepolemus may not have remained long in the satrapy. In 325 he was promoted to be satrap of Carmania (vi 27. 1; *Ind.* 36. 8), and there is no hint that he was still in Parthia/Hyrcania.

2. ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος . . . Ἑκατομβαιῶνος. Arrian's date has been taken as central for the chronology of both Darius' reign and the campaigns of Alexander (cf. Beloch iii² 2, 130, 318-19), and it is to some degree corroborated by the Parian Marble, which records the death of Darius as the first event of the archonship of Aristophon (*FGH* 239. B 6). It seems difficult none the less to reconcile the month Hecatombaeon, which according to Beloch coincided in 330/29 with the Julian month of July, with the progress of Alexander from Persepolis. Alexander left Persis towards the end of May (see below, iii 18. 10); subsequently he marched through Paraetacene to Media, and then diverted to pursue Darius. The pursuit from Media covered over 500 km and took Alexander over three weeks, allowing for the halts at Rhagae and Choarene (iii 20. 3-4). But the journey from Persis to Media was longer and hardly less difficult (700 km to Hamadan, of which Alexander must have covered at least 600: see iii 19. 5 n.). For much of that journey, moreover, Alexander was moving with his full bullion train and had no reason for haste. It is difficult to fit the entire journey into the bare two months which Arrian's chronology demands, and I am inclined to place Darius' death in the second Attic month, Metageitnion, some time in August 330. In that case there has been an error of conversion similar to that involved in Arrian's date for Gaugamela (cf. iii 15. 7).

22. 26. *Darius' Necrology*

The verdict on Darius is certainly Arrian's own (as Strasburger 36 saw); Kornemann's suggestion (132-3) that it is a concoction from the vulgate sources is totally unjustified. There is little original in the opinions evinced. The passage is no more than an exercise in rhetoric and is not merely historically valueless but positively misleading.

2. τὰ μὲν πολέμια . . . φρενήρει 'a man who with regard to things

military was surpassingly cowardly and irrational'. Darius' behaviour in the major battles, as portrayed by Arrian's sources, made this verdict inevitable. Cowardly he certainly appeared to be, for Ptolemy insisted that he led the flight at both Issus and Gaugamela (ii 11. 4, iii 14. 3 nn.). Arrian goes further. οὐ φρενῆρει is a very strong expression, borrowed from Herodotus' descriptions of outright lunatics such as Cambyses and Cleomenes (Hdt. iii 25. 2, 30. 1, 35. 4, v 42. 1, ix 55. 2), and Arrian implies that Darius' strategy was that of a man deranged. He must be consciously harking back to his strictures upon the strategy at Issus (ii 6. 4-6). The picture of Darius is schematic and consistent, taken directly from the officially biased accounts of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, and it is no credit to Arrian that it satisfied him. Had he delved further, he might at least have posed the question how it was that the man selected for the Persian throne on his record of personal bravery (Diod. xvii 6. 1; Justin x 3. 3-5) underwent a metamorphosis after his accession and became a chronic coward.

ὁμοῦ μὲν . . . ὁμοῦ δέ Darius' accession date is disputed, thanks to the differing regnal years given by the ancient sources (cf. Swoboda, *RE* iv 2205-6; Berve ii 117). Diodorus, however, dates his accession to the period of Philip's death (Diod. xvii 6. 2), and the most precise figures for Darius' reign give him six years and 2 months. In other words his accession should be dated to the summer of 336. Arrian is quite correct that the war had begun by that time. The advance force under Attalus and Parmenion had been sent into Asia Minor at the beginning of spring 336 (Diod. xvi 91. 2, xvii 5. 1-2), and hostilities were in full swing at the time of his accession. But until Alexander crossed the Hellespont in the spring of 334 the fighting was fairly desultory, and the advance force did little more than establish a bridgehead in the Troad (cf. Diod. xvii 7. 8-10).

3. οὐδὲ τις ἀνακωχή This statement is incorrect. Darius' first two years could be said to have been relatively successful. By the end of 335 the Macedonian expeditionary force in Asia could be said to have been contained, and that year saw a successful invasion of Egypt, which ended the insurrection which had raged there since the death of Artaxerxes III in 338 (cf. F. K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens* 109 ff.).

εὐθὺς δέ Arrian speaks as though the satrapies of Asia Minor collapsed like a pile of dominoes in the face of Alexander's advance. The only hint of resistance after Alexander's passage is the reference to the belated capture of Halicarnassus (taking up ii 5. 7). But even this statement is incorrect, for his own account reveals that Halicarnassus continued as a Persian naval base well after the battle of Issus (cf. ii 13. 4 n.). This summary well epitomizes the whole tendency of Arrian's narrative—a catalogue of effortlessly won victories.

4. ἀίχμαλωτισθεῖσαν An inelegancy stigmatized by Phrynichus as

non-Attic, although relatively frequent in *koinē* (cf. W. G. Rutherford, *The New Phrynichus* 500).

ἐν Ἀρβήλοις A remarkable lapse. When he followed Ptolemy Arrian gave a precise description of the battle site by the river Bumelus (iii 8. 7 n.), and at vi 11. 5–6 he inveighs against the common habit of locating the battle at Arbela. Yet the force of tradition is such that Arrian, once separated from his sources, slips back into the *communis error*. Nothing shows more clearly his dependence upon his immediate authorities.

6. τροφή τε... καὶ παιδείσεις Arrian had referred briefly to the maintenance of the royal children after his Issus narrative (ii 12. 3), but he mentions nothing about the education in Greek which they were given at Susa (Diod. 67. 1; Curt. v 2. 17), and which must be the παιδείσεις he here mentions. It is possible that his source digressed to give a full account of the posthumous honours accorded Darius (including the education of his children), and this gave Arrian the inspiration for his rhetorical contrast between the king's miserable life and his honourable death.

καὶ γαμβρὸς Ἀλέξανδρος This refers ahead to the mass marriage at Susa (324), when Alexander took as his second wife Stateira, the eldest daughter of Darius (vii 4. 4; cf. Plut. *Al.* 70. 3, 77. 6; Diod. 107. 6; Justin xii 10. 9; Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F 1 (4. 4)).

III 23–4. *The Campaign in the Elburz Mountains*

23. 1. ἡ Ὑρκανία χώρα Arrian concentrates upon the Hyrcanian plain, the semi-tropical jungle enclosed between the Caspian Sea and the Elburz mountains. The ancient Hyrcania extended roughly between the modern cities of Gorgān and Sari (see Kiessling, *RE* ix 454 ff.). Arrian gives the bare minimum of geographical information, mentioning no more than could be found in Hecataeus' *Periegesis* of Asia (*FGrH* 1 F 291; περὶ τὴν Ὑρκανίην θάλασσαν καλεομένην οὔρεα ὑψηλὰ καὶ δασέα ὕλησιν). His sources seem to have avoided the rapturous descriptions of fertility that are found in the other Alexander sources (cf. Onesicritus, *FGrH* 134 F 3–4; Cleitarchus, *FGrH* 137 F 14; cf. Diod. 75. 4–7; Curt. vi 4. 21–2; Strabo xi 7. 2 (508)).

τοὺς Ταπούρους The manuscript reading πάγρους is an obvious error, and can be corrected from the references below (cf. 23. 2, 7, iv 18. 2). The people whom Arrian here calls *Tapouroi* must be identical with the *Toperoi* who fought at Gaugamela with the Parthians and Hyrcanians (iii 8. 4, i 1. 4). The different nomenclature presumably reflects different sources.

The Tapurians, according to Strabo (xi 8. 8 (514); cf. xi 9. 1), were located to the east of Hyrcania; Eratosthenes, he says, located them

between Hyrcania and Arcia. Alexander, however, invaded their territory from Parthiene, and the mercenaries who had fled to the Tapurian mountains left the main Persian army at the time of Darius' arrest (iii 21. 4), that is, to the west of Hecatompylus (cf. Marquart, *Philologus* Suppl. x (1907) 50 f.). In Arrian's view, then, the Tapurians occupied the Elburz peaks as far west as the region of Choarene and the Caspian Gates, and they will have separated the two portions of Parthia and Hyrcania. Tapuria, however, formed a separate satrapy (iii 24. 3; Curt. vi 4. 24), and there must have been awkwardnesses if the communications between Parthia and Hyrcania were controlled by a totally independent satrap. Perhaps, then, Tapuria was a subdivision of Parthia/Hyrcania with an under-governor, subject to the satrap. Phrataphernes, it should be noted, had commanded the Tapurians at Gaugamela as well as his own satrapal troops. In that case Arrian once again uses the term loosely, as he did earlier in the case of Paraetacene (cf. 19. 2).

2. **τριχῆ δὴ διελὼν** Curt. vi 4. 2 agrees about the triple division, which he says took place three days' march from Hecatompylus at the borders of Hyrcania (cf. Diod. 75. 1). He supplements Arrian's information, adding that the archers and cavalry under Craterus both totalled 600. Curtius, however, says that Craterus' mission was to protect Parthiene from attack, whereas Arrian states that he was to traverse Tapuria in search of the fugitive mercenaries. The two versions can be reconciled, for, now that Bessus and his men were in flight for Bactria, the main threat to Alexander's rear came from the refugees in the Elburz (cf. Curt. vi 3. 9), and a drive through the mountains to subjugate them would also secure Parthiene.

τὴν ἐπιτομωτάτην καὶ χαλεπωτάτην There are two possible routes which Alexander could have taken. He may have moved up the road to Shahrūd, some 115 km north-east of Hecatompylus, and forked in a northerly direction over the pass of Chalchanlyan to the upper reaches of the river Neka. This, however, would have involved Erigyus in a vast detour via the modern road to Gorgān, and it seems unlikely that his slow-moving convoy could have covered the distance in time to meet Alexander at Zadracarta (23. 6). Most scholars therefore have assumed that Alexander branched off at Damghan and went north past the modern town of Chehardeh, crossing the Elburz by the Shamshirbun Pass. This will have brought him to the upper reaches of the Dorudbar, itself a tributary of the Neka, and he then only had to follow the course of the river to the Caspian shore (cf. Marquart 50; von Stahl, *Geogr. Journal* lxiv (1924) 324; P. Pédech, *REA* lx (1958) 75-7; Walbank, *Polybius* ii 237). Erigyus will then have taken the longer route via Shahrūd.

3. **τοὺς τε ὑπασπιστάς κτλ.** As in the pursuit of Darius (cf. iii 21. 2 n.) Alexander selects the fittest and best-trained men for the more difficult

work. Arrian does not imply (as Lane Fox 512 thinks) that some battalions of the phalanx were lighter-armed than others.

4. διελθὼν τὰ στενά The vulgate sources give a more vivid description of this part of the route. Alexander led his men to the watershed (*in valle qua Hyrcaniam adeunt* Curt. vi 4. 3), and passed by the amazing river Stiboetes, which broke out from the mountainside, disappeared underground for 300 stades, and finally emerged to join a second river, the Rhidagnus (Curt. vi 4. 4-7; Diod. 75. 2). The Stiboetes was first identified as the Fountain of Ali north of Damghan, which was a landmark for the Arab geographers (cf. Marquart 52-5; Weissbach, RE iiiA. 2484; Pédech, *REA* lx (1958) 76). But the Fountain of Ali is on the wrong side of the watershed, facing Parthiene not Hyrcania; and von Stahl, op. cit. 324 was surely right to identify the Stiboetes as the Dorudbar, which runs into the Neka (Curtius' Rhidagnus) and may well have gone underground for part of its course during antiquity. At all events, it looks as though the στενά mentioned here by Arrian are the upper reaches of the Dorudbar, and the camp he established will have been on the Rhidagnus/Neka, just below the confluence. At least that is what Curtius implies (vi 4. 8).

Ναβαρζάνης κτλ. Curtius disagrees over the details of the surrender. He places at this camp an overture by Nabarzanes, but an overture made by letter with the object of preparing the ground for his surrender. Alexander accordingly gave him a pledge of safe conduct (Curt. vi 4. 8-14). It was not until after the Mardian campaign that Nabarzanes surrendered formally and was pardoned, thanks in part to the entreaties of the eunuch Bagoas (Curt. vi 5. 22-3; Berve ii 269 suggests, against the evidence, that Nabarzanes was executed). As Badian has cogently observed (*CQ* viii (1958) 144-7), Curtius' account is self-consistent and there is no valid reason to reject it. Arrian by contrast is much more brief and contracted, and he places at a single point the surrenders which Curtius' more extended narrative distributes at various stages of Alexander's progress through Hyrcania. It was only Nabarzanes' original overtures which occurred at the head of the Rhidagnus valley. The fugitives from Darius' murder, who had already traversed the Elburz, will have awaited Alexander on the Caspian coast. Not being immediately involved in the murder of Darius, they could surrender without having previously acquired guarantees of safe conduct. Nabarzanes, however, needed to clarify his position immediately.

ὁ Ὑρκανίας τε καὶ Παρθυαίων σατράπης The context shows that Arrian is thinking of the position under Darius. Phrataphernes was the ex-satrap of Parthia/Hyrcania. He was not immediately reappointed, as Berve thinks (ii 26 no. 55, 400 no. 814). Compare Autophradates, who is introduced below as ὁ Ταπούρων σατράπης (23.7). Arrian states explicitly that he was immediately reappointed, and it is hard to see

why he should not have said the same about Phrataphernes, had he been restored to his former position.

5. τέσσαρας ἡμέρας Curt. vi 4. 8 agrees on the four days' rest but knows nothing of the rearguard adventure.

6. εἰς Ζαδράκαρτα The city is named Xazacerta in the *Itinerarium*, here as usual deriving from Arrian (70, 72), and the manuscript reading was probably uncertain even in antiquity. It may be identical with the *Κάρτα* mentioned by Strabo xi 7. 2 (508); but Strabo says nothing of a royal palace, locating the βασιλεῖον at a place called Tape (cf. Treidler, *RE* ixA. 2217-19). Arrian at any rate refers to it as the capital of Hyrcania (25. 1; cf. Curt. vi 5. 22), and it was the terminal point of the campaign. The present site of the city must remain conjectural, but the most promising candidate appears to be Sari, a modern provincial centre close to the river Tejan at its exit from the mountains (von Stahl 328; Treidler, *Der kl. Pauly* ii 1294).

7. Ἀρτάβαζος (Berve no. 152) Curt. vi 5. 1-5 describes the surrender and claims that nine sons were with him at the time. Of the three named by Arrian, only Cophen is known to have played any significant part, having commanded the Persian baggage train at Damascus (ii 15. 1; on Ariobarzanes see iii 18. 2 n.). Artabazus is said to have had in all eleven sons and ten daughters (Diod. xvi 52. 4). Of these we can be fairly sure that the eldest, Pharnabazus, was not present with his father, having escaped custody in Cos during 332 and presumably withdrawn to Crete (iii 2. 7 n.); and a young son, Ilioneus, had been captured at Damascus (Curt. iii 13. 13). The other nine presumably surrendered in Hyrcania as Curtius says.

Ἀυτοφραδάτης At iv 18. 2 Arrian refers to the satrap as Phradates, the form used by Curtius (iv 12. 9, vi 4. 24). The variation probably goes back to the original sources, rather than manuscript corruption. In that case the source for iv 18. 2 is probably Aristobulus.

24. 1. ἐπὶ Μάρδους The Mardi are not mentioned before the period of Alexander; Ctesias in particular had made the Tapurians the immediate neighbours of the Cadusians, omitting any reference to the Mardi (Diod. ii 2. 3 = *FGH* 688 F 1). In Eratosthenes, however, the Mardi (whom he calls Ἀμαρδοί) are placed immediately to the west of Hyrcania (Strabo xi 6. 1 (507); cf. 8. 1 (510), 8. 8 (514); Pliny, *NH* vi 36). It was presumably the campaigns of Alexander which revealed their existence to the Greek world.

Where exactly the Mardi were located is difficult to ascertain. The modern town of Āmul is thought to have derived its name from the Mardi (Andreas, *RE* i. 1733; Marquart 57-8), and, if Zadracarta is correctly identified with Sari, the area around Āmul is convenient for a campaign immediately to the west. In Alexander's day the Mardians seem to have occupied the foothills and interior valleys of the Elburz,

not impinging on the coastal plain (see below 24. 2). Their territory has been taken as far west as the Sāfid Rūd (Andreas i 1734; von Stahl 328), following the statements of Ptolemy that the Mardi were neighbours of the Cadusians and that the Cadusian boundary was the river Amardus (Ptol. vi 2. 2, 2. 5). Alexander can have gone nowhere near as far as this in his limited campaign (five days according to Curt. vi 5. 22), and probably only encountered the Mardian tribes of the extreme east.

τοὺς ἵππακοντιστάς Arrian emphasizes that the ἵππακοντισταί are a new phenomenon, and presumably Ptolemy noted that a new formation had been recently established. There is no hint of the origins of these mounted javelin men, and Berve (i 151) suggested that the unit was composed of Persian deserters. There is no suggestion in the sources that that was so. In fact, when ἵππακοντισταί are mentioned by Arrian, he groups them with regular units of the Macedonian army, the Companions and the Agrianians (iii 29. 7, iv 4. 7, vi 17. 4) with no suggestion that they had a different ethnic origin (contrast v 12. 2). Indeed ἵππακοντισταί were the nucleus of the tiny garrison of Areia (iii 25. 2, 5), and it would be strange for recent deserters to be placed in such a position of trust and power.

I think it more likely that the ἵππακοντισταί were a division of the Macedonian cavalry. In the past the Macedonians tended to use a single heavy lance (cf. i 15. 6) and the πρόδρομοι in particular seem to have been equipped with some kind of *sarisa* (i 12. 7 n.), which must have been cumbersome at times. At both the Granicus and Gaugamela the πρόδρομοι were at times at a disadvantage against the Persian cavalry (i 15. 2, iii 13. 4), and Alexander might have thought it appropriate to variegate his cavalry by including a unit with lighter weaponry. Whether or not the ἵππακοντισταί formed an entirely separate unit cannot be ascertained. It is worth noting, however, that the term πρόδρομοι does not recur after the pursuit of Darius (iii 20. 1). Instead we hear of ἵππακοντισταί and σαρισοφόροι (cf. iv 4. 6–7), and the ἵππακοντισταί seem to have performed the functions of the πρόδρομοι (cf. iii 25. 6, 20. 1). It may well be that in 330 the πρόδρομοι were divided into separate units, equipped in very different ways.

2. ἐπελθὼν δέ Arrian's account of the campaign is brief and schematic. It can be supplemented by the vulgate narrative (Curt. vi 5. 11–21; Diod. 76. 3–8; Plut. *Al.* 44. 3–5), which tell of two phases, the first a relatively easy storming of the passes into the mountains and the second the far more difficult subjugation of the mountain strongholds. The two phases are mentioned by Arrian also, but he typically concentrates on the easy and successful massacre in the lower villages and reduces to a few words the laborious work in the mountains (cf. 24. 3 with Curt. vi 5. 13–17). Most surprisingly Arrian omits the most dramatic episode of the campaign, the loss and recovery of Bucephalus. He refers to the

episode in a retrospective digression after the horse's death but dates it erroneously to the Uxian campaign (v 19. 6).

χρόνου 'For a time'. This absolute use of the genitive is rare and apparently confined to late Greek. Cf. Lucian, *Lexiph.* 19; *Dem. enc.* 36; Aelian, *NA* iv 45, v 33.

3. σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς ἐνέδοσαν It is dubious how long this surrender was effective or how many tribes submitted to Alexander's jurisdiction. The Mardi remained a problem as late as the Parthian empire, when Phraates I transplanted a number of them south of the Elburz in the vicinity of Rhagae (Isidorus of Charax, *FGrH* 781 F 2. 7).

4. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις For the problems of identity see the commentary on ii 15. 2.

τοὺς Σινωπέων κτλ. The presence of an embassy from Sinope is confirmed by Curtius (vi 5. 6), who implies that the delegates had the same fears for their safety as the Spartans. Arrian, however, says that they were released honourably, on the grounds that they had not joined the Corinthian League and as subjects of Persia had acted quite understandably in sending an embassy to their king. This is difficult. It is hardly likely that the people of Sinope sent the embassy while they were still subjects of Darius. If that had been the case, their delegates ought to have been arrested at Damascus in late 333 with the rest of the ambassadors to Darius (cf. ii 15.2 ff.). To have been still with Darius in 330 these ambassadors must have been dispatched after the battle of Issus. If so, the people of Sinope were subjects of Alexander himself. It is true that they had formed part of the Persian Empire under Darius. They had been annexed by Datames as early as 370 and formed part of the satrapy of Paphlagonia until the Macedonian conquest (Polyaenus vii 21. 2-5; Aen. Tact. 40. 4; cf. Trogus, *Prol.* x). But Paphlagonia had surrendered as early as summer 333 (ii 4. 1) and its inhabitants placed under the control of the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Sinope formed part of Paphlagonia and in Alexander's eyes will have participated in the submission. There was no possibility of his renouncing suzerainty over the cities of the Black Sea; indeed we have evidence of his support for a democracy at Amisus (App. *Mithr.* 8. 24) and attempted intervention in Heraclea (Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F 1 (4. 1)). The men of Sinope were subjects of Alexander, and their delegates to Darius in 330 were technically rebels. Presumably they had sent for assistance during the campaign of Calas in Paphlagonia, which took place some time in 332 (Curt. iv 5. 13). In that case their crime was worse than the Spartans', for Sparta had from the first rejected the Corinthian League and spurned any alliance with Macedon (Justin ix 5. 3; cf. i 1. 2, 16. 7). The Spartans were outright enemies (ii 15. 5) but hardly subjects in revolt. Yet it was the Spartan embassy not that from Sinope which Arrian says Alexander kept under arrest.

5. Καρχηδονίων Ἡρακλείδην The archetype reads *Καρχηδονίων*,

which since the seventeenth century has been universally emended to *Καλχηδονίων*, presumably because the ambassador has a Greek not a Carthaginian name. But the emendation itself causes difficulties. Nothing is known either of Heracleides (Berve no. 349) or of Calchedon during the period of Alexander. The city, however, had previously been under the sway of Byzantium (Dem. 15. 26; Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F 62) and can hardly have maintained its independence after Byzantium became a subject of Macedon (cf. i 3. 3 n.). There may have been a change of government during the Aegean War of 333/2; and a Persian-backed regime might well have approached the Great King for support. In that case Heracleides' release comes as a surprise, and one can only assume that his name was his best advocate (cf. ii 5. 9, 15. 4). On the other hand, there is nothing surprising in a Carthaginian embassy to Persia, especially after that city's involvement in the siege of Tyre (cf. ii 24. 5 n.); and as a non-Greek and a non-subject a Carthaginian ambassador would have been exempt from the penal provisions of the Corinthian League. The name Heracleides remains a problem. If we accept the manuscript reading, it is most economical to assume that we have *interpretatio Graeca* of a Punic name (cf. *IG* xiv 600—a bilingual equating Heracles with Melqart Baal).

25. *Alexander in Areia*

25. 1. *ἡμέρας πεντεκαίδεκα* It is at Zadracarta that the vulgate sources place the arrival of the Amazon Queen (Diod. 77. 1–3; Curt. vi 5. 24–32; Justin xii 3. 5–7). All these accounts mention a stay of thirteen days, which coheres well with Arrian's fifteen-day rest period. Arrian's silence about the visit of the Amazons guarantees that the episode was not mentioned by Ptolemy and Aristobulus (cf. vii 13. 3). It seems unlikely, however, that they inveighed against the story as a fabrication (as Plut. *Al* 46. 2 claims), for that would have given Arrian a peg for an excursus on the unreliability of the historical tradition (cf. vi 11. 5–8). *ὥς ἐπὶ Παρθαίους κτλ.* From Zadracarta the most direct route back to Parthia was the carriageway followed by Erigyius (23. 2). This would have brought Alexander to the main road south of the Elburz at the modern town of Shahrūd. From there the road drives due east and finally bends northwards to the crossroads at Meshed, a journey of 475 km by the modern road. Meshed itself is a relatively modern city, founded after the time of Timurlane. The old provincial centre was at Tus, some 25 km to the north-west; and it is Tus that is usually identified as Arrian's *Σουσία* (cf. Marquart 65; Kiessling, *RE* ix 459; Schachermeyr² 312 n. 358).

2. *Ἀνάξιππον* (Berve no. 72) Anaxippus' appointment is not mentioned elsewhere, and Arrian's description of his functions is far from clear. In the first place his command was tiny, a mere 40

ἱππακοντισταί; and it is hard to see how he could have acted as provost marshal during the entire march through Areia. What is more, Anaxippus remained behind after the main army had left for Bactra, and his troops were massacred by the insurgent Satibarzanes (25. 5; Diod. 78. 1). It is clear that Anaxippus was in charge of the provincial army of Areia, his position parallel to that of Tlepolemus in Parthia and Neiloxenus in Parapamisadae (cf. 22. 1). In that case his forces were absurdly small to contain Areia, a satrapy 2,000 stades from end to end (Strabo xi 10. 1 (574)); according to Curtius (vii 3. 5) Arachosia was given 4,000 foot and 600 horse. Anaxippus' forces then are too small, and his functions difficult to reconcile. He seems to have been sent as ἐπίσκοπος for Satibarzanes, and at the same time he was to establish regional control points to prevent pillage by the Macedonian army. I suspect that there is a lacuna either in the text or in Arrian's excerpting. Anaxippus was placed in charge of the satrapal army, and Alexander commissioned another officer to establish guard posts along his anticipated line of march. If the lacuna is due to textual corruption I should expect the break to have occurred after ἱππακοντιστῶν. The error, however, may have arisen through Arrian himself: a careless conflation of two different commissions (cf. iii 21. 8).

3. τὴν τε τιάραν ὀρθήν From the time of Aristophanes it was common knowledge that the king of Persia alone was privileged to wear the tall tiara or *citaris* (Arist. *Aves* 487 with scholia; cf. Xen. *Anab.* ii 5. 23; Jos. *AJ* xx 67). The Persepolis reliefs, both in the palace and on the rock tombs, show clearly the peculiarity of the royal head-dress. It is far taller than the tiaras of his subjects and tends to flare slightly towards the top (E. Schmidt, *Persepolis* i 163, pl. 105). Sometimes, as on the tomb of Darius I, the *citaris* is crowned with three-stepped crenellations (*Persepolis* iii 84, pl. 33). This tall *citaris* was jealously reserved for the king, and the king alone bestowed it to designate his successor (Plut. *Artox.* 26. 4); in the Treasury frieze at Persepolis both Darius and the crown prince Xerxes wear the tall tiara, but nobody else. The assumption of the head-dress was therefore the clearest manifestation possible of one's claim to the throne (cf. vi 29. 3; Cleitarchus, *FGrH* 137 F 5). See further, H. -W. Ritter, *Diadem und Königsherrschaft* (Vestigia VII: 1965) 6 ff.

It is not so obvious what Arrian means by *Περσικὴν στολήν*. The Persian king's principal over-garment was the *candys*, a long-sleeved, flowing robe (cf. ii 11. 5-6). On the Persepolis friezes, however, the royal *candys* is no different in appearance from that worn by the commoners (*Persepolis* i 164). Perhaps what distinguished the royal garment was not so much its cut as its colour (cf. Curt. iii 3. 17).

Ἀρτοξέρξην τε καλεῖσθαι It had become customary during the fourth century to assume a royal name on ascending the Persian throne. The first example seems to have been in 424 when Ochus, one of the

seventeen bastard sons of Artaxerxes I, overthrew his brother Sogdianus and assumed the regal title Darius (Ctesias, *FGH* 688 F 15. 48). Subsequently Artaxerxes II only assumed the royal title on ascending the throne (Ctesias F 15. 55, 16. 57; Deinon, *FGH* 690 F 14), as did his successor Artaxerxes III (Diod. xv 93. 1). It seems likely that Arses also adopted the official title Artaxerxes IV (cf. i 23. 7 n.). Bessus, then, was following sound precedent in adopting a regnal title (he should be listed as Artaxerxes V), and it seems likely that Justin was following a good tradition when he claimed that Bessus' relative and predecessor only took the name of Darius after his accession (Justin x 3. 5).

4. *ἦει ἐπὶ Βάκτρων κτλ.* 'He was on his way to Bactra, when Philip, son of Menelaus, arrived from Media'.

As at iii 9. 7 *ἴνα* is used in a strictly temporal sense; there is no suggestion that the reinforcements actually arrived at Bactra. Alexander presumably went part of the distance and then was recalled by the outbreak of Satibarzanes' revolt.

Βάκτρα is used ambiguously by Arrian. Most often it denotes the entire satrapy of Bactria, as it does in Herodotus (Hdt. vi 9. 4, ix 113. 1). The capital of the satrapy is most commonly named Zariaspa, but it had a second name Bactra, derived from the river which intersected the city (Pliny, *NH* vi 48; Curt. vii 4. 31; cf. Strabo xi 8. 9 (514), xi 11. 2 (516)). Arrian refers to the city most frequently as Zariaspa (iv 1. 5, 7. 1, 16. 6), but he also calls it unambiguously *Βάκτρα* (iii 29. 1). For that reason it is often difficult to determine whether he intends to refer to the satrapy or its capital. In the present case it makes no difference. *Νικάνωρ δέ* Curtius records the death of Nicanor at precisely this point and adds that Nicanor's brother Philotas, was left behind with 2,600 men to perform the obsequies (Curt. vi 6. 18–19). E. Badian, *TAPA* xci (1960) 329–30, regards Nicanor's death as the stimulus for Alexander's eradication of the family of Parmenion. Parmenion himself was far away in Media, and his sole surviving son was no longer in Alexander's immediate entourage. A plot could now be safely concocted to dispose of the family. There is of course no direct evidence for the suggestion, but it gains strength from the time of Nicanor's funeral, immediately after the arrival of Menelaus with the cavalry from the Median army (iii 19. 8 n.). When Nicanor died and Philotas was detached for the funeral Alexander knew that Parmenion's army in Media was denuded of Macedonian troops and comprised mostly Thracians (iii 19. 7 n.).

5. *εἰς Ἀρτακόανα* Diod. 78. 1 agrees that Satibarzanes concentrated his forces on the capital, which he calls *Χορτάκανα*. The location of Artacoana is an unsolved problem, complicated by Alexander's foundation of Alexandria in Areia, modern Herat. The old view was that Alexander resettled the old capital, Artacoana, as Alexandria, expanding it and adding a new population of Hellenes (Tomaschek,

RE ii 1304, revived by Lane Fox 280). But all the ancient sources who describe the geography of Areia mention both Artacoana and Alexandria, and imply that they were separate cities (Strabo xi 10. 1 (516); Isidorus of Charax, *FGrH* 781 F 2. 15; Pliny, *NH* vi 93 (corrupt); Ptol. vi 17. 6–7). In the light of this unanimity it is hard to see how Alexander could have resettled Artacoana as a new foundation; Curtius indeed says explicitly that its inhabitants were given full rights of occupation after the siege (vi 6. 34). It seems best to accept that there were two cities and to locate Artacoana somewhere along the Hari Rud in the vicinity of Herat. It is a large cultivated oasis and surely contained many ancient settlements (cf. V. Tscherikower, *Die hell. Städtegründungen* 102; Schachermeyr² 314).

6. καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῇ Κράτερον The vulgate sources (Diod. 78. 1–4; Curt. vi 6. 20–34) differ markedly from Arrian's account of the suppression of the Areian revolt. Diodorus and Curtius clearly tell the same story, but excerpt it in different ways, both omitting important parts of the original. The vulgate story diverges markedly with regard to the role of Craterus. Curtius knows of the division of the army at the news of the revolt (vi 6. 21), but he does not name the commander of the reserve force. Instead he mentions an assault on a citadel occupied by Areian refugees (vi 6. 23–4; Diod. 78. 3). Alexander first laid siege, but diverted to pursue Satibarzanes, leaving Craterus to invest the citadel (vi 6. 25). When he learned that Satibarzanes had too long a start, Alexander returned to storm the rock citadel (vi 6. 25–32; Diod. 78. 3). There ensued a campaign of thirty days, to subjugate the rebel strongholds. Craterus had one army division and began the siege of Artacoana, reserving the surrender of the city for Alexander's arrival in person (vi 6. 33–4). The whole is a detailed and consistent story, which may derive ultimately from eyewitnesses (so Schachermeyr² 313 n. 360, wrongly suggesting a doublet in Curtius' narrative).

Arrian's narrative is much vaguer. There is no hint of the attack upon the rock citadel. Instead Alexander goes directly to Artacoana (25. 6 *fin*) and then carries out the diversified raids in the countryside, which are mentioned by Diodorus. Either Curtius' whole narrative is romantic fiction or Arrian's source has misrepresented the progress of the campaign, erroneously placing Craterus in command of the reserves and dating the capture of Artacoana too early, at the time of the attack upon the rock citadel.

ἐν δυσὶν ἡμέραις This figure presupposes a marching rate of nearly 65 km per day, which seems suspiciously high considering that Alexander's advance force contained two battalions of phalangites. Curtius also talks of a forced march, continued over a whole night (vi 6. 21), but he says nothing of the distance covered.

7. Ἀρσάκην (Berve no. 146) Arrian is the only person to mention Arsaces' appointment at this juncture. He is to some degree confirmed

by Justin (xii 4. 12), who includes an incredibly confused note that Alexander placed over Parthia a noble Persian named Andragoras. This took place immediately before the entry into Drangiana, the very point where Arrian places Arsaces' appointment. Justin is, of course, hopelessly confused, but the confusion is interesting. There was no Andragoras appointed over Parthia by Alexander, and the name is Greek not Persian. But the Seleucid satrap of Parthia at the time of the Arsacid invasion was named Andragoras (J. Wolski, *Berytus* xii (1956/7) 42-6), and it is clearly to this context that Justin was referring, for he states that the Parthian kings derived their origins from Andragoras (!). I suggest that Justin's original, Trogus, originally mentioned the appointment of *Arsaces*, whom he claimed was the ancestor of the Arsaces who overthrew Andragoras and founded the Parthian empire. In that case we have an intermediate link in the fictitious genealogy whereby the Parthian kings claimed descent from Artaxerxes II (Syncellus 284 BC = Arrian, *Parthica* F 1). Now Arsaces was the pre-regnal name of Artaxerxes II (25. 3 n.); and the Parthians may have regarded Alexander's satrap of Areia as a descendant of Artaxerxes and ancestor of Arsaces I.

8. ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Ζαραγγαίων χώραν κτλ. Arrian is describing the old Persian district of Zranka (the name apparently means 'Sealand'; E. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* 331), which extended from the southern borders of Areia to the great system of lakes which receive the river Helmand, the main drainage system of the southern Hindu Kush. Arrian's terminology for the area varies. At iii 21. 1, 28. 1, iv 18. 3, and vii 10. 6 he refers to the inhabitants as *Δράγγαι*, whereas elsewhere he terms them *Ζαράγγαι* (vi 17. 3, 27. 3, vii 6. 3). *Ζαράγγαιοι* occurs in this passage alone. The variation must go back to Arrian's sources; in which case iii 25. 8 and iii 28. 1 derive from different authorities, for it is unlikely that either Ptolemy or Aristobulus would have changed their terminology while dealing with Alexander's stay in the area. Drangae, however, seems to be the more common Hellenistic form, used by the bematists (*FGrH* 119 F 2 (both Pliny and Strabo)), Nearchus (Strabo xv 2. 5 (721)) and the vulgate sources (Diod. 78. 4, 81. 1, 105. 7; Curt. vi 6. 36). *Ζαράγγαι* is rarer, the exact transliteration of the Akkadian, and is the older form, preferred by Herodotus (iii 93. 2, 117. 1). If we can be sure that vi 17. 3 and vi 27. 3 come from Ptolemy, we can be fairly confident that he used the rarer form, while Aristobulus used the more common Hellenistic name, *Δράγγαι*. For the two forms see R. G. Kent, *Old Persian: Grammar Texts, Lexicon* (American Oriental Series xxxiii; New Haven 1953), §88.

The palace of the *Ζαράγγαιοι* mentioned by Arrian and Diodorus (78. 4) is the ancient Phrada, whose name Alexander changed to Prophthasia, in commemoration of the trial of Philotas (Charax, *FGrH* 103 F 20; Strabo xi 8. 9 (514); xv 2. 8 (723); Pliny, *NH* vi 61; Ptol. vi

19. 4, viii 25. 2). There is no doubt that the city should be identified as the modern Farah. It is about 290 km from Herat, a distance which corresponds well to the bematists' figure of 1,592 stades (Pliny vi 61; cf. *FGrH* 119 F 2). For detailed discussion of the distances involved in the equation, see K. Fischer, *Bonner Jahrbücher* clxvii (1967) 154.

Βαρσαέντης δέ (Berve no. 205) Curtius confirms that Barsaentes fled into India before Alexander's advance. Arrian, or rather his source, gives a rare digression on the ultimate fate of Barsaentes. The regicide was not surrendered until 326, when Alexander was about to cross the Hydaspes (Curt. viii 13. 3-4).

26-7. *The Deaths of Philotas and Parmenion*

Other sources: Curt. vi 7. 1-vii 2. 38; Diod. 79-80; Plut. *Al.* 48-9; Justin xii 5. 1-8; Strabo xv 2. 10 (724). For a full analysis see F. Cauer, *Jahrb. f. class. Philologie* Suppl. xx (1894) 8-38.

Curtius is incomparably the fullest source. He presents a wealth of detail, embellished by speeches, which are highly rhetorical but nevertheless contain a very considerable substrate of historical fact. His story is largely repeated by Diodorus and Plutarch, although both accounts are much compressed and flawed by errors of contraction. Arrian differs markedly from the rest of the tradition (except Strabo). His narrative is very general, giving no details about the alleged plot, the circumstances of its discovery, and the defence of Philotas. He introduces Philotas without comment as a conspirator of long standing and treats his death as an uncontroversial execution. This brevity and categorical statement of guilt must reflect the treatment of his immediate sources, and for once Arrian explicitly names his authorities. The divergence of the sources has given rise to a rich crop of conflicting views among modern scholars. See particularly Berve ii 393-7 (no. 802), 305-6 (no. 606), E. Badian, *TAPA* xci (1960) 324-38; J. R. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 132-8; Schachermeyr² 326-36; Lane Fox 282-91; W. Heckel, *Phoenix* xxxi (1977) 9-21.

26. 1. τὴν Φιλῶτα ἐπιβουλὴν Both Ptolemy and Aristobulus claimed that Philotas conspired against Alexander. Strasburger 37 is wrong to suggest that Arrian exaggerated a more guarded statement by Ptolemy. It is clear from what Arrian says later that Ptolemy represented the failure to pass on information as conclusive proof of conspiracy (ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχοις οὐκ ἀφανέσι καὶ μάλιστα δὴ ... 26. 2). In this categorical statement Arrian is only supported by Strabo, who says baldly that Alexander eliminated Philotas, φωράσας ἐπιβουλὴν. The other sources maintain an agnostic view, except for Justin, who commiserates with Philotas and his father as innocent victims whose sole crime was

criticism of their king's departure from the traditions of Philip (xii 5. 2). In the eyes of the vulgate sources Philotas' failure to pass on information could be construed as evidence of his complicity, but that was not the only explanation (Diod. 79. 3; Plut. 49. 5). The background, which Arrian fails to mention, is as follows. A prominent Macedonian of Chalaestra named Dimnus (cf. Hamilton, *Plut. Al.* 135) had initiated a conspiracy against Alexander and revealed details of the plan to his lover, Nicomachus. Nicomachus in turn confided in his brother, Cebalinus (Berve no. 418) and urged him to reveal the plot to someone in the close entourage of Alexander. That someone proved to be Philotas, who guaranteed to communicate the news to Alexander. He did not, although he saw the king three times within two days, and Cebalinus was forced to convey his news to Alexander in person (Curt. vi 7. 2-27; cf. Diod. 79. 1-5; Plut. 49. 3-6). It is this failure to report Cebalinus' news that formed the main item in the indictment of Philotas (Arr. 26. 2; Curt. vi 9. 7 ff.; 10. 15 ff.). There are two dilemmas to resolve. Was there or was there not a plot by Dimnus? The whole business may have been fabricated by Alexander to remove the last surviving members of Parmenion's family and faction (Badian 330-2). If Dimnus was a genuine conspirator, the second dilemma arises. Was Philotas an accomplice or an innocent victim?

(i) Dimnus' guilt seems assured. All the sources which mention him state that he was conspiring against Alexander's life (Curt. vi 7. 6-13; Diod. 79. 2; Plut. 49. 3). What is more, Dimnus died when he was arrested, apparently by his own hand (Curt. vi 7. 29; Diod. 79. 6). Only if one accepts the rival, less plausible, story of Plutarch (49. 7) that he was killed resisting arrest, can one argue for a fabricated conspiracy. If Dimnus had served the king, it would be strange for him to miss his reward by suicide. What is even more conclusive is the list of fellow conspirators given by Curtius (vi 7. 15). Apart from Demetrius the Bodyguard they are obscure individuals, not otherwise attested. Amyntas, who terminates the list, cannot be the famous son of Andromenes (*pace* Badian 334 n. 30; W. Heckel, *GRBS* xvi (1975) 394 f.); it is clear from Curtius' own account that the famous Amyntas was not named in the délations of Nicomachus and Cebalinus (vii 1. 12-17) and, since Amyntas was such a common name, Berve was quite right to infer that two men named Amyntas were involved (nos. 57, 64). Now the people implicated with Dimnus did not include Philotas or any of the principal known members of the faction of Philotas. If, then, Dimnus' plot was fabricated by Alexander, it was an uncharacteristically incompetent fabrication.

(ii) The plot existed. In that case the reported behaviour of Philotas is conclusive that he had no share in it. If he had been in collusion with Dimnus, he would hardly have allowed Cebalinus to remain at liberty to accost him twice more. Better far to remove him from the royal tent

and ensure his silence by intimidation or murder. This obvious point is made by Curtius in his speech for Philotas' defence (vi 10. 20-1); but is strangely ignored by Lane Fox (286-9), who believes in Philotas' guilt as charged. We are left with the undoubted failure to report Cebalinus' news, which Philotas himself readily admitted (Curt. vi 7. 33 f.; Diod. 79. 6). The only reason possible is that Philotas, as he claimed, thought the details too trivial for serious concern. The sole conclusion therefore seems to be that of Berve, Schachermeyr, and Hamilton, that the plot was genuine, but seized upon by Alexander, abetted by Craterus, as a means to remove Philotas (cf. Curt. vi 8. 2 ff.). **καὶ πρότερον ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ** Arrian is the only source to mention this supposed earlier report of conspiracy, but two episodes shed light on the allegation.

(i) Plutarch (*Al.* 48. 4 ff.; *de Al. f.* ii 7 (339 E-F)) tells the story of Philotas' mistress, Antigone, who was suborned by Craterus to report his utterances. He reports only criticism; there is no suggestion that charges of conspiracy were made. At all events Antigone had been captured at Damascus and may well have been channelling information by the time of the Egyptian campaign.

(ii) When under torture Philotas described the origins of his alleged plot, and claimed that he and his father seriously discussed removing Alexander after the visit to Ammon (Curt. vi 11. 22 ff.). This was a confession elicited under extreme duress and can have little truth; but Philotas did apparently admit disloyalty as early as the stay in Egypt. 2. **εἰσαχθῆναι εἰς Μακεδόνας** The trial by the Macedonian army is well attested (Curt. vi 8. 23 ff.; Diod. 79. 6-80. 1); of the major sources only Plutarch omits it, diverted by the more sensational episode of the torture of Philotas (49. 11-12). The practice of trial and sentence by the army in capital cases is said to have been an age-old Macedonian custom (Curt. vi 8. 25), and this right of trial was preserved jealously as late as the reign of Philip V (Polybius v 27. 5; cf. A. Aymard, *Études d'Histoire ancienne* 156 f; *contra* R. Lock, *C. Phil.* lxxii (1977) 91-107; R. M. Errington, *Chiron* viii (1978) 83-91). As one would expect, the procedure was rudimentary and informal. There was a formal accusation, presentation of witnesses, formal defence, and verdict. Senior officers might speak (Curt. vi 9. 28, vi 11. 1-7), but there seems to have been nothing in the way of cross-examination of witnesses. Verdicts were apparently given by acclamation, and the assembly could be influenced strongly by emotions alien to the case (cf. vii 2. 7-8); and the royal bodyguard apparently acted to some extent as cheer leaders (vi 11. 8). In that case it is hardly surprising that Philotas was condemned. The assembly was faced immediately with Dimnus' dead body (vi 8. 26) and the thunderbolt of Alexander's accusation, backed up by detailed evidence from Nicomachus, Cebalinus, and Metron (vi 9. 7), and highly coloured speeches from Amyntas and Bolon attacking

the accused. It is hardly surprising that the assembly was worked up to demand Philotas' death (so Badian 352).

Arrian's schematic description of the trial agrees with Curtius' immensely more detailed account, except that he places the deposition of evidence after rather than before the defence (cf. Curt. vi 9. 7). That is probably due to Ptolemy's presentation, which clearly placed the emphasis on the evidence, which he claimed proved Philotas' guilt.

ἄλλοις τε ἐλέγχους . . . καὶ μάλιστα δὴ Arrian's language is emphatic, and it is clear that Ptolemy presented Philotas' failure to give information as the clinching proof of his guilt. There can have been no other information of substance (Badian 331 n. 21; Hamilton 134). Once more Curtius corroborates and expands the bare skeleton of Ptolemy/Arrian. Cf. Curt. vi 8. 10 *nec ceteri dubitabant quin coniurationis indicium suppressurus non fuisset, nisi auctor aut particeps*.

καίτοι . . . φοιτῶν According to Curtius Philotas was twice approached by Cebalinus on successive days and failed to pass on his information (vi 7. 16-21; so Diod. 79. 3-4; Plut. 49. 5). Arrian has made the charge more indefinite. Philotas had access to the king twice a day (δύς . . . ὁσημέραι), yet failed to inform him.

3. κατακοντισθῆναι κτλ. Diod. 80. 2 says that the condemned were executed κατὰ τὸ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἔθος and does not specify what that custom was. Curtius, however, says that they were stoned to death, the mode of execution later used upon the Pages (vi 11. 10 *Macedonum more obrui saxis*; 11. 38; cf. Arr. iv 14. 3). After the execution of Philotas came that of Alexander the Lyncestian, who, Curtius says, was indeed run through by javelins (vii 1. 7). The execution of the Lyncestian is omitted by Ptolemy/Arrian, but it clearly lingered in Ptolemy's mind strongly enough for him to transfer the mode of execution to Philotas and his alleged associates.

The other sources are in agreement that the fellow-conspirators of Dimnus named by Cebalinus were executed with Philotas (Curt. vi 11. 38; Diod. 80. 2). Only Arrian/Ptolemy describes them as *Philotas'* accomplices. These other accused persons presumably are those initially mentioned by Nicomachus (Curt. vi 7. 15, 9. 5). The only problem is whether Demetrius the Bodyguard was dealt with now or later (cf. 27. 5 fin.).

ἐπὶ Παρμενίωνα For the story of Parmenion's death, see Curt. vii 2. 11-32; Diod. 80. 3; Strabo xv 2. 10 (724); Plut. *Al.* 49. 13. There can be no doubt that Parmenion was killed on the initiative of the king without formal condemnation by the army assembly. Even Strabo, who says that Parmenion was an accomplice of the conspiracy (κοινωνὸν τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς), makes Alexander alone the agent. It is true that Diod. 80. 1 speaks as though Parmenion was formally condemned, and Curtius himself implies so (vi 11. 39), although there is no hint of his condemnation in the actual report of the trial of Philotas. Indeed

condemnation is excluded by the letter of Alexander to the Median army (Curt. vii 2. 30), which accused Parmenion of treason but said nothing of a death sentence.

Πολυδάμαντα (Berve no. 648) The story of Polydamas' epic dash across the Dasht-i Lut is told more fully by the other sources (Curt. vii 2. 11 ff.; Diod. 80. 3; Strabo xv 2. 10). Alexander had apparently taken hostages to ensure his compliance (Curt. vii 2. 14); so that Badian's verdict upon him ('the despicable Polydamas' *JHS* lxxxi (1961) 22 n. 39) is a little harsh. There is, however, no reason to think (with Lane Fox 285-6) that he was ignorant of the contents of the letters he bore. **οὗτοι γάρ . . . τεταγμένοι ἦσαν** C. A. Robinson, *AHR* lxxii (1957) 334, infers from this passage that Parmenion had already been deposed and replaced by a junta of generals. That is contrary to the explicit evidence of Curtius (vi 9. 22), and it is not the obvious interpretation of Arrian. All he need imply is that Cleander and company were (under-)generals of the army which Parmenion commanded.

4. ἐν τοσαύτῃ . . . ἐξηγείτο 'enjoying such great distinction with Alexander himself and in the eyes of the rest of the army, not only the Macedonians but also the other foreign troops whom he often used to command with great popularity in and beyond the call of duty on the orders of Alexander'.

For the rare phrase *καὶ ἐν μέρει καὶ παρὰ τὸ μέρος* see Xen. *Anab.* vii 6. 36.

Parmenion's popularity with the army is well attested. The immediate reaction to his death was near mutiny, the demand for the execution of the assassins only stopped by the reading of letters from Alexander himself (Curt. vii 2. 28 ff.). These troops were in all probability not Macedonian but Thracian (cf. iii 19. 7 n.). Among the Macedonians themselves there was trouble. Alexander was forced to form a separate punitive unit, the *ἀτάκτων τάγμα*, for critics of his actions (Curt. vii 2. 35-8; Diod. 80. 4; Justin xii 5. 5-8; cf. Badian 335; Schachermeyr² 333). Disaffection probably also spread to the allied troops; the last Thessalian volunteers were demobilized a few months later at the Oxus (iii 29. 5), perhaps because of discontent at Parmenion's elimination.

27. 1. λέγουσι κτλ Cf. Introduction p. 21.

ὑπαχθῆναι ἐς κρίσιν Curt. vii 1. 10 ff. gives a fuller version of the trial and in particular of the charges laid against the brothers. Apart from the flight of Polemon and the known intimacy with Philotas (vii 1. 10) they were trivial; a conversation with Philotas the day before his arrest (vii 1. 13), an angry exchange with the cavalry quartermaster, Antiphanes (vii 1. 15 f.), and letters of warning from Olympias, who interestingly had a grudge against Amyntas for his over-zealous recruiting in Macedonia (vii 1. 12, 37-40). It is clear from both authors

that the most damning item was the flight of Polemon, which all treated as *prima facie* evidence of guilt (cf. Curt. vii 2. 6). Otherwise charges might not have been formally laid.

2. **Ξυλληφθέντος Φιλώτα** According to Curtius (vii 1. 10) Polemon fled when he learned that Philotas was under torture, that is, in the immediate aftermath of his condemnation. That is precisely the time Curtius claims that there was a general flight of prominent Macedonians, who feared the Macedonian law that relatives of a condemned traitor should also be executed (vi 11. 20). Curtius refers to the law later during the conspiracy of the Pages (viii 6. 28), and it is surely authentic (whether it should be described as 'law' or 'custom' (Tarn ii 270 f.; Lane Fox 533) is immaterial; in Macedon there may have been no clear distinction). But the law does not explain the mass flight at the time of the *torture*. Then it was not Philotas' relatives but his friends who had grounds for fear. Philotas might be forced to admit or invent stories of complicity.

ἀπολογησάμενος . . . καρτερῶς Curt. vii 1. 18–44 places a long and dramatic speech in the mouth of Amyntas.

ἡξίωσεν ἐφεθῆναι οἱ Curtius makes Polemon return of his own accord and secure the acquittal of all the brothers by a dramatic appeal (vii 2. 1–10). Berve (no. 644) dismisses the story as rhetorical invention, but it is hardly more dramatic than Arrian's picture of Amyntas searching out his delinquent brother. Polemon was an enemy of Ptolemy (Arr. *Succ.* F 24; cf. iii 11. 9 n.), and Ptolemy perhaps gave the story a malicious twist. Instead of Polemon winning his brothers' salvation he owed his own life to Amyntas. Cf. Bosworth, in *Alexandre le Grand : image et réalité* 12–14.

3. **ἐτελεύτησεν** The date of Amyntas' death is not known. His brother, Attalus, became a phalanx battalion commander some time before the march on India (cf. iv 22. 1, 24. 1, etc.), and it is tempting to suppose that he succeeded to his brother's command. Attalus continued to enjoy high favour, perhaps because of his marriage with the sister of Perdiccas (Diod. xviii 37. 2; cf. Badian 335), but nothing is heard of the other two brothers during Alexander's reign. Perhaps they were too young. Polemon at any rate is described as *iuuenis* . . . *primo aetatis flore pubescens* (Curt. vii 2. 4), and it would have been some years before he reached an age suitable for high command.

4. **ἱπάρχας δύο** The cavalry was divided for political reasons (Arrian's wording recalls his account of the deposition of Alexander the Lyncestian; cf. i 25. 5) and the two commanders are an interesting contrast. Cleitus had commanded the *ἑλθ βασιλική* since the beginning of the campaign and had won his laurels in Philip's reign (cf. i 15. 8 n.). Hephaestion owed his promotion to Alexander alone and seems to have held no previous command of importance (i 12. 1, ii 12. 6 nn.). He had

been a principal agent in both the arrest and torture of Philotas (Curt. vi 8. 17, 11. 11; Plut. *Al.* 49. 12; cf. Heckel, *Phoenix* xxxi (1977) 18 f.), whereas Cleitus was probably far to the west, leading Macedonian infantry from Media (cf. iii 19. 8 n.). As an old soldier of Philip Cleitus gave the appearance of continuity of command and counteracted the unpopularity of Hephaestian's promotion (so Badian 336).

Arrian implies that each commander had authority over half the Companions, but there is no evidence how the divided command worked. There is an added problem in that Arrian from 329 onwards refers to hipparchies as regular units of the cavalry (cf. iii 29. 7 n.), and on the first two occasions (iii 29. 7, iv 4. 7) he mentions contingents of *three* hipparchies of Companions. Since only two hipparchs are named by Arrian, Brunt (*JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 28 f.) has argued that all references to hipparchies before the murder of Cleitus at Maracanda are anachronistic. But the first record of hipparchies (iii 29. 7) comes in a passage directly attributable to Ptolemy, who referred consistently to cavalry *ilai* during the earlier part of the campaign and had no apparent reason to misdate the new nomenclature. It is better not to lay technical emphasis on Arrian's use of *ἵππαρχης*. The word is used very generally, applied to commanders of the Thessalian cavalry (i 25. 2), allied cavalry (iii 6. 6), and a commander of a squadron of mercenary cavalry (iv 5. 7; cf. 3. 7). Arrian need not have taken the term directly from his source, and in any case it seems quite possible that the Companion cavalry in 330/29 were divided into a number of hipparchies, each with its own commander, but with the over-all command invested in two marshals. After Cleitus' murder the hipparchy commanders may have been left as equals with no hierarchical superior.

πάλαι μὲν Ἀριάσπας κτλ. The encounter with the Ariaspans is widely reported by the Alexander sources, Diod. 81. 1-2; Curt. vii 3. 1-3; Justin. xii 5. 9; Metz Epitome 4; Strabo xv 2. 10 (724). The vulgate sources term the people *Ἀριμασποί*, perhaps through confusion with the fabulous Scythians said to have been discovered by Aristaeas of Proconnesus (Hdt. iv 13. 1-2, etc.). There is little doubt about their location. Arr. iv 6. 6 says that the river Etymandrus ran through their territory, and that river is certainly the modern Helmand. Diod. 81. 2 adds that the Gedrosians were contiguous with them. In that case the Ariaspans lived in modern Sīstān to the south of the complex of fresh-water lakes into which the Helmand drains (cf. G. Gnoli, *Recherche storiche sul Sīstān antico* (Rome 1967) 50). Alexander must therefore have turned south from Prophthasia/Farah and travelled some 200 km to the Sīstān lakes. It was a considerable divergence from the direct road from Farah to Kandahar, and one must assume that Alexander was worried enough by the Areian revolt to settle the area thoroughly in person. Perhaps, too, provisioning was a relevant factor. Sīstān was a

famous granary in the Arab period with a very considerable winter harvest (cf. *Cambridge History of Iran* i 80).

The services of the Ariasprians to Cyrus are described more fully by the vulgate sources. The Persian army had been overcome by cold and famine, and were reduced to cannibalism by the time the Ariasprians providentially appeared with a prodigious quantity of grain (Diod. 81. 1-2).

5. οὐ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους . . . πολιτεύοντας The civic peculiarities of the Ariasprians are not stated. F. W. Thomas, *JRAS* 1906. 180 ff. (esp. 196), argued that the Saca invasion which gave the area of the Helmand lakes its ancient name Sakastanē had already taken place by the time of Cyrus. The Ariasprians, then, formed an alien enclave of Saca culture in a sea of Iranian peoples. The theory has been widely accepted (see, most recently, Lane Fox 533) but it is based on serious misinterpretation of the ancient evidence and cannot be sustained (cf. Gnoli, op. cit. 47 ff.; P. Daffina, *L'Immigrazione dei Sakā nella Drangiana* (Rome 1967), 83-6). It seems that the irruption of the Sacae cannot be dated earlier than the time of Phraates II (c. 128 B.C.).

It is more likely that Arrian's statement relates to Zoroastrian tradition. The Helmand lakes were a particularly sacred place, associated with the rebirth of Zarathuštra (E. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* 331-2), and there was a tradition that the Ariasprians received their laws from the prophet himself (Diod. i 94. 2, with the *lectio difficilior* 'Αριασποῦς cf. Gnoli 59 f.). It may well have been a local tradition, which Alexander believed.

ἐλευθέρους τε ἀφῆκεν Both Diodorus and Curtius claim that the Ariasprians were placed under a governor (Amedines: Curt. vii 3. 4; Tiridates: Diod. 81. 2). Berve (ii 25, 375) supposes that he was a native, placed over his fellows so as not to impair their autonomy. This, however, implies that Alexander's grant of liberty had real content, which was not the case. The Lydians had also been granted their liberty (cf. i 17. 4), but they were none the less subject to a satrap and paid tribute.

Δημήτριον κτλ. Arrian implies that Demetrius was only arrested in Ariasprian territory, more than a week after the trial of Philotas. Curtius, however, says that he was implicated with Philotas (vi 7. 15, 9. 5) and claims that he actually stood trial at Prophthasia (vi 11. 35-8). Curtius has been regarded as at best mistaken (Berve no. 260; Badian 334 n. 30; Heckel, *Phoenix* xxxi (1977) 22) but his account is very circumstantial. Can we presume that Arrian is strictly accurate? As far as the appointment of Ptolemy to the post of Bodyguard goes, we can be sure that he is correct, for the source for the episode was Ptolemy himself. The reference to the arrest of Demetrius is not so clear-cut. Ptolemy could have explained that a gap had been made in the ranks of the Bodyguard by the arrest of Demetrius at *Prophthasia*, which he

filled a few weeks later. Arrian is often careless, and he could have missed a retrospective reference of this nature.

28. *The Passage of the Hindu Kush*

28. 1 Δράγγας τε καὶ Γαδρωσούς This passage is resumptive. It begins with Alexander's departure from Prophthasia and very briefly takes Alexander as far as Parapamisadae. The vulgate sources give a more detailed itinerary: Alexander settled Drangiana on the journey between Prophthasia and the Ariaspian's country (Strabo xv 2. 10 (724) confirms that Alexander reached the Euergetae only after passing through Drangiana), and during his stay with the Ariaspian's received the Gedrosian embassy of submission. Then he moved on to Arachosia (Curt. vii 3. 1-5; Diod. 81. 1-2; Justin xii 5. 9). Arrian gives a briefer account of the same events, but omits the Ariaspian's whom he had mentioned in the previous chapter. It seems clear that he has changed sources, and the use of the term Δράγγαι instead of Ζαράγγαι indicates that he has switched to Aristobulus (cf. iii 25. 8 n.).

The Drangians were placed under a satrap of Iranian stock. This appointment is mentioned in passing by Curtius (vii 3. 1), but the text is deeply corrupt and unhelpful. The country, however, must have been separated from Arachosia. At viii 3. 17 Curtius mentions a commission to Stasanor, the incumbent satrap of Arcia, to remove the satrap of Drangiana and take over the administration of the area. Once more the text is uncertain, but the absorption of Drangiana is confirmed by a passage exactly parallel in Arrian (iv 18. 3). Until 328/7 Drangiana formed a satrapy separate from both Arcia and Arachosia. Alexander obviously thought it unsafe to retain the old composite satrapy of Drangiana/Arachosia in the hands of a single governor, held as it had been by the regicide Barsaentes (iii 21. 1). Drangiana was therefore placed in the hands of an Iranian, Arsames, and Arachosia was governed by a Macedonian.

The Gedrosians, situated in the modern Makran (cf. vi 22. 1 ff.), had apparently been independent under the Achaemenids or at best associated with Arachosia (cf. E. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* 334-6). An embassy of submission, probably from the peoples immediately south of the river Helmand, approached Alexander in Ariaspian territory, and for the moment he placed them under the same government as the Ariaspian's (Diod. 81. 2), reserving their definitive settlement for a later decision (cf. vi 27. 1).

τοὺς Ἀραχωίτας Arachosia of the Alexander sources was the old Achaemenid satrapy of Harauvatiš, the name apparently derived from the river name, *Sárasvatī* (E. Herzfeld, *The Persian Empire* 332-4). The core of the satrapy was the river Helmand (Etymandrus), which provided a strip of fertile and well-watered land as far as the lakes of

Sīstān. The satrapy provided access to the mountains of the Hindu Kush and the crossroads to Bactria and India.

The precise route taken by Alexander is difficult to identify. The issue is complicated by the conflicting figures given by the bematists and by the obscure problem of the foundation of Alexandria in Arachosia.

(i) The bematists' figures are given directly by Pliny and indirectly (via Eratosthenes) by Strabo (cf. iii 21. 3 n.).

	<i>Strabo</i>	<i>Pliny</i>
Prophthasia– Arachosian town	4,120 stades	565 miles (4,520 stades)
Arachosian town– Ortospana (Kabul)	2,000 stades	175 miles (1,400 stades)
Total: Prophthasia– Ortospana	6,120 stades	740 miles (5,920 stades)

The two versions agree roughly about the over-all distance, but Pliny appears to place the Arachosian town some distance east of the location in Strabo. But neither source can be reconciled with the direct distance by the modern road from Prophthasia (Farah) to Kabul, a distance of about 880 km, no more than 4,500 ancient stades. The measurements in both authors seem to presuppose a considerable southward turn between Prophthasia/Farah and the Arachosian town (cf. J. Markwart, *Wehrot und Arang* 172). There are still problems, however. Alexander's southern swing down to the lakes and back up the Arghandab valley is estimated at 810 km (K. Fischer, *Bonner Jahrbücher* clxvii (1967) 195–9), which corresponds nicely to Strabo's figure of 4,120 stades, and presupposes an identification of the Arachosian town with modern Kandahar. But the distance from Kandahar to Kabul is another 515 km, a figure which can be reconciled neither with Strabo nor with Pliny. If we accept the bematists' figures and the general picture they imply of the relative distances, there seems no alternative to placing the Arachosian town well to the north-east of Kandahar (cf. Fischer 199 for other alternatives).

(ii) The foundation of Alexandria in Arachosia is first attested by Isidorus of Charax (*FGH* 781 F 2. 19) and very rarely thereafter (Ptol. vi 20. 4; Steph. Byz. s.v. 'Αλ. no. 12). The bematists and Eratosthenes apparently chose the Arachosian town as the terminus for their measurements, and it is certain that Alexandria had not as yet eclipsed it in importance. Now the chief Hellenistic centre in Arachosia was undoubtedly Kandahar, the provenance of the Greek texts of the Rock Edicts of Aśoka (cf. Sir M. Wheeler, *Flames over Persepolis* 65–9), and it seems by far the most likely site for Alexandria (see also the exhaustive discussion of Fischer 132 ff. on the importance of Kandahar as a centre

of communications). But, even granted the identification of Kandahar and Alexandria, nothing compels us to go further and identify Alexandria with the Arachosian town of the bematists (so Brunt, *Arrian* 502 f.). The old capital may have been totally distinct, located to the north-east near Ghazni.

διὰ χιόνος τε πολλῆς Arrian implies that Alexander's march was plagued by snow from Drangiana to the borders of Parapamisadae and Arachosia. The time of year when such conditions are most likely to have obtained is January/February (Schachermeyr² 317 n. 369). This presents a major crux. Strabo xv 2. 10 (724-5) gives the same itinerary as Arrian with similar details of the mountain flora of the Hindu Kush; and it is usually considered that his source was Aristobulus (Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 515; Schachermeyr² 316 n. 367). Unfortunately Strabo says explicitly that Alexander passed through Parapamisadae at the time of the setting of the Pleiades (6 November 330) and spent the winter (διαχειμάσας) near his new foundation of *Alexandria in Caucaso*. This is quite impossible to reconcile with our accounts of Alexander's march since the death of Darius. From Hecatompylus his army had covered over 2,400 km, and there had been lengthy diversions. Even if we place the death of Darius as early as the beginning of July (cf. iii 22. 2 n.), four months is too little time to accommodate the diversions, let alone the basic marching. It seems better to suppose that Strabo's source was referring to the *evening* setting of the Pleiades in late March or early April, 329 B.C. (Tom B. Jones, *Cl. Weekly* xxviii (1935) 124 f.; Hamilton *Plut. Al.* 98-9). In that case all we need suppose is that Alexander paused near Begram to see out the winter; there would be a wait of at least a month before the passes even on the south side of the Hindu Kush became clear (Schachermeyr² 337 n. 394; cf. Lane Fox 295).

2. αἰθῆς ἀφ'εστάναι Further details of the second Areian revolt together with a more precise chronology are given by the vulgate sources. News of Satibarzanes' return was brought to Alexander in Ariaspian territory (Diod. 81. 3; Curt. vii 3. 2), and the report of the crushing of the insurrection reached him at Bactra in early summer (Diod. 83. 4-6; Curt. vii 4. 32-8).

Ἀρτάβαζον κτλ. Curtius agrees on the command of the expedition and adds the name of Andronicus (vii 3. 3). That is probable enough. The force comprised mercenaries (Curtius, loc. cit.), and Andronicus had been given command of the 1,500 survivors of Darius' army who surrendered in Hyrcania (cf. iii 24. 5). Phrataphernes' role is mentioned by Arrian alone, and no source says that he actually participated in the fighting. We must assume that he was given orders by letter to invade Areia from the north (cf. iii 22. 1 n.).

4. πόλιν ἔκτισε The site of *Alexandria in Caucaso* has not been directly confirmed by excavation, but the sources leave little doubt about its approximate location. It lay close to the northern passes from

Parapamisadae to Bactria (Pliny, *NH* vi 62 = *FGrH* 119 F 2a; Curt. vii 3. 23; Strabo xv 2. 10 (725)). Diod. 83. 1 sites it explicitly by 'the pass leading to Media'—an obscure expression, which at least suggests the pass leading first to Bactra and thence directly to Alexandria/Herat and the Caspian Gates. These indications point strongly to the vicinity of Begram, at the confluence of the rivers Gorband and Panjshir. Traces of a fortress have been discovered at the confluence itself (the mound of Borj-i 'Abdullah), and there are Hellenistic remains immediately to the south (R. Ghirshman, *Bégram* (Cairo 1946) 1–12). The site commands the main routes across the Hindu Kush—the Shibar Pass to the west and the Khawak Pass to the east (cf. Schachermeyr² 676–81); and its strategic importance is evident.

The vulgate sources and Arrian himself (cf. iv 22. 5) provide supplementary details of the process of foundation. Alexander settled 7,000 locals together with 3,000 soldiers unfit for service and volunteers from the mercenaries (Diod. 83. 2; Curt. vii 3. 23). We have no idea what element of compulsion existed, but Diodorus' emphasis that the mercenaries were volunteers implies that the rest had little choice. The city seems to have been under the direct control of an official appointed by the king; on his return in 327 Alexander dismissed the incumbent ὑπαρχος, replacing him with Nicanor, a Companion (Berve no. 556). ὑπερέβαλε τὸ ὄρος The pass used can only be guessed at. The main route of antiquity led through the Shibar Pass to the Bāmyān valley and then across the higher Ak-Robat Pass (3,060 m) down towards Balkh. This may have been Alexander's route (cf. Schachermeyr², pl. 21–3, for the terrain); but Bessus was known to be destroying fodder (cf. 28. 8 below), and Alexander probably took one of the less frequented passes to the east, perhaps the Khāwak Pass (A. Foucher, *La Vieille Route de l'Inde de Bactres à Taxila* (Paris 1942) i 20 ff.; Schachermeyr² 336 f.).

5. μακρὸν γὰρ ὄρος κτλ. Arrian repeats his observation at greater length at v 5. 2–3 and at *Ind.* 2. 2, where he mentions some local names: Parapamisus, Emodus, and Imaus. In both later passages Arrian states that the name Caucasus was first applied to the Hindu Kush by Alexander's men, an act of flattery known to have been criticized by Eratosthenes (v 3. 1–4; cf. Strabo xi 5. 5 (505), xv 1. 8 (688)). The present passage is an independent observation, which interrupts the extract from Aristobulus dealing with the sparse vegetation of the Hindu Kush. It may indeed be a piece of late editing. At v 5. 3 Arrian refers back apologetically to the earlier passage, justifying his use of the term Caucasus. In the context he is retailing Eratosthenes' criticisms of the promiscuous use of the name Caucasus, and he no doubt realized that in his earlier discussion he had wrongly adopted the term from Aristobulus to refer to the Hindu Kush. He accordingly inserted a sentence, a précis of his later discussion, to prove that he knew the

distinction between the eastern and western Caucasus. The modification must have been added at a late stage; otherwise it is hard to envisage Arrian breaking the flow of his narrative so abruptly.

6. *τέρμινθοι . . . καὶ σίλφιον* Strabo xv 2. 10 (725) mentions the same flora, and his source is supposed to have been Aristobulus (cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* ii D. 515). But there are differences in presentation. For Arrian and Aristobulus the interest of the plant is merely as a botanical curiosity, a parallel to the silphium of Cyrene. Strabo, however, only mentions the silphium in the context of hardship suffered by Alexander's army. Food was so scarce that they were forced to kill the draught animals for food (so Curt. vii 4. 25), and because of the dearth of wood the meat had to be eaten raw, marinated in silphium juice.

Theophrastus gives more detailed descriptions of the plants in question, and he makes it clear that they differed botanically from the Mediterranean terebinth and silphium. The 'terebinth' was characterized by its sweet almond-like nuts (*HP* iv 4. 7) and it is identified with the pistachio tree, *pistacia vera*, which is reasonably common in the area (cf. H. Bretzl, *Botanische Forschungen des Alexanderzuges* (Leipzig 1903) 245 f.). As for the silphium, he assimilates it with the less pungent *μάγδυρις*, which grew around Syria (*HP* vi 3. 7; cf. Pliny, *NH* xix 46). This cannot be anything other than asafoetida, which burgeons on the slopes of the Hindu Kush in spring (Foucher, *La Vieille Route* i 26). Although its use is well attested medicinally, its effect as a marinade cannot have been pleasant. The juice has a strong alliaceous odour, which is said to justify the plant's German name: *Teufelsdröck*.

τό τε ἄνθος ἐπινέμεται See further Theophrastus, *HP* vi 3. 1.

7. *πολλοῦ ἄξιον* Arrian speaks as though silphium were still a booming export of Cyrene (so *Ind.* 43. 13). But Strabo had commented that the plant was virtually extinct (xvii 3. 22 (837)), and by Pliny's day the plant was a distant memory, its juice replaced by inferior substitutes from the east (*NH* xix 38). Interestingly, the very reason Pliny gives for its disappearance is ruthless over-grazing by the *publicani* who leased the pasture land.

8. *ἔφθειρε τὴν ὁπὸ τῷ ὄρει* This was the strategy proposed by Darius at Ecbatana (iii 19. 1). There is no indication how widespread Bessus' devastation was, but it is a fair assumption that he concentrated on the principal route through the Shībar Pass. Alexander seems to have caught Bessus by surprise (28. 9), and presumably he crossed the peaks by a subsidiary pass, most probably the Khāwak (cf. 28. 4 n.).

9. *διαβὰς τὸν Ὄξον* (Curt. vii 4. 20-1). The crossing of the Oxus according to the vulgate sources was not a panic decision but formally discussed at a council of war (Curt. vii 4. 1 ff.; Diod. 83. 7). It has been suggested that Bessus was ill advised to retreat instead of attacking Alexander's forces while they were still weak from the crossing of the mountain (Schachermeyr² 339 f.; Lane Fox 297). This is somewhat

unfair to Bessus. His forces were not enormous, and the morale of the Bactrian cavalry may have been suffering from the defeat of Satibarzanes at the hands of a small portion of Alexander's army. Now he was faced with the entire Macedonian army, refreshed by over a month's stay in permanent quarters in the Kabul valley.

ἐς Ναύτακα Probably the modern Shakhrisyabz, the old home and winter palace of Timurlane (von Schwarz 74 f.). It was centrally placed in Sogdiana, an ideal headquarters for assembling an army. Alexander was to stay there over the winter of 328/7 (cf. iv 18. 2).

29–30. *Alexander in Bactria and Sogdiana. The Capture of Bessus*

29. 1. ἐς Δράψακα The city is mentioned by Strabo xv 2. 10 (725) as the terminal point of the journey through the Hindu Kush (although he names it "Ἀδραψα), and at xi 11. 2 (576) it is listed as the second city of Bactria. It is most plausibly identified as the modern Kunduz (von Schwarz 28).

Ἄορνον The name does not occur elsewhere, but Arrian's account makes it quite clear that it was the principal citadel of Bactria, important enough to have a Companion as its commandant (Berve no. 157). Von Schwarz was probably right (27–8) to identify it as the modern town of Khulm, a prominent strongpoint at the head of the valley leading to the Salang Pass.

Aornus was not the only Bactrian citadel placed under a permanent Macedonian garrison. We hear of another phrurarch, Attinas, who commanded an unknown garrison with troops including 300 cavalry (Curt. viii 1. 3–5; Arr. iv 16. 4–5).

Ἀρτάβαζον Cf. Curt. vii 5. 1.

2. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸν Ὄξον ποταμόν. This is the invariable spelling in the *codex Vindobonensis*, found also in Polybius x 48. 1 ff. Other authors have the form Ὀξος. The name itself occurs first in the Alexander historians. Previous writers, perhaps including Callisthenes (*FGrH* 124 F 38), had referred to the river as the Araxes and had occasionally conflated it with the Armenian Araxes (Hdt. i 202. 3; cf. A. Herrmann, *RE* xviii 2006 ff.). The name Oxus seems originally to have applied to the western tributary stream originating in the Hindu Kush, which has been called Waxš since Abbasid times (the modern Schachdarya); cf. J. Markwart, *Wehrot und Arang* 31 ff. Alexander's men applied it to the whole course of the Amu-Darya.

Arrian gives no details of the march from Bactra. They are supplied by Curtius, who tells of a 400-stade death-march through waterless country and hot sun, the army being thoroughly unprepared for the ordeal (Curt. vii 5. 1–16; esp. 7 f.; cf. Diod. xvii *Argumentum* 10th). The journey from Balkh to Alexander's crossing point at Kelif is in fact

virtually waterless, with only two insignificant springs along its entire course, and Curtius' description of the march and the losses incurred (vii 5. 15) is only too credible (cf. von Schwarz 32 f.).

ὁ δὲ Ὅξος The geographical information is again excerpted from Aristobulus, as a comparison with Strabo xi 7.3 (*FGrH* 139 F 20) clearly shows. Arrian extracts the details about the river's size and speed of flow; he passes over Aristobulus' celebrated story of a trade route from India along the Oxus to the Caspian.

ἐς τὴν μεγάλην θάλασσαν τὴν κατὰ Ὑρκανίαν Arrian is here referring to the Caspian Sea which he regards as a gulf of the outer Ocean (cf. v 5. 4, 26. 2). The terminology may possibly come from Aristobulus; but at vii 16. 2–3, a passage apparently taken from Aristobulus (*FGrH* 139 F 54; cf. Pearson, *LHA* 185 n. 179), he describes the mission of Heracleides to investigate precisely whether the Caspian was a gulf of Ocean, and he there leaves the question undecided. Elsewhere, however, Arrian follows the *communis opinio* that the Caspian was a bottle-shaped gulf (J. O. Thomson, *History of Ancient Geography* 127 f.); and the identification with the outer Ocean is likely to be Arrian's own.

The discharge of the Oxus into the Caspian is a commonplace of ancient geography, and apart from one dubious reference in Ammianus (xxiii 6. 59) there is no hint that any ancient author had heard of the Aral Sea into which the Oxus now discharges (cf. 30. 7 n.). It is unlikely, however, that the ancients were ignorant of the lower reaches of the river. We have explicit evidence of a trade route from India which used the Oxus to reach the Caspian and from the Caspian followed the river Cyrus into the Caucasus and ultimately to Phasis. The route was described by Aristobulus, repeated by Patrocles, and transmitted by Eratosthenes (Strabo xi 7. 3 (509); cf. ii 1. 15 (73)). Two centuries later Varro claimed that Pompey's campaigns had revealed the existence of the same route from India to Bactra and then to the Caspian along the Oxus (Pliny, *NH* vi 52). It is an impressive consensus, indicating that the Oxus, or a branch of it, flowed into the Caspian throughout antiquity. Tarn, however, denied that such a route ever existed (*The Greeks in Bactria and India* 488–90), and his conclusions have been widely accepted (Thomson, op. cit. 127; Pearson, *LHA* 163 f.). His arguments, however, are a tissue of improbabilities and involve serious distortion of the ancient evidence. In fact it was accepted for more than two centuries that the Oxus discharged into the Caspian, and the tradition should be taken seriously. It seems now accepted that it was the case in neolithic times (V. M. Masson and V. J. Sarianidi, *Central Asia* (1972) 12 f.), and A. Herrmann suggested very plausibly that the Oxus in antiquity veered west along the present dry-water channel of the Ungus, joined the dry bed of the Uzboi, and finally entered the Caspian to the south of Krasnovodsk (*RE* xviii 2011–15, endorsed and summarized by Walbank, *Polybius* ii 262 f.; cf. also J. Thorley, *Greece*

and Rome xvi (1969) 215). R. A. Lewis, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* lvi (1966) 480 f., gives a good summary of theories by post-war Soviet archaeologists, concluding that the flow in the Uzboi ceased during the first millennium BC; the ancient sources suggest otherwise.

3. ἐξ ἑξ μάλιστα σταδίου According to von Schwarz 30 ff., Arrian's description can only be reconciled with a crossing at Kelif. During high water (May–July) the river at Kelif is approximately 1,000 m wide, as opposed to 5 km and more at other crossing points. At Kelif, moreover, the flow is particularly rapid, up to 8–10 km per hour, and both banks are apparently denuded of vegetation. On the south side of the crossing the hill of Taš-Kurgan provides an ideal site for the fires which Curtius says were lit to guide the stragglers (vii 5. 13).

4. ξυναγαγών . . . τὰς διφθέρας Alexander used the same technique, and Arrian the same vocabulary, as in the Danube crossing of 335 (i 3. 6). Curtius confirms the details, although he says nothing about the use of tent coverings (Curt. vii 5. 17–18), and adds that the crossing took six days.

5. τῶν τε Μακεδόνων κτλ. Curt. vii 5. 27 says that 900 troops were discharged and given donatives (higher than the sums disbursed at Hecatompylus; cf. Diod. 74. 3; Curt. vi 2. 17). It is unlikely that war-weariness alone was the reason for the demobilizations. The recent murder of Parmenion must have affected morale among the men most closely associated with him, the veterans of Philip's reign and the allied cavalry (cf. iii 26. 4 n.). Arrian certainly thought that the Thessalians were demoralized; in Coenus' speech at the Hyphasis he says that they were sent home from Bactria because of their unwillingness to face hardship (v 27. 5; cf. C. A. Robinson, *AJP* lxx (1949) 194; *AHR* lxxii (1957) 333 ff.).

ὅτι ἐθελοκακεῖν αὐτῷ Ἀρσάκης ἔδοξεν Arsaces was not deposed for attempted revolt, as Berve apparently thought (nos. 146, 179), but rather for slackness in the face of Satibarzanes' invasion. ἐθελοκακεῖν is a common Herodotean word, and its meaning is invariably 'to do badly in battle deliberately' (Hdt. i 127. 3, v 78, vi 15. 1, etc.). Presumably Erigyius not only reported victory over Satibarzanes (Curt. vii 4. 38), but also accused Arsaces of half-hearted collaboration. Alexander was no longer willing to leave Arcia in the hands of an Iranian satrap, now proved unreliable; and the territory was placed in the hands of a Greek from Cypriot Soli, a Companion of long standing (cf. Diod. xviii 3. 3; Strabo xiv 6. 3 (683); Berve no. 719). For the extension of his command to Drangiana see iv 18. 3; Curt. viii 3. 17.

6. πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀγγέλλοντες Arrian is the only source to mention a formal embassy. The vulgate tradition has instead a story of a Median deserter, Bagodaras or Gobares, who went over to the Macedonian camp after a quarrel with Bessus (Curt. vii 4. 8–19; Diod. 83. 7–8). According to Diodorus it was his safe reception and the gifts which

were expected from Alexander that encouraged the Persian generals to arrest Bessus. There is no hint of formal negotiations (*pace* J. Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* 15, Diodorus speaks only of Persian hopes of reward, not of any formal promise by Alexander).

7. ἵππαρχίας τρεῖς This is the first reference to 'hipparchies' in a passage of Arrian certainly deriving from Ptolemy (cf. i 24. 3 n.). Previously, until the time of Gaugamela at least, the Companions had been divided into eight *ilai*, including the Royal *ile*. From this point, however, *ilai* virtually disappear from the narrative. Except for a passing reference to *ilai* of *σαρισσοφόροι* (iv 4. 6), which may be the result of conscious variation by Arrian (there are references to hipparchies before and after), the term only recurs as a subdivision of a hipparchy. It is a major problem how and why the cavalry was reorganized and also how many hipparchies there were.

There are no precise statements about numbers. Certain passages of Arrian, however, suggest that the total remained standard between 328 and 326.

(i) At iv 22. 7 the army is said to have been divided for the march on India. The advance group of Perdiccas and Hephaestion had half the cavalry. The rest went with Alexander (iv 23. 1) and comprised the *agema* and four hipparchies (iv 24. 1). That creates the presupposition that there were *at least* eight hipparchies in addition to the *agema*, the old Royal *ile*.

(ii) During the advance on the Malli town Alexander again had half his cavalry (vi 6. 1). He was able to detach two hipparchies, those of Perdiccas and Cleitus, for a separate mission (vi 6. 4) and later sent off another detachment of two hipparchies (vi 7. 2). There is no suggestion that Perdiccas rejoined the army before the actual attack on the Malli town (vi 9. 1). It looks again as though half the Companions comprised four hipparchies and the *agema*. The total is then a minimum of eight hipparchies in addition to the *agema* (Brunt, *JHS* lxxxiii (1963) 29, has miscalculated by one).

Superficially the picture seems that the eight *ilai* of Gaugamela were supplemented by Amyntas' reinforcements and an extra *ile* created (cf. iii 16. 10–11). These nine units could have been renamed *agema* and hipparchies. But the hipparchies comprised at least two *ilai* (vi 21. 3; cf. 27. 3), and they seem to have been larger units. There seems also no reason why a technical term should suddenly have been altered; the new name implies a new unit (Brunt, *op. cit.* 31). In the absence of detailed evidence all reconstructions are vulnerable, but one solution may be tentatively offered. It is possible that the Companions were gradually reconstructed between late 331 and 328 with the object of reducing the regional affiliations of the *ilai*. After the arrival of Amyntas' reinforcements new subdivisions, *lochoi*, were created—and an extra *ile* may have been formed. The next step was a regrouping of

the *lochoi* into new units, *tetrarchiai*, probably composed of four *lochoi* from separate *ilai*. There would have been four *tetrarchiai* in addition to the Royal *ile* (cf. iii 18. 5 n.). These *tetrarchiai*, perhaps originally composed as the occasion required, may have developed into regular hipparchies, mentioned by Ptolemy from 329 onwards. If so, the larger units were far more heterogeneous than the old *ilai*, comprising cavalymen from four different regions. In the course of time new *ilai* emerged as subdivisions of the hipparchies, composed of two *lochoi* as before, but *lochoi* which were regionally distinct.

τὴν τε Φιλώτα τάξιν This *taxis* of Philotas recurs in another Ptolemaic passage, again in a list of troops commanded by Ptolemy (iv 24. 10). In both cases it is part of a light column, picked for mobility and speed, and it is hardly likely to have been a phalanx battalion (*contra* Berve no. 803; Tarn ii 144 n. 1). Most probably it was a unit of light infantry, named merely because it happened to fall under the command of Ptolemy (cf. Bosworth, *CQ* xxiii (1973) 252–3).

It may be observed that Ptolemy's force seems surprisingly large in view of the modest request by Spitamenes for a small force (Seibert, *op. cit.* 11). Like the rest of the narrative it seems closely modelled on Alexander's pursuit of Darius from the Caspian Gates. The composition of the two forces is similar (cf. iii 21. 1), as is the speed of pursuit, the arrival at the final Persian camp (iii 29. 7 *fin.* cf. 21. 6), the accelerated pursuit with cavalry (iii 30. 1; cf. 21. 7), and finally capturing Bessus, deserted by his associates (iii 30. 2; cf. 21. 10).

30. 4. ἤρετο ἀνθ' οὗτου κτλ. Curtius gives much the same version of Alexander's question and Bessus' response, except that he brings in the motif of the usurpation of the Persian throne (vii 5. 38). Bessus' reply indeed avoids the subject of the arrest of Darius and concentrates on the usurpation; he had assumed the throne in order to surrender his own satrapy the more surely (vii 5. 39). Bessus' usurpation of the throne has been discounted in discussions of his punishment (e.g. Badian, *CQ* viii (1958) 146), but it must have been a relevant factor. Admittedly Bessus had not surrendered voluntarily like Nabarzanes and Satibarzanes, but he was treated with a savagery apparently unique in Alexander's reign (cf. iv 7. 3). It looks as though the usurpation was the reason for the humiliation and mutilation.

5. ἀποπέμπεται ἐς Βάκτρα The story is resumed at iv 7. 3. The vulgate sources add that the actual execution was entrusted to Darius' brother (Diod. 83. 9; Curt. vii 5. 40; Justin xii 5. 11). The journey to Bactra was only the first stage; Bessus was finally conveyed to Ecbatana (Curt. vii 10. 10).

Ἀριστόβουλος κτλ. Emendation is not justified. Krüger deleted Ἀλεξάνδρῳ and Jacoby posited a small lacuna (καὶ <Πτολεμαῖον> παραδοθῆναι); both emendations presuppose that Aristobulus' version

was an incompetent contamination, fusing Ptolemy's report with the vulgate tradition that the conspirators themselves brought Bessus before Alexander (Curt. vii 5. 36 ff.; Diod. 83. 8; cf. Schwartz, *RE* ii 916 f.). But Aristobulus seems to have an independent version, giving Ptolemy a role in the arrest but a relatively minor one. Spitamenes and his associates presented Bessus to the king; Ptolemy merely led the convoy which escorted them to the king. It seems correct that the Persian nobles presented themselves before Alexander. Even the *Itinerarium* (78) adds to its digest of Arrian the detail that Alexander spared the Persians other than Bessus, and the vulgate tradition has details about rewards given to Bessus' captors. Curtius indeed gives some curious information about Catanes' skill in archery which seems too recondite to have been invented (Curt. vii 5. 41-3; cf. Diod. 83. 9). Subsequent events confirm the tradition. Later in 329 the Persians who had arrested Bessus raised a revolt in Bactria and Arrian implies that they had surrendered (iv 1. 5); the parallel passage of Curtius (vii 6. 14 f.) is explicit that the rebels had previously surrendered and even enjoyed Alexander's confidence.

The only acceptable conclusion is that Ptolemy exaggerated his role in the capture of Bessus (compare his account of the Persian Gates: iii 18. 9 n.). Aristobulus was probably right that he played some minor part. I suspect that his task was merely to bring the Persians safely to Alexander, once the news arrived that Bessus was under arrest. It may indeed be that the query how Bessus was to be presented (cf. 30. 3) came originally from Spitamenes, and Ptolemy was sent with instructions. From this core evolved Ptolemy's dramatic story of the initial embassy and the chase through Sogdiana to capture Bessus in the nick of time (cf. C. B. Welles, *Miscellanea Rostagni* 109 f.; Seibert, *Untersuchungen* . . . 14-16).

6. ἀναπληρώσας τὸ ἵππικόν Von Schwarz 39 observes that the horses around modern Karshi are still famous for their quality and numbers. It was an ideal place to replenish the losses in livestock suffered during the winter (cf. 29. 2 n). Berve i 107 f. unfortunately misinterpreted the passage and assumed that it was the *cavalrymen* who were replenished, inferring that mid 329 was the crucial period for the reorganization of the Companions.

ὡς ἐπὶ Μαρακανδα The modern Samarkand. The city, Curtius claims (vii 6. 10), was surrounded by walls with a circuit of 70 stades, an impressive figure but one which corresponds roughly to the dimensions of the city in the sixteenth century A.D. (von Schwarz 43). There was a formidable citadel surrounded by a wall and moat (cf. iv 8. 9), and containing a garrison of 1,000 men (cf. iv 5. 2).

7. τῷ δὲ Τανάϊδι κτλ. The modern Syr-Darya. Aristobulus called the river Tanais and explained that it had a different name locally. It is clear from Arrian's observations that he did not explicitly identify the river with the European Tanais (Don); cf. Pearson, *LHA* 163. It is also

clear that in Alexander's time the Syr-Darya and the Don were believed to be one and the same river. Plutarch says explicitly that Alexander crossed the 'Orexartes', which he believed to be the Tanais (*Al.* 45. 6; cf. Pliny, *NH* vi 49). The contemporary Polycleitus of Larisa used the identification as a basic premiss for his proof that the Caspian and Maeotis (Sea of Azov) were interconnected lakes. The Caspian, he argued, was identical with the Maeotis because the Tanais, known to flow into the Maeotis, was also reputed to flow into the Caspian. If the rivers were identical the seas also were (Strabo, xi 7. 4 (509 f.) = *FGrH* 128 F 7; for discussion of the argument see J. R. Hamilton, *CQ* xxi (1971) 108-10). Strabo castigates the identification as an unscrupulous invention, but he wrote at a time when it was accepted dogma that the Caspian was a gulf of Ocean (cf. 29. 2 n.) and the equation of the European Don with any river east of the Caspian was a blatant absurdity. But Aristotle had claimed that the Araxes flowed from the Hindu Kush and sent off a side-stream which became the European Tanais and discharged into the Maeotis (*Meleor.* i 13: 350^a 24 f.). Alexander therefore was probably predisposed to identify one of the great rivers north of the Hindu Kush as the Tanais, and interpreters' mistakes may have helped the process along (cf. Herrmann, *RE* iv A. 2162: **tana* is 'ein uraltes Wort für "Wasser"').

Aristobulus, like Ptolemy, referred to the river as Tanais, for the native name occurs only twice in Arrian's entire history (see note below). But there is no indication that he endorsed Polycleitus' equation of the Caspian and Maeotis, for at vii 16. 2, a passage of Aristobulean origin, the connection of the seas is presented as a hypothetical possibility only.

Ὀρεξάντην At vii 16. 3 Arrian's manuscripts read *Ὀξυάπτης*, which may well be a corruption arising from confusion with the well-known Persian name (last appearing at vii 6. 5). But there was no uniformity of spelling; Plutarch, *Al.* 45. 6, calls the river *Ὀρεξάπτης*. The more standard form, *Ἰαξάπτης*, is first attested in Strabo (xi 6. 1 (507), etc.) and seems to originate with Eratosthenes (Berger, *Die geogr. Frag d. Eratosthenes* 314 f., 324).

εἰς τὴν Ὑρκανίαν θάλασσαν The Syr-Darya rises in the Tien-Shan mountains south of Lake Issyk-Kul and runs some 2,500 km to discharge into the Aral Sea. Arrian, like all writers of antiquity, believes that it flows into the Caspian. There is no evidence that the Aral Sea was known at all in antiquity. Polycleitus' statement about the freshness of the Caspian water (*ὑπόγλυκυ*: Strabo xi 7. 4; cf. Plut. *Al.* 44. 1) has caused some obscurity. The Aral Sea, particularly at the mouths of the Amu- and Syr-Darya, has a relatively low saline content (Hamilton, *CQ* xxi (1971) 111), and it has been thought that Polycleitus' description reflects confused knowledge of the Aral Sea. The Chorasmian king might have reported the existence of an inland sea (cf. iv 15. 4), so that

Alexander's men tentatively reconstructed the course of the Tanais/Iaxartes through the Aral Sea and round to the Maeotis (cf. (e.g.) Schachermeyr² 400 f.). But there is no hint that any source thought of the Aral or Caspian as an intermediate lake on the course of the Tanais; the Maeotis and Caspian were actually equated. Secondly, the Caspian itself has an extremely low salinity compared with the Mediterranean; and the water to the south-east, where Alexander impinged upon it, is especially sweet (cf. *Cambridge History of Iran* i 48). 8. Ἡρόδοτος ὁ λογοποιός Arrian borrows Herodotus' description of Hecataeus to refer to Herodotus himself (cf. ii 16. 5, v 6. 5). The passage is almost direct citation (cf. Hdt. iv 57) with only minimal changes in phraseology (ἀνίσχοντα for δρμώμενος).

εἰσὶν οἱ ὄρον ποιοῦσι The Tanais was selected relatively early as the boundary of Europe and Asia. It first appears in the mid-fourth century (Ps.-Scylax 70); and, according to Strabo (xi 7. 4 (509); cf. i. 1 (490)), there was universal agreement by the time of Alexander. The theory of the river boundaries probably goes back to Hecataeus, whom Arrian knew and quoted (ii 16. 5, v 6. 5), but Arrian may have had some later author in mind. Polybius expounds the theory in much the same terms as Arrian, fixing as the continental boundaries the Tanais, the Nile and the Pillars of Heracles (Polyb. iii 37. 2 ff.). It was clearly a familiar theory, and Arrian's studiously vague expression suggests that he had no particular author in mind.

10. ἐνταῦθα κτλ. The episode is described by Curtius (vii 6. 1-9) in somewhat different detail. In particular he places it not at the Tanais, the location implied by Arrian, but immediately after the surrender of Bessus, four days' journey from Maracanda (vii 6. 10). Von Schwarz accepts Curtius' location and suggests that the mountain where the engagement took place was Kungur-Tau, near Karshi and about 140 km from Samarkand. It is apparently the only isolated elevation in the area (von Schwarz 40; Lane Fox 300).

ἐς ὄρος . . . πάντη ἀπότομον Curtius also mentions the barbarians' defensive position in the mountains (vii 6. 2), but he gives no hint that the terrain was precipitous. He also gives a lower number (20,000) for the defenders.

11. καὶ τῆς περόνης τι The wound was famous and widely commented upon. Plutarch in particular speaks of a compound fracture, not of the *fibula* but of the *tibia* (κερκίς): *de Al. f.* ii 9: 341 B; cf. i 2: 327 A; *Al.* 45. 5; Curt. vii 6. 3). It cannot have been a very serious wound, for Alexander was able to carry out strenuous siege warfare in the next months without any apparent physical handicap (cf. iv 2. 1 ff.).

οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ κατεκόπησαν This is the most glaring divergence from Curtius. According to his account the barbarians were so awe-struck at having wounded Alexander that they surrendered forthwith (Curt. vii 6. 6 f.).

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